Quo vadis Europa? Assessing the impact of the Eurocrisis on the voting alignments of the European Parliament

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Abstract
The current economic crisis is increasingly affecting the political debate in the European Union (EU) and its member states, although to different degrees and in different forms. At the same time, exogenous political changes and dramatic austerity measures appear to have been imposed on a number of national contexts (i.e. Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The measures imposed and the direct intervention of the EU institutions and of some external stakeholders on key realms of domestic politics seem to pose a serious challenge to the Union’s cohesiveness and to its transnational democratic nature, possibly presaging a drift between Mediterranean and Northern European/continental member states.

The aim of this paper is to look at the way the debate and votes on economy-related legislation in the European Parliament (EP) are affected by the on-going crisis. It will highlight the domestic/European tensions behind legislators’ individual and collective choices about whether to support or oppose crisis-related legislation. Given its multi-national and politically diverse nature, the EP is the perfect laboratory in which to conduct this analysis. In particular, the study will analyse in which direction and to what extent the voting dynamics in the EP reflect the debate on the financial crisis along geo-territorial or political lines.

In order to assess the domestic and political salience of economic/financial legislation in times of crisis and its impact on the EU’s cohesiveness, a roll-call vote (RCV) based analysis will be conducted, empirically comparing legislators' voting alignments on economy-related votes with the full universe of votes held in 2011. This will shed light on issue-related changes in the EP’s common government-opposition dynamics.
Introduction

If we look at the way the discourse on the continental economic crisis affected the political debate in the European Union and its member states and has been constructed and framed the transnational context, a wide variety of positions identifiable within the same political area. These positions seems not only determined by the ideological connotation of the actors at stake, but to a large extent by the domestic perspective through which the economic crisis is framed and contextualized. In this respect, the measures imposed and the direct intervention of the EU institutions and of some national governments on key realms of domestic politics seem to pose a serious challenge to the Union’s cohesiveness and to its transnational democratic nature, possibly presaging a drift between Mediterranean and Northern European/continental member states (Elgström, Bjurulf, Johansson, 2001; Zimmer, Schneider, Dobbins, 2005).

In this respect, it is not odd to suppose that the effects of the growing cleavage might be somehow reflected in the deliberations of the European Parliament as the only directly elected EU transnational institution and present the potential to play a disruptive role on the nature of its voting dynamics.

By simply looking at the specificity of the crisis-related debates held so far in the EP, although some of the mainstream political groups might emerge, on the whole, as more economically interventionist and others more pro-austerity; the situation seems much more complex than it might appear at a first sight. The same might be said with respect to the impact of legislators’ nationality and background, given the evident salience of the issue at stake. In this respect, the parliamentary debate on the ongoing crisis emerges as a cross-cleavage and, at the same time, highly divisive issue.

The work focuses on the way the debate has taken place in the EP. So far, only very limited empirical research related the the ongoing continental crisis has been conducted from an EP perspective, while most of the attention has been devoted to the negotiations at the Council and Commission level or to the national debates.

In an attempt to successfully penetrate the voting dynamics and coalition patterns determined in the EP by the debate on the economic crisis, our analysis will ‘map’ MEPs’ voting behaviour in the EP when crisis-related votes are at stake.

The study will focus on the parliamentary works of the current EP thereby following the emergence
of a growing awareness of a pan-European malaise and the contagion fear in the last three years. To
grant the salience and the consistency of the votes included in the analysis, we considered only the
votes falling in the policy area of ‘Economic and Monetary Affairs’ as they represent the only votes
directly related to the debate on the crisis and its possible ways out. This decision is also based on
the consideration that other votes falling in different policy areas, although tangentially related to
the Eurocrisis debate, appear to call into cause other realms such as Foreign policy or Environment
(and different national and political priorities) whose weight in the voting dynamics would be
difficult to determine and disentangle in a general assessment of the crisis-related votes.

As we are addressing a relatively unexplored ground, this study is conceived as an exploratory
analysis towards a more precise understanding of the parliamentary face of the Eurocrisis. For this
reason, we will not propose a formal set of hypotheses to test.

The positions of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) seem to reflect different ways of
framing the crisis and different degrees of support and opposition for the solutions/measures
proposed. MEPs' attitudes seems determined by a combination of factors, involving interest-driven
domestic pressures and ideological/political transnational instances promoted by the groups.

The analysis will perform a comparative assessment considerations the votes held in current EP
(between 2009 and 2012), distinguishing between crisis-related votes and votes of other nature. The
impact of the debate on the economic crisis on the legislators' individual voting behaviour and on
the collective voting blocs will be assessed using the RCV-based Nominal Three-Step Estimation
(NOMINATE) algorithm.

The study proceeds as follows. After presenting the conceptual framework that defines our analysis
(Section 2), we will define our research strategy, methodology, cases, and variables (Section 3). In
Section 4, we will present and discuss the empirical results of the comparative NOMINATE
analysis. In Section 5, we will present some concluding considerations and discuss possible broader
implications and further developments.

2. Conceptual framework of the study
In the past decade much has been written concerning the nature of the EP and the voting dynamics
that characterize its members. A number of scholars have claimed the increasing normalization of
the EP and its growing compatibility with the domestic legislatures in the member states. Such
compatibility and similarity with the national parliamentary experiences of continental Europe as
well as the growing parliamentarization of the EU has been generally linked to two phenomenon (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006).

The first factor represents a consequence of the macro developments that have taken place over the past decades, since the EP direct election in 1979 and marked a gradual but constant increase in the competence and powers of the Parliament in the EU decision-making process. Today, the parliament (although with some relevant exceptions) has a wide assets of powers and prerogative comparable to those of most of the assemblies of parliamentary Europe. In line with this process of parliamentarization the recently approved Lisbon Treaty acknowledges EP's role as equal co-legislator vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers, thereby paving the way to a two-chamber system.

Aside this macro-level development, another – equally relevant - phenomenon of micro-level nature related to the nature of MEPs' voting behaviour has been widely analyzed. A number of scholars (Hix, Noury, Roland, 2009) highlighted a clear trend towards higher intra-group cohesion and ideological coherence. They empirically claim that as the powers of the EP have grown groups internal cohesion has dramatically increased in order for member parties to maximize their influence in the decision-making process at the expenses of the parliaments' consociational nature (Fabbrini, 2005).

In the light of these developments, many observers claim that the grand coalition between the major parties is in constant decline as it was functional to the institutional empowering of the EP, something that has been already achieved, while MEPs' voting behaviour is increasingly determined by ideological factors and by a growing left-right cleavage (Helms, 2008; Hix, 2005; Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2004).

In this respect, it is particularly surprising that while a lot of scholarly attention has been devoted to both micro-level and macro-level developments related to the normalization of the EP and of MEPs' voting behaviour, practically very limited analysis has been conducted on the effects of exogenous pressures on the claimed dynamics of normalization. More specifically, very few studies have been devoted to the analysis of the impact of highly salient issues on the EP voting dynamics and on the individual voting behaviour of the involved legislators.

In this respect, the debate on the Eurocrisis and its possible ways out might represent a very useful analytical shortcut to assess this phenomenon and to empirically test the impact of nationally salient issues on the EP “normalizing” dynamics.
The debate on the Eurocrisis represents a perfect case study in the light of four very special key features that characterize its nature. First, it clearly represents a transnational issue affecting more or less all the member states and very diverse strata of the EU societies. It can be therefore defined as a typical cross-cleavage issue. Second, its significance is indisputable, given the evident repercussions of the crisis both on the European societies and on the national and European political dynamics. Third, given the different interests at stake and the different ways in which the crisis has affected the EU member states, clear inter-state coalitions are emerging when it comes to the definition of the price that every actor involved has to pay to define as way out of the crisis. Fourth, the high ideological potential of the debates on the possible ways out of the crisis is indisputable, as they imply different political/economic recipes and different potential winners and losers according to the political/economic choices sponsored.

The present study has the ambition to contribute to a wider comparative assessment in this respect. In particular, we aim at identifying a balance between ideology and salience and its repercussions on MEPs' collective voting trends and the coalition patterns at macro-level.

3. Methods, measures and techniques

In this section, we describe the methods and the tools used to conduct the analysis. The objective is to compare the nature of the EP voting dynamics and coalition patterns when Eurocrisis-related debates are at stake with the general dynamics in the EP. The analysis is based on 240 RCVs held between October 2009 and July 2012 (see Appendix).

3.1. Defining the RCV-based test

The RCV-based analysis has been conducted using the NOMINATE algorithm.¹ This scaling method produces ‘maps’, where each dot represents the estimated location of a legislator on a plane. It is worth noting that what this scaling method does is to ‘discover’ the main orthogonal dimensions of voting behaviour. This method does not provide any substantive meaning of these dimensions. Like other scaling techniques, the dimensions discovered by NOMINATE might capture a mix of underlying issue-based or interest-based dimensions of conflict. The plane in which legislators are located is defined by the two most significant dimensions.²

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¹ For further details, see Everson, Valey, and Wiseman (2009).
² Generally, the analysis defines two key dimensions based on Eigenvalues which explain most of the variance. According to Everson, Valey, and Wiseman (2009), the party systems characterized by more than two significant dimensions are considered to be chaotic and unstable. They maintain that ‘interestingly, an expansion in legislative dimensionality in fact happened once in congressional development, in the pre-Civil War era. This underscores the tremendous political and developmental importance that “chaos” – and its aftermath – can actually have. Poole and Rosenthal found so much dimensionality in Congress just before the Civil War that they called the American Congress “chaotic” – unmanageable in just the way that Joseph Bruno fears the New York legislature might be were
In order to compare the dynamics characterizing the debate on the Eurocrisis with the general dynamics in the EP including all the votes held in the current parliament from 2009 to August 2012 as our reference point (hereinafter, NOMINATE EP). In order to compare the two maps, we adopt the explanatory dimensions emerged from Hix and Noury’s analysis of the RCVs (the left–right continuum and MEPs’ feelings towards European integration/government-opposition) in NOMINATE EP and MEPs' attitude towards the proposed austerity measures coupled with the the left–right continuum in the analysis of the votes related to the economic crisis.

Hix and Noury (2009) maintain that:

the first dimension in both [6th and 7th] Parliaments is clearly the left-right dimension. The second dimension is more difficult to interpret. At face value, this dimension appears to represent anti-/pro-Europe policy preferences: toward the top of the figure are the more pro-European parties (Socialists, Conservatives and Liberals), and near the bottom are the more anti-European parties (Radical Left, Greens, Nationalists and anti-Europeans). A more detailed analysis of MEP locations reveals that this second dimension also captures government-opposition interests in the European Union: MEPs from national parties that are in government appear near the top on this second dimension; MEPs from national parties in opposition appear near the bottom.

In this respect, we cannot ignore the very high domestic salience in terms of national interest attached to the crisis-related votes. This appears particularly true if we consider that most of the votes held in the EP reflect decisions taken or to be taken by the Council under the unanimity rule. Needless to say, no member states' government wants to see a package deal achieved after endless negotiations subverted by the divergent vote of the Parliament in such a sensitive matters. In this respect, Hix, Raunio, and Scully (1999) argue that “EP party groups are unable to prevent whole national delegations from defecting from the EP party group lines if an issue is highly salient for the the domestic party leadership”. Moreover, according to Hix, Noury, and Roland (2006) “MEPs from national parties that are in government in the domestic arena might come under particular pressure, as these parties are represented in the other branch of the EU legislature (the Council) and so are likely to have high stakes in votes in the parliament”.

The RCV data employed in the analysis, covering the current EP, have been collected within the framework of the VoteWatch project.3 When it comes to MEP’ voting behaviour, all the available

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3 The VoteWatch project was coordinated by Sara Hagemann, Doru Frantescu, Simon Hix and Abdul Noury. According to its developers Votewatch.eu ‘an independent website set up to promote better debates and greater
roll-call votes (RCVs) falling in the policy area of “Economic and Monetary Affairs” held between 2009 and 2012 and related to the debate on the Eurocrisis have been coded. In addition to the NOMINATE voting 'maps' (hereinafter, NOMINATE CRISIS), measures of homogeneity and cohesiveness have been calculated on the basis of MEPs’ partisan affiliation and nationality.

Given the specific nature of the issue at stake and the national alignments emerged in the debates and reflected in the decisions taken by the Council, two cleavages are supposed to play a very important role in the definition of the voting alignments in the crisis-related deliberations: 1. the north-south cleavage opposing the low-public debt and pro-austerity Member states of continental Europe to the highly indebted Mediterranean Member states; 2. the East-West cleavage opposing old and new Member states. The clusters of national delegations whose coalition patterns and voting coherence include therefore PIGS countries, other western European Member states and Member States from Central and Eastern Europe [see Figure 1]. According to what we argued in the previous section of this study we expect these three clusters to appear fairly cohesive in crisis-related votes, given the high domestic significance of the issue and the perceived existence of a common interest to safeguard among the 'members' of the different clusters.

**Figure 1. - Geographical distribution of the sample.**

![Geographical distribution of the sample.](image)

Given the technical requirements of the statistical package used (W-Nominate)\(^4\), the valid votes have been coded as follows: ‘Yes’ (code=1), ‘No’ (code=6), ‘Abstentions’ (code=9). All other

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\(^4\) For further details see [http://voteview.com/w-nominate.htm](http://voteview.com/w-nominate.htm).

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transparency in EU decision making by providing easy access to, and analysis of, the political decisions and activities of the European Parliament’. The record of the votes held is available at [http://www.votewatch.eu/search.php](http://www.votewatch.eu/search.php).
options such as ‘Present but did not vote’ and ‘either absent or not an MEP’ have been coded as ‘missing values’ (code=0). The analytical dimensions have been set to two, while the respective reference points have been selected accordingly. Fifteen per cent or better on the minority side has been set as the cut-off criteria for a vote to be counted; while a minimum of 75% of RCVs attended represents the cut-off criteria for a legislator to be included in the scaling.

Before moving on, it seems useful to briefly discuss the nature of the RCVs. When a RCV is requested, the voting choice (Yes, No and Abstention) of each MEP is recorded in the minutes, thereby providing the voting stance of each legislator on a specific vote. The RCVs represent only a portion (roughly one-third) of all the votes cast by the plenary. All the other voting procedures – either by a show of hands or by ‘electronic vote’ – do not record the way in which each individual MEP votes. The RCVs are usually called by the political groups. According to Hix (2002) and Carrubba et al. (2002), this procedure is typically requested by the parliamentary leadership for achieving two specific self-promotion goals: either to show their position to the public or to mortify other groups (Corbett, Shackleton, and Jacobs 2000).

According to several scholars, the analyses based on RCV records might suffer from a structural bias determined by the particular nature of this procedure (Carrubba et al. 2002; Settembri 2006; Rasmussen 2008). On the other hand, Hix (2002) maintains that:

RCVs cover a broad range of issues on the European Union agenda do not appear to be called disproportionately by one EP party or another. Hence, without empirical evidence to prove that roll-call voting is systematically biased towards a particular EP party or set of issues, it is reasonable to assume that these votes should produce a fairly accurate picture of voting behaviour in the EP.

In conclusion, notwithstanding their still-controversial nature, the analysis of RCV records represents by far the most effective means currently available for studying MEPs’ legislative behaviour from an empirical perspective.

4.1. The NOMINATE test

Table 1 presents the goodness-of-fit measures of the NOMINATE analysis conducted on the basis of 240 crisis-related votes. The first measure is the percentage of RCV decisions correctly classified
by the set of legislator locations on the first (left–right) and second (support for austerity/government-opposition) dimensions. In this respect, NOMINATE CRISIS with 89% appears almost perfectly in line with the NOMINATE EP, producing 92% of correctly classified votes. The measure in the second column is the aggregate proportional reduction in error (PRE), which indicates how much the spatial model improves on a naïve benchmark model, such as everybody voting the same way in each vote. The last three columns focus on the variation explained by the two dimensions. The first two dimensions (Eigenvalues) capture approximately 20 and 15% of the variation. In the case of NOMINATE TR, with an aggregate value scoring 35 (Eigenvalues respectively of 52,23 and 38,59), the variation explained is relatively lower than in the case of the NOMINATE EP. The relatively low score seems due to the smaller number of RCVs computed.

Table 1. - Analytical dimensions of NOMINATE CRISIS.

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<th>Classified (%)</th>
<th>Aggregate PRE</th>
<th>Variation explained (first dimension)</th>
<th>Variation explained (second dimension)</th>
<th>Aggregate variation explained (first+second dimension)</th>
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<td>NOMINATE CRISIS</td>
<td>89,11</td>
<td>0,62</td>
<td>20,10 (Eigenvalue 52,23)</td>
<td>14,85 (Eigenvalue 38,59)</td>
<td>34,95</td>
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</table>

It is worth noting that both NOMINATE tests identify the ideological (left-right) dimension as the main dimension of voting. Nevertheless, if we look at the differentials between the first and the second dimension, while in the general map (NOMINATE EP) the second dimension represents a residual explanatory factor, in the case of the sample analysing crisis-related votes (NOMINATE CRISIS) it appears to play a primary role, along with political/ideological factors. This suggests that in this second scenario MEPs are more inclined to think bi-dimensionally with an eye on their national interest.

Figure 2. Spatial maps of NOMINATE CRISIS.
Figures 2 and 3 show the spatial maps produced by the NOMINATE algorithm, where the dots represent the estimated location of each MEP on the two dimensions, respectively left-right and anti-/pro-Europe in NOMINATE EP and left-right and anti-/pro-austerity measures in NOMINATE CRISIS. Before interpreting these figures, it is worth clarifying that this method does not provide any substantive meaning of these dimensions. As with other scaling techniques, the dimensions identified by NOMINATE might capture a mix of underlying issue-based or interest-based dimensions of conflict.

The algorithm operates under two fundamental assumptions. First, alternative choices can be projected on a basic, two-dimensional Euclidian space. Second, within that space, individuals have utility functions which are normally distributed. Because individuals also have symmetric, single-peaked utility functions which center on their ideal point, ideal points represent individuals' most preferred outcomes. That is, individuals most desire outcomes closest their ideal point, and will choose/vote probabilistically for the closest outcome. Ideal points can be recovered from observing choices, with individuals exhibiting similar preferences placed more closely than those behaving dissimilarly.
If we compare NOMIATE EP with NOMINATE CRISIS, we can identify a number of relevant differences. The first point deals with the nature of the voting alignments which appear far more conditioned by the MEPs' nationality in figure 2 than in figure 3. While in NOMINATE EP the different party groups are separately clustered in a coherent way from left to right marked by clearly detectable borders between and within them and the proposed national groups (PIGS, not PIGS, and CEE) do not make much sense as they are scattered throughout the plan in a fairly chaotic way, when the discourse on the Eurocrisis is at stake the national alignments appear much more consistent. In particular, if we look at the second dimension related to the perception of the austerity measures more than 70% of the MEPs from the so-called PIGS countries fall in the “flexibility” side of the spectrum, the same does a large majority of MEPs from CEE Member states. Coherently, a majority of MEPs from non-PIGS western European Member states cover the “rigour” side. The distribution of MEPs in the two planes and their comparative assessment seems to confirm our intuition based on the explanatory potential of the second dimension in NOMINATE CRISIS, thereby highlighting the increased relevance of domestic factors related to national interests (reflecting the decrease of group-based alignments) in the crisis-related votes.

The decreasing significance and explanatory potential of the partisan factor is confirmed by the fact
that in NOMINATE CRISIS more than 80% of the MEPs fall within the ±.50 range in the first
dimension (as witnessed by the relatively low Eigenvalue). It somehow suggests that in crisis-
related votes, the conceptual difference between left and right tend to decrease. On the other hand,
looking at the ideological nature of the votes, the major party delegations appear to converge
towards an ideal centre in which most of their MEPs are located and to mix themselves denoting
relatively low internal coherence, but higher inter-party closeness. For this reason, while the three
nationally-defined clusters of MEPs can be clearly located in the plan, the legislators appear no
more identifiable in terms of ideology (partisan affiliation).

A comparative assessment of NOMINATE EP and NOMINATE CRISIS in terms of MEPs’
distribution along the two dimensions, confirms the existence of a north-south (and, to a lesser
extent, of a east-west) cleavage that appears to play a very relevant role in the definition of national
interest-driven voting alignments at the expense of the delegations' partisan coherence.

The emergence of clusters of national delegations sharing similar scenarios in the management of
the Eurocrisis at the expense of intra-group cohesion is witnessed by some of the most recent votes
held in EP addressing the crisis and possible ways out of it. In this respect, if we look at one of the
most important resolutions voted on the economic crisis entitled “Financial, economic and social
crisis: measures and initiatives to be taken” (13 June 2012), the specificity of the crisis-related votes
emerges very clearly. In line with the results of the NOMINATE analysis, the internal coherence of
the main parties appears severely harmed. More specifically the Socialists & Democrats (S&D)
prents a cohesion rate of 78.85% (compared to an overall average of 93%); the European People's
Party (EPP) appears on average more cohesive with a score of 88.86% (vs. 93%); while the worst
performing party is the group of the Liberal-democrats with a very low cohesion rate of 64.68%,
compared to an overall average of 90%. Worth noting is also the vote on the “Economic and
budgetary surveillance of Member States with serious difficulties with respect to their financial
stability in the euro area” (held in the same date) where the voting cohesion of the S&D fell to
54.05%. Interestingly, this state of things is reflected by the proportional growth in terms of
cohesion of the nationally-defined clusters. Worth noting in this respect, is the level of cohesion
achieved by the PIGS group when it comes to the vote entitled “Motions for resolutions - Feasibility
of introducing stability bonds” (15 February 2012). In that occasion the score equaled 91.94%,
higher than the cohesion rate of most of the groups represented in the EP.

Concluding considerations
The present study represented a pioneering attempt to explore the impact of highly nationally-
salient issues on the EP voting dynamics and coalition patterns. In particular, we focused on the parliamentary debates concerning the current continental economic crisis and its possible ways out. The parliamentary perspective is generally ignored by the mainstream literature, in favour of the two executive institutions.

Our belief is that the EP might represent the perfect laboratory to study the impact of cross-cleavage issues on the voting dynamics, given its multinational, multilingual and multicultural nature. On the other hand, a number of studies have proven that despite its exceptional nature and multidimensionality, the general patterns of competition and coalition in the EP are largely based on the ideological left–right division, rather than nationality. The primary objective of this study is to assess to what extent and in which direction these general dynamics change when the debate on a highly salient issue, such as the economic crisis is at stake. In this respect, we hypothesize that no member states' executive would like to see a package deal achieved after costly negotiations to be subverted by a divergent vote of its parliamentarians in such a sensitive matters. Moreover, we assume that the crisis-related debates are: 1. transnational, 2. significance, 3. nationally-, 4. and ideologically-divisive.

Practically, the analysis implied a comparative NOMINATE assessment of the votes held in current EP (between 2009 and 2012), distinguishing between the 240 crisis-related votes and the votes of other nature. In order to compare the two NOMINATE maps, we adopted the explanatory dimensions proposed by Hix and Noury’s analysis (the left–right continuum and MEPs’ feelings towards European integration/government-opposition) and MEPs' attitude towards the proposed austerity measures coupled with the the left–right continuum in the analysis of the votes related to the economic crisis.

In the light of the above presented results, our analysis proved successful and particularly revealing. Our study demonstrates that the voting dynamics in the EP appear highly affected by the highly sensitive nature of the issue at stake, thereby reflecting the external interest-based interstate coalition patterns. In particular, if we look at the distribution the legislators along the second explanatory dimension (NOMINATE CRISIS) related to the economic dichotomy between “flexibility” and “rigour”, our analysis demonstrates that more than 70% of the MEPs from the so-called PIGS (and CEE) countries fall in the “flexibility” side of the spectrum, while – coherently with their governments' position in the council - a majority of MEPs from non-PIGS western European Member states cover the “rigour” side.
On the other hand, no relevant differences could be found between government and opposition parties, thereby confirming the general decline of the explanatory potential of the first dimension of ideological nature. Witnessed by the fact that in the second NOMINATE map more than 80% of the legislators fall within the ±.50 range in the first dimension.

More in general, our findings seem to suggest that in nationally-salient votes in which alternative interest-based interstate coalition patterns emerge, the conceptual difference between left and right tend to decrease. In our NOMINATE tests this phenomenon is reflected by the fact that the majority of MEPs belonging to mainstream delegations appear to converge towards an ideal centre reflecting low intra-group coherence, but higher inter-party closeness.

In conclusion, our comparative analysis of the parliamentary voting patterns, far from being exhaustive, seems to provide a useful map to identify key dimensions of conflict in the case of the debate on the ongoing economic crisis, thereby highlighting structurally different dynamics than those generally found in the EP (NOMINATE EP). More in general, our study seems to introduce an empirically rigorous comparative method of analysis bridging _particulare_ and _generale_ which might be easily applied to other sensitive cross-cleavage policy areas.

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APPENDIX

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1345 Motions for resolutions - Establishing a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area - Motion for a resolution: Recital C/2
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1076 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: vote: resolution (text as a whole)
1068 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 68
1071 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 92
1075 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 190
1069 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and
initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 77 - 20.10.2010

1074 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: After paragraph 181, amendment 3 - 20.10.2010

1070 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 83 - 20.10.2010

1073 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 103 - 20.10.2010

1072 Financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 101 - 20.10.2010

3074 Access to basic banking services - Motion for a resolution: vote: resolution (as a whole) - 04.07.2012

3073 Access to basic banking services - Motion for a resolution: Recital J/2 - 04.07.2012

3047 Attractiveness of investing in Europe - Motion for a resolution: vote: resolution (as a whole) - 03.07.2012


2964 Multiannual financial framework and own resources - EPP, S&D, ALDE, Verts/ALE, GUE/NGL - Motion for a resolution: vote: resolution (as a whole) - 13.06.2012


2953 Monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area - Draft legislative resolution: vote: amended proposal - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading - 13.06.2012


2952 Economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area - Draft legislative resolution: single vote - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading - 13.06.2012

2891 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Am 52D, amendment 52D - consultation - 23.05.2012

2895 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Am 41, amendment 41 - consultation - 23.05.2012

2896 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: vote: legislative resolution - consultation - 23.05.2012

2890 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Am 40, amendment 40 - consultation - 23.05.2012
2892 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Amendment 38 - consultation 23.05.2012
2894 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Amendment 37 - consultation 23.05.2012
2893 Common system for taxing financial transactions - Draft legislative resolution: Amendment 36 - consultation 23.05.2012
2662 Derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories - Draft legislative resolution: Vote: legislative resolution - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 29.03.2012
2528 Deposit guarantee schemes - Draft legislative resolution: Vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 16.02.2012
2522 Motions for resolutions - Feasibility of introducing stability bonds - Motion for a resolution: Vote: Resolution (text as a whole) 15.02.2012
2513 Annual tax report - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 11 02.02.2012
2387 European semester for economic policy coordination - Motion for a resolution: Amendment 6 01.12.2011
2389 European semester for economic policy coordination - Motion for a resolution: Vote: Resolution (text as a whole) 01.12.2011
2388 European semester for economic policy coordination - Motion for a resolution: Recital F 01.12.2011
2374 ECB annual report for 2010 - Motion for a resolution: Single vote 01.12.2011
2356 Motions for resolutions - Modernisation of VAT legislation in order to boost the digital single market - Joint motion for a resolution: Vote: Resolution (text as a whole) 17.11.2011
2303 Short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps - Draft legislative resolution: Vote: Legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 15.11.2011
2314 State aid rules on services of general economic interest - Motion for a resolution : vote: resolution (text as a whole) 15.11.2011
2273 System of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States - Draft legislative resolution : single vote - consultation 26.10.2011
2211 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 67 25.10.2011
2213 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 72 25.10.2011
2209 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 61/1 25.10.2011
2207 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 31 25.10.2011
2206 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 8 25.10.2011
2212 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 69 25.10.2011
2215 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : vote: resolution (text as a whole) 25.10.2011
2144 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Recital W 25.10.2011
2210 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 61/2 25.10.2011
2208 Global economic governance - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 37 25.10.2011
2193 The future of VAT - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 37 25.10.2011
2194 Subscription to additional shares in the capital of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - Draft legislative resolution : vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 13.10.2011
2163 Enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in euro area - Draft legislative resolution : vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 28.09.2011
2162 Enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in euro area - Draft legislative resolution : vote: amended proposal - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 28.09.2011
2167 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution : Text as a whole - amendment by the committee responsible,amendment 7 - consultation 28.09.2011
2170 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution : vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - consultation 28.09.2011
2161 Enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in euro area - Draft legislative resolution : Text as a whole - amendment by the committee responsible,amendment 4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 28.09.2011
2166 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution : vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 28.09.2011
2164 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution :
Text as a whole - amendment by the committee responsible, amendment 3 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 28.09.2011

2160 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  28.09.2011

2158 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - amendment by the committee responsible, amendment 10 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  28.09.2011

2157 Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: vote: legislative resolution (text as a whole)  28.09.2011


2155 Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - amendment by the committee responsible, amendment 13  28.09.2011

2159 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: vote: amended proposal - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  28.09.2011

2015 Investor-compensation schemes - Draft legislative resolution: vote: legislative resolution - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  05.07.2011

2014 Short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps - Draft legislative resolution: Article 12, paragraph 1, amendment 2=3/2 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  05.07.2011

2013 Short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps - Draft legislative resolution: Amendments by the committee responsible - block vote, amendment 1/3 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  05.07.2011

2012 Supplementary supervision of financial entities in a financial conglomerate - Draft legislative resolution: vote: legislative resolution - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  05.07.2011

1928 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/7 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1927 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/6 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1926 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/5 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1924 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/3 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1923 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/2 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1922 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole - Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/1 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading  23.06.2011

1920 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution: Article 6, point d, amendment 2cp (B) - consultation  23.06.2011

1919 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
Article 2, paragraph 3, point c, amendment 2cp (A) - consultation 23.06.2011
1918 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
1917 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/3 - consultation 23.06.2011
1916 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/2 - consultation 23.06.2011
1915 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/1 - consultation 23.06.2011
1913 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Article 12, paragraph 3, amendment 5 - consultation 23.06.2011
1921 Requirements for budgetary frameworks of Member States - Draft legislative resolution:
vote: amended proposal - consultation 23.06.2011
1912 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Article 12, paragraph 1, amendment 4 - consultation 23.06.2011
1911 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Article 2, paragraph 1 bis, amendment 2cp (A) - consultation 23.06.2011
1910 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Article 2, paragraph 1 bis, amendment 3 - consultation 23.06.2011
1925 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011
1909 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Article 2, paragraph 1 bis, amendment 6 - consultation 23.06.2011
1908 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/2 - consultation 23.06.2011
1907 Implementation of excessive deficit procedure - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/1 - consultation 23.06.2011
1929 Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: After article 2, amendment 4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011
1906 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution: vote: amended proposal - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011
1905 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011
1904 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/3 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011
1903 Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution:
Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances - Draft legislative resolution:

Enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in euro area - Draft legislative resolution:

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution:
Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: Article 1, point 1 bis, amendment 4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/4 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/3 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: Text as a whole Block No 1 - compromise, amendment 2/2 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: After article 1, amendment 12 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: After article 8, amendment 2cp (C) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Surveillance of budgetary positions and surveillance and coordination of economic policies - Draft legislative resolution: After article 7, amendment 9 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Article 5, amendment 2cp (B) - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Article 5, amendment 7 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: Article 5, amendment 8rev - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: After article 2, amendment 5 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Budgetary surveillance in euro area - Draft legislative resolution: After article 2, amendment 6 - ordinary legislative procedure, first reading 23.06.2011

Innovative financing at a global and European level - Motion for a resolution: vote: resolution (text as a whole) 08.03.2011

Innovative financing at a global and European level - Motion for a resolution: Paragraph 08.03.2011
Stabilisation Mechanism and future actions - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 20/2  07.07.2010

838  Motions for resolutions - European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and future actions - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 20/1  07.07.2010

837  Motions for resolutions - European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and future actions - Motion for a resolution : Paragraph 16,amendment 3  07.07.2010

836  Motions for resolutions - European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and future actions - Motion for a resolution : After paragraph 15,amendment 5  07.07.2010