From Polarized Pluralism to Polarized Bipolarism. Party System and Patterns of Competition in Contemporary Italy

Giuseppe Ieraci

Abstract

Italian party politics had been described for decades as immoderate and highly fractionalized. A great distance between the parties on the left-to-right dimension (polarization) and fractionalization are the two well-known syndromes of polarized multiparty politics, according to G. Sartori. Observing the rallying of the Italian parties around two major and opposite poles since the 1994 elections, one would have been tempted to conclude that, despite the persistent fractionalization, the Italian party system was now bipolar. This paper addresses the peculiarities of the new Italian bipolarism, inquiring into the contemporary changes of the patterns of party competition in Italy. Starting from G. Sartori’s seminal party system theory, an interpretation of the new alignment of the Italian party system is advanced and it is argued that the Italian case has moved from polarized pluralism (1948-1992) to polarized bipolarism (since 1994 elections).
1. Introduction

There is little doubt that the Italian party system is still highly fractionalized. Notwithstanding the fact that the 1993 and 2005 electoral reforms failed to reduce the number of parties represented in Parliament, yet another electoral reform seems to be the only available answer to this problem. Nonetheless, there is a generally overlooked factor of instability, namely the level of polarization of the Italian party system and the current distances between the Italian parties. The Italian party competition is still characterized by polarization (Ieraci 2006; 2008a; 2008b) and therefore it is arguable whether the seminal interpretation by Sartori (1976, 1982) has been made obsolete by the recent events and by the “end of the ideologies”. Observing the rallying of the Italian parties around two major and opposite poles since the 1994 elections, one would be tempted to conclude that, despite the persistent fractionalization, the Italian party system is now bipolar. Italian democracy is losing its features of exceptionality, but it is still a question whether the two party poles might be described as ‘homogeneous’ (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997; D’Alimonte and Bartolini 2002; Pasquino 2002). The two dominant political coalitions during this long phase (1994-2008), the centre-left Ulivo and the centre-right Casa delle Libertà, very often
disclosed their true nature of ‘electoral cartels’. Disagreement and conflict over policies were still very high, as indirectly shown by the high instability of the three centre-left coalitions during 1996-2001, the fall of Berlusconi’s 2nd government (Spring 2005), and the recurrent conflict into the new version of the centre-left coalition (L’Unione).\(^1\) We ought to address our attention towards the peculiarities of the Italian new bipolarism as it has evolved from polarized pluralism described over forty years ago by Giovanni Sartori.

2. Polarized Pluralism as a Pattern of Party Competition in «Difficult Democracies».

When Sartori intervened in the – at that time - relatively new debate on parties and party systems, there was quite unanimous consent that party systems could be arranged according to the number of parties competing, either two (two-party systems) or more than two (multi-party systems) (Duverger 1951). The introduction of the notion of political space by Downs (1957) did not alter this opinion, although the spatial approach helped to explain the dynamic of the party competition. According to the utilitarian perspective adopted by Downs, whatever the number of parties may be (either two or more than two) the dynamic of the party competition does not change, as long as the distribution of the voters on the space is symmetrical and a relevant percentage of them is positioned in its metrical centre. There is one noticeable case when the parties committed to the struggle for political power would not converge towards the centre of the space of competition, namely when the distribution of the electorate is bi-modal, only a small percentage of it is positioned in the centre, and as a consequence of this

---

\(^1\) A drastic change in Italian coalition politics was brought about by the almost simultaneous launch in 2008 of the Partito Democratico (PD) on the centre-left, as a rally of former Democratici di Sinistra and Margherita, and of the Popolo delle Libertà (PDL) on the centre-right, as a rally of former Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale.
distribution the competing parties will try to implement radically opposed policies as government incumbents (Downs 1957: 120). Sartori’s (1976; 1982) criticisms to this mainstream of interpretation are two. Firstly, the dichotomy between two-party systems and multi-party systems is objectionable because the latter class includes a variety of party distributions which affect the dynamics of the party competition itself. Secondly, the more parties are positioned on the political space, the more ideologically distant they may be and the more likely it is that the political space is disjointed. Democracy is «easy» when the competing parties are two or only few (three-four at the most) and the political space is continuous, lacking in any ideological cleavage. On the other hand, democracy proves to be «difficult» in the opposite conditions, when the competing parties reach or even exceed the threshold of five-six, and the political space is disjointed because of some ideological cleavages (Sani and Sartori 1978; 1982). Finally, in these conditions it is likely that the competing parties are gathered in at least three (left, centre, right) «political families» with the two left and right families being «anti-system» in their character and inclining toward the extreme ends of the space rather than converging toward its centre. In Sartori’s words, if in the «easy» democracies the dominant drives of the party competition are centripetal, in the «difficult» democracies the dominant drives of the party competition are centrifugal.

3. Patterns of Competition in Comparative Perspective

Although party systems vary according to a wide range of parameters (Mair 2002; Bardi and Mair 2008), Sartori’s framework for analysis allowed to identification of three main patterns of competition in the European party systems if the distribution of parties on the political space was taken into account (Ieraci 2012, 541-545):
1. Bilateral left-right distribution with only two (Two-Party System) or three-four relevant parties (Moderate Pluralism) (Sartori 1976), i.e. Great Britain, the Scandinavian democracies, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, France V Republic since the 1980’s;
2. Multilateral left-centre-right distribution with dominant party or centre pole (Polarized Pluralism, Sartori 1976), i.e. Italy 1948-1992, France IV Republic.
3. Multilateral Distribution with no dominant party or pole (Fragmented Party System, Sartori 1976), i.e. Netherlands, some Eastern and Central European countries today.

Type 1 corresponds to the well known Downs’ model of competition, in which two parties or two party poles compete over the metrical centre of the space and overlap to some extent (Downs 1957). Bilateral distributions are to be found even in multi-party systems characterized by a limited number of relevant parties (3-4) with a moderate ideological distance between them, as in the moderate pluralism systems (Sartori 1976). The dynamic of the competition of a moderate pluralism is therefore similar to the two-party system. Great Britain had a «bilateral distribution» of parties until 2010, the Scandinavian democracies of Norway and Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece resemble this model. In France a similar pattern of competition has been established since the 1980’s, when the Socialist party became the dominant force on the left wing of the political space and could challenge the Gaullists.

Type 2 corresponds to the well known «polarized pluralism» model described by Sartori (1976) to interpret the Italian post World War II politics and the Franch IV Republic. In these models the coalition politics is dominated by a large centre party (i.e., the Christian Democratic Party in Italy) or centre pole which leads the coalition governments in alliance with some minor parties from the moderate left and/or from the moderate right.
A «multilateral distribution with no dominant party» (Type 3) is to be found in the Netherlands, Belgium, and in some Eastern and Central European Countries. In Belgium and in the Netherlands there have been no dominant parties and the coalition governments have included over time parties that have come out of confessional, ethnic-linguistic and socio-economic cleavages. In Eastern and Central Europe, after the collapse of the Communist regimes, the new party systems which emerged from the democratic transition sometimes proved highly fragmented, exceeding the threshold of six parties established by Sartori (1976) to identify polarized systems and atomized systems.

This classification has been strongly challenged and the debate has mainly concentrated on some variations in the classes, sometimes suggested by direct observation of the national cases. For instance, Blondel (1968) pointed out the existence of a fourth model of party competition:


Type 4 corresponds to the German and Austrian party systems, where a centre minor (half) party occupies a pivotal position in the political space between two larger right and left parties. In this model, as shown by the two above mentioned cases, the ‘half’ party swings from one alliance (with the left wing) to the other (with the right wing), determining the government turnovers. The last elections in Great Britain and the subsequent formation of a Conservative-Liberal democrat coalition government may suggest the demise of the two-party system in favor of the two-and-a-half pattern of competition even in this case.

Type 2 raised great concern and attention, because it was a model particularly designed to explain the party competition in
fragmented systems with deep ideological cleavages. A vast debate over the interpretation of the Italian case (Cavazza and Graubard 1974; Graziano and Tarrow 1979; Vitiello 1983) was triggered by the controversy over the three main features of the polarized pluralism: a) existence of bilateral and anti-system opposition, which is implied by the multi-polar and polarized party system; b) prevalence of centrifugal drives over the centripetal ones; c) ideological or immoderate attitudes of both the political class and the electorate (Sartori 1982, 89). With regard to the Italian case, the turn of the 1960’s was a crucial time because, as some scholars have pointed out, the rapid economic and social growth in Italy had become a destabilizing factor. The inadequacies of the two mass-parties, PCI and DC, and of the «imperfect two-party system» that they generated were evident (Galli 1966). If the theory of polarized pluralism could well explain the dynamics of Italian politics up to the mid 1960’s, since 1965 a new phase was opened in which there was a trend towards a «bipolar party system», notwithstanding the fact that the centre maintained its crucial function in the managing of the system (Farneti 1983, 227). On

2 Apart from Italy, the other extreme and polarized multipartisms listed by Sartori were: Chile (1961-73); Denmark (1947-71); Finland (1951-1971); France (Fourth and Fifth Republic); Israel (1949-1973); Netherlands (until 1967); Norway (1945-1969) Switzerland (1947-1971); Weimar Republic (1920-1933). Cfr. Sartori (1976, 146).

3 Other complementary characteristics of the polarized pluralism listed by Sartori (1976, 132-139) are: the occupation of the metrical centre of the system; the presence of irresponsible oppositions; and the politics of outbidding, or of overpromising.

4 Galli (1966) denounced the gap created by the rapid growth in Italy between a modernizing society and a traditional party system still aligned according to some ‘old’ cleavages (i.e., ‘Church versus State’, ‘Communism versus Capitalism’). The PCI and the DC were the clearest expression of such an inadequacy. The main argument put forward by Galli was that the Italian party system had not developed at the same speed and in the same direction as Italian society.

5 Farneti (1983) accepted Sartori’s interpretation of the Italian party system only with regard to its structure (a multi-polar system with at least three
the one hand, the pivotal position of the DC favoured the convergence towards the centre of some of the originally semi-loyal parties of the left (PSI) and of the right (PLI), in a process of ‘extension of the centre’ which took place in the governmental arena and with regard to the coalition governments (Ieraci 1992). On the other hand, the specific institutional setting of Italian system (i.e., strong parliament versus weak governments) prevented the total seclusion of the extreme parties (the PCI, on the left, and the MSI, on the right) warranting them a considerable degree of influence on the legislative process and on the coalition process. In turn, these open opportunities to exercise influence at the institutional level created the condition for the parliamentarization of these parties and gradually dampened their anti-system attitudes and encouraged their ideological transformation (Ieraci 1999).

4. From Polarized Pluralism to Polarized Bipolarism

It would go beyond the purposes of this article to revise systematically all the relevant contributions to the understanding of the Italian party system. Nonetheless, it is necessary to address a final point, which is the interpretation of the recent transformation of the Italian party system. Fig. 1 sketches a polarized pluralism model in which some critical elements are deliberately introduced.  

poles, Left, Centre and Right). But he contested that its dynamic was inescapably centrifugal. According to Farneti, Italian parties did converge towards the centre as was shown by their degree of co-operation in the coalition governments.

The attempt of the centre parties to extend towards the centre-left and the centre right, including in the coalition governments the semi-loyal parties of the left and right, is a tactical reaction to the centrifugal drives which would otherwise determine a progressive polarization of the political spectrum. For an analysis of the interaction of the combined tactics of the anti- and pro-system party families, see Ieraci (1997, 71-81).

The full extension of the following arguments is to be found in Ieraci (1997).
The political space in a multi-party polarized system was described by Sartori (1976, 343) as disjointed, therefore it would be cross-cut by at least two points of «no-transfer» and «no-coalition» lying somewhere towards the left and towards the right. These points divide the pro-system parties of the centre from the anti-system parties of both the left and the right. That means that on the political space there could be found one or more parties «perceived as being more or less ‘alien’ or more or less ‘extraneous’». As a consequence, the voters identifying with the pro-system centre would not be prepared to transfer their votes to any of the alien parties lying on the left or on the right, regardless of their actual distance from them. Turning to Fig. 1, one should assume that Voter \( x \) would never choose the Left Anti-system party and would vote always for the Centre Pro-system party, notwithstanding the fact that at least in terms of policy position the former is closer to him than the latter.\(^8\)

Similarly, the two «no-coalition points» exercise an effect on the behaviour of the parties. Therefore we should expect that the Centre Pro-system Party \( B \) would never form a coalition with the Right Anti-system party and would rather become a coalition partner of the Centre Pro-system Party \( A \).\(^9\) If we took these assumptions seriously, the conclusion would be that any polarized party system would tend sooner or later to stabilize itself, because the disjointed space and the two points of no-

---

\(^8\) It may not be necessary to recall that such behaviour would be an infringement of a basic standard assumption of any spatial model of voting based on the principle of ‘proximity’, according to which the voter rationally chooses the closer party in terms of policy or ideological distance. Of course, things may be different if one opts for a model based on ‘directionality’ (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). For an application of the two theoretical models, see Warwick (2004).

\(^9\) As in the case of the voter, see footnote 8 above, this would be another infringement of any standard spatial model, because even the parties are supposed to act rationally and to choose the closest possible coalition partner.
transfer and of no-coalition would prevent any noticeable systemic dynamic. In other words, the three portions of the electorate would systematically vote for the parties belonging to the same segment of the political space as themselves. That is, the left voters would choose the left anti-system parties, the centre voters would choose the centre pro-system parties, and obviously the right voters would choose the right anti-system parties. Even the coalition dynamics would be rather predictable, and one could expect that each party would choose only coalition partners belonging to the same ideological family as themselves.

Such a stabilizing effect of the two discontinuities on the political space can be observed in the Italian case. The Christian Democrat Party and its allies dominated the coalition game during 1948-1994 and Sartori’s prediction of the «enfeeblement of the centre» (Sartori 1976; 1982) was not confirmed. The Christian Democrat Party did lose votes after 1948, but its electoral decline was balanced by the gradual inclusion in the coalition government of some quasi pro-system parties like the Socialist party on the Left and the Liberal party on the Right. The Centre was not enfeebled by the party system dynamic, but it rather included new parties in the coalition governments according to a process of extension (Ieraci, 1999).

The strategy of the «extension of the centre» proved to be successful for a long time, but it revealed some inconsistencies of the theory of polarized pluralism (Ieraci 1997, 61-63). These inconsistencies may be reduced to a simple observation: either the two points of «no-transfer» and «no-coalition» are effective, and therefore any polarized pluralism would reach a status quo with no further possible «enfeeblement of the centre», or they are not. In which conditions do the two points of «no-transfer» and «no-coalition» become ineffective? The answer could be a two-fold one.

Firstly, as shown in Fig. 1 by the dotted line, a hypothetical curve of the left-to-right intensity of the anti- and pro-system attitudes of the electorate could be traced. According to the trend
of the curve, it is assumed that such intensity declines drastically the closer the voters are to any of the two points of «no-transfer». In other words, the closer the voters are to the points where the space is disjointed, the less relevant the pro- and anti-system cleavages are for them. These voters would not perceive the extreme parties of the left or of the right as potential challenges to the system and therefore they would be prone to vote for them. The growth over time of the Communist Party on the left signalled the fact that part of the originally pro-system electorate was discontented with the government’s performance and disapproved of the strategy of «extension of the centre». Therefore, the identification of the voters with the parties lying in the same segment of the political continuum (anti-system left, pro-system centre, and anti-system right) was not so compelling. These voters did not perceive any risk in switching their votes towards the Communists, and this is what they did at least until the late 1970’s. On the other hand, and secondly, the formation of the first centre-left coalition government in the early 1960’s, with the allocation of some ministerial offices to the Socialist Party as well as to the Social Democratic Party, and later on the stabilization of the Pentapartito («Five-party coalition», 1979-1994), ranging from the Socialist Party to the Liberal Party, revealed that the two «no-coalition» points on the space could be pushed backward and forward. It could be said that, similar to the behaviour of the voters, even for the politicians the pro- and anti-system cleavages, signalled by the «no-coalition» points, became more blurred as their position moved closer to them. The political leaders and their parties positioned around such cleavages (in Italy, for instance, the so-called partiti laici minori: PSI, PSDI, PRI and PLI) tended to collaborate with the DC when they had an opportunity and to withdraw this availability when necessary. The Italian parties did coalesce in an opportunistic way, openly interacting regardless of their own ideological family. These interactions concerned all the parties
but two: the Communist Party on the extreme left and the Neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano on the extreme right. This bilateral exclusion of the two extreme parties, called in Italian political jargon conventio ad excludendum, proved that the model was right with regard to one crucial aspect. The political space was disjointed and some alien parties were placed on it. The centre parties could dispose at their convenience of the points of «no-coalition» in order to counterbalance the loss of votes in favour of the excluded parties. Extending the centre through bargaining over the coalition governments and the inclusion of new partners was a strategy for containing the growth of the Communist Party on the left and for limiting the systemic challenge of the Neo-fascist movements on the right. But once those two useful embankments were removed by the unforeseeable accidents of history (the «End of Communism» and of the Cold War), the appeal of the centre parties evanesced and the picture changed drastically, as shown in Fig. 2, and a fifth “new” pattern of political competition emerged:

5. Polarized Bilateral Distribution (Polarized Bipolarism, Ieraci 2006; 2008a; 2008b), i.e. Italy 1994-2010, Eastern and Central European countries;

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Type 5 would appear similar to Type 1, introduced in section 3, except that the party distribution is polarized and there is no overlapping between the two parts, as in the case of the Italian polarized bipolarism (Ieraci 2006; 2008a; 2008b). Italy has been

---

10 During 1976-1979 an attempt was made to involve the PCI in the coalition game, when G. Andreotti’s 3rd Government received a vote of confidence thanks to the decision of the communists to abstain from voting against it. This phase was labelled compromesso storico («historic compromise»), after the strategy developed by the Communist leadership aiming at a government of democratic or national unity including both the PCI and the DC. For a theoretically oriented reconstruction of this phase, see D’Alimonte (1999).
moving towards this model since the 1994 party system realignment and some Eastern and Central European countries also approach this situation. Party competition tends to be immoderate and the government turnover is very high because of the general instability of the distribution. Indeed, there have been 5 complete turnovers in Italy in the last 15 years, that is one in every legislature. This volatility is quite often the outcome of some drastic realignment of the party system (i.e., Italy) and/or of the fundamental democratization of the country, which establishes new party identities and a new structure of cleavages (i.e., Eastern and Central European countries) (Ieraci 2012).

A polarized bipolar party system, such as that in Italy during 1994-2012, has no clear centripetal drives. The centre pole has dissolved into its two components, because the bilateral pressures which kept it together are now weakening and eventually disappearing. The centre pole now breaks into two or more parts, with the more left-oriented of its components merging in a left-centre pole while the more right-oriented are moving towards the right. The system is still highly polarized and highly fragmented. The two newly born poles or coalitions find it hard to converge centripetally. They are indeed very heterogeneous in terms of membership, and the smaller the radical parties they include the more easily they are blackmailed. They have to include as many parties as possible if they want to have a chance to win, but at the same time they have to compromise continuously on policies to prevent defection and defeat.

5. The Italian Bipolarism

The Italian party system after almost twenty years of changes and realignments is still highly fragmented. The two main parties currently on the stage (PD and PDL) lack political and ideological cohesion, like the two large coalitions (Ulivo and
they were supposed to substitute through a process of merging their relative compounds together. These last comments concern therefore the unique version of Italian bipolarism. If we take into account the long phase marked by the 1994 and 2008 elections, there is evidence that the two 'party poles' or coalitions did not converge centripetally according to a Downsian model of competition (Ieraci 2006; 2008a; 2008b). In 1996, the Ulivo coalition won the elections with a moderately left oriented policy offer, but the centre-right countermove was not a convergence towards the median. The Lega Nord abandoned the centre right coalition and the latter positioned itself on the far right of the political continuum, leaving a vacuum in the middle. The outcome was a queer type of bipolar politics developed on a political space with an empty centre. Similarly, five years later when the centre-right coalition came into power (2001), the centre-left coalition was quite clearly far away from the median of the political continuum, and once again the two coalitions did not meet around the metrical centre of the continuum. In the intermediate phase between the two general elections (when D’Alema and later Amato were in charge of the government leadership), the two coalitions did converge and came quite close to each other, even if sometimes this meant an increased intra-coalition conflict (as in the cases of the strains caused by the PRC in the Centre left coalition, and by the CCD and the LN in the Centre right coalition). The party positioning after the 2008 elections confirmed these trends (Ieraci 2009).

Persistent high fractionalization of the party system and endurance of some of the old structure of cleavages (i.e., Communism-Socialism, Tradition-Modernization, State-Periphery) might be some of the explaining factors of this cyclicity (Ieraci 2008a; 2008b). Fractionalization and the resilience of the structure of the cleavages provided strong incentive to the small parties for exit and blackmailing. In turn, these tactics were encouraged by the particular 1993 reform of the Italian electoral system which combined proportional
representation and plurality system (Bartolini and D’Alimonte, 1995). Nonetheless, the dynamics of the Italian party systems provide evidence of the complex trade off between politics and policy. When they are trying to reinforce their positions vis à vis the electorate, parties may tend to adopt clear-cut policy positions even if that implies the risk of a coalitional breakdown. Policy coherence is a rewarding tactic when parties are competing for votes. But when the payoff is the exercise of direct influence over the government incumbents, parties compromise easily. Policy adaptability is a virtue when parties are competing for offices and authority and they are aiming at staying in power (Ieraci 2004).

After all the Italian party system seems to have moved from polarized pluralism (Sartori 1976; 1982) to a new model, which could be labelled polarized bipolarism:

1. Two opposite coalitions or parties compete for government, but they lack ideological and policy coherence, something which in turn increases the government instability.
2. The two opposite coalitions or parties are quite far apart from each other and the measure of systemic polarization is high.
3. There are no clearly identifiable centre parties, which permanently occupy «the metrical centre of an ideological continuum» (Hazan 1997, 27). The metrical centre of the continuum is a sort of no-man’s land towards which the parties may converge in their tactical moves.
4. There are no systemic constraints on the political continuum which may restrict the party movements, similar to the discontinuities registered over thirty years ago by Sartori (1976; 1982) which separated the anti-system parties from the pro-system parties. As a consequence, the distribution of the parties on the political continuum is less stable and depends on the bargain over the government policies.
5. The intra-coalition stability is jeopardized by the swing of the minor parties, either towards the centre or towards the extremes of the political continuum. These movements are designed to condition the government policy and the alignment of the competing coalitions.

According to Downs (1957, 120), in a two-party system, when the parties do not converge towards the centre and they try to implement radically opposed policies as government incumbents, the «government policy will be highly unstable», «democracy is likely to produce chaos», and «the growth of balancing centre parties is unlikely». The first and the last of these three predictions may apply to contemporary Italian politics, but Italian democracy has not yet degenerated into chaos. There are two connected reasons why it seems likely that Italian democracy, although highly conflictual, incoherent and inefficient, might survive notwithstanding the persistent polarization.

Firstly, party fractionalisation and coalition politics reduce on the one hand the government capacity to produce coherent policies but, on the other hand, they prevent any hegemonic control over the government by one single party. In other words, whatever the winning coalition may be, it is very unlikely that it would be able to implement radical policies and that it would avoid the need for accommodation between the parties. The lack of ideological and policy coherence of the two coalitions (characteristic 1 of the model) simply weakens the government’s policy capacity even more.

Secondly, system polarization together with party fractionalisation has preserved the original character of the Italian institutional arena. The government has been for decades a crossroads of party politics and pressure politics, and the policy outputs have tended to be the result of a very complex network of mutual conditioning and adjustment. The Italian parliament has been the arena where all the accommodation and the bargaining have taken place, and because of the
government’s weakness, that is its relatively short control over the legislative process (Ieraci 2000), the blackmailing potential of the political parties has not been reduced significantly. The government has gained a mediating and central position in this polarized bipolarism, as an arena of bargaining and compromise between the parties, also thanks to the absence of clearly identifiable centre parties (characteristic 3 of the model).
Bardi, L. and P. Mair

Bartolini, S. e D’Alimonte, R. (a cura di)

Blondel, J.

Cavazza, F.L. and S.R. Graubard (a cura di)

D’Alimonte, R.

D’Alimonte, R. e Bartolini, S. (a cura di)


Downs, A.
Duverger, M.

Farneti, P.

Galli, G.

Graziano, L. and S. Tarrow (a cura di)

Hazan, R.Y.

Ieraci, G.


Mair, P.

Pasquino, G. (a cura di)

Rabinowitz, G. e Macdonald, S.E.

Sani, G. and G. Sartori

Sani, G. and G. Sartori

Sartori, G.

1982 Teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, Milano, SugarCo.

Vitiello, E.

Warwick, P.W.
Figure 1: A Polarized Party System Model

Figure 2: A Polarized Bipolar Party System Model