

Section 8– Relazioni Internazionali

Chairs: Carla Monteleone, Vittorio Emanuele Parsi

Panel 8.3 The end of the global world? The anti-globalization backlash and the making of foreign economic policies

The notion that open international markets and globalization make societies better off has become increasingly contested in the last decade in many advanced economies. The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States (US) and the protectionist rhetoric and trade policy initiatives of his administration are perhaps the most visible examples of this trend. However, the European Union (EU) has also witnessed political debates over the appropriate degree of economic integration and a growing contestation underlying the making of foreign economic policies. The examples are well known: Brexit; the opposition against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada-Europe Trade Agreement (CETA); and, more generally, the electoral victories of protectionist parties and candidates in many EU member states.

While there is growing consensus on the idea that the rise of populism and nationalism across various advanced economies should be understood, at least in part, as the result of a popular “backlash against globalization”, our understanding of these processes’ implications for the making of economic foreign policies is far from comprehensive. These examples suggest an obvious connection between the anti-globalization backlash and the rise of protectionism, but the effects of the growing popular discontent over globalization are by no means restricted to the realm of trade policy. The frequent debates on how much should national industries be protected from foreign acquisition and what should the role of foreigners be in national economic infrastructures, suggest that in the making of decisions over Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) economic considerations are increasingly often trumped by political and security-related ones. Chinese acquisitions of European manufacturers or Chinese role in telecom and port infrastructures is making often the headlines but these types of conflicts are also present among Europeans: Italy and France, for instance, have been recently engaging in harsh fights over telecoms and shipyards. But the anti-globalization backlash could also have systematic effects on monetary policy making, as shown by the increasing relevance of anti-Euro movements in many EU countries, or by the growing US pressures on various global economic players to pursue monetary policies (e.g. exchange rate devaluations) that could be instrumental to correcting the US current account deficit. And it is plausible that these processes can have systematic effects on issues areas such finance or development aid. All these examples are telling of 1) the anti-globalization backlash’s potential to recast the way in which states define the objectives, strategies, and instruments of foreign economic policies, and 2) different foreign economic policies’ potential influence on the intensity, direction, and success of rising anti-globalization sentiments.

We are interested in original and innovative contributions analyzing the multiple connections existing between the so-called anti-globalization backlash and the making of foreign economic policies, independent of the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological angle from which these

contributions approach the topic. We welcome papers that cover theoretical and methodological aspects of this broad topic. Particularly, however, we seek to attract papers that offer novel (theory-guided) empirical work. This empirical work can be in the form of single case studies, comparative case-studies across issue areas or over time, and large-N quantitative analyses.

Chairs: Francesco n. Moro, Arlo Poletti