GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN CRISIS ACCOUNTS:
A CULTURAL POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE ON THE ITALIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT

The present contribution is concerned with the crisis accounts of Italy's head of state Giorgio Napolitano and
of the prime ministers Romano Prodi, Silvio Berlusconi and Mario Monti in the context of the North Atlantic
Financial Crisis and of its following stages. Two main research questions lead the analysis: How did these
two categories of actors contribute to represent and interpret the crisis in the Italian context? Which role did
the recourse to concepts related to globalization and Europeanization play in their crisis accounts?

The study draws on the theoretical framework of cultural political economy, which is adopted for the first time
to investigate the Italian case, and on the methodological toolbox of corpus linguistics. Building on a periodi-
zation of the crisis in Italy from January 2008 to July 2012, the analysis develops along two research lines.

The first line of investigation shows topics of continuity and divergence in the crisis accounts of the observed
actors by focusing on concordance, collocation and cluster analysis. Main findings concern Napolitano's insi-
stence on the topicality of the crisis and a progressive fading out of the focus on the opportunities offered by
the crisis itself; Berlusconi's emphasis on comparisons and on his government's achievements in reaction to
the crisis; as well Monti's tendency to motivate impending public efforts and anti-crisis measures in the con-
text of a considerable recourse to Europe-related topics.

The second research line uses concordance and keyword analysis to investigate the actors' use of terms re-
lated to globalization and Europeanization. The results shed light on a very strong yet sometimes problemat-
ic relationship between the two concepts, as it emerges especially in Napolitano's crisis accounts. European-
ization, instead, is a topic which all analysed actors contribute to characterize as a political project to defend,
albeit with relevant differences concerning the extent, the insistence and the coherence with which this argu-
ment is supported and further developed.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Since 2008 the term ‘crisis’ has progressively been gaining relevance in political communication all around the world, Italy being no exception. Political actors have appealed to the term in order to describe, to accuse, to legitimate – giving rise to a variety of representations which, in part, have come to inform crisis responses.

Against this background, the present paper investigates how the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and its evolution in the Italian context have been construed by two categories of actors: Italy’s head of state and prime ministers. To this aim, it adopts for the first time the cultural political economy approach to investigate the Italian case. Cultural political economy suggests a critical realist-oriented view of the crisis – and, more generally, of the social – as a dialectic between semiotic and material-institutional aspects. This, in turn, offers a still unexplored perspective of analysis on the co-evolution of semiotic and extra-semiotic factors in construing the crisis and crisis responses in Italy and prompts two central research questions. How did Italy’s head of state and prime ministers contribute to represent and interpret the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and its evolution in the Italian context? Which role has their recourse to concepts relating to globalization and Europeanization played in this co-evolution of semiosis and structuration?

The paper concentrates on the semiotic aspect of the answers to these research questions. However, true to the cultural political economy standpoint, extra-semiotic factors are also taken into account, in so far as the semiotic analysis of crisis accounts builds on a periodization of the crisis in Italy from January 2008 to July 2012. In this way, the analysis is put in the context of Italy’s response to the crisis through fiscal, economic and political measures as well as of crisis-relevant events at the domestic, European and international level.

Drawing on the six stages of the periodization, the paper focuses on how President Napolitano and the three prime ministers Prodi, Berlusconi and Monti have variously construed the crisis in official speeches, interviews, press conferences and newspaper commentaries. Methodologically, this is achieved by means of a software-based corpus linguistics analysis of the sources as well as of a CPE-oriented exploration of the social, political and economic context situating the study of crisis accounts.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is focused on the theoretical framework of the study. The main features of cultural political economy are presented in order to show how the approach features the conception of crises at the core of the analysis (2.1). It follows an exploration of the focus on the use of concepts related to globalization and Europeanization in the construction of crisis accounts (2.2). Finally, the theoretical foundations of a periodization are dealt with, followed by the concrete example of the periodization of the crisis in the Italian context (2.3). Section 3 shortly presents the characteristics of the corpus and how it has been compiled. The methodology used in the analysis is dealt with in section 4 with a particular focus on the two lines of investigations followed in the paper: on the one hand, the study of collocates and clusters (4.2); on the other hand, the study of keywords (4.3) – both integrated by the recourse to concordance analysis. Section 5 presents the results and the interim conclusions of the two analyses – the first aimed at giving an overview of the crisis accounts of the two categories of actors (5.1), the second intended to offer a more detailed insight into their use of concepts related to globalization and Europeanization (5.2). Finally, section 6 resumes the major findings of the study and puts them in the context of a broader research project on the crisis in Italy.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The cultural political economy approach

The analysis of crisis accounts presented in this paper draws on the cultural political economy approach (henceforth CPE) developed by Bob Jessop (2004, 2008, 2009, 2012). CPE links critical political economy with critical semiotic analysis in that it stresses the importance of the cultural turn- intended as a concern with "semiosis" - "to the analysis of the articulation between the economic and the political and their embedding in broader sets of social relations" (Jessop 2009: 336). CPE grounds the cultural turn in the existential necessity of complexity reduction as a way of ‘going on’ in the world and argues that semiosis plays a central role in reducing complexity:

"Because the world cannot be grasped in all its complexity in real time, actors (and observers) must focus selectively on some of its aspects in order to be active participants in that world and/or to describe and interpret it as disinterested observers. This enforced selection occurs as actors/observers attribute meaning to some 'aspects' of the world rather than others." (Jessop 2009: 338).

However, though semiosis is appreciated as a fruitful point of entry in social analysis and, as in the present case, in the study of crises, CPE argues that it cannot explain these developments entirely. In CPE terms, semiotic moments take place in the context of material-institutional circumstances and often, at least in part, as a reaction to these latter. For this reason, CPE takes into account both the semiotic and the material-institutional aspects of political economy, yet without reducing the first aspect to the latter or overemphasizing the first to the detriment of the latter. The underlying aim is to avoid both material and semiotic reductionism or, in other words, to offer a “third way between a structuralist Scylla and a constructivist Charybdis” (Jessop 2009: 340).

CPE not only stresses the interdependence of the semiotic and extra-semiotic, but also their co-evolution, in that it integrates the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection and retention into semiotic analysis:

"[This] evolutionary turn highlights the dialectic of path-dependency and path-shaping that emerges from the contingent co-evolution of semiotic and extra-semiotic processes that make some meaningful efforts at complexity reduction more resonant than others" (ibid.).

The evolutionary turn distinguishes CPE-oriented analysis from a mere semiotic analysis of individual texts in a given context; instead, it calls for a shift to an integrated focus on the role of both semiotic and extra-semiotic factors in the emergence (variation), privileging (selection) and realization (retention) of certain discursive and material practices (ibid.).

These CPE cornerstones – focus on semiosis and grounding of the cultural turn in the necessity of complexity reduction, interdependence and co-evolution of the semiotic and extra-semiotic, focus on the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection and retention determining the transformation of construals into social constructions – inform the present study and its conception of crises. In times of crisis, so the claim of CPE, existing structures appear not to work adequately, common understandings are questioned and not considered appropriate any more, the complexity reduction which could explain the state of things before the crisis now becomes implausible, as extra-semiotic events turn commonly accepted representations upside down.

1 “The cultural turn is used here as an ‘umbrella’ concept for the wide range of (re-)discoveries in the humanities and social sciences of the role of semiosis in social life: the cultural turn, the narrative turn, the rhetorical turn, the discursive turn, the argumentative turn, the performative turn, the reflexive turn, the visual turn, etc. Semiosis is the most comprehensive turn to cover all of these cultural turns because it refers to all forms of social production of intersubjective meaning.” (Jessop 2008: 15).
Figure 1: Variation, selection and retention of crisis interpretations (reproduced on the basis of Jessop 2012: 9).

Table 1: Variation, selection and retention of crisis interpretations (adapted from Jessop 2008: 347).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variation</th>
<th>Selection</th>
<th>Retention</th>
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<tr>
<td>Continuous process, even in normal times.</td>
<td>Only some innovations resulting from variation get selected.</td>
<td>Focus on the extra-discursive mechanisms that select some discourses for further elaboration and articulation with other discourses and contribute to their subsequent institutionalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors deliberately or unintentionally redefine sites/subjects/stakes of action, articulate and experiment with innovative strategies/tactics/projects/visions.</td>
<td>As for crisis interpretations, plausibility of narratives and associated strategies/projects depend on their resonance (hence capacity to interpret and mobilize) with the personal narratives of significant classes/strata/social categories/groups affected by the crisis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even more likely process in times of crisis, when alternative discourses and practices are stimulated by disorientation.</td>
<td>Decisive role of the prevailing 'web of interlocution' and its discursive selectivities, organization/operation of mass media, role of intellectuals in public life, structural biases and strategically selective operations of various public/private apparatuses of economic, political and ideological domination.</td>
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In this context, CPE argues, the variety of interpretations of social phenomena increases, social agents' strategies to steer the transformation of existing structures in particular directions proliferate all of a sudden. “In short, crises are potentially path-shaping moments that provoke responses that are mediated through semiotic-cum-material processes of variation, selection and retention” (Jessop 2009: 374; see figure 1, table 1).

Drawing on these theoretical considerations, the present analysis is part of a broader research project aimed at catching the variation, selection and retention of interpretations of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and of its developments in the Italian context. In this paper, the bulk of attention is paid to the variation of crisis accounts with regard to the interventions of two categories of actors: head of state and prime ministers.

2.2 Focus on globalization, Europeanization and related concepts

On the basis the CPE theoretical framework, the paper takes account of the co-evolution of semiotic and extra-semiotic factors in construing the crisis in Italy. Among the semiotic factors, a particular focus is laid to the recourse to concepts related to ‘globalization’ and ‘Europeanization’. This choice is theoretically motivated by the underdeveloped state of research at the intersection between the two mentioned fields of study. Research concerned with globalization and Europeanization, in fact, is heavily affected by definitional problems.
Yet, even assuming a basic agreement on the meaning of the two terms, how the two phenomena relate one another is open to question. Does Europeanization act as a mediator of globalization? If yes, does it reinforce the process of globalization (Haverland 2003) or does it rather offer an antidote against its more detrimental effects (Graziano 2003; Verdier/Breen 2001; Levi-Faur 2004)?

These and similar questions have unleashed a series of methodological challenges concerning the study of domestic change in the face of globalization and Europeanization (Lynggaard 2008). However, this debate often neglects that both processes can be studied not only as material phenomena. In the case of globalization, for instance, the veracity of the material globalization thesis as well as the analytical utility of the concept itself have been strongly questioned (Smith 2004). If such criticism is well-founded, why then should policy-makers continue to make recourse to the term ‘globalization’? Confronted with this question, many authors have concluded that, be globalization a real material phenomenon or not, globalization as an idea retains remarkable power (cf. Rosamond 1999; Hay/Marsh 2000; Verdun 2002). Following this line of reasoning, it is argued here that a thorough investigation of the semiotic (ab)use of globalization and Europeanization and related concepts is very promising in political analysis, as also some research agenda in the field of Europeanization studies have started to point out (Jacoby/Meunier 2010; Radaelli/Exadaktylos 2010).

The need for empirical analysis generated by the theoretical interest in the semiotic dimension of globalization and Europeanization, however, has been followed by little if no empirical efforts to date. One exception is the work of Hay and Smith (Hay/Smith 2005; Smith/Hay 2008) who, building on previous research (Hay/Rosamond 2002), have developed a theoretical scheme to map the multiple discursive constructions of globalization and Europeanization by British and Irish political actors. The framework, which is of use also for the present analysis, is based on two variables: the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the phenomenon and the positive, open-end or negative connotation it is assumed to entail (see table 2).

Summing up, as part of a broader research project on the construction of and political response to the North Atlantic Financial Crisis in Italy, this paper builds on a CPE-oriented analysis of the crisis accounts delivered by the Italian head of state and prime ministers. The bulk of attention is paid to the investigation of the semiotic aspects and, among these, to the recourse to concepts concerning globalization and Europeanization. True to the CPE standpoint, extra-semiotic factors are also taken into consideration, as dealt with in the following section with regard to the periodization of the crisis in Italy.

Table 2: Framework to map the discursive recourse to globalization (G)/ Europeanization (E) (adapted from Smith/Hay 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATURE</th>
<th>CONNOTATION</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Unambiguously positive</strong></td>
<td><strong>Character contingent upon political choices</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable process</td>
<td>1 G/E as a non-negotiable external economic constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-negotiable)</td>
<td>2 G/E as inevitable but a process whose content is amenable to political influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingent process</td>
<td>4 G/E as a political project which should be defended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 G/E as a political project which must be made defensible</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2.3 Periodization of the crisis

A periodization of the crisis constitutes the bedrock of the empirical analysis of crisis accounts presented here. CPE argues that a crisis is reproduced and develops throughout a series of analytically distinguishable periods, which, however, sometimes may overlap. The reproduction of a crisis period or its transformation in a new one can play a crucial role for certain social actors who are able to steer the direction of crisis response. This steering capacity is influenced not only by extra-semiotic factors, but also by the semiotic resources these actors have at their disposal to conceptualise, visualise and propagate their ideas of the causes, solutions and courses of action concerning the crisis (Koller/Farrelly 2010: 173-174).

The term ‘periodization’ is used drawing on Marx’s analysis in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* to define the classification in phases of a series of events and processes during which the relative continuity of an accumulation regime is challenged, whereby

“the disruption may have its own logic (e.g., neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes imposed on developmental states) and/or serve as an experimental transitional phase with different forces struggling over future patterns of structural coherence (e.g., new economic strategies after the ‘Asian crisis’)” (Jessop 2003a: 2).

Methodologically, a periodization differs from a chronology in three ways. First, it adopts several time scales instead of a single unilinear one. Second, it focuses on the conjunctural implications for the involved social actors, i.e. on their constraints and opportunities, instead of drawing on the temporal succession of events. Third, it does not deliver a simple explanation on the basis of a single temporal series of events and actions but builds on a complex explanatory framework referring to the interaction of several temporal series (Jessop 2003a: 4, 2003b: 4). In short, the key feature of a strategic-relational periodization, i.e. of a periodization stressing the reciprocal dialectic of structure and agency, is its concern with the strategic possibilities which any single period opens up for the various involved actors, interests, identities, possibilities of coalitions, horizons of action, strategies, and tactics (Jessop 2003a: 4).

Drawing on these theoretical considerations, the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and its development in the Italian context have been classified according to a six-phase periodization. The period of observation goes from 1st January 2008 to 31st July 2012. This enables to focus on the whole duration of the crisis in the Italian context up to its most recent developments in the summer 2012 without neglecting the situation before the outbreak of the crisis, including the change of government in May 2008.

The periodization is based on the integrated analysis of macroeconomic indicators, political events at the national, European and international level as well as the passage of bills concerning crisis management in Italy. Table 3 gives an overview of the most salient features of each stage. With an eye to the conjunctural implications for the observed actors, the disruption between the V and the VI periodization stage stands out due to the context of international political, economic and financial pressures in which it took place as well as to the implications of a not democratically elected government. It is thus expected that this disruption will turn out to be particularly relevant in the CPE analysis of crisis accounts, as shown in the following sections.

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I 2008/01/01-2008/09/14 Economic slow-down and political change
• Political uncertainty leads to new general elections in April. Berlusconi wins.
  • In the USA, collapse of the real estate and mortgage markets. Escalation: credit crunch, bank crisis, then liquidity crisis. Global expansion through bad loans and the leverage of credit derivative markets, yet the crisis is still a far concern for Italy.
  • Independently from the crisis, the Italian economic performance and the labour market situation start to worsen in the 2nd quarter (Q2). This continues a pervasive phase of cyclical weakness already started in the Q4-2007, with the Italian economy suffering from old internal structural problems which have been reflected in an insufficient growth of productivity for years.
  • 2008/07: decree-law on economic development, simplifications, competitiveness and stabilization of public finances becomes law

II 2008/09/15-2009/06/30 The crisis brings Italy to its knees
• After the crash of Lehman Brothers, Italy lives no moment of real ‘panic’ like the USA/UK, given the limited impact of the international financial crisis on its banking system, which proves to be quite sound.
• However, the crisis hits the country, which was already in recession, in a very hard and prolonged way. In particular, Italy is struck by the depressive effects of the crisis on the real economy, which are reinforced by the old structural weaknesses of the Italian economic and labour system.
• Q4-2008: GDP negative record since the recession 1974-75.
• In line with the EU, first legislative measures to help the financial system.
• Q1-2009: most acute recession phase. After this negative peak, first positive signals in the industrial production but no other indicators let register any improvement. On the contrary, the situation in the global and European economy starts to improve already in Q2-2009.
  • 2008/12: financial bill 2010 adopted
  • 2009/01: anti-crisis decree-law to support families, employment and enterprises becomes law

III 2009/07/01-2010/02/28 The long way out of the crisis
• Economic indicators improve after prolonged contraction. However, by October it becomes clear that the recovery is feeble. Very negative influence of the deteriorated labour market on the development of the internal demand.
• Political crisis management continues to be characterised by Tremonti’s austerity programme and attempts to control the debt/GDP ratio.
  • 2009/08: anti-crisis decree-law n.78 becomes law
  • 2009/10: decree-law modifying the anti-crisis decree-law n.78 becomes law
  • 2009/12: Financial bill 2010 adopted
  • 2009/12: National accounting and public finance law adopted

IV 2010/03/01-2011/05/31 Sovereign debt/fiscal crisis (I)
• No relevant changes in Italy’s domestic situation. However, EU countries are worried by the explosion of national debt in some member states (Greece, Ireland).
• Crisis in the Eurozone and ensuing attempts at crisis management begin.
• The world economy slows down during the summer 2010, while Italy registers an improvement in the employment situation in October/November.
  • 2010/12: stability law 2011 adopted
  • 2010/07: decree-law on financial stabilization and economic competitiveness becomes law
  • 2011/04: law modifications following new EU-rules on coordination of national economic policies

V 2011/06/01-2011/11/12 Sovereign debt/fiscal crisis (II): Italy in the eye of the storm
• The tensions in the field of the sovereign debt crisis hit Italy, too. The spread BTP-Bund reaches its highest level.
• New recession and increased unemployment rate in Q3. Recession phase confirmed in Q4.
• Frantic crisis management, two decree-laws legislative packages in two months (July/August) with the aim to get a debt/GDP balanced budget by 2014, then by 2013.
• Strong political pressures on the Italian government at both European and international level. Berlusconi resigns after the Chamber of Deputies has approved the draft of the stability law 2012.
  • 2011/07: decree-law on financial stabilization becomes law
  • 2011/09: decree-law on financial stabilization and development becomes law

VI 2011/11/13-2012/07/31 Technical government in power
• Monti in charge of constituting a new government of ‘technicians’.
• Marked change in the collective psychology of the country and in the political scenario with ensuing re-drawing of economic and social policies.
• Adoption of drastic financial/economic measures in order to wipe out the public debt and to initiate structural reforms in order to strengthen the economy.
• Public opinion becoming aware of the structural character of the crisis.
  • 2011/12: decree-law on stability of the credit system becomes law
  • 2011/12: decree-law on growth, equity and consolidation of the state budget becomes law
  • 2012/03: decree-law on competition, infrastructure development and competitiveness becomes law
  • 2012/04: decree-law on simplifications and development becomes law
  • 2012/06: decree-law on stability in the Eurozone becomes law
  • 2012/07: decree-law on streamlining of public expenditure becomes law

Table 3: Periodization of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and its evolution in Italy.
3 DATA GATHERING

The paper concentrates on the crisis accounts of two categories of actors: head of state and prime ministers. In the first case, the same actor (Napolitano) held office during the whole time span of analysis; in the second one, all actors were considered who came into office during the period of observation (Prodi: 2008/01/01-2008/05/07; Berlusconi: 2008/05/08-2011/11/15; Monti: 2011/11/16-2012/07/31).

Different kinds of sources, or ‘genres’, have been collected for each category of actors in order to get a comprehensive picture of their interventions in the public sphere. The selected sources are in Italian and contain the noun ‘crisis’ (crisi) with the meaning ‘financial crisis’, ‘economic crisis’, ‘euro crisis’, ‘sovereign debt crisis’, etc. Summing up, the corpus amounts to 401.616 words and comprises 263 sources belonging to four genres: articles authored by the actors, interviews, press conferences and speeches (see fig. 2-3, table 4).

Fig. 2: Composition of the head of state’s (HS) sub-corpus.  
Fig. 3: Composition of the prime ministers’ (PM) sub-corpus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Kinds of sources (genres) collected in the corpus.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article (A)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interview (I)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Press conference (P)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Speech (S)</strong></td>
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4 The restriction of the corpus to texts in Italian was necessary because of the software used in the analysis, which requires to process data in the same language. In case of multiple copies, e.g. when the same interview was published on different days and in different length in different newspapers, the integral source has been selected or, in its absence, the most comprehensive source at disposal. All other copies have been filed as additional information but are not directly analysed as part of the corpus.

5 Interviews and press conferences have been filed twice: integrally (with both questions and answers) and as a succession of answers, in order for the software-based analysis to process only the statements of the interviewees under observation and not of their interviewers, as dealt with in the following section.

6 The interview is to be distinguished from the ‘conversation’ (colloquio) which is a newspaper article often classified as an interview but whose pattern question/answer is difficult or even impossible to track, as many interviewee’s statements cannot be taken out of the (con)text written by the author. Because of their unclear question/answer structure, sources of this kind have been gathered to get additional information but are not part of the corpus used in the analysis.

7 The corpus compilation revealed a high percentage of speeches by Napolitano and Berlusconi which have been cut and re-adapted as editorials or more general newspaper articles. In this case, the sources has been classified as speeches, though, in the following analysis, it is considered that its reception has taken place through the printed press, too.
4 METHODOLOGY

4.1 Why corpus linguistics?
The adoption of CPE as theoretical framework of the study raised a relevant methodological question. As
dealt with above, the approach combines concepts and tools from critical semiotic analysis with those from
critical political economy. The version of critical semiotic analysis adopted in the broader research project to
which this paper belongs is the approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fair-
clough (2003, 2006; Fairclough/Fairclough 2012). This latter, however, is suited to analyse a much smaller
corpus than the one compiled for the present paper. An interesting solution to fix this mismatch between the
nature of the data and the chosen CDA framework was offered by research work integrating the methodolo-
gical toolbox of CDA with the one of corpus linguistics (CL) (Hardt-Mautner 1995; Mautner 2000, 2009; Baker
et al. 2008). The present paper thus concentrates on the CL analysis of the sources, which can be seen as
the first step in the context of a more comprehensive research project. The following considerations are in-
tended to give an insight into the instruments, the analytical categories and the gains of a software-based CL
analysis as it is performed in the present study.

4.2 Focus on syntagmatic relations: concordances, clusters and collocates
A first usage of CL in this paper is centred on the syntagmatic relations of the term ‘crisis’ (crisi). The soft-
ware used in the analysis (WordSmith Tools 6, cf. Scott 2012) allows to investigate these relations by dis-
playing concordances, clusters and collocates (see examples in table 5). A concordance shows the occur-
rence of a linguistic item, in this case the crisi, together with its immediate co-text. The number of words on
either side of the search-word can be set by the researcher, who can always extend each concordance line
up to the whole text. By bringing together many occurrences of a word or phrase, concordance lists allow to
observe recurring themes and usages which otherwise would be difficult to spot when the same
words/phrases are studied alone, in their normal contexts (Hunston 2002: 9). In this paper, concordances of
the search-word crisi have been calculated for each category of actor at each stage of the periodization.

Word clusters (or n-gram or lexical bundles) are closely related to concordance analysis. They are a se-
quence of two or more words not necessarily linked by a grammatical or meaningful relation. Clusters help to
show patterns of repeated phraseology in a concordance list. They usually contain the search-word, since
they are based on concordance lines. To the aim of the present analysis, clusters of three, four and five-word
length have been calculated drawing on each of the crisi-concordance lists. The horizon within which clusters
were sought was 5 words left and right of the search-word and they had to occur at least 3 times.

8 The distinction between the various steps of the analysis, however, is mainly analytical. The core idea informing the merging of CL
and CDA in a CPE-oriented research framework is to move constantly back and forth between these different views of the data,
instead of working in separate compartments (cf Mautner 2009).
9 CL is not used here to perform a study of language use on the basis of a corpus which is representative of a given language or
language variety; rather, CL is meant here to give an entry point into the study of crisis accounts, whose results have then to be put
in the context of following research steps, as pointed out in section 6.
10 The examples refer to the analysis of the PM sub-corpus in period V.
As for the lexical level of syntagmatic relations, the notion of *collocation* indicates the lexical relation between two or more words which tend to co-occur. More precisely, the co-occurrence of words can be defined as a node-word co-occurring with collocates in a span of words to its left and its right (Stubbs 2001: 29). There are many ways of calculating collocation, each of them stressing different kinds of relationship between words in terms of frequency/exclusivity. Here the collocates of the node-word *crisi* have been calculated within a span of 5 words left and 5 right of the node by using the Mutual Information (MI) score. A collocate was selected as relevant if it occurred twice at least and its MI score was $\geq 3$.

The lists of relevant collocates have been analysed in detail in order to draw the collocational profile of the term ‘crisis’ for each actor at each stage of the periodization. Collocates have been studied in their role as discourse markers, i.e. as indicators for thematisations in the crisis accounts given by the actors under observation (cf. Storjohann 2011). The collocation analysis of *crisi* revealed six strongest thematisations which are resumed in table 6.

### 4.3 Focus on frequency: word lists and keywords

Beside its syntagmatic relations, the corpus has been analysed by looking at patterns of frequency, i.e. by calculating word lists and keywords. A *word list* is a list showing all words present in a text (or in a group of texts) which can be sorted in both alphabetical and frequency order. Word lists can be a useful starting point in studying the syntagmatic relations dealt with above. One of their most interesting applications, however, is their use in the calculation of *keyword lists*. Keywords are words which result as over- or under-represented in a statistically relevant way when a given corpus is compared with a reference corpus. Looking for the relative prominence of a certain word and of its usages is a way to get a first overview of the topics which are bound to this word and on its distribution at a given stage of the periodization.

In the present paper, the HS sub-corpus and the PM sub-corpus presented in section 3 have been compared with the reference corpus CoLFIS (*Corpus e Lessico di Frequenza dell'Italiano Scritto*). Each word list of

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11 For further considerations about the pro and contra of the MI score as well as other modes of calculating collocation, see: Baker 2010: 24-25; Gabrielatos/Baker 2008: 10-11.

12 Among other usages, the study of keywords can be helpful in downsizing the corpus to get a more manageable number of texts for the CDA analysis. For example, sources can be selected which display the highest frequency rate and the widest range of keywords (cf. Koller/Farrelly 2010).

13 CoLFIS consists of texts extracted by newspapers from 1992 to 1994 (‘La Repubblica’, ‘La Stampa’, ‘Il Corriere della Sera’), periodicals and books, taking also books into account which are read for scholastic or professional purposes. It has 3.798.275 occurrences, of which 1.836.119 from newspapers, 1.306.653 from periodicals and 655.503 from books. A particular strength of
the HS and PM sub-corpora has been compared with the CoLFIS word list in order to find out the keywords of each category of actor in each period. The keywords have been calculated by using the chi-square test statistic (p value: 0.000001). By way of example, figure 4 shows the keywords resulting from the comparison between the PM sub-corpus (period V) and the CoLFIS reference corpus in the form of a wordcloud.

For example, the wordcloud shows that the words ‘euro’ (euro), ‘financial statement’ (rendiconto), ‘government’ (governo), ‘reform’ (riforina), ‘growth’ (crescita), ‘crisis’ (crisi), ‘debt’ (debito), ‘enterprises’ (imprese) and ‘GDP’ (Pil) range among the top ten keywords characterising Berlusconi’s interventions in the V periodization stage. By highlighting outstanding topics in a given period, these keywords offer an entry point to analyse how Napolitano has construed the crisis as well as whether and how the recourse to concepts related to globalization and Europeanization has played a role in it. Moreover, often the keywords of a given period are also to find among the collocates of the word ‘crisis’ at the same stage of analysis, thus making room for a cross-analysis at the level of frequency and lexicon.

The present paper focuses only on keywords relating to the concepts globalization\(^\text{14}\) and Europeanization\(^\text{15}\). Starting from them, concordance lists have been calculated.\(^\text{16}\) The concordances of these keywords have been analysed one by one in order to investigate the connection between the actors’ crisis accounts and their recourse to concepts related to globalization and Europeanization. Concordances of these words have been calculated also when they did not result to be keywords, in order to have a comprehensive picture about the usages of the two classes of terms throughout the period of observation. The results of the concordance analysis have been further interpreted with the help of the mapping framework presented in table 2. This process has been repeated for each category of actors at each stage of the periodization, as dealt with in detail in the following section.

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\(^\text{11}\) CoLFIS is that the authors have based their text sampling on the data furnished by Italy’s National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) about Italians’ favourite readings, in order to build a corpus which could be the most representative as possible of what Italians actually read (Laudanna et al. 1995).

\(^\text{14}\) Selected keywords: ‘globalization’ (globalizzazione), ‘globalized’ (globalizzato/a/i/e).

\(^\text{15}\) Selected keywords: ‘Europe’ (Europe), ‘European’ (europeo/a/i/e), ‘EU’ (UE), ‘euro’ (euro), ‘Eurozone’ (Eurozona).

\(^\text{16}\) With the help of WordSmith Tools, only concordances of the keywords (search-word) have been calculated which occur together with the word ‘crisis’ (context-word), whereby the horizon within which the context-word could appear was 25 words left and 25 right of the search-word.
5 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

5.1 Overview of crisis accounts: results of the concordance, collocate and clusters analysis

**PERIOD I** - In period I the crisis does not represent a major issue for both categories of actors. Napolitano (see table 7) limits himself to underlining its actuality and mainly financial nature. He traces the origin of the crisis back to the US credit market, although, he concedes, the crisis is beginning to affect the real economy not only of the United States with backlashes concerning Italy, too.

As for the prime ministers Prodi and Berlusconi, neither clusters nor collocates could be retrieved. However, the concordance analysis shows that also Prodi, like Napolitano, traces the origin of the crisis back to the financial markets and expresses concerns about the ensuing lack of confidence. It is noteworthy that Prodi’s speech (his only relevant source in the whole corpus, dated February 2008) refers to the turbulences on the US markets in the summer 2007. All other sources, as dealt with more in detail below, tend to postpone the beginning of the crisis to 2008, given the limited influence which the first signals of US financial turmoil had on Italy. Berlusconi, on his part, mentions the crisis right after the beginning of its mandate as prime minister in May 2008. He portrays the crisis as something which is presently unfolding and affecting both the international and national level. It is in this context that he conceives the mission of his government, which must give proof of authority and credibility if it wants to tackle the crisis effectively.

**PERIOD II** - In comparison, the picture emerging from the analysis of period II is much more complex. The crisis becomes a hot issue in political communication worldwide after the crash of Lehman Brothers. The prolonged impact of the crisis on Italy’s real economy explains the huge recourse to the term made by both head of state and prime minister. As for Napolitano, he strongly remarks the topicality of the crisis. Beside the usual characterisation of the crisis as financial/economic and global/international, further adjectives underline the dimensions of its impact by highlighting that is has had no equal, at least since 1929. Interestingly, the crisis is often treated as an active subject spreading all sort of negative effects. At the same time, however, Napolitano attaches great importance to the opportunities offered by the crisis to improve Italy’s (not only) economic situation.

Berlusconi stresses even more than Napolitano the extraordinary depth, dimension and extension of the crisis, both in a local and temporal perspective (see table 9). New is the use of the collocate sociale, meaning that the crisis must be prevented from becoming a social crisis. In line with this, the strongest thematisation in Berlusconi’s crisis accounts concerns the reaction to the crisis. The insistence on this topic refers not only to what is still to do but especially to what has already been achieved. This explains the large presence of collocates drawing a comparison between the situation in Italy and in other countries and stressing that Italy is better off than many, if not all, its European partners. Very important is the role ascribed to the government, which is presented as an active subject in tackling the crisis, and to Italy, whereby the country is seen both as an agent of the recovery and as the object which the government must and wants to save. Europe is an equally relevant collocate, in particular with reference to the arena in which the Italian government operates and as a term of comparison to underline Italy’s good performance in getting out of the crisis (see also section 5.2).
PERIOD III - Even though period III is characterised by a progressive recovery of Italy's economy and a by steady improvement of the global situation, Napolitano stresses the still actual dimension of a crisis which has been lasting for two years and is not over yet (see table 10). Also in this case, the collocation analysis reveals a subjectivization of the crisis, but this is less marked than in period II. Moreover, Napolitano's crisis accounts focus on the ways to tackle and react to the crisis, which is not perceived as a chance any more. As far as Berlusconi is concerned, the prime minister is mainly interested in communicating Italy's progress in getting out of the crisis and avoiding its negative consequences, as shown by the collocates concerning the temporal dimension of the crisis and the reaction to it (see table 11). The crisis is depicted as the worst moment worldwide since the post-war period and, among its causes, the psychological factor is considered to play a major role.
PERIOD IV - The evolution of the crisis in the European context, particularly in Greece, strongly influences Napolitano’s crisis accounts in period IV (see table 12). The temporal thematisation continues to play a relevant role and the cluster analysis shows that, after more than two years, the crisis is definitely considered to have started in 2008. As for its characterisation, the crisis begins to be explicitly defined also as a Greek crisis. This picture is confirmed by the analysis of the collocates concerning the crisis consequences, among which terms referring to debt, solvency and stability of the euro emerge. Concepts like ‘stability’ and ‘economy’, however, are not only connected to the consequences of the crisis (meaning the negative influence of the crisis on them) but also to the reactions to it (meaning the introduction of a stability mechanism at European level and the relaunch/recovery of the economy). Without any doubt, both thematisations, i.e. causes and reactions, stand out in the analysis of period IV.

With regard to Berlusconi, the findings show that the usual characterisation of the economic and financial crisis is integrated by collocates referring to the threat of a crisis of a new kind, of an ‘unreasonable’,
‘irresponsible’ crisis ‘in the dark’ concerning its government (see table 13). No collocate directly relates to the Greek case, but the term ‘debt’ (debito) acquires relevance: it refers not only to a crisis-led increase in public debt but also to a old legacy which has heavily restricted Italy’s scope of action to get out of the crisis. The concordance analysis reveals that also other collocates are ambiguous, as they refer to the crisis but also to growth and politics (economica), speculation and stability (finanziaria), speculation and leadership (internazionale). A very equivocal collocate is ‘conditions’, which Berlusconi uses in two opposite cases: either to stress the much more difficult conditions Italy had to cope with in facing the crisis, or to praise the much better conditions Italy was able to reach by tackling the crisis in comparison to other countries. Indeed, comparisons confirm to be very important in Berlusconi’s crisis construction, as already dealt with in period II. Moreover, many collocates concerning the reaction to the crisis are expressed in the past tense; this reveals Berlusconi’s tendency to stress what his government already has achieved – among other things, the fact that ‘nobody’ has been left behind in facing the crisis. As for Italy, the country is depicted also in this context as both the subject of the recovery and the object which has been sheltered from the crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collocates</th>
<th>Temporal dimension</th>
<th>Characterisation</th>
<th>Crisis as agent</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Reactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clusters</td>
<td>Crisi al buio / la crisi economica / una crisi di / una crisi che / crisi economica globale / di altri paesi / della crisi economica / della crisi economica / una crisi al buio / irragionevole una crisi irresponsabile</td>
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Table 13: Results of the analysis / Prime minister (Berlusconi) / Period IV / 88 crisis-occurrences.

PERIOD V - This comparatively short period is featured by a new escalation of the crisis in Italy, whose topicality is confirmed by the analysis of Napolitano’s crisis accounts (see table 14). As shown by both collocates and clusters, the crisis is seen to have reached a new stage: it is a ‘crisis of confidence’, a ‘crisis of the Eurozone’, a ‘sovereign debt crisis’. The collocates concerning the consequences of the crisis suggest that Italy is more exposed to it than others because of its high public debt. The only possible reaction is thus ‘to face’ the crisis and give an ‘answer’ to it. Against this background, the collocate ‘leadership’ is pointed out as a relevant agent in tackling the crisis, while the ambiguous adjective economica refers not only to the crisis but also to the necessity of economic growth (crescita economica).

As for Berlusconi, his interventions on the crisis issue in period V are more sporadic than in the past (see table 15). The crisis is defined as a ‘crisis of confidence’ and a ‘sovereign debt crisis’, though this happens less often than in Napolitano's case. Many collocates need disambiguation, since they refer not only to the crisis but also to the economy (mondiale), to the field of policy (economica), to speculation (internazionale), to speculation and stability (finanziaria) as well as to the difficulties of state budget (debito). Italy is still portrayed as both the motor of the reaction and the most important aim for which to react, i.e. especially ‘to oppose’ the crisis and ‘to work’ hard in order to get out of it.
PERIOD VI - In the last period, Napolitano confirms his concerns for a crisis which he portrays as more actual than ever (see table 16). The characterisation of the crisis strongly reminds of the second period of analysis because of the great emphasis on its gravity and dimensions. The cluster ‘euro crisis’ adds to the clusters emerged in period V to define a further evolution of the previously mainly economic and financial crisis. New is also the reference to a crisis of the ‘government’, a ‘political’ and ‘social’ crisis. ‘Grave’ is a feature not only of the crisis but also of the emergencies, risks and difficulties it brings about. ‘Debt’ confirms to be a crucial word both to define this new crisis stage and, most importantly, to refer to Italy’s difficult internal situation. The findings show that the consequences of the crisis and the reactions to it play an equally relevant role in Napolitano’s crisis accounts of this last period.

The change of government between Berlusconi and Monti proves to leave semiotic traces, too. The analysis of the collocates and clusters featuring Monti’s crisis accounts shows a parallelism with Napolitano’s insistence on the actuality of the crisis (see table 17). New collocates characterise the crisis as ‘systemic’,

Table 14: Results of the analysis / Head of state / Period V / 48 crisis-occurrences.

Table 15: Results of the analysis / Prime minister (Berlusconi) / Period V / 37 crisis-occurrences.

Table 16: Results of the analysis / Head of state / Period VI / 104 crisis-occurrences.
European’, and ‘social’; it is a crisis of the ‘markets’, whose turbulences are seen to act, in a vicious circle, both as causes and consequences of the crisis itself. Equally ambiguous is the collocate ‘growth’, which is also used to refer not only to the recovery but also to the very causes of the crisis, meaning a ‘lack of growth’. The findings show that the thematisation of the reactions to the crisis plays a prominent role as in Berlusconi’s case. However, here the underlying aim is to incite, to support measures in order to overcome the crisis, instead of stressing what has already been achieved. The approach is very inclusive, as remarked by collocates like ‘we must’ (dobbiamo), ‘our’ (nostra) and ‘everybody’ (tutti). A peculiarity of this period is also the talk of ‘phases’ - meaning the steps to take in order to get out of the crisis, which encompass both the principles of austerity (fase 1) and growth (fase 2). Yet the most striking aspect resulting from the analysis concerns Monti’s large use of concepts related to Europeanization in connection with the crisis – a crucial feature which is dealt with in detail in the following section.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Collocates</th>
<th>Temporal dimension</th>
<th>Characterisation</th>
<th>Crisis as agent</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>Reactions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘we are’ (stiamo), ‘today’ (oggi), ‘this’ (questa), ‘since the’ (dall’inizio)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘hit’ (colpito)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘social’ (sociale) - ‘loss’ (perdita), ‘need’ (bisogno), ‘debt’ (debito), ‘difficulty’ (difficoltà), ‘markets’ (mercati)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘to get out of’ (uscire), ‘to overcome’ (superare), ‘to avert’ (prevenire), ‘living’ (vivendo), ‘it overcomes’ (supera), ‘we are’ (stiamo), ‘to tackle’ (affrontare), ‘we must’ (dobbiamo) - ‘way out’ (uscita), ‘overcoming’ (superamento), ‘management’ (gestione), ‘solution’ (soluzione), ‘phase’ (fase), ‘growth’ (crescita) - ‘our’ (nostra) - ‘everybody’ (tutti)</td>
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**Clusters**

| Crisi dell’eurozona / della crisi finanziaria / inizio della crisi / la crisi dell’eurozona / crisi del debito sovrano / la crisi che stiamo vivendo / gravissima una crisi internazionale una / |

### 5.1.1 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

Summing up the findings of the concordance, collocate and cluster analysis, following picture emerges. President Napolitano has been a very lively protagonist in the construction of crisis accounts in Italy. A strong element of continuity in his interpretation and evaluation of the crisis in the Italian context is the focus on the temporal dimension, on the urgent actuality of the crisis. Yet the various periods also feature some relevant differences. The emphasis on the crisis as an agent is stronger in period II and then progressively decreases. Also collocates referring to the crisis as an opportunity can be found only in period II. Starting from period III, the sphere of reaction to the crisis starts to acquire importance; this focus is then integrated by a further relevant focus on the crisis consequences (period IV and VI). The proliferation of new crisis definitions (period IV, V, VI) points out that the crisis is seen to progressively reach new stages and dimensions. Finally, the emphasis on the gravity and extension of the crisis creates a strong parallelism between period II and VI, even though in this last period the crisis is not perceived as a chance any more.

As far as the prime ministers are concerned, the analysis of Berlusconi’s crisis interpretation and evaluation shows several elements of continuity. The bulk of attention is on the sphere of reaction to the crisis. Comparisons between Italy and other European countries are at the core of Berlusconi’s argumentative style, which basically tends to stress achievements rather than future reaction strategies. The crisis is almost never seen
as an agent in its own right; the most important agent, on the contrary, is the government, while Italy is portrayed both as an active and a passive figure in this crisis context. The study of Monti's crisis accounts, in turn, shows a strong emphasis on the actuality of the crisis, as in Napolitano's case. An element of continuity with Berlusconi is the equally strong focus on the sphere of reaction to the crisis. However, Monti focuses on present and future anti-crisis measures instead than on past achievements; moreover, his arguments tend to motivate and incite instead of drawing comparisons. The overall attitude is very inclusive but in a different way than in Berlusconi's case: while this latter focuses on the fact that nobody has been forgotten by the government in tackling the crisis, Monti addresses everybody in order for the answer to the crisis to be diffused and thus more effective.

5.2 Globalization and Europeanization in crisis accounts: results of concordance/keyword analysis

PERIOD I - The analysis of Napolitano's crisis accounts in period I reveals that 'globalization' (globalizzazione, 4th), 'European' (europea, 3rd) and 'Europe' (Europa, 15th) are all keywords. The process of globalization is put in very close connection with the crisis and Napolitano stresses the urgency to re-direct it on a more sustainable course, since it has shown to be no guarantee for uninterrupted growth nor an antidote against crises:

- Globalization does not mean certain, uninterrupted growth free from setbacks and risks of crisis. This is very well evident today as the crisis on the US credit market is starting to affect the real economy in the United States and not only in the United States. (1_S_20080319)

With regard to the keywords concerning Europeanization, Napolitano gives a very positive evaluation of the euro, considering it a strong anchoring device which has provided the EU member states with a comparatively safer position during the financial crisis. Yet he takes a critical stance towards the EU for having made no relevant contribution to a new development phase of our economies and societies. Independently from the crisis, Napolitano remarks that Europe is urged to speak with one voice, since we are all in an era of globalization and new challenges await us. He further stresses the importance to recognize the importance of Europe also in Italy and consequently invest in it.

As for the prime ministers Prodi and Berlusconi, they make no reference to globalization in period I. On the contrary, 'euro' (euro, 1st), 'European' (europei, 34th) and 'Europe' (Europa, 43rd) result to be keywords. All three, however, are not directly used in the context of crisis accounts. Prodi focuses on the need for integration and coordination of the European financial markets as well as on the advancements shown by the Italian financial markets in the effort to keep pace with Europe. Berlusconi, on the other hand, uses Europe as a term of comparison: he focuses on Italy's difficult situation of May 2008 and lists a series of aspects because of which Italy is in a worse condition than its European partners. It is noteworthy that first signals of concern about Italy's public debt emerge and that Berlusconi aims at legitimating the decision taken by the government to cut public expenditure in order to 'remain in Europe':

- We have the highest level of public debt in Europe: 105-106% in comparison with our global turnover, our GDP. (3_S_200870216)
- We had two ways to remain in Europe: either to increase the fiscal pressure or to cut the public expenditure. We have chosen the second one, in order to get a balanced budget by 2011. (3_I_20080821)

17 All quoted concordances have been translated by the author. The information in brackets refers to the actor (1: Napolitano, 2: Prodi, 3: Berlusconi, 4: Monti), to the kind of source (A: article, I: interview, P: press conference, S: speech) and the date (yyyyymmdd).
PERIOD II - In period II, Napolitano's crisis accounts stand out due to a very large use of terms related to globalization and Europeanization. Among the keywords, we find 'European' (europa, 1st/ europeo, 17th/ europee, 107th), ‘Europe’ (Europa, 5th) as well as ‘globalization’ (globalizzazione, 24th). Napolitano clearly expresses his point of view concerning the connection between globalization and the crisis:

- The globalization is not born with the crisis: today, we are rather facing also the crisis of this process, of this phenomenon. (1_S_20090318)

As for the relationship between globalization and Europeanization, the head of state encourages to see Europe as a sustainable model in the globalization government. In order to succeed, however, Europe has to face the challenge of maintaining a pivotal role in a world immersed in the era of globalization:

- We believe that Europe and the model it proposes, which is based on the rule of law and the social market economy, can have a primary role in the so-called “globalization government”. (1_S_20090619)
- Europe's role is not inevitably bound to become marginal if we will “live up to our responsibilities in a globalized world”. (1_S_20090519)
- Yes, Europe will live up to its responsibilities in a globalized world, provided that it will recognize itself in the Union originated from the Community created almost sixty years ago. (1_S_20090519)

Moreover, Napolitano often relates the recourse to globalization with descriptions of a changing (not only) economic scenario, in which the need for governing this process is more urgent than ever, especially after the global economic-financial turmoil of 2008:

- The year which is ending has been marked by important events, in the face of which the international community has become aware of the necessity to strengthen the mechanisms and the instruments to govern the globalization. (1_S_20081218)

As for the concordance analysis of the Europeanization-keywords, the results portray the crisis as something stressing that the EU is able to achieve (political) results and to contribute in developing a system of global governance:

- The economic and financial crisis is a clear sign of how much the European Union can achieve by acting on a common base. (1_S_20090619)
- The European Union has shown to be ready to have a hand in creating a more sound global governance. (1_S_20081127)
- During the actual international financial crisis the European Union has shown capacity of action and leadership. (1_S_20081027)

However, Napolitano stresses that these and future achievements are possible only if Europe stays and acts united and, most importantly, if it pushes the political process of European integration further, first of all by adopting the Lisbon Treaty. A Europe speaking with one voice is seen as the only possible and sustainable solution: according to Napolitano, in fact, answers to the crisis by single member states, i.e. what has been the rule up to now, are bound to fail in the long run - or, at least, to exclude Europe from the world stage. The crisis thus highlights the necessity to revive and invest in the European vision, since Europe cannot allow itself to act in a fragmented way, otherwise it risks decline and marginalization:

- The answer of the European Union to the crisis has been partial. The support to the economy has been mainly national, since economic policies essentially remain domain of the member states. (1_S_20090619)
- Today is needed a new motivation and a new vision [...] of the European project as an answer to the crisis which has hit the European and worldwide economy. (1_S_20090613)
- It is a fact that the economic crisis, which is questioning the growth perspectives of all member states, urges a strong unitary answer at European level and for this reason it is necessary to strengthen the community method and the institutions of the Union (1_S_20090225)
- In these new conditions, in reaction to the dramatic impulse given by the actual global financial and economic crisis – as a crisis also, and mainly, of behaviour and ethic values – it is necessary to count on a new enthusiasm in order to revive this (Eu-
The mentioned relationship between Europe and Italy is often used as the starting point to draw comparisons and to emphasize Italy as a crucial interlocutor for Europe and the United States in the effort to plan the way out of the crisis:

Regarding the Europeanization-keywords, Europe is seen first of all as a political partner. Berlusconi portrays Italy as depicted as the worst of all economic and social evils: "vendetta from the globalization path because the fear of it pushes states towards protectionism, which, in turn, deviates from the globalization path. The protectionist measures reduce the growth worldwide, they deprive us of the benefits of the global trade and confine millions of people to poverty. We must aim at an international financial and economic system for the 21st century which acknowledges the new realities but builds on already existing standards and common principles."

On the other hand, the crisis also represents an opportunity for Europe to give a substantial contribution to its solution and continue to be proud of the European founding models and values. Especially with reference to the Southern Mediterranean states, Napolitano incites to see the crisis as an opportunity and not only as something from which we have to defend ourselves:

Napolitano also addresses the relation between Europe and Italy in the context of the crisis. He does not intend to underestimate the crisis or Italy's difficult situation featured by a dangerous level of public debt. Italy, however, so Napolitano's argument, does not act alone and this is time neither for fear and resignation nor for dangerous alarmism:

As far as the analysis of Berlusconi's crisis accounts is concerned, also in this case, 'euro' (euro, 2nd), 'European' (Europei, 42nd) and European (europei, 42nd / europea, 115th / europeo, 138th) are keywords, while 'globalization' does not figure in the list. Despite the fact that it is not a keyword, the concordance analysis of 'globalization' shows an interesting finding. Berlusconi, in fact, points out that the crisis represents a dangerous deviation from the globalization path because the fear of it pushes states towards protectionism, which, in turn, is depicted as the worst of all economic and social evils:

Regarding the Europeanization-keywords, Europe is seen first of all as a political partner. Berlusconi portrays Italy as a crucial interlocutor for Europe and the United States in the effort to plan the way out of the crisis:

As soon as the global financial crisis loomed up, we have convinced Europe and the United States to tackle it with coordinated interventions based on these focal points: not to allow the bankrupt of any bank, to secure citizens' savings, to protect the weakest people [...] (3_A_20090606)

The mentioned relationship between Europe and Italy is often used as the starting point to draw compari-
sons. Berlusconi stresses that its government has recognized and tackled the crisis even before the other European countries; he underlines that he was the first in Europe to make clear Italy's plan of action, which was later applied worldwide. Moreover, Berlusconi affirms that he got faster than the other European partners to the conclusion that the focus on stability and austerity had to be integrated by a equally important focus on growth:

- We arranged a series of measures to face the global crisis before the other European countries, since we had recognized its dangerousness more than one year ago, when we still were at the opposition. (3_S_20090328)
- In the meanwhile what was necessary has been done. Personally I was the first leader in Europe on 10th October this year to declare that we would not have allowed that one single Italian bank would go bankrupt or one single citizen would lose his savings. (3_I_20090022)
- The first obstacle is the crisis that Italy is facing like the other countries. We have acted promptly. I have been the first in Europe to declare that we would have not allowed the bankrupt of any bank with the ensuing loss of citizens' savings. Our banking system withstood the stress thanks to its soundness. (3_I_200900224)
- I rememeber that some years ago I was criticized in Europe because I was asking to loosen the (Stability) Pact and to focus on growth instead of stability. If Europe today is able to tackle the effects of the financial crisis effectively through national anti-crisis plans, this is due to the new budget flexibility and stability of the euro. Austerity should be combined with development. (3_I_20090022)

On the whole, the measures adopted by Italy to tackle the crisis thus go in the same direction of other European countries and Berlusconi appears quite satisfied with the EU's line of action. This joint European action, in turn, has a positive influence domestically, where Berlusconi's government enjoys popularity and the Italians do not blame it for the crisis:

- Also other European countries have done the same in order to prevent the integrity of the national industry from the crisis. All companies in trouble will benefit from it [...] (3_I_20090208)
- I think that Europe is tackling the crisis in the right way. (3_I_200900224)
- The Italians have realized that this crisis is global, it is not a responsibility of the government. Rather, we are doing everything possible together with our European friends to mitigate its effects, to restore confidence in families and companies and to arrange the recovery. (3_I_200900308)

PERIOD III - The keyword analysis shows that following terms are over-represented in Napolitano's interventions in period III: ‘European’ (europea, 3rd / europeo, 27th / europee, 342nd), ‘Europe’ (Europa, 5th) and ‘globalization’ (globalizzazione, 24th). This latter is related again to the causes of the crisis. Napolitano argues that the problem revealed by the crisis is the imbalance between a over-developed globalization at the economic level and no adequate counterpart at the political one:

- [...] but the crisis, which broke out because of the degenerations of the financial system, is undoubtedly to trace back to the crucial fact that an ever more globalized market has been followed by no global governance at an adequate level. (1_S_20091028)

As a consequence, Napolitano is convinced that the crisis has given a clear lesson: in the future, it is necessary to create a more solid and shared system of global governance in order to cope with the challenges of globalization. This latter, in fact, is not something bad in itself but it has to be (politically) managed. He points out two crucial principles to follow in this effort at developing global governance: sustainability and solidarity.

- At the same time, the need for a largely shared government of the process of globalization has become more urgent, with the aim of a more equal and diffused access to its benefits and opportunities, of a sustainable growth [...] (1_S_20091114)
- I would like to end my intervention by stressing that the challenges dictated by the globalization of the markets and by the difficult overcoming of the crisis require the research of a new shared model of governance which is founded on the values of solidarity, inclusivity, ambiental sustainability of development policies [...] (1_S_201000217)

As for Europe, once again, it must strengthen its integration and capacity of common action if it wants to cope with the possible evolutions of globalization. More generally, so Napolitano's claim, globalization urges
commitment and forms of global governance worldwide:

- In effect, no matter what aspect of the last year experience and of the possible evolution of the process of globalization we take into consideration, there is an incontestable need for Europe to proceed on the way of integration, to strengthen its capacity of common action. (1_S_20090905)

- This interdependence is the necessary condition and at the same time the objective result of that process of globalization whose directions and setbacks require – and this has been the lesson of the last year – a clear commitment and concrete governance forms [...] (1_S_20091222)

With regard to Europeanization, Napolitano pushes forward an argument already encountered in the previous periods, namely that the EU is an actor which is able to tackle the crisis and has already achieved important results:

- I think, we must not underestimate the efforts and the contributions made by the European Union, especially in the semester of the French presidency. (1_S_20090905)

- It cannot be denied that the European Union has given impulses and contributions to the general effort of the international community to address the recent crisis; however, the basic decisions are not taken in the G8 any more, where Europe had an undeniably relevant role, but in the G20, and there is no need to stress the importance already achieved by the new emerging powers, especially from Asia, beside the major protagonists of the old G8, first of all the United States. (1_S_20091114)

At the same time, as pointed out in the last quote, a new international balance of powers forces the European Union to take action in order to strengthen its political integration and thus to try in this way to avoid political decline. In a word, the crisis has shed light on Europe's responsibilities and challenges – also concerning its role in the (new) decisional fora, from the G8 to the G20:

- Can the European Union still hesitate, after what has happened, to start a fiscal harmonization, although a moderate one? (1_S_20090905)

- The European Union cannot avoid the crucial choices imposed by such deep changes which have been clearly revealed by the financial and economic crisis started in 2008 as a global crisis. (1_S_20091118)

- The last year has been crucial because it made us dramatically aware of Europe's responsibility, of the tests and the challenges Europe's role has to face nowadays. That is, in a world which is subjected to radical changes to its stability and has been recently affected by a global crisis which has hit our economies and our societies and has questioned the perspectives of our development. (1_S_20090925)

- We hope that in the next G20 the European voices will be univocal. (1_S_20090905)

Though the way towards improvement in the EU seems to be all but easy, Napolitano still stresses the strength of the European project and especially of the euro. As already shown in period I, he puts emphasis on the single currency as an anchoring device for the states of the Eurozone during the crisis:

- Also this example shows that the Euro has represented a guarantee and a highly considerable protection in the face of the global financial crisis for the countries which are already part of the system. (1_S_20090714)

As for Italy, the country is considered to have been playing an important role in the European and global context up to now. With reference to the G8 in L'Aquila, for example, Italy is seen as a major power when it is considered not alone but in the European context:

- Without any doubt Italy has played its role by giving its contribution in the context of the decisions which have been defined and concorded at European level and in new broad global assemblies in reaction to the crisis. (1_S_20091221)

Regarding Berlusconi, the keyword analysis of period III does not reveal any term in relation with globalization and Europeanization. 'Globalization' is not mentioned at all; on the contrary, the concordance analysis of 'European' and 'Europe' highlights two most relevant points. First of all, the crisis is portrayed as something which has already been tackled and won, as also acknowledged by the European Commission and other international organizations. This adds to the popularity of the government which praises its own action:
Moreover, Italy is seen as the country doing better in Europe. The government is therefore firmly believed that it has to carry on its strategy, i.e. restoring citizens’ confidence and encouraging the economy:

• Italy is doing better than expected and this is considered in Europe to be a good sign for the entire euro area. Moreover, Italy and France show signals of recovery among the most relevant economies of the Ocse area. […] Our country seems to be the one doing better in Europe. And we believe that the government must continue to invite the citizens not to fear and not to change their lifestyle and their buying habit. This is the only way to reduce the impact of the crisis and its temporal extension. (3_I_20090809)

PERIOD IV - The keyword analysis of Napolitano’s crisis accounts in period IV shows again that concepts related to globalization and Europeanization are over-represented: ‘European’ (europea, 1st / europeo, 22nd / europei, 74th), ‘Europe’ (Europa, 1st), ‘euro’ (euro, 6th), ‘globalization’ (globalizzazione, 23rd), ‘globalized’ (globalizzato, 115th), ‘Eurozone’ (eurozona, 28th). This time, Napolitano makes recourse to ‘globalization’ in order to support his claim for a more integrated and united Europe:

• All what has happened and is happening – the process of globalization, the global financial and economic crisis which broke out in 2008, then the attack to our single currency, the Euro, and finally the new and serious evolution of the international situation in areas which are very next to us – all leads to the conclusion that we must be more determinate and consistent on the way of the European unity. (1_P_20110224)
• Only the European Union can play the role of a global actor in the era of globalization and in the face of new great emerging realities, only the Union can act in favour of all Member States. (1_S_20110413)
• The problem today is that of the contribution to give to the peace in the world and the security on a global scale. Europe must have an influence on the process of globalization. (1_I_20110224)

Napolitano’s convinced argument is that Europe necessarily has to speak with one voice in order to face the changed world situation. Such changes are ascribed, among others, to the process of globalization, which is seen as ‘more then ever relentless’ and causing ‘common problems’ which require ‘common answers’ by a Europe which should be ‘more united, more integrated, more dynamic’:

• On the other hand, of course, also the problems have become globalized, so that the sovereign States are not able any more to deal with them nationally. The globalization of problems requires the globalization of solutions. (1_S_20110328)

A new interesting perspective concerns the fact that globalization is not seen as something bad, quite on the contrary. Its benefits, so Napolitano’s claim, should be recognized and any simplistic vision avoided. At the same time, it is necessary to find out where the problem is, i.e. not in the process of globalization itself, but rather in the international economic government. This, in turn, implies to admit that the single sovereign states are not able to cope with a globalized, changing world effectively. Napolitano’s argument leads back to his claim for a stronger European Union, which is deemed to be necessary to preserve ‘national continuity’:

• Let not forget this, before surrendering to the schematic vision of a globalization producing few winners and many losers. In the interdependent world we live in – nowadays more than ten years ago – exactly the contrary has happened. (1_S_20101220)
• [Concerning the fight against poverty and needs] This is a big success of the international system grown up in the last sixty years and of the globalization in the last twenty. For sure, we have to manage it – not to disregard it. (1_S_20101220)
• Finance and financial instruments evolve very fast, too fast in order for the States to react in time. This is not a failure of globalization, but rather of the international economic government. Globalization has represented a powerful motor of growth and wealth for millions of people. (1_S_20110328)
• The simplistic vision according to which the globalization had necessarily to end up in ‘linear and idyllic progress’ is not correct, but neither the opposite thesis is correct, i.e. that of the globalization failure. Actually, an ever more complex world requires a renewed, articulated governance. A more integrated Union in a multipolar scenario represents a point of strength for the single Member States and is the better guarantee of national continuity in a globalized world. (1_S_20110407)
As far as the analysis of the Europeanization-keywords is concerned, the first recognition is that, after more than two years from its beginning, the descriptions of the crisis and of how it has been changing its face are several and much more precise than before. In this context, expressions like ‘euro crisis’ or ‘crisis of the eurozone’ have definitely become part of Napolitano's crisis accounts.

In this context, the President paid particular attention to the aspect of public debt and, consequently, to the difficult situation in Italy, which, despite all, continues to be portrayed as a convinced pro-European country:

- The tensions to which the euro has been exposed on the financial markets, in the following of the Greek crisis, have led to stress more than ever – at European level – the question of the consolidation of the public balances. (1_S_20100621)
- We are in a phase of consolidation of public finances which all European countries are facing under the weight and the worry of a global financial and economic crisis as well as of a consequent expansion of public debt. (1_S_20100713)
- Italy has been among the most convinced founding countries of the European Union and among the most coherent in supporting the development of the integration process. And, lastly, in the face of the Greek crisis, it has adopted a clear stance in favour of a collective commitment [...] (1_S_20100526)

As far as the euro crisis is concerned, however, Napolitano takes a quite critical stance towards the EU, stressing its lack of suitable instruments to tackle the crisis. Once again, the head of state supports the option of more EU integration as the only possible solution to overcome this weakness and points out the necessity to create ad hoc mechanisms against the crisis. In the end, so his underlying argument, ‘opportunities grow out of crises’:

- [Concerning the Eurozone crisis] In fact, in the face of the emergency, the European Union had no valid instruments, no suitable mechanisms to avert and solve such a crisis. (1_S_20100526)
- It is necessary to strengthen the system of the EMU – which has shown extremely serious weaknesses – by concretely creating a mechanism and a European fund to manage the crisis [...] (1_S_20100526)
- I have tried to show, without underestimating the risks of this crisis, that the euro is not at risk neither the European construction is at risk, provided that we go further on the path of integration [...] (1_P_20100525)
- Opportunities grow out of crises: in this case, the impulse to pose again the fundamental topic of the revitalization of European competitiveness, with the aim of a balanced, fair, environment-friendly growth. (1_S_20110415)

This critical stance, however, does not undermine Napolitano’s enthusiasm for the European project. He declares to be a convinced Europeanist and finds enough reasons to be proud of the European construction. Indeed, as already resulted in previous periods, it is exactly the euro which is portrayed as one of the greatest European achievements supporting such optimism:

- According to me, the problem is that we must not mitigate the drama of the test which Europe has to face in clashing with the global crisis neither the drama of the uncertainties and the challenges which weigh on Europe’s development and on its role. The more we are honest with ourselves, the more we will cope with it: and I continue to trust, I continue to believe rationally in Europe. It has been painful, we know, to find a common line of action in the face of the Greek crisis: but, even with some delay, we have managed it [...] (1_S_20100904)
- The disorder and the perverse competitions which have been characterising the European monetary courses for a long time would have exposed us to a fatal blow. Last spring we had to foil the Euro crisis through extraordinary measures but we would have been in great troubles if we had not had the euro, the single currency, in the global storm of 2008-2009 [...] (1_S_20101026)
- This year the repercussions of the global financial crisis have affected the European single currency with particular intensity. We do not underestimate the risks for everyone. But we are convinced that the euro is a fundamental and irreversible goal of our common history. (1_S_20101220)

A last relevant finding in the analysis of this period concerns the connection between the crisis, Europe and a growing scepticism towards this latter. Napolitano sees a causal relation between the three but, at the same time, does not hesitate in stressing the political mistakes which have determined this situation:

- If nowadays Europe is seen with more scepticism – after all, in Italy a bit less than in Germany – this, of course, has a lot to do with the economic crisis. People believed that the EU was something like an insurance against all crises, they believed that a united Europe could only pursue development and increased wealth uninterrupted. It has been an illusionary conviction, this is why now many are disappointed. It has been a mistake of politics to go on in feeding this conviction or, at least, not to
With regard to Berlusconi, following keywords concerning Europeanization have been found in period IV: ‘euro’ (euro, 7th), ‘Europe’ (Europa, 128th), ‘European’ (europei, 147th / europa, 179th). ‘Globalization’ is not a keyword, yet the concordance analysis shows an interesting use of the word. The crisis, in fact, is portrayed as an opportunity to implement a ‘strategy for the country’, in order for a more competitive Italy to get out of the crisis and win the ‘challenge of the new globalization’. In this context, a particular focus is laid on the interconnection of austerity measures and growth:

- These five points are not a list of reforms with no connection. They are the cornerstones of a single strategy for the country, whose aim is to strengthen our institutions, our economies, our territory, our social fabric, so that Italy comes out of this crisis as a more competitive country ready to win the challenge of the new globalization. The aim of this strategy and these cornerstones is the economic growth; their essential foundation is the rigour in our public finances, since we are aware that there can be no lasting and fair growth if the state balance is not stable. We must be clear with our citizens, there is no choice between austerity and growth, they go hand in hand with each other. (3_S_20100929)

As for the analysis of the Europeanization-keywords, also in this case Europe is considered first of all a relevant partner. Berlusconi emphasizes Italy’s role in managing the crisis, as the country is said to be constantly in touch with all other relevant economies, especially Germany:

- We are constantly in touch with all European diplomats. Tomorrow I will speak with the German Chancelllor Angela Merkel. In this crisis Italy is playing and will play its part. (3_I_20110301)

Berlusconi’s most relevant way to address Europe and other European countries, however, is still to make of them a term of comparison. The aim, as already seen in other periods, is always to communicate that Italy is in a better situation than the other European economies thanks to the anti-crisis measures adopted by the government. In this context, particular importance is given to the cut of public expenditure and to the contribution of families and enterprises to the soundness of the banking system:

- The government has the merit of having supported this positive reality and having avoided the mistake – which many other governments have done in Europe – to increase the deficit in public expenditure in the illusion that the increased demand would make the economy recover. Italy needed austerity and credibility. (3_S_20100929)
- [Concerning the austerity in public expenditure] As for this aspect, Italy is better off than other and sounder countries in Europe. (3_I_20100704)
- The unemployment rate has drop to 7.8% while in Europe it is 8.7%, thus the recovery is underway […] (3_I_20100709)
- This has determined the soundness of our banks which are probably the soundest banking system in Europe. Unlike other governments, our government did not need to help the banks at the most acute moment of the crisis. (3_I_20100715)
- [About citizens’ private debt as a further method to evaluate the financial soundness of a country] […] in Europe we are second only to Germany. This is very important, because if we would have continued to have only the public debt as the only judgement method on our country, we would have been heavily sanctioned by Europe. (3_S_20100929)

Italy’s performance is even more to appreciate, so Berlusconi’s claim, if the more difficult point of departure of the country is taken into consideration. The legislative measures adopted are said to have saved Italy from the repercussions of the Greek crisis; however, Berlusconi does not envisage any reduction of the fiscal pressure since, he argues, the crisis not over yet, even though Italy is portrayed to be better off than others:

- Maybe it has been forgotten that Italy entered the crisis in much worse conditions than other countries because it had to tackle the financial crisis – the global economic crisis – while coping with a huge public debt among the highest in Europe. A debt – we should not forget it – we have inherited from the governments of the historical compromise. Italy’s sovereign debt made it more exposed than others to speculative attacks. (3_S_20101213)
- I would like to recall you that the financial bill of 25 billions, which passed in July without provoking any strike wave as the left parties had supposed, protected Italy from the financial crisis which has struck Greece and has upset Europe as well as many countries worldwide. (3_S_20100905)
- [About fiscal reductions] No country in Europe can introduce them now. The global crisis is not completely over yet. We are
A further recurring theme is the way how Berlusconi refers to Europe as an external monitoring authority which steadily controls if and how Italy is implementing the necessary and adequate measures in order to accomplish the duties of the Stability Pact. All three mentioned aspects – Europe as a term of comparison, the emphasis on the soundness of Italy’s private debt, Europe as an external controlling authority – are exemplary resumed in the following concordances:

- [...] even when the positive action of our government has been acknowledged by international and certainly independent organizations such as the IMF, the OCSE, the EBC and the Commission of the European Union. These evaluations have constantly approved the measures adopted by the Italian government to manage the various moments of the long economic crisis. This enabled Italy to overcome the negative peak of the crisis in better conditions than almost all other European countries and especially those countries which have been forced to inject huge sums of public money in the banking system in order to avoid a crash, thus causing a steady increase in public debt. This is certainly not a merit of our government. Luckily, our Italian families, 85% of which are homeowners, tend to save their money and this factor has made our banks and our banking system sounder than all other European banking systems. As I already said this morning, our government has been able to avoid the mistake of tackling the crisis by increasing the public expenditure in the illusion that an increase in demand could make the economy recover. (3_S_20100929)

- First of all, EU, Ocse, IMF have observed that our government has managed the most serious crisis in the last eighty years effectively. We have kept the state budget under control and, if we consider the aggregate debt, Italy is even among the strongest EU countries together with Germany and before France, Great Britain and Sweden. (3_I_20100914)

Summing up, Berlusconi shows himself very proud of Italy’s performance in managing the crisis. To put it bluntly, Italy is not considered to be a problem for Europe anymore, but rather a solution:

- Italy has assumed its responsibilities in contributing to keep the financial and monetary stability in Europe and has always found convinced subscribers of its state bonds on the financial markets. (3_S_20101213)

- I can say with absolute certainty that Italy is not part of the problems of Europe’s economy any more: it has become part of the solutions of these problems. (3_S_20101213)

PERIOD V – Following terms figure in Napolitano’s keyword list of period V: ‘European’ (europa, 2nd/ europeo, 11th/ europee, 49th/ europei, 94th), ‘euro’ (euro, 3rd), ‘Eurozone’ (eurozona, 4th) and ‘Europe’ (Europa, 9th). Although ‘globalization’ is not a keyword in this period, the concordance analysis reveals two relevant findings. First of all, Napolitano advances a clear argument in favour of the Union as an instrument to control a ‘wild globalization’ featuring no rules:

- All has changed in comparison with the starting point, those far 1950. But new powerful motivations support us: the mission of the Union of States and peoples which we have been strengthening is to make life possible in the context of a wild globalization which could overwhelm us, our identity, our example and model of integration and unity, the [...] peculiarity of our contribution to the historical development and to the future of the world civilization. (1_S_20111026)

Moreover, he stresses again the challenges posed by globalization and the need for interconnected solutions, since the crisis, so goes the claim, has struck an already truly interdependent world:

- When faced with the challenges of globalization, the interdependence linking all of us becomes even more stronger; stronger and stronger is the link between economic development and financial stability; hypotheses of merely national ways out of the crisis appear unrealistic. (1_S_20110915)

- The global financial crisis exploded between 2007 and 2008. What is essential, however, is how the world has changed in this decade from the point of view of the global economic and political equilibria. And many steps forward have been taken towards globalization. We have really become an interconnected world and there is an interconnection among security, economic and political issues. (1_I_20110910)

As for the analysis of the Europeanization-keywords, a variegated picture emerges. The crisis is increasingly portrayed as having reached a new stage: it has become a ‘Eurozone crisis’ and this often unleashes doubts and worries about the not unitary stance of the EU member states:

- After more than half century of unity and continuous progress, now it is necessary, in a clear and convincing relation with the citizens, to think about the crisis which has affected the Eurozone and to offer persuasive answers. (1_S_20111026)
Italy is often at the core of the discourse about the Eurozone crisis. More generally, however, the crisis is considered to affect the world of politics everywhere in Europe, as shown also by the increased recourse to expressions like 'crisis of confidence', 'loss of confidence' and 'distrust':

- And in this period Italy's is not the only Parliament in Europe where difficult votes lie ahead, at the end of arduous debate. There can be no doubt that the world of politics in general is struggling to tackle the tensions and risks of crisis to which the Eurozone is exposed, and that the political and social equilibria within each country are being tested. (1_S_201110903)
- The global financial crisis which broke out between 2007 and 2008 and has gone through various periods and manifestations, reached its peak in 2011 in the Eurozone crisis because of the growing unsustainability of the sovereign debts of certain countries, among which there is Italy, too. (1_S_20110909)
- I say this without forgetting that – in the context of the Eurozone crisis – we are taking charge of the unavoidable aim to reduce the enormous weight of our public debt. (1_S_20110923)
- You have posed an essential question which is the one concerning the confidence, the credibility of European Institutions and leadership in the face of the crisis. (1_I_20110903)

According to Napolitano, however, this situation leads in a clear direction: the crisis highlights the need for more Europe and the only possible solution is to satisfy this need, because a crisis of the whole European project would represent no viable alternative. This request for more concrete action is partially satisfied by current developments at the institutional level, since the crisis has forced EU member states to take action, e.g. by creating the European Financial Stability Facility:

- The crisis of the single currency would mean the crisis of the common European project. After such an important step we cannot escape unharmed – none of us. (1_S_20110714)
- This moment of difficult global economic crisis is severely testing the European Union, too. We cannot afford to get afraid, neither can we forget the great potentials of integration as well as the enormous benefits it has already given to our citizens. (1_S_20110915)
- Merely nationally-oriented ways out of the actual crisis appear unrealistic. Here it comes the need to go further without hesitations on the way of the European political unity as the only possible anchorage of a new fair and sustainable economic development of our countries. (1_S_20110915)
- The need for 'more Europe' has been expressed unequivocally in the succession of appeals, some of them accompanied by a wealth of concrete recommendations, presented by experienced and authoritative European figures. It has become categoric evermore clearly in a world, shaken as it is by the crisis we are currently experiencing, in which no individual European country, not even the biggest and most efficient one, can 'save itself by itself' or play a significant role using its own forces alone. (1_S_20111026)
- It is around this acute need that the problematic and intense discussion aroused by the Greek crisis, by the Irish and Portuguese crises, but also by the tensions and risks that have hit Spain and Italy in terms of sovereign debt crisis, revolves. The European institutions and national governments have reacted, and continue to react, to these events with extraordinary measures and significant innovations. One example is the creation of three new supervisory authorities and, most notably, the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) (1_S_2011026)

Summing up, Napolitano's interventions in period V point out a crisis which is more and more a sovereign debt crisis. In this context, Italy is portrayed to be right in the eye of the storm – a deeply economic, financial as well as political storm. The President's message to the country is not to feel hurt or offended by external pressures, but to react with pride and to remember that this is a crisis of the entire Union:

- A global crisis, a European crisis, and inside this picture there is Italy, with its strengths and weaknesses, with its load of old and new problems, of institutional and political sort, of structural, social and civil sort [...] (1_S_20110821)
- Italy is extremely exposed to this crisis, which in the Eurozone is characterised as a sovereign debt crisis [...] (1_S_20111019)
- Let's put it plainly: in Europe, and not only in Europe, has emerged a serious crisis of confidence towards our country. We must be aware of it, we must not be offended but rather encouraged in our pride and in our will to get over it. (1_S_20111104)
- Italy has to give its contribution in this sense, not being second to any of the big founding members of the European Community. At the same time, it has to overcome its delays and its falls, by resigning itself to those crisis of confidence I have been talking about and drawing all consequences from it (1_S_20111104)

27
In Europe, and not only in Europe – as I have said publicly some days ago – has emerged a serious crisis of confidence towards our country. Nobody can question, dear Mr. Fusco, that Italy is for Europe an integral and indelible part of its civilization, and not only of its history but also of its future. Nevertheless, we must understand that the European Union [...] is going through its most critical stage [...] (1_S_20111109)

Today Italy is facing very difficult and politically complicated changes and choices in order to reach those aims of financial recovery and relaunching of its economic and social growth which would allow us to cope with the serious financial crisis affecting the Eurozone and Italy in particular, with dangerous repercussions on our society. Europe is urgently waiting for important signs that Italy faces up to its responsibilities [...] (1_S_20111110)

As in Napolitano’s case, the analysis of Berlusconi’s crisis accounts in period V shows that ‘globalization’ is not a keyword, while following terms rank in the keyword list: ‘euro’ (euro, 2nd), ‘European’ (europea, 15th/europei, 21st/europeo, 50th) and ‘Europe’ (Europa, 108th). The only relevant concordance of ‘globalization’ refers to the process as something which the Italian production system was adapting to when it was struck by the crisis:

Dear colleagues, before I conclude I would like to recall that the economic crisis hit our production system during a process of adaptation to the new technologies and to the globalization. (3_S_20110803)

As for the Europeanization-keywords, the findings show that Berlusconi continues to stress the achievements of the government, whose action is appreciated as effective despite the crisis and the emergencies which the country had to tackle at the same time. In this context, Europe is still a term of comparison to stress that Italy is in a better situation than what its detractors say, especially if the criterion of the aggregate debt is considered. In particular, Berlusconi remarks that Italy is not alone with its problems and that its GDP/deficit ratio is better than expected:

We must have clear that all this negative legacy makes us grow less than the European average. Moreover, in the midst of the global crisis we had to tackle serious national emergencies: the tragedy of the earthquake in L’Aquila, the garbage issue in Campania, the effects of the revolutions in Africa. (3_S_20110621)

The Italians should erect a monument to Tremonti and to the whole government, because we are managing to come out of the crisis without the measures which other European countries had to adopt. (3_I_20110604)

If we added the systems of savings and debts of the Italian families and companies to our public debt, we would be at the second place in Europe, immediately after Germany and before Sweden, Great Britain and France. But let’s speak about our public debt. After the explosion of the crisis, the evolution of our state budget has turned out to be better than in most developed countries. (3_S_20110803)

Similar problems concern – as you know – many other countries of the Euro area, too. (3_S_20110803)

In period V as in previous ones, a recurring theme is the conception of Europe as a monitoring, judging instance, which basically encourages the Italian course:

These are strengths which have often led the European authorities to consider Italy in absolutely secure conditions. Short time ago also the President of the European Commission Barroso acknowledged it and defined the pressures on our market as ’clearly unjustified’. (3_S_20110803)

Of course, we did not care only about the emergencies. We achieved a lot in recent years: the pension reform, which has been required and appreciated by Europe, has transformed our pension system into one of the soundest in Europe […] (3_S_20110621)

Europe’s judgement has been encouraging both concerning the objectives for the growth and the way how to achieve them (3_S_20110621)

These measures have been conceived in line with the objectives which have been agreed on at the European level and they have been assessed as adequate and satisfactory by Europe as well as by all international observers also with regard to their time schedule. (3_S_20110803)

Some parallelism with Napolitano can be found in Berlusconi’s critical stance towards the present EU situation, especially concerning the euro crisis. The EU itself, he argues, bears the fault for the attacks to the euro, among others because of the slow and not coherent reaction to the Greek crisis as well as because of its lack of political unity. Berlusconi, however, shows a constructive attitude in that he integrates this
evaluation of the EU weaknesses with the strategies to overcome them. In the end, this is presented as Italy's position: the belief in the necessity to take steps towards a governance of the Euro area in order to tackle the crisis and to avoid future ones. Particularly relevant in this context is the reference to the single currency as a ‘pillar of the European construction’:

- The turbulences on the financial markets have been fed also by the perception of an excessively slow reaction of the authorities of the European Union to the sovereign debt crisis triggered by the Greek situation. (3_S_20110803)
- But we would deny the truth if we did not remember that the single currency has an original defect. In fact, a European authority which can coordinate the fiscal policies and issue bonds does not exist yet. (3_S_20111013)
- The economic crisis will mark a positive turning point only when Europe will show to be able to take a crucial step towards political unity, towards the coordination of economic, defense and foreign policy. Until we remain a big economic body with a little political head there is a risk that the economic crisis drags on without solution and Europe can become a destabilizing factor for the global economy worldwide. (3_S_20111013)
- As for the turbulences triggered by the sovereign debt and the crisis of the banking system, especially of the French-German one, we took a firm stand that we will present at the next meeting of the Union. Unlike the dollar, the pound or the yen, the Euro is the only currency with no lender of last resort in order to defend its credibility structurally […] (3_A_20111025)
- We have taken some faint step forward towards a government of the Euro area, but there is still a lot to do. The Germany of Angela Merkel is aware of it and we will cooperate fairly. (3_A_20111025)
- The recent weeks which we had to face are the direct consequence of a crisis of confidence which is shaking the international markets and does not seem to calm down both because of the uncertainties about the Euro and for the trend of financial speculation. Such a crisis has to be tackled firmly and coherently without following the jumpiness of the markets in order to defeat them. (3_S_20110803)

Finally, Berlusconi refers to Europe with regard to the reasons why he does not want to resign as prime minister. On the one hand, Europe is portrayed as an arena hit by the crisis; on the other hand, Europe appears as the stage where pressures against Berlusconi have been taking place in recent months:

- The request of resignation of the government is completely out of place, even more in a moment of objective economic trouble everywhere in Europe. (3_S_20110621)
- Third, because a crisis of government “in the dark” would mean today the victory of that party inclined to catastrophism and speculation which has been acting in Europe and Italy for months. (3_S_20111013)

PERIOD VI - All following terms result to be keywords from the analysis of Napolitano’s crisis accounts in period VI: ‘European’ (europea, 2°/ europeo, 16°/ europei, 159°/ europee, 329°), ‘Europe’ (Europa, 3°), ‘Eurozone’ (eurozona, 4°), ‘euro’ (euro, 7°) and ‘globalization’ (globalizzazione, 60°). Once again, this latter can be found both in relation to the crisis and to Europeanization. Napolitano, in fact, stresses the necessity to deepen the European project and to put it in the context of the globalization process:

- In Europe in particular, we’ve now reached a third engagement with history: we now need to implant - at new depths - our integration process within the context of a critical phase of globalization. (4)

Globalization is further described as something we are completely immersed in and which does not only concern economic aspects, but also social and intellectual ones. Napolitano maintains that Europe’s single market somehow preceded globalization; however, he argues, the pace of globalization has become much more impetuous and Europe does not represent the core of global productivity any more – a condition which forces Europe to act if it wants to avoid its own decline:

- Europe anticipated globalization thanks to the forward-looking intuition of the single market. The direction has not changed, but the rhythm has become pressing. (1_S_20111219)
- In the last twenty years the focus of global development has radically moved away from Europe; the process of globalization has become impetuous; countries from a different continent and some real giants among them have progressively emerged thanks to their extraordinary productivity and competitiveness. (1_S_20120130)
- And in order to avoid that its [Europe's] peculiar role fades in the globalization era, we must be able to relaunch that societal model and lifestyle by combining – I use the German Chancellors’ words intentionally – “the power of competitiveness with social responsibility”. (1_S_20120213)
As far as the analysis of the Europeanization-keywords is concerned, the findings give evidence of the proliferation of descriptions and analyses of the crisis, of its development and consequences. Europe, and the Eurozone in particular, is considered to be the part of the world which has been struck at most by the crisis – together with Italy which is fallen in the storm of the sovereign debt crisis. In this context, part of the responsibilities for the Eurozone crisis are traced back to the unsustainable development achieved by some European countries before the crisis:

- Of course, if we think about a global financial crisis and its backlashes on the economy also in Europe, than we must catch multiple causes and dimensions, not only that of the crisis or of the explosion of the sovereign debt. (1_P_20120320)
- The anxiety of the last summer is not dissipated, but we are aware, both in Italy and in the Union, of having found the essential steps to be taken in order to defuse a crisis which does not originate in Europe but comes from far away. (1_S_20111219)
- During this wide-ranging worldwide changes, starting from the United States, in 2008 a financial crisis broke out which has affected Europe and, in 2011, has mutated in a concentric pressure on the Eurozone, especially on the sovereign debts of countries like Italy. (1_S_20120130)
- It is a hard present, we know, what the workers' Italy is going through; we have been getting through times of crisis since more than three years, times of crisis for Italy and for Europe in a world which has radically changed especially in the last ten years and is still changing. (1_S_20120501)
- [It] is even complicated to list all the adjectives which can be used to define the various dimensions, the various causes, the various aspects of this crisis. But let's put it plainly: the world of politics is in distress, and our societies all around Europe are in distress. (1_S_20120503)
- The financial crisis, which exploded in 2008 in the United States and, from there, spread to other global areas becoming extremely acute in the Eurozone, has revealed the fragility and the pathological traits of the previous development of some countries. (1_S_20120613)

Napolitano, however, does not limit himself to an economic-financial interpretation; rather, the crisis is seen as threatening the whole European project. This, he argues, is the result of an incomplete and not coherent development of the process of European integration, of Europe's chonical lack of political unity. Consequently, he emphasizes the mistakes made by European politicians as well as the dangerous weakening of the truly European principle of solidarity:

- Dear Editor, now, on a daily basis, we face the crisis of the European project which represents the greatest political invention of the second half of the twentieth century, a project that unleashed so much energy and so many possibilities that it became a reference point, if not a model, far beyond the borders of Europe. What has ended up emerging is actually a crisis of the very political leadership that was supposed to give the process of European integration coherent expansion after the start of the new century. (1_A_20111229)
- In Europe in particular, we've now reached a third engagement with history: we now need to implant - at new depths - our integration process within the context of a critical phase of globalization. But this time, it's true that Europe's leaders are struggling to meet the challenge, especially in terms of the pressing crisis of the euro. They also seem blatantly inadequate due to a general cultural backwardness and an impoverished democratic political life. Together these factors have produced a ruinous fall back to petty and anachronistic attitudes and national prejudices. (1_A_20111229)
- The fiscal and financial crisis of the Euro area has a destabilizing extent whose limits are difficult to measures. It assails the roots of the European Union, it threatens the economic stability and well-being worldwide. (1_S_20111219)
- In the most recent period, because of the global financial crisis and of the ensuing Eurozone crisis, our common European project has been put at stake more than ever. (1_S_20120213)
- The second need is to get to the bottom of the lessons given by the Eurozone crisis as a consequence of the incomplete and contradictory progress of the Union after Maastricht. (1_S_20111220)
- And we suffer from the contradictory and narrow-minded answers the Union has given to the Eurozone crisis in general during 2011. (1_S_20111216)
- During the crisis of the Eurozone, the principle of solidarity has encountered some obstacles. The wrong belief has arisen that some countries have only benefitted from the Euro, while others have only footed the bill. (1_S_20120210)
- [...] That principle of European solidarity whose weakening had a very relevant role in the crisis of the Eurozone, as it made room for the most dangerous financial speculations. (1_S_20120501)

Yet, despite these weaknesses, Napolitano is convinced that the European project has no alternatives and that the only solution is to deepen and strengthen it. This marked forward-looking perspective results in Napolitano's usual plea for more unity, more active action, more integration, more Europe. He stresses the
Europe, which he deems to be at the root of a crucial reversal in their traditionally pro-European attitude: however, despite these improvements, he also shows to be aware of the Italians' loss of confidence towards context, the head of state stresses the importance of the first results achieved by Monti's government; Berlusconi's government as well as the way how the crisis has been dealt with at the institutional level. In this at legitimating these efforts. Moreover, the findings point out the President's attempt to explain the crisis of Napolitano stresses the commitment of its country – both domestically and at European level – to overcome the crisis. He attaches great importance to the austerity measures adopted by Italy and his interventions aim at legitimating these efforts. Moreover, the findings point out the President's attempt to explain the crisis of Berlusconi's government as well as the way how the crisis has been dealt with at the institutional level. In this context, the head of state stresses the importance of the first results achieved by Monti's government; however, despite these improvements, he also shows to be aware of the Italians' loss of confidence towards Europe, which he deems to be at the root of a crucial reversal in their traditionally pro-European attitude:

- A financial crisis going well beyond Europe forces us to take innovative action, to take a leap in quality in integration and economic governance and to mobilize our better resources. But there are no realistic alternatives to strengthening the European construction. The crisis requires, or, better, it urges 'more Europe'. (1_S_20120320)
- We need a more united and determinate European Union which is able to face the crisis with the necessary authority and to offer a perspective to disoriented citizens without reference points concerning the future of Europe. (1_S_20120710)
- Outside Europe there is a demand for more Europe, but for a Europe speaking with one voice. (1_S_20120210)
- Maybe today, in the crucible of a still unsolved crisis for Europe, there is a revival of the necessity, of the perspective, of the project of an Europe becoming a truly political Union, with all its also institutional implications. (1_S_20120213)
- [About a series of values well recognized ad guaranteed in Europe] Yes, Europe is this. Let not forget it only because our attention today is spasmodically concentrated on the serious financial and economic crisis started three years ago, on the emergency which has affected the Eurozone [...] (1_S_20120127)
- Now that the sovereign debt crisis of some states, among which Italy, threatens the sustainability of such a great and indefeasible achievement like the creation of the Euro, a deep, severe reduction and selection of the public expenditure has become paramount. (1_A_20111229)
- The crisis in Europe motivates us to strengthen the links with the Southern side of the Mediterranean. I do not get tired to repeat it, especially to the European partners north of the Alps: the fortunes of Europe, of all Europe, originate and prosper together with those of the Mediterranean. (1_I_20120516)

The keyword analysis sheds light on the relationship between Europeanization and Italy, too. Napolitano emphasizes the nature of the crisis in Italy, which, in his view, is not merely internal, but inseparably Italian and European as well as of great importance for its potential repercussions worldwide. Against this background, particular concerns are expressed about the Mezzogiorno of Italy:

- We are still plunged in a crisis which is inseparably Italian and European, on the wake of the global crisis arisen in 2008. (1_S_20111216)
- But if Italy will play its part – as, I am sure of it, it will do – the way out of the crisis is more generally European and supranational. And its impact goes well beyond the boundaries of the 17 or 28: if for Europe there is a lot at stake, the repercussions concern the entire world. (1_A_20111219)
- And nowadays – in the context of the general crisis which the Italian and European economy is going through with heavy negative effects also on the financial situation and the capacity of action of the State – the permeation between criminality and economic activity has become a key-issue for the Italian Mezzogiorno. (1_S_20120523)

Napolitano stresses the commitment of its country – both domestically and at European level – to overcome the crisis. He attaches great importance to the austerity measures adopted by Italy and his interventions aim at legitimating these efforts. Moreover, the findings point out the President’s attempt to explain the crisis of Berlusconi’s government as well as the way how the crisis has been dealt with at the institutional level. In this context, the head of state stresses the importance of the first results achieved by Monti’s government; however, despite these improvements, he also shows to be aware of the Italians’ loss of confidence towards Europe, which he deems to be at the root of a crucial reversal in their traditionally pro-European attitude:

- We are doing our part of responsibility in order to guarantee the overcoming of the Eurozone crisis. (1_P_20120213)
- My country is severely concerned by the financial and economic crisis and by the ensuing occupational crisis which have struck the Eurozone in particular. (1_S_20120613)
- The urgency of those choices – beginning from the realization of measures which have been already arranged at European level – derives from the gravity of the financial crisis and of the dangers of economic regression faced by Italy and Europe. (1_S_20111114)
- The commonly defined austerity measures have been imposed by a very thorny situation such as the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. (1_P_20120320)
- [It] [Berlusconi’s government] has been shaken by internal contradictions in the government alliance which had won the elections and, without any doubt, by the test of the global financial crisis as well as by the Eurozone and sovereign debt crisis, among which ours has turned out to be the most exposed. (1_S_20120130)
The attempt to avoid a sudden dissolution of the Chambers and recourse to the ballot box was my precise institutional duty, given the disruptive effects this could have had for our country in the stormy context of the Eurozone, i.e. given the looming disastrous worsening of the financial crisis in Italy. (1_S_20111220)

[Concerning Monti's government] There have been already very important results: in essence, a new confidence, both at the European and international level, in Italy's capacity of recovery and development and in its contribution to overcoming the crisis of the Eurozone and of the European project. (1_S_20120317)

[Concerning the Italians' attitude towards Europe] An attitude which during a long series of decades has always been of deep, extremely large adhesion, but which now meets some difficulties linked in particular to the financial and economic crisis that Europe, and especially the Eurozone, are going through. (1_P_20120615)

The keyword analysis concerning Monti's crisis accounts in period VI shows that Europeanization-related terms rank all very high: 'euro' (euro, 2nd), 'European' (europea, 3rd/ europeo, 6th/ europei, 25th/ europee, 74th), 'Eurozone' (eurozona, 5th), 'Europe' (Europa, 16th), 'EU' (UE, 19th). On the contrary, 'globalization' is not a keyword and, in general, the term is used almost never. The concordance analysis points out that, for the first and only time in the whole corpus, globalization is seen from a historical perspective, with no reference to crisis issues at all:

1. Also Italy was shaken by a technological revolution and a globalization of trade right after its unification. We often forget that, according to many indicators, the peak of globalization was not reached some years ago but in 1914. (4_S_20120107)

On the other hand, the analysis reveals Monti's extremely large use of Europeanization-keywords. To begin with, the prime minister expresses his opinion about the causes of the crisis; he stresses the problems of flawed governance at European level and the limitations of European integration as well as the defects of both markets and institutions. He promptly refuses the argument that the euro itself is to blame for the crisis; rather, he underlines the dramatic importance of the proliferation of divisions among Europeans – a problem which, in a vicious circle, seems to be both a cause and an effect of the crisis:

- The crisis management has been suffering from flawed governance arrangements and it must be tackled with measures at European level. (4_S_20111117)
- I am also convinced that a big deal of responsibility for the crisis – at first a financial, then economic, now social and in part political crisis – which is affecting Europe and Italy is to trace back to the very serious defects in the functioning of both markets and financial institutions. (4_S_20111119)
- On the other hand, some believe that the crisis of the single sovereign debts has become systemic because of the lack of confidence in Europe's unitary response. (4_S_20120626)
- To think that the Euro is the cause of the crisis is not only an economic mistake, but an excuse or, even worse, an attempt to put the blame on Europe also for other problems concerning other responsibilities and very different interests. (4_I_20120119)
- These limitations to the European integration make the economic Union malfunction and prevent the Eurozone from being a perfectly working monetary area. (4_S_20120215)
- But the problem lies in the divisions among the various European countries. For example, there are some difficulties if Germany goes in a certain direction and Greek in the opposite one. (4_I_20120723)
- The Eurozone crisis has given rise to too many resentments, it has recreated too many stereotypes, it has divided the Europeans according to the latitude, it has divided them in central and peripherical States. All these classifications must definitely be rejected. (4_S_201120215)
- I do not think it is possible to understand the difficulties of the European political debate if we do not acknowledge that by now there is no shared vision of the causes neither of the necessary solutions to the crisis which Europe and the Eurozone are going through. (4_S_20120626)

Beside the mainly economic and financial issues concerning the crisis, Monti introduces a new argument. According to him, the crisis is closely related to the question of democracy in Europe, which, in his view, turns out to be the core problem in Europe today:

- At the same time, the crisis has stressed the need to legitimate European decisions. Unemployment causes huge damage, uncertainty and inequalities increase. Too many Europeans feel like in a tunnel. They are ready to make efforts if these latter are shared fairly. Above all, they want to know who takes the decisions and they want to have an influence on the choices in
order to retrieve dignity and hope. We are sure that, in order to overcome the crisis definitely, we have to rethink democracy at all levels – both European and national – without opposing them. (4_A_20120215)

- Among the issues raised by this crisis, no one is more important and more debated than the issue of democracy in Europe. (4_A_20120215)
- Nobody can affirm that national democracies work satisfactorily while “Europe” does not work. At the same time, the crisis has stressed the need for legitimation of European decisions. (4_A_20120215)
- I have confirmed our and my conviction that the crucial problem of Europe today – even more than the financial crisis which we hope we are overcoming – is to reconcile the integration and the decisions of economic policy with democracy. (4_S_20120223)

Against this background, the discourse concerning the causes, problems and dangers of the crisis appears to be constantly related to the necessary efforts urged by the crisis. As already touched upon above, Monti’s interventions feature a highly positive evaluation of the euro as well as of the European construction in general – and this, in turn, works as a legitimation strategy for the mentioned efforts. In line with Napolitano’s argument, Monti envisages no alternatives to Europe nor to the European single currency. Nevertheless, he does not underestimate the risks of the paradox from which the EU is suffering, caught as it is between the need for more integration and the danger of inaction:

- Moreover, the stabilization of our economy and of our financial and production system is crucial to tackle a European crisis which many times in recent months came close to becoming a systemic crisis. It is thus good to recall this, too: outside the euro and the common home of the European Union there are poverty and stagnation, the fall of incomes and of purchasing power […] (4_S_201111205)
- The euro has been the most ambitious perfectioning of the European construction up to now. We can allow all but that it becomes a factor of disgregation and separation among Europeans. There is this risk, it is clearly visible. I think and hope that we therefore commit ourselves to the solution of the Eurozone crisis, but we must make as many efforts to retrieve a spirit of unity and belonging to one single project. (4_S_20120215)
- We feel we must accept the challenge coming from this global and European crisis. We want to complete the European project of our fathers, we want to get to a united Europe which is able to show the way out of the crisis also to the other countries. (4_S_20120513)
- The crisis of the Eurozone is extremely serious and it is still there for the moment. But Europe has always developed going through the different stages of the crisis. Exactly in those moments, the European leaders and the public opinion decided that it was necessary to find more common points of contact and even to put efficiency before sovranity in some way. (4_I_20120723)
- Now is time for everyone to do his part. Nobody can think he can do without the others. Europe will overcome the crisis only if all components of the Union act in a convinced and united way. (4_S_20120107)
- The overcoming of the economic, financial and social crisis which is affecting Europe depends on structural reforms which are in the hands of the Member States and in their decisional capacity. (4_S_20120125)
- As you maybe already understood, I am completely convinced that the EU, even though the Eurozone is now in crisis, is a crucial factor for the modernization of each single country. (4_I_20120723)
- Nowadays to quit the Euro would mean to abandon the weakest and the poorest in the uncertainty. (4_I_20120119)
- I believe that at present the EU is one of the main factors of integration of the economies and of the social systems of the European peoples. (4_I_20120723)
- In this blend, citizens’ sense of frustration towards Europe would thus increase the paradox, too: in order to come out of the crisis there is an ever stronger need for integration, but if the European Council does not intervene concerning the Eurozone, public opinions, governments and also parliaments will move against that deeper integration which is instead necessary. (4_I_20120622)

Yet the picture emerging from Monti’s crisis accounts is not entirely bleak. The prime minister also stresses the positive aspects and the progress made since the beginning of the crisis. This, in turn, motivates his basically confident evaluation of future prospects. However, he clearly states that the crisis has not finished yet, despite the fact that the worst seems to be over:

- The answer to the Eurozone crisis at European level has been strong, especially with regard to the introduction of new and more credible rules of fiscal discipline as well as of an adequate fire wall. (4_S_20120417)
- The impression I have gained from these meetings and the recent events is that of a picture in evolution in which a way out of the serious crisis affecting Europe is taking shape. (4_S_20120125)
- Yes, I am confident. And I also dare say that the Greek crisis has clearly confirmed that Europe gets more mature and
stronger with the crisis [...] (4_I_20120521)

- Since the beginning of the Greek crisis two-three years ago, the EU has taken big steps forward towards a more integrated governance. I am sure that this time Europe will be able to take a step forward. However, in my opinion, this should be done a bit faster. (4_I_20120723)

- The Chancellor and I focused on the fact that we cannot relax, even though in this moment of European history it seems that the most acute financial crisis has been overcome. (4_P_20120313)

As for Italy's situation in this crisis context, Monti stresses like Napolitano the very interconnected nature of a crisis which he depicts as both Italian and European. In this last period, in fact, the domestic dimension of the crisis and its evolution appear to be linked more then ever to the development of the euro crisis, too:

- The recent events show that the fortunes of our country and of Europe are closely linked. The crisis of the Eurozone increases Italy's vulnerability and weakens its anchoring to the European context which has played a pivotal role in the past in stabilizing and protecting the country from the turbulences of the international economy. (4_S_201111205)

- The spreading of the sovereign debt crisis to other markets up to Italy, the third economy of the monetary Union, brought about the belief that the future of the euro depends also on the decisions Italy is taking. (4_S_201111205)

- The future of the euro also depends on what Italy is going to do in the next weeks. (4_S_20111117)

- Italy has given a decisive contribution to the stability of the euro area thanks to the incisive "extraordinary and courageus" measures, as President Sarkozy defined them [...] (4_S_20120107)

For this reason, the prime minister motivates the citizens to react and to take an active stance in the resolution of the crisis, although, he argues, Italy should not be blamed indistinctly if these general efforts worldwide turn out to be vain:

- For this reason, Italy, the government, the Parliament and the political forces have to play an active role in order to redefine the governance of the euro area in a fair and sustainable way by removing the weaknesses shown by the crisis and to bring the Union back to stability and growth. (4_S_20120125)

- However, should the crisis overflow despite the contribution of the US, Italy and several European countries, Italy would have a clear conscience, even if with troubled financial markets. (4_S_20120516)

Finally, as in Berlusconi's case, Monti often refers to Europe in its role of monitoring authority:

- The recommendations that the European Commission, the European Council, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund have made to Italy in recent months clearly show that the sovereign debt crisis is not only a crisis of public finance, it is a crisis of failed reforms. (4_S_201111205)

- Last summer, when the Head of Government Berlusconi and the Minister of Economy and Finance Tremonti had to readapt their economic policy – in order to take the crisis on the markets and the demands of the European Union into account – they acted, I think, all of a sudden in order to show determination, in the hope this would calm down the markets [...] Therefore, I am not criticizing at all [...] (4_S_20120416)

- Then, when it seemed that the crisis had loosened the grip, the pressure of the G20 has diminished. This tendency is peculiar both of the European Union and of the other international fora. (4_I_20120723)

5.2.1 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS

The mapping framework presented in table 2 turns out to be very helpful to sort out the findings of this second part of the analysis focusing on globalization, Europeanization and related concepts. The framework, as pointed out in section 2.1, features two variables: the nature (inevitable or contingent) and the connotation (unambiguously positive, contingent upon political choices or unambiguously negative) which are ascribed to the process in question.

GLOBALIZATION - Napolitano makes use of the globalization concept in each period, although the term does not always rank among the keywords. The resulting picture is not homogeneous. First, the head of states considers globalization as an inevitable process whose connotation is contingent upon political choices (period I, VI). According to this view, we are all completely immersed in the process of globalization, which, at present, urges to be re-directed on a more sustainable path. The global economic and financial
crisis, in fact, has shown that it is not a synonym for uninterrupted growth neither an antidote against crises. According to a second point of view, however, globalization appears either as an inevitable process negatively connotated or as a contingent project negatively connotated (period II). Its nature is not clear; for sure, however, the present crisis stresses the necessity to govern and tame globalization, whereby Napolitano appreciates the European project as the most promising candidate to accomplish this task. Yet also a third interpretation emerges, according to which the imbalance between the two main facets of globalization is at the core of the actual crisis itself (period III). These two facets are the hyper-developed economic globalization and its under-developed political counterpart. The imbalance problem between the two suggests that both are contingent processes, yet the economic globalization features a contingent connotation, while the political globalization, i.e. the system of global governance, is positively connotated, in that it helps to tame its economic counterpart. The vision of a contingent globalization process whose characterisation depends on political choices is confirmed in period IV, when Napolitano stresses its interconnection with the need for a more influent European construction. In any case, the head of state clearly rejects any simplistic vision of globalization, considering it neither as inevitable and unambiguously negative, nor as inevitable and unambiguously positive. Yet a last interpretation (period V) leads back to a threatening picture of globalization as something contingent but negatively connotated: since it could overwhelm us, so Napolitano’s claim, it has to be fight with interconnected solutions.

Berlusconi, on his part, delivers a less developed picture of globalization. He praises it as a contingent process positively connotated, whose progress has to be defended from the threat of a backlash of protectionism in times of crisis (period I). On the other hand, Italy is seen as struck by the crisis during its process of adaptation to globalization, which thus stands out as an inevitable process with open-end connotation (V). As for Monti, he almost never refers to globalization and is the only one to put the process in a rigorous historical perspective, supporting the argument that its peak was in the 1910s.

EUROPEANIZATION - Napolitano’s recourse to concepts concerning Europeanization – intended both as a project/process in itself and as the impact of this project/process on the political actors taking part in it – is best defined by two adjectives: all-pervasive and highly coherent. For the head of state, Europeanization means and can mean nothing but a contingent process with undoubtedly positive connotation, i.e. a political project which should be defended at all costs. The same argument is to find in all periods together with other often recurring sub-arguments, among which: a positive evaluation of the capacity and achievements of the European project; a positive evaluation of the European construction in general as well as of the European single currency as one of its main achievements, followed by the recognition that both have no alternatives; a critical stance towards the present weaknesses of the European project; the ensuing plead for more unity and political integration; the vision of the crisis as an opportunity to export this project and its own models and values; the European construction and its influence on the member states as a positive web of protection, as often shown with regard to Italy’s case. Against this background of arguments, Napolitano’s view of the relationship between globalization and Europeanization acquires great relevance. The European project, he argues, somehow anticipated globalization but now cannot hold the pace; from globalization thus all most important challenges originate which Europe has to cope with, first of all the threat of marginalization and political decline. However, the paradox pointed out by the head of state is that, at the
same time, globalization also represents the greatest chance ever for Europeanization to lead the way in showing the world how to (successfully) tame and govern it. Yet the President also acknowledges that the present crisis puts the unambiguously positive picture of Europeanization at stake. The increased scepticism towards this vision and the loss of confidence in it because of political mistakes risk to back an opposite view of Europeanization, i.e. that of a contingent process negatively connotated which should be resisted. The reversal of the Italians' traditionally pro-European attitude, for example, is observed with concern as a step in this direction.

With regard to Berlusconi, the analysis shows that also his crisis accounts are connected with a vision of Europeanization as a contingent process with positive connotation. However, three remarks should be made. First, the recourse to this topic is markedly less pervasive than in Napolitano's case. Second, this interpretation of Europeanization mainly tends to stress the advantages of supporting it because of its positive influence on the government's popularity at home. Third, Europeanization-keywords basically refer not to this positive interpretation of Europeanization but to three further aspects which play a crucial role in Berlusconi's crisis construction, i.e.: the focus on Europe as a political partner and an interlocutor in the global arena, the focus on Europe and European countries as terms of comparison to stress Italy's strengths and progress; and, finally, the focus on Europe as an external monitoring authority.

Monti shares Berlusconi's focus on this latter aspect; however, his arguments rather support Napolitano's standpoint. As a matter of fact, all the recurring themes dealt with above concerning the President's view of Europeanization as a contingent and positively connotated process are strengthened by Monti's interventions on the crisis issue. In this context, one aspect, however, is distinctive for Monti's approach to Europeanization, in that he stresses the importance of the problem of democracy in Europe as the most important issue in this time of crisis. He sees the risk that, because of it, the current perception of Europeanization could turn into that of a contingent process unambiguously negatively connotated and acknowledges that the present paradox of the (need for more) European integration and the (incapacity of) European action is already working in this direction.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The analysis of crisis accounts evidences elements of continuity in Napolitano's construction of the crisis, first of all the focus on its topicality, its consequences and the reactions to it. Progressively less emphasis is put on the crisis as an agent, and also the perception of the crisis as an opportunity increasingly fades out. Berlusconi's crisis accounts, on the contrary, are entirely centred on the sphere of reaction and aim to stress the achievements of his government by making a extremely large use of comparisons, especially with reference to other European countries. Monti shares with Napoletano the focus on topicality and with Berlusconi the focus on reaction; however, his crisis accounts turn out to be projected in the future rather than in the past, they feature an inclusive attitude motivating the efforts against the crisis and also reveal a much larger use of Europe-related issues than in the case of his predecessor.

As for the recourse to globalization, the keyword analysis has shown that Napolitano often refers to the concept, albeit not always in a coherent way. In any case, he rejects any simplistic vision and is seriously
concerned about the imbalance between economic and political globalization, which he also blames for the present crisis. For Berlusconi, globalization mainly represents a desirable contingent project which should be defended from protectionist backlashes, while Monti almost never refers to the concept.

Finally, Napolitano’s crisis accounts feature a pervasive recourse to Europeanization as a political project to defend. This adds to his constant plea for more and more integrated Europe, especially in times of crisis and as a form of globalization government. Napolitano and Monti share the request for more political integration as well as the concern about Europeans’ crisis-led loss of confidence in Europeanization, which risks to become a project to be resisted rather than defended. As for Berlusconi, his crisis accounts mainly depart from these themes, as they rather point at Europe as a political interlocutor, a monitoring authority and, especially, a term of comparison.

These findings concerning the variation of crisis accounts in the Italian political arena are to put in the context of a broader research project, which ampliates the present study in three respects: first, it takes further categories of actors into account (political parties, trade unions, employer associations and the press); second, it integrates the methodological toolbox of critical discourse analysis in order to perform an in-depth analysis of a selected part of the corpus; finally, it puts a stronger emphasis on the study of extra-semiotic factors affecting the variation, selection and retention of crisis accounts in Italy.

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