

Enemies at the Gates: Framing Strategies of Extreme Right Parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic

Alena Kluknavská

Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University in Bratislava

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Abstract

The extreme right parties offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”, translating the dichotomy into friend-enemy distinction. The aim of the paper is to analyse the frames employed by these parties that serve to construct meanings about their perceived enemies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The paper builds upon the assumption that meanings do not exist on their own, but are constructed through interpretive processes producing specific frames. Applying the frame analysis, the paper examines the discourse of the People’s Party Our Slovakia and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in regard to their enemies in the period of 2010-2013. The paper makes an empirical contribution to the research on the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe and considers the factors that may account for variations in framing strategies of the two parties, which in their discourse focus on identical enemies.

Keywords: right-wing extremism, extreme right, frame analysis, political parties, nationalism, xenophobia

Introduction

Various actions of the extreme right parties¹ in Slovakia and the Czech Republic such as anti-Roma demonstrations and rallies mixed with anti-establishment attitudes contribute to rising concerns regarding the tense relationship between the majority and various minorities, presently particularly the Roma minority. Extreme right movements and parties appear to be united by their distinct hostility toward various out-groups and offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”, translating this dichotomy into friend-enemy distinction. This vision helps setting boundaries, where the friend is either presented as a strong actor protecting the defenceless people or the society itself, and the enemy as an outsider, ranging from holders of power to various minorities. The “people” are according to extreme right’s reasoning defined as suffering from the misdeeds of the elite, and in need of protection by the extreme right (Caiani, della Porta 2011). Even though the enemy stands in the centre of the extreme right’s attention, the literature usually deals with only one group of enemies. Most

¹ Acknowledging the on-going academic discussion about the conceptualization of the terms and the main features and the complexity, throughout the paper we follow the term extreme right as the widely used concept in the terminology in relation to parties of the right-wing extremism.

studies in Western Europe focus on immigrants from outside of Europe, or concentrate on the oppositional processes in form of extreme right's identity politics (e.g. Caiani et al. 2012). Although there exist some theoretical contributions to different types of enemies of the extreme right (e.g. Mudde 2007), less work has been done on comprehensive identification of the enemies and on the ways through which meanings about these enemies are built in the discourse of the extreme right.

The important questions therefore ask, who are the perceived enemies in the discourse of extreme right parties and which meanings do the parties associate with these enemies? Such reasoning comes from the assumption that meanings are not naturally attached to objects or events and do not exist on their own, but are produced through interpretive processes mediated by various contextual factors (Snow 2006b). Actors assign meanings to events and conditions to motivate constituents or mobilize potential adherents to action (Snow, Benford 1988). Caiani and Della Porta (2011: 70) point out that the actors point at particular occurrences and refer to them as a problem only "in the amount, in which the phenomena as problems are interpreted". Produced meanings are packaged into frames, which serve as the interpretative structures that the members of a party or a movement use to address the symbolic construction of the external reality. While attributing blame to concrete actors, extreme right parties through strategically built frames usually punctuate the seriousness and injustice of social conditions, specify the action needed to generate change and offer a rationale to engage in an action (Snow, Benford 1992).

This paper investigates the forms of issue-specific frames in the discourse of the extreme right in Slovakia and the Czech Republic and looks at the ways, in which the extreme right constructs meanings about its perceived enemies in the period of 2010-2013. Applying the frame analysis, the paper examines the framing processes of People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) and Worker's Party of Social Justice (DSSS) in regard to the actors these parties perceived as their enemies. Both parties currently stand in an extra-parliamentary spectrum, with the exception of the leader of the ĽSNS Marian Kotleba, who has been elected as a governor of the Banská Bystrica in 2013 regional elections. The aim of the paper is twofold: First, to identify the enemies to which extreme right parties have been referring; second, to analyse extreme right's active construction of meanings associated with the perceived enemies. The identification of the enemies and the frames the extreme right creates not only help to identify and understand the processes standing behind the construction of the out-groups in discourse of the extreme right, but is also helps to a better understanding of the extreme right's own worldview because the nature of the in-group is often largely defined as a mirror image of the out-groups' characteristics (Mudde 2007).

The paper is structured into four parts. It shortly introduces the research on extreme right parties in Europe, propose a potential of the framing perspective in studying the extreme right and present the dichotomous vision of the world divided into good and bad. In methodological part it introduces the case and data selection, as well as the method used when exploring the discourse of two extreme right parties – frame analysis, which builds upon the framing perspective elaborated in social movement studies. The paper follows with the results of the analysis, where it focuses on presenting the quantifiable measures and qualitative data regarding the extreme right's enemies, with special attention paid to framing of the establishment and the Roma communities as their main perceived opponents. It

concludes with the summary of the findings and the discussion about the relevant factors, which may account for variations in frame differentiations, mainly the political and discursive opportunities, the organizational resources, the ideology and the role of the leadership.

The research on the extreme right in Europe: potential of the framing perspective

The extreme right parties of the current wave begun to form in Western Europe during 1980s and 1990s and in Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in the course of regime change after 1989. During the last two-three decades many countries in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe saw an increasing intensity of achievements of extreme right parties, which have been successful not only in electoral arena, but also in developing frames and putting issues on the agenda, mostly on the topics such as minorities issues or themes related to nation and the state, with potential to influence the public discourse, mainstream political parties and their policies.

Although much of the literature on the extreme right deals with their electoral successes, the appeal and influence of extreme right parties based purely on the election results may be misleading (Minkenberg 2013). The literature suggests the need to incorporate the supply-side factors (e. g. Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer, Carter 2006) in the study of the extreme right, which turns the focus to the role of extreme right parties as a strategic actors attempting to best respond to their political environment, and to orient on the meso-level of the analysis, which has potential to link structural conditions with the individual motivations. Framing perspective is in this regard flexible enough to link ideas, actions and events, and could shed some light on understanding how the movements present the reality and actors involved in it (Caiani et al. 2012).

Framing perspective is a well-established and quickly developing concept in the social sciences. The concept of frame was introduced by Gregory Bateson in 1955 and elaborated by Erving Goffman in *Frame Analysis* (1974). Although the framing perspective was developed in social psychology and elaborated mostly in social movements studies, it has soon transposed to media studies (e.g. Pan, Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999; Semetko, Valkenburg 2000), policy studies (e.g. Rein, Schön 1996) or political research (e.g. Lakoff 2004), including the study of extreme right (e.g. Rydgren 2005; Bosman, d'Haenens 2008; Caiani, della Porta 2011). The perspective has also proved to be useful in the research on extreme right parties, since their origins often lie in social movements. Extreme right movements and parties are sometimes intertwined, as is the case of the LSNS in Slovakia with the movement Slovak Togetherness, or are ideologically and personally connected to various movements, such in the case of the DSSS in Czech Republic. The decision to include or not include participation in elections is dependent upon factors such as external opportunities, tactical or ideological considerations (Della Porta, Diani 2006).

Following Snow and Benford (1992: 137), we see a frame as an “interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment”. Collective action frames employed by social movement and political parties are therefore conscious outcomes of negotiated shared meanings among movement’s members, but they are also created by confrontation with the actors outside of

the movement (Benford, Snow 2000: 614). Framing focuses attention on an active construction of reality by which actors give meaning to symbolic actions and promote specific issues (Benford, Snow 2000; Snow 2006b). Collective action frames, that are subject to change over time rather than static cultural and/or interactional entities (Snow 2006a), attribute blame for perceived social problems by identifying the individuals or groups that are supposed to have caused the problem (a diagnosis) and by suggesting the course of action in solving the problem (a prognosis).

Extreme right discourse in Europe: Enemy in the spotlight

The contemporary extreme right parties are believed to be part of the “third wave” of right-wing extremism (Von Beyme 1988) or the “new right” (Ignazi 1992), which shifts the attention from the “old right”, whose primary reference point is either Italian Fascism or German Nazism and which contains elements of biological racism, as well as an anti-democratic critique of the political system. Current extreme right has been linked to xenophobic and populist attitudes, which are considered to be one of extreme right’s main traits. According to Mudde (2007), the extreme right parties share a core ideology of nativism (combination of nationalism and xenophobia), authoritarianism, and populism. Rydgren (2003) postulated that extreme right parties share the fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism (Rydgren 2005). This new master frame is communicated and diffused between related parties in different states and is supposed to enable parties of the extreme right to mobilise xenophobic attitudes without being stigmatised as racists and to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic systems without being stigmatised as antidemocrats (Rydgren 2005).

This strategy of extreme right parties is based on the in-group–out-group differentiation. The extreme right parties posit that in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separate because mixing ethnicities leads to cultural extinction (Rydgren 2004). While in the populist vision, the world is divided into “us” and “them”, the extreme right interprets the world through “black and white” categories, which leads to division of the world separated between friends, who support extreme right’s causes, and enemies, who oppose them (Caiani, Parenti 2013). While the in-group suffers from unfair treatment and deprivation, the enemies are expected to benefit from such an injustice. The enemies are therefore demonized (Mudde 2007), targeted through symbolic and/or physical violence (Caiani et al. 2012) by the extreme right actors and depicted as (specific) human decision-makers, rather than (abstract) impersonal forces (Gamson 1992; Polleta, Kai Ho 2006; Caiani et al. 2012). Within this strategy, the party, as part of the in-group, constructs an image of itself as in opposition to political elites, however, positioning itself between “normal” opposition and an anti-democratic one (Rydgren 2004). However, it is the enemy who presents the common feature of the extreme right parties and who stand in the centre of their discourse.

The methodology of the analysis

Case Selection. We focus on two extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe – the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in the Czech Republic and the People’s Party Our Slovakia in Slovakia and their framing activities between 2010 and 2013. The extreme right political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia began to form in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. They do not represent a homogeneous block, but range from parties established in mainstream politics and marginal parties occupying extra-parliamentary spectrum since the 1990s to more recent or radical counterparts, as well as dissolved political subjects. We focus on extra-parliamentary parties, which share a similar path in the development. Both parties were founded after 2000 and formed from previous extreme right movements, but had been dissolved (Slovak Togetherness – National Party, current ĽSNS, in 2006, and Worker’s Party, current DSSS, in 2010) and re-emerged with the same membership and leadership (ĽSNS in 2010 and DSSS immediately after dissolution as another, already-existing party). Moreover, both parties never entered parliament, but run for the office; however, with each elections, their electoral gains have slightly arisen. Both the DSSS and the ĽSNS were running for several positions in regional and local elections, and were to some extent successful. The biggest success so far has been M. Kotleba’s victory in the 2013 regional elections when the leader of the ĽSNS became a governor of the Banská Bystrica region.

Data Source and Sample Selection. The data are derived from 478 articles that appeared in electoral programs or party manifestos and the party press (monthly or quarterly party journal). As the article, being a unit of the analysis, we counted each press item and each paragraph or coherent section in the party programs which were separated by the sub-headline. We analysed 250 articles in the DSSS sample and 228 in the ĽSNS sample.

First, we analysed parties’ programs: electoral program and manifest 2010 and 2011 for DSSS (34 units) and electoral programs 2010 and 2012 for ĽSNS (10 units). Second, we analysed the on-line journal *Naše Slovensko* (Our Slovakia), which is irregularly circulated by members of the ĽSNS, and *Dělnické listy* (Workers’ Post), which is issued by members of the DSSS approximately four times a year. Throughout our research period of 2010-2013, we analyse 19 issues of *Naše Slovensko* (121 articles) and 17 issues of *Dělnické listy* (216 articles). Each issue is printed on four pages. However, ĽSNS began to circulate the journal *Naše Slovensko* in September 2011 and during first two years released only five issues altogether, we supplement the data with statements, articles and commentaries published on www.naseslovensko.net (2010-2013) and www.pospolitost.wordpress.com (2010-2011); 45 articles for 2010, 28 articles for 2011 and 24 articles for 2012 (together 97 articles). The first is the official Internet page of the party and the latter webpage is the official page of political movement Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitost’), with which the ĽSNS has had close ideological and personal connections and common activities. Until 2012 the movement’s webpage was used as a platform for presenting ideas of (then-emerging) party. We selected only those articles that were signed as written by ĽSNS or its members.

Frame analysis. The paper is based on a qualitative frame analysis, with providing quantifiable measures. Although theoretically the concept is well established, there are not

shared criteria as how to perform the frame analysis methodologically. To analyse the framing processes qualitatively, most studies use techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics, as frames can be reconstructed through the analysis of the discourse of the social movements (Johnston 1995). Although we do not apply any clear approach from a discourse analysis, the discursive techniques, especially when analysing deeper structures of the qualitative data, may prove themselves helpful in analysing the way, in which parties or movements frame specific issues. The quantifiable measures present descriptive statistical data about the enemies and frames as well as the sources of frames and actors associated with the problem and blame attribution.

For purposes of the analysis, we build upon Snow and Benford's (1988) core framing tasks and Gamson and Modigliani's (1989) catchphrases. We use these theoretical bases to arrive at a frame structure of issue-specific frame. Based on the core framing tasks of the frames, we identify the diagnostic and prognostic framing. For each article, we code various diagnostic and prognostic framing elements. Framing element represents a concrete (or part of) sentence or paragraph, which contains at least one of pre-defined frames. First of all, a general topic was coded for each article. The diagnostic framing refers to 1) the problem identification and interpretation of perceived reality (What is the problem?), and 2) identification of the source of problem responsibility – the attribution of blame (Who is responsible for the problem? Who caused it?), 3) identification of the actors affected by a problem – problem holders. In this part of the process, the delineation between the perpetrators (enemies who are to blame) and victims (friends who are affected) takes place. Prognostic framing refers to 4) the articulation of a possible solution to the identified (diagnosed) problem or a strategy for action of carrying out the plan in solving the problem (How should the problem be solved? What means should be used?), usually by identifying new social patterns or ways of regulating relationship between groups (Caiani et al. 2012). It also carries 5) the actor responsible for carrying out this strategy (Who is responsible for action?).

Based on the catchphrases, we determine the nature of causal chains, which are the connections between the different actors, usually between those who are seen as a cause and who are seen as affected by a certain problem. For each framing element, we code for stereotypes, dichotomies, metaphors, and historical references. We are also able to recognize the characteristics ascribed to respective actors involved in the extreme right's framing. When present, we code for labelling, naming or adjectives used to describe respective actors (perpetrators, victims or actors responsible for solution).

In order to identify the issue specific frames, we conducted a qualitative pre-study on the sample of articles across years and both parties, and developed a codebook used for further analysis. We identified main enemies, as well as actors and frames associated with those enemies. For each article, we coded multiple diagnostic and/or prognostic framing elements respectively. For each framing element, a source is coded. A source could be either the party in general, the party leader or (other) party member. Together, we coded 1071 sources; 493 sources for the DSSS sample and 578 sources for the LSNS sample. The presence of a diagnostic or prognostic framing element is indicated when one of the sources makes a statement that addresses the character of the frame.

Table 1. Diagnostic frames employed by the extreme right parties and their characteristics (in alphabetical order).

Frame	Characteristics
Abuse of political power	The government and established politicians abuse their political and economic power, all for their own benefit.
Destruction of traditions	the government or politicians destroy the national, Christian traditions and virtually destroy the society.
Discrimination of people	Authorities discriminative against majority population. Failure of the authorities to secure safety of people.
Establishing New World Order	World is dominated by a few individuals, who try gain control over global power.
Financial lobby control	The government is controlled by financial and lobby groups.
Homosexual threat	Homosexuals present moral and physical danger to society.
Immigrant threat	Inflow, criminality and favouritism of immigrants, who are taking jobs of people and do not want to integrate.
Loss of independence	Loss of national sovereignty, federalization of Europe, control over member states by supranational organizations.
Media propaganda	Media disinformation and manipulation.
Persecution of political opponents	Interventions, criminalization and persecution of political opponents, suppression of free discussion.
Police incompetence	Inactivity and idleness to protect people.
Positive discrimination of Roma	Unfair protection, support and favouritism of the Roma minority by authorities, who ignore their violations of laws
Roma menace	Roma criminality and Roma parasitism. Roma are criminals and inherently lazy exploiters, live at the expense of society.
Surveillance	Technological control over people.

For coding of diagnostic framing elements, we differentiate between 14 diagnostic frames in relation to various enemies (Table 1). A total of 967 diagnostic elements were coded: 424 for the DSSS and 543 for the LSNS. In addition to diagnosis, when mentioned by a source, we coded for the attribution of responsibility and the problem holder. We coded for 771 problem attributions altogether (363 for the DSSS and 408 for the LSNS) and 516 problem holders (260 for the DSSS and 256 for the LSNS).

Table 2. Prognostic frames employed by the extreme right parties and their characteristics (in alphabetical order).

Anti-establishment actions	Stopping political elite in the elections, establishing a real democracy, organizing anti-establishment demonstrations.
Emphasis on traditions	All aspects of political and public life should place emphasis on national and/or Christian traditions, natural order.

Empowerment	The people or the extreme right should help themselves, mobilize and use their potential, resources, organizational skills, etc.
Chauvinist national economy	The government should prioritize own people for job positions, support businesses of own people or limit foreign capital.
Law and order	Various policy reforms and law changes. The law should apply to all equally. Stricter enforcement of rules and law.
Privatization/Nationalisation	The government should either privatize or nationalize the strategic businesses and privatize or restore privatized state assets.
Restitution of independence	Withdrawal from EU, Eurozone and/or NATO. Stricter foreign policy. Restoration of food, economic and energy self-sufficiency.
Voting for political opposition	Vote for real political or ideological opposition, usually the extreme right itself.

For coding of prognostic framing elements, we identified eight major frames (Table 2). A total of 422 prognostic elements were coded (232 for the DSSS and 190 for the ĽSNS). In addition to prognosis, we coded for responsibility for carrying out the solution; a total of 196 responsible actors were coded (75 for the DSSS and 121 for the ĽSNS).

When coding for actors associated with the problem attribution, problem holder and responsibility for the solution and motivation, we clustered actors after preliminary analysis into following categories: political elite (government, politicians, political regime, establishment, ruling parties, MPs, political system, etc.), economic elite (financial businesses), cultural elite (media, intellectuals, non-governmental organizations), people (individuals, the society, the majority population), Roma (individuals and the minority), the extreme right (extreme right parties and parties' members), homosexuals, and foreigners (immigrants, EU, NATO, USA, supranational financial groups, foreign countries).


The Enemies in the discourse of extreme right parties

The extreme right parties show strong negative attitudes towards various currents, events or situations. Such a designation of the problematic situation is often accompanied by identification of a perpetrator, who is according to the extreme right responsible for the diagnosed problem. These perpetrators, depicted as enemies, are often linked to perceived victims, who are supposed to be affected by the problem. This in-group–out-group differentiation is clearly present in the discourse of the extreme right parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, whose members refer to several enemies and several victims. The victims, who are presented as actors affected by identified problems, are part of the in-group, which is comprised of the people (the society or majority population), including the extreme right parties. The extreme right members allocate themselves as part of the people, but at the same time as part of the political opponents, who protect the goodwill of the people and who suffer from regime's persecution. The enemies are more diverse than victims, and in both cases consist of the same groups of actors (Figure 1). However, their salience in the discourse and the way, how parties diagnostically frame these enemies, differ in the two countries.

The Czech DSSS in two thirds of its framing activity blames the responsibility on the political elite (usually the government, the state or established politicians), in 11.3 per cent

point to Roma, then to foreigners (8.8 per cent), the media (8.2 per cent), and the financial businesses (4.7 per cent). In least cases the perpetrator is seen in homosexuals (1.1 per cent). The Slovak ĽSNS consider the political elite guilty in more than half of the cases (54.4 per cent), and the Roma communities in almost third cases (28.4 per cent). The rest of the blame responsibility is assigned mostly to the foreigners (8.3 per cent), the media (6.4 per cent), financial businesses (2.7 per cent) and homosexuals (2.5 per cent).

Figure 1. Enemies in the discourse of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013 (in %).




Source: the author.

Both parties construct several different diagnostic frames in regard to their enemies. The Slovak extreme right party, the ĽSNS, persistently over the years emphasized mostly the Roma menace frame, according to which the Roma communities threaten the majority population and parasite on the society (Figure 2). For Czech extreme right, the DSSS, the idea of Roma as a threat to well-being of the majority plays less significant role (though by 2013 the salience of the frame increased). The DSSS throughout the years mostly stressed the Abuse of political power frame, the notion of corrupted elites, who stand behind the “destruction” of the nation. This was also significant in the discourse of the Slovak ĽSNS (the second most visible frame). The Czech party also very intensively, unlike its Slovak counterpart, stressed the idea of accusations (which are according to the party false allegations) and interventions against the party’s members and the party itself (Figure 3).


While in 2010 the framing activities of the DSSS were more balanced, the salience of the Abuse of power frame increased over time and in 2013 presented 30 per cent of the framing activity, setting itself far above the other frames. In overall, the Czech party largely emphasized the abuse of the government’s power, either by stealing the “money of people” (the state’s assets), discriminating people, or by persecuting the regime’s opponents. On the other hand, the diagnostic framing strategy of the ĽSNS persistently highlights the threat coming from Roma communities and the government, either in the form of danger coming from the Roma communities, or from the government’s influence on the lives or ordinary people. Almost all the ĽSNS’ framing activity pays attention to misdeeds of the people.

Figure 2. Diagnostic framing of the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) over years 2010-2013.



Source: the author.

Figure 3. Diagnostic framing of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS) over years 2010-2013.



Source: the author.

The People’s Party Our Slovakia and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice mostly emphasize the Roma menace and Abuse of power frames, which relate to their two enemies – the Roma and the political elite. While the parties create the meanings about the political elite in a similar way (Table 1), they construct the meanings about the Roma communities very differently (Table 2). The political elites are in discourse of both parties depicted in a dismissive way as “treacherous politicians” (the ĽSNS) and “corrupted establishment” (the DSSS). The parties also use a very negative, even hostile way to present the Roma, however, the DSSS engage in more subtle, abstract and ambiguous form than the ĽSNS. The DSSS

addresses the Roma as Gypsies, unadaptable community, members of Gypsy minority, or unadaptable individuals, while the LSNS uses more severe, concrete and direct way of naming the Roma, who are addressed as drunken asocial Gypsy parasites, asocial parasites, Gypsy extremists, or asocial Gypsies.

Table 1. Naming, adjectives and catchphrases used to address “enemies” and “victims” in the discourse of the LSNS and the DSSS in relation to Abuse of power frame, 2010-2013.

Party	Date	Enemy	Catchphrase	Victim
LSNS	17.02.2010	Politicians	Frauds and thefts by our politicians regardless their party affiliation. They are usually all thieves, liars and crooks.	
	01.11.2011	Treacherous Slovak politicians	They have plundered the state’s assets after 1989.	People
	01.01.2012	Government	The government endlessly wastes our money.	Us (we), decent working people
	01.02.2012	Politicians after 1989	Abuse of power and corruption. While decent people in Slovakia languish, they have made a business out of politics, receive hundreds of millions in bribes and rob us all.	Decent people, all of us
	01.01.2013	Government, establishment after 1989	They devastated, destroyed Slovakia and stole everything.	People, Slovakia
	01.10.2013	Government	The government wastes our money with impunity and its members live luxurious life.	US (our money)
DSSS	19.03.2010	Ruling establishment	It is impossible what the current ruling establishment does. It is corrupted, materialistic and totalitarian regime.	Ordinary citizens
	25.06.2010	Political parties	Political parties during past 20 years have been asset stripping our land and leading it to permanent debt.	Our land
	15.04.2011	Corrupted establishment	The establishment is paralyzed by corruption and involved in mafia structures.	
	08.07.2011	Regime after 1989	The regime lost last remnants of its legitimacy. It has not been for a long time a democracy and the rule of law. Thieves and crooks rule the state, while decent people are dragged through the courts.	Decent people
	18.01.2012	Government	They have ruined and stole our nation assets, but the consequences delegated on citizens.	Nation, citizens
	05.07.2013	Government	The government have made a good business out of politics.	

Source: the author.

Table 2. Naming, adjectives and catchphrases used to address “enemies” and “victims” in the discourse of the LSNS and the DSSS in relation to Roma menace frame, 2010-2013.

Party	Date	Enemy	Catchphrase	Victim
ESNS	25.10.2010	Drunken, asocial Gypsy parasites	Young Gypsies showed a hunt in a pack; The last month there were a couple of attacks on white residents who have such a misfortune that they live close to the community of asocial Gypsy parasites.	White residents; A young couple
	01.09.2011	Asocial families	Asocial families live at the expense of us all, and spend our money.	Us (our)
	01.11.2011	Asocial parasites	The flats are built only for asocial parasites, while decent young families must pay for overpriced mortgages for decades.	Decent young families
	07.07.2012	A group of Gypsies	A group of Gypsies with axes in hands threatened a white citizen.	A white citizen
	01.01.2013	Gypsy extremists	Gypsy terror; Raging Gypsy extremists terrorize the whole village. They steal, beat and kill decent people on a daily basis.	Decent People
	01.10.2013	Gypsy extremists; Gypsy asocials	Gypsy extremists destroy our land and people, who have a right to live here. White children are afraid to go to school, because Gypsy kids beat, torture and bully them.	People; White children
DSSS	25.06.2010	Gypsies	Gypsies parasite on social benefits, while laughing from their expensive cars.	Us (We)
	30.10.2011	Members of Gypsy minority	They cause problems; The attacks on decent people by members of Gypsy minority are growing.	Decent people
	30.10.2011	Gypsy community	The attacks of Gypsy community on the Czechs.	The Czechs
	14.10.2012	Gypsies	Gypsies do not want to comply with the law and order.	Citizens
	05.07.2013	Unadaptable individuals	Aggressiveness of unadaptable individuals towards decent citizens.	Decent citizens
	16.10.2013	Gypsies	The thefts, noise, destruction of municipal and private properties are on the rise.	


Source: the author.

According to the LSNS, politicians are all “thieves, liars and crooks”, who “have plundered the state’s assets”, “devastated, destroyed Slovakia”, “endlessly waste our money”, and “live luxurious life” (Table 1). Similarly, the DSSS denotes that politicians “have been asset stripping our land and leading it to permanent debt”, the government is “paralyzed by corruption and involved in mafia structures”, and “corrupted, materialistic and totalitarian

regime”, which “lost last remnants of its legitimacy”. Both parties identically state that the politicians “have made a business out of politics”.

As the LSNS is more severe in naming the Roma minority, the more extreme form of framing the Roma community is seen also in overall phrasing and the way of connecting the enemies with the victims. The DSSS rather distantly states that “The attacks of Gypsy community on the Czechs” and “Aggressiveness of unadaptable individuals towards decent citizens”, and formally claims that “Gypsies are favoured against majority population” or “The thefts, noise, destruction of municipal and private properties are on the rise” (Table 2). The LSNS uses more emotional, expressive and dramatic presentation and points to “Gypsy terror”, “Brutal attacks by Gypsy extremists”, who “terrorize the whole village”, and puts forward claims that “Asocial families live at the expense of us all” or that the “Raging Gypsy extremists... steal, beat and kill decent people on a daily basis” (Table 2).

Figure 4. Variations in prognostic framing of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left) and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2013.




Source: the author.

Both parties in their discourses propose in absolute numbers fewer solutions than they identify problems. The most salient prognosis for both the DSSS and the LSNS is the Law and order, which touches upon all of the enemies, and is seen as an answer in almost half of the cases respectively (Figure 4). The frame generally refers that “so that law will finally apply to everyone equally – for the Whites, as well as Gypsies” (LSNS, 19. 1. 2010), or “the corruption and stealing our common assets must be punished severely” (DSSS, 30. 4. 2010), or more concrete actions such as that the party wants “to adopt orders to protect decent people” (DSSS, 13. 10. 2011) or to “deport the illegal immigrants... to their home states” (DSSS, 16. 10. 2010).

Although the salience of prognostic frames constructed by both parties is very similar, the intensity of two frames differ – the Anti-government actions and Restoration of independence. While the former is present in 13.4 per cent of the DSSS’ framings, and in 5.8

per cent of the ĽSNS' activity, the latter in present in 13.8 per cent of the ĽSNS' framing and in 9.5 per cent of the DSSS. The DSSS calls for "immediate purification of political scene" (DSSS, 17. 4. 2012) and to "head to streets and show them that our goal is only to have peaceful and criminal-abuse-free life" (DSSS, 30. 10. 2011). It states that their "goal is the parliamentary change of affairs in the country" (DSSS, 10. 1. 2011). The ĽSNS also wants to "head to the streets and try to change this system" (ĽSNS, 5. 5. 2011). It calls for radical measures, because "the nation needs real political change" (ĽSNS, 13. 4. 2012), however, it also emphasizes the need of withdrawal from supranational organizations such as EU and NATO, and the restoration of food, economy and energy self-sufficiency.


Figure 5. The most salient diagnostic (D) and prognostic (P) framing and associated enemies (the political elite, the Roma, the foreigners) of People's Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), 2010-2013.



Source: the author.

The most emphasized diagnostic and prognostic framing and the causal relationships between respective actors indicate that while framing activity of the DSSS is rather chaotic (Figure 6), the ĽSNS constructs two strong framing strategies (Figure 5). The most salient frames in the discourse of the ĽSNS create a clear narrative (Figure 5). The party states that the political elites (mostly the government or the establishment) unfairly protect and support Roma at the expense of the decent people, who are terrorized by the Roma communities and discriminated and controlled by the elites. Meanwhile, the establishment, who is responsible for losing the national sovereignty, abuses the power by stealing the state assets and by spending the money of the people. The solutions to these problems are seen in applying strict laws and order, restoration of state's independence, and empowerment of the party's members and the people.

Figure 6. The most salient diagnostic (D) and prognostic (P) framing and associated enemies (the political and cultural elite, the Roma, the foreigners) of Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS), 2010-2013.



Source: the author.

The DSSS inconsistently creates the frames in regard to four enemies – the political and cultural elite, the Roma, and the foreigners. It focuses its framing activities on relation between the in-group and the political elite, presenting two framing chains highlighting the mistreatment by the ruling establishment in relation to the people or the extreme right party itself. It also constructs the diagnostic link between the people and the cultural elite by claiming that the people are manipulated by the mass media on a daily basis. Then it presents the link between the Roma and the people by referring to threat coming from the Roma communities, and also constructs prognostic framing between the government and the foreigners, in which restoration of independence of the Czech Republic is suggested.

Conclusion

The paper aimed at answering the question how the two extreme right parties in Slovakia and the Czech Republic constructed meanings about their perceived enemies in the period of 2010-2013. The Worker’s Party of Social Justice and the People’s Party Our Slovakia clearly engage in the populist differentiation between “us” and “them”, turning the dichotomy into more extreme form of “enemies” and “victims”. While the in-group is comprised of the people, i.e. “the decent citizens” (DSSS) or “decent people” (LSNS), including extreme right parties’ members, the out-groups consist of parties’ perceived enemies. Although the composition of the enemies is in both countries identical, the salience of these enemies in the parties’ discourse and the way in which the parties frame them differ in some respects. While the framing activity of the DSSS is disordered and rather subtle and abstract, the LSNS

constructs a clear narrative by using severe and dramatic rhetoric. The results indicate that the framing strategy employed by the parties is in line with the new master frame combining the xenophobia and anti-establishment populism, according to which the extreme right parties mobilise xenophobic attitudes and pose a critique on contemporary democratic systems.

The Worker's Party of Social Justice changed its strategy during the course of the years – in 2010 the framing strategies of the DSSS were more balanced, but by 2013 the idea of political elites abusing their power became the most emphasized frame, which took third of the parties' framing activity, leaving the other frames rather insignificant. The People's Party Our Slovakia, on the other hand, persistently highlighted the threat of Roma minority and the government, and their combined blame over the misdeeds of the ordinary people. The ĽSNS constructed a narrative, which tells that the people suffer because of the Roma, who terrorize them and who are unfairly protected by the government at the people's expense, and because of the government, which is responsible for loosing the national sovereignty and for abusing its political power.

Although the theoretical and empirical literature on the framing perspective is extensive, we still do not know enough about the determinants of selection of particular framing strategies. Why do actors choose and modify the frames they do? Although two parties exist in the countries with similar political and economic background, framing strategies of two extreme right parties differ quite considerably. The literature suggests that extreme right frames are mainly determined by four sets of factors: opportunity structures, organizational resources, the party leadership and the ideology. In this way, the political and cultural opportunities, the presence of organizational resources, the role of the leadership and the party's ideology influence the extent and forms of frames constructed by the extreme right. According to Caiani et al. (2012), the discourse of extreme right actors is first of all influenced by a political opportunity structure, i.e. the political and discursive political context. Here we cannot find a lot of differences when comparing two countries; both states have an open political system to challengers and state possesses a capacity for repression. Both parties (or to be more precise, their official predecessors) were at some point in their existence officially dissolved – the Worker's Party in February 2010 (a couple of days later the DSSS was launched) and Slovak Togetherness – National Party (Slovenská pospolitost' – národná strana) in March 2006 (it re-emerged in 2009/2010 as the ĽSNS). The dissolution of the DSSS in early 2010 might have affected the party's framing, when the party stressed the Persecution of the political opponents frame. However, the party keep on emphasizing the frame also in the following years. In both countries, the public opinion concerning relation between Roma communities and the majority population is rather negative (CVVM 2013; SASD 2008), and parts of the media tend to stereotype the Roma minority (e.g. Kluknavská, Zagibová 2013), which can lead to deepening of racial stereotypes in the society and contribute to the formation of the favourable context for the parties of the extreme right.

The differences in the framing strategies can neither be fully understood by the type of resources by the extreme right parties. Both parties have rather weak organizational structure (the DSSS have built the strongest structure in the north part of the Czech Republic, Mareš, Vejvodová 2010), which is centralized around the leadership. The parties usually organize campaigns through internet-shared party magazines, and various local rallies and protests. The parties' leadership and the party's ideology appear to most likely affect the

framing strategies of the parties. The ĽSNS' leader Marian Kotleba appears to have more charismatic skills than the DSSS' leader Peter Vandas, while also possessing stronger position within the party. The effect of the leadership on the framing process seem to be of particular importance when dealing with the extreme right, which tends to rely on the charismatic persona of the leader. The more elaborated answers, however, require further research in this area. This paper tried to analyse the form of the frames that parties construct in their discourses, which is the first step in explaining why the parties chose certain strategies and avoided others. The further research could also focus on answering the question, whether these strategies succeeded or failed the extreme right parties in the electoral arena.

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