National Myth-Making
and Populist Mobilization in Scandinavia

This paper examines how three nationalist parties (the Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) in Denmark and the Progress Party (PP) in Norway) invokes, and radicalizes claims for national cohesion, centred on the experiences of the post-war Social Democratic traditions in these countries. We thus ask if and how these three nationalist-populist parties use national myths in the mobilization of voters.

Our focus on political myths corresponds to how political actors give significance to certain narratives of the past. Political myths do not merely tell and re-tell narratives; ultimately they enjoy a moralizing capacity and represent a creative force to discursively construct the foundation of e.g. national communities. By national myths we refer to particular narratives that aim to glue a distinct people to a particular national community, imagined or real, territorial or not.

The analysis shows how political myths of national exclusiveness and myths of the common man are invoked by these parties to radicalize claims for national cohesion. Our material is based on primary sources, such as party manifestos and autobiographies.

This perspective brings a novelty to the study of anti-immigrant parties in two distinct ways. First, we highlight the need of context-sensitivity; i.e. expanding beyond ideas that the ‘radical right’ parties succeed in the electoral competition, combining neo-liberal politics on economic matters and authoritarian views on e.g. immigration, integration, family, law and order. Considering the particular socio-political environment in the Scandinavian countries, these parties emphasize myths of the universal welfare state, combining social reforms with cultural conformism. Second, our analysis emphasizes how political actors give significance to certain narratives of the past by means of national myth-making to perform and inject a sense of belonging to the nation. In the attempts to gain credibility in the overall political competition of the votes, it is essential for these parties to cling on to particular narratives of the (national) past that appear common-sensical, rather than extremist.

In terms of the re-appropriation of the Social Democratic heritage, the SD stands out as the party most explicitly linking myths of national belonging to the ‘old’ Social Democracy. At the other extreme, the PP is more closely linked to a neo-liberal, anti-statist view. In between, the DPP invokes myths of national exclusiveness, shaped by extensive welfare arrangements, but the Social Democratic heritage is less significant, compared to e.g. the SD.

Our results show that national myth-making might take different paths, though here united in ideas of welfare-chauvinism and cultural conformism. If there is a ‘new’ Scandinavian party-family in the making, references to national myths that separate between decent workers and the indecent others are essential to recognize in this regard.

By way of conclusion, our analysis demonstrates that processes of national myth-making show different faces also in socio-economically similar countries. We thereby suggest that scholarly research in the field of nationalist-populist parties need to take full account of the historical legacy of individual parties, also in relation to the mainstream domestic political culture.
1. Introduction

In a debate 1912 against Hjalmar Branting, the leader of the Social Democratic party, the conservative scholar and member of the parliament Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) argued for his vision of Swedish society as “the People’s Home” [folkhemmet]. Kjellén insisted that the political institutions should mirror the particularities of the national character and not divide the country (Berman 2006: 164; cf. Berggren & Trägårdh 2006: 169; Hall 1998: 217). He welcomed the workers’ movement, but strongly resisted the class struggle that, in his view, only served to weaken the nation (Trägårdh 2002: 84). Instead, Kjellén hoped for a kind of “National Socialism”, based on corporatist principles—subordinating the class struggle to national cohesion and welfare (Stråth 2012: 28).

Considering the prominence the metaphor “the People’s Home” later gained in Swedish politics, this debate epitomizes the relevance of political myths for political mobilization. In contrast to the political positions of the 1912 debate, the metaphor of the People’s Home was later connected to the Social Democratic project of administrating social reforms after World War II. In its Social Democratic version, the People’s Home alluded to a trinity of democracy, the people and the nation that contributed to establish a founding myth of the modern Swedish welfare state. As such, the metaphor can be traced not only to Kjellén’s conservative and nationalist ideas but also to liberal ideas of civic education (Björck 2008). In the mid-1920s, liberal politicians used the term to criticize Social Democrats for prioritizing class interests before the public interest. However, when the Social Democrats referred to the People’s Home metaphor in the late 1920s and during the 1930s, under the leadership of Per Albin Hansson, it was to pursue social reforms that incorporated the lower classes into the polity (Karlsson 2001: 477–490).

In the discursive struggle for the proper name of “the people”, the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties from the 1930s onwards successfully combined visions of modernity with ideas of economic growth and state interventions in the market economy; hence, the Scandinavian, or Nordic, model (Stråth 2012). In Scandinavia, Nazi-style parties never came close to a parliamentary breakthrough and the mainstream-right was not influenced by fascism to the same extent as many other European countries, according to e.g. Sejersted (2011: 76).
In this context, the concept of the People’s Home illustrates how myths are contingent and potentially, politically efficient. Myths are powerful rhetorical instrument to provide substance to political claims for national cohesion (Bottici 2007). A myth, in this view, is not simply the opposite of ‘truth’ or a deliberate distortion of reality. Rather, myths constitute the plot in which the community identity is being formed (Stråth 2000: 20).

In line with such an understanding, we focus on how myths about the nation are used by contemporary nationalist political parties—in the literature commonly referred to as Populist Radical Right Parties (RRPs)—in the Scandinavian countries, to construe a narration of the nation that connects the past, via the present, with the future. The parties in question are the Sweden Democrats (SD) in Sweden, the Danish People’s Party (DPP) in Denmark and the Progress Party (PP) in Norway. By national myths we refer to particular narratives that aim to glue a distinct people to a particular national community. To be politically efficient, we assume processes national myth-making needs to cling on to popularly held narratives of the nation; hence, be more normal than extreme.

Sweden, Norway and Denmark were during the post-war period characterized by high political stability, universal welfare states, similar party families and most parties were closely linked to distinct social groups (Svåsand & Demker 2005). Between the 1930s and the 1960s, the party system remained essentially ‘frozen’ (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). These countries share many socio-economic features and common socio-political attributes, thus a similar plot in which the national identity is being formed. However, the historical legacy of the RRP parties in these countries differs and these parties also differ in terms of influence.

a. Political Opportunity Structures
Why do the RRP parties score better in some countries and not in others? Rather than a mere focus on the demand for such parties following e.g. the financial crisis, recent research on the RRP (Bournischer 2012; Rydgren 2010; Bale et al. 2010; Mudde 2007) suggests increased scholarly attention to the mainstream reactions of these parties and the salience of the immigration issue in the political debate. There is for instance no significant correlation between
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the electoral fortunes of the RRPs, and levels of unemployment, slow economic growth, ethnic heterogeneity (Rydgren 2007: 249–50) or the size of the immigration population (Sprague-Jones 2011). Instead, it seems relevant to focus on the supply-side and thus the “political opportunity structures” that demarcate the possibilities for the RRPs to provide an impact on domestic politics.

We understand political opportunity structures as the ’consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or failure’ (Tarrow 1988: 85; see also Kitschelt 1986). In order for the RRP parties to gain significant electoral fortunes, then, the sociologist Jens Rydgren (2006: 14–22) suggests that the following political opportunity structures need to be present: the appearances of niches in the electoral arena (e.g. “new” political parties need to emphasize “new” political issues not sufficiently recognized by the mainstream parties); voting behavior is structured along the socio-cultural cleavage structure and e.g. appropriates parts of the socio-economic cleavage structure (the political debate shifts attention from welfare vs. capital to life-style politics); issue salience (e.g. the immigration issue is high on the political agenda); the degree of convergence in the political space (e.g. the difference between the mainstream left and the mainstream right tend to); the degree of openness of the political system (e.g. the parliamentary threshold); responses by the other political parties to the emergence of the RRP parties (whether they choose to debar, defuse or adopt the RRP parties’ politics) and finally the behavior of the media (e.g. to what extent the ‘new’ parties gain access to the media space to orchestrate their politics).

We here suggest that the use of national myths in the political environment constitutes a relevant political opportunity structure that, potentially, affects the electoral outcome of the RRP parties in various countries. To gain credibility in the public space, then, we hypothesize that the three RRP parties in Sweden, Denmark and Norway take advantage of the opportunity of radicalizing and further accentuating national myths to secure its position in the political competition of the votes in these countries.

b. Aim of the study
We aim to analyze if and how the nationalist parties in Sweden, Denmark and Norway use myths of national exclusiveness and myths about the common man to radicalize popularly held sentiments in order to attract votes, successfully balancing the tightrope between radicalism and extremism. We will compare if and how the three RRP parties in Sweden, Denmark and Norway justify claims for national cohesion by referring to experiences of long-standing Social Democratic welfare regimes.

This approach, we argue, add essential context-sensitivity to the scholarly literature on the RRP parties. Our comparison is situated between the thin large-N studies and the thick single case studies that dominate the field. In general, RRP parties mobilize voters around an anti-elitist political agenda—the mainstream parties are accused of deserting the nation and the nationals, and to merely protect the interests of the privileged few. However, in order to understand their impact on domestic politics in specific countries, we need to bring full account of the object of their antagonism—that is the political and cultural “elites”. A comparison of the RRP in the Scandinavian countries needs to consider the national memories of long-lasting Social Democratic governments, we argue.

In many Western European countries, structural changes affecting the political competition for votes has made it increasingly difficult for Social Democratic parties to maintain the close relation between the people and the elite as a catalyst for progressive politics. Much of post-war politics was shaped around the socio-economic cleavage structure—between the left (advocating redistribution and interventionist welfare state policies) and the right (advocating more market-oriented solutions). Ellinas (2010: 26) recognizes, however, a socio-cultural shift in many stable democracies, towards a polarization between, on the one hand, those embracing post-material values and cultural pluralism and, on the other hand, those resisting such views to instead advocate cultural homogeneity and protectionism. Evidently, the RRP try to exploit this backlash.

A similar observation was made by Piero Ignazi (1992: 6) two decades ago when he hypothesized that the new extreme right parties reacted against the increased popularity and
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salience of post-material values (used by the left to challenge the established partisan structure to politicize “new” political issues; a process referred to as the silent revolution) to achieve electoral fortunes along the lines of a silent counter-revolution. Against ideals of e.g. individual self-realization, these parties mobilize voters along messages that instead privilege cultural belonging and (national) community cohesion.

The general shift in Western societies towards an emphasis on socio-cultural political issues coincide with a period of economic liberalization and greater exposure of national economies to international competition, a dual development which has severely affected Social Democratic parties, and their traditional strategies of achieving social cohesion (see e.g. Wennerhag & Gustavsson 2010). The Social Democratic parties in Europe have, in general, adapted economic policies that are more market-friendly than before, oriented towards the growing middle-class—often under the label of the third way—as well as less focused on the economic interests of their original primary constituency, the working class. For some observers, these developments open up opportunities for the ‘new’ RRP parties to attract working class voters (see e.g. Coffé 2008; Cuperus 2003; Mouffe 2005).

2. Material and outline
We will primarily analyze party programmes, party pamphlets and internal party material that concern the RRP parties’ stances towards both the Social-Democratic interpretation of national history and the universal welfare state as such.

We will begin with a section on the significance of political myths in modern politics. Here, we detail two such political myths. First, the myth of national exclusiveness articulates the national territory as moral landscape, equipped with normative considerations that possibly also extend the nation’s territorial boundaries. Second, we highlight the myth of the common people, ascribing to the broad masses of the nation a particular characteristic, distinct from ‘the elite’, as well as those at the bottom of the society and the ‘non-natives’. In the analysis, we will focus on how these political myths shows through in the parties’ self-presentation.

3. The politics of myths
During modernity, political myths are vehicles to satisfying popular demands of temporal continuity and stability, without relying on the truth-value of the myth as such. On the one hand, we consider the use of political myths as a re-occurring and social phenomenon, through which social cohesion is reproduced by means of both symbolic representation (e.g. rituals, traditions, memory-making and customs) and peoples’ lived experiences (Stråth 2000). Our focus on political myths corresponds to how political actors give significance to certain narratives of the past (Bottici 2007: 14). Political myths do not merely tell and re-tell narratives—ultimately they enjoy a moralizing capacity, aiming at the re-constitution of the basic values that underpin the foundation of the society.

Political myths correspond to the conjuring of a certain past. For Kølvraa and Ifversen (2011), then, the myth is a narrative of foundation. Political acts that re-call this foundational act are mythical, replaying “the original past” in present times. The common origin does not simply exist out there—it needs to be invoked by someone or something that mediate the words of “the spirit” (Petersson & Hellström 2003: 252).

Myths need not be expressions of nostalgia, though. The early 20th century philosopher and movement intellectual Georges Sorel insisted that myths, unlike religion, are future oriented and serve as tools for political mobilization (Sorel 1908/2004: 124–129). Following Sorel, the myth of ’the general strike’ underpinned the proletarian struggle; hence, mobilizing the fragmented workers’ demands into a united whole, by means of class struggle.

Here, we shall focus two particular images that embody uses of myths in the political communication of the votes; i.e. the myth of national exclusiveness and the myth of the common man.

a. The myth of national exclusiveness
Common symbols such as the national flag and the celebration of national days are used to ‘authenticate the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not’ (Elgenius 2011: 3). The sameness of the national people is communicated and pleaded for. Most modern nation-
states are founded on such myths of national belonging. Limiting the understanding of nationalism as the property of others—i.e., it happened before and elsewhere but not here and now (Billig 1995: 6; Hellström et. al 2012: 191)—tends to obscure commonsensical articulations of banal nationalism.

The populism scholar Paul Taggart uses the concept of the heartland to distinguish the populist appeals to “the people” from other appeals to”the people”. What characterizes populist appeals to “the people”, according to Taggart, is their exclusive focus on the population of a certain territory: the heartland. The populist appeal to the heartland embeds 'the positive aspects of everyday life’ and is simultaneously a construction of an ideal world that is constructed retrospectively—a vision derived from the past and projected onto the present (Taggart 2000: 95–98). In this regard, the heartland constitutes a claim to a common spirit foundation that creates a sense of belonging to a culturally homogenous and singular population. Appeals to the heartland suggest a semblance between “the virtuous people” who share precedence to their predestined home, and is founded on beliefs of a long-last past, diluted by the contemporary “elites”.

This is, however, by no means the only way to reproduce and communicate national exclusiveness. Certainly ideas and stories of what makes “our nation” distinct from others are told, deliberately or inadvertently, on a daily basis and as such appear banal and commonsensical. It can also be about articulating certain civic virtues of nationhood (such as tolerance, social cohesion and human rights) that are demarcated from other ’nationalities’ or religions such as Islam. National exclusiveness refers to the ways in which national communities are being reproduced as distinctively exclusive. This can be done both by civic and/or ethnic means. By references to narratives that extend the territorial boundaries of the nation such as western civilization or human rights, the demarcation line towards “the others” that do not cherish these beliefs is made with increased clarity.

In the analysis, we ask: what constitutes national exclusiveness according to the three RRP-parties put into scrutiny here?
b. The myth of the common people

Canovan (2004: 251) argues that the special quality enabling the ordinary people, by means of mobilized common action, to transcend into the position of “popular sovereign” rests upon the invocation of political myths of a past foundation and future redemption. According to Canovan, modern political systems cannot work properly without a certain mythology of “the people”. Even though popular demands of popular sovereignty and majority rule are balanced against the constitutional system of checks and balances, the appeals to 'the people' rest on a certain mythology of “the people”. Political representatives who claim to talk in the true name of the people express their mandate in the realm of political myths.

The people connotes to, on the one hand, the masses or the lower strata of the population and on the other hand to the citizenry of the state or the nation. Canovan (1999) distinguishes between three different ways of referring to the people in political discourse. First, it could refer to the united people as a contrast to the political elites that are accused of dividing the people, causing societal fragmentation. This appeal envisions the people as a united body in need of cautious care. Second, and sometimes at odds with the previous imagination, this appeal addresses the view that politics ultimately should be restricted to our people, e.g. the population of the heartland. This appeal is distinguishably exclusive, as it demarcates which groups of people—or ideas—that belong to the people. This appeal thus corresponds well with the myth of national exclusiveness.

Third, Canovan talks about the appeals to the common people against the educated and privileged cultural elites. This appeal regularly presupposes that the interests and views of the ordinary people are overridden by the political elites and ridiculed by the cultural elites. Certainly, parties that are ascribed to the label populist use this appeal to mobilize supporters against the establishment, including the values and norms shared by these elites. This particular appeal corresponds with the myth of the common man; she or he that knows how things really are without having to be told by the elite how she or he should live her or his life.
We thus ask: what are the attributes of the *common man* in the political language of the three RRP s put into scrutiny here?

### 4. National myths in Sweden, Denmark and Norway

The added value of our analysis features a detailed account how the ‘new’ nationalist parties in Sweden, Denmark and Norway use political myths to create a sense of belonging to the nation, challenging the established partisan structure of political competition. In this regard, the long-standing Social Democratic governance in Scandinavian politics constitutes the partisan context in which the RPP-parties operate—the Social Democrats are the arch-enemies and, in some of the cases, the heroes of the past. This does not suggest that these RPPs are more “left-wing” than similar parties elsewhere in Europe; rather we assume that they radicalize mainstream concerns, from both the left and the right, about the myths of national exclusiveness and the common man to authenticate claims for national cohesion.

#### 4.1. Sweden

After the Second World War, the Swedish national identity has been tightly linked to the welfare state. Furthermore, according to Trägårdh (2002: 80) the Social Democrats from the 1930s and onwards used a national narrative in which “[t]he “national” and “democracy” imperatives came to be inextricably fused, and with this followed the idea that the state and the people were joined in a common endeavor to safeguard the two freedoms, that of the nation and that of the individual’. During this time, the Social Democratic party also gradually shifted its focus from “class” to “people”, a move that reverberated with more popular notions of “Swedishness” (Hall 1998; Hellström et. al 2012).

These references were invoked by the party leader Hansson to implement universal welfare reforms within a liberal-democratic framework. This route was chosen to counter the more dramatic social transformations anticipated by the communists and the Nazis.

The most powerful national myth to signify the transformation of Sweden into a (Social Democratic) welfare state is arguably, then, “the People’s Home”. Perhaps less surprisingly, then, the RRP party, the Sweden Democrats (SD) presents itself as the “new People’s Home
party”. Since the last national elections in 2010, SD is for the first time represented in the national parliament (with 20 seats out of totally 349).

4.2. Denmark

There is no equivalent metaphor such as the People’s Home in Danish political history. In an introduction to Danish history, the author takes account of two national myths of Danish history that is frequently used in contemporary Danish history writing, though.

The first myth corresponds to a radical interpretation of history (Jespersen 2004: 188–191). In this view, after the defeat against Bismarck’s forces in 1864, Denmark was made into a midget state that had to act peacefully in relation to its larger neighbors to secure its’ survival. This view suggested that the Danes should mind their own business and look after their own house instead of playing with the “big guys”. This particular interpretation has e.g. been used to explain Denmark’s relatively skeptic attitudes towards larger political projects such as the EU. The widely spread myth of Denmark as a midget state, corresponds to what we above refer to as the myth of national exclusiveness.

The second relevant national myth is labeled “the farmer’s approach” (ibid: 192f). This myth emanated from the agrarian reforms in the late 18th century that later developed during the following century and was further accentuated by the growing middle-class. As a consequence, following this interpretation, the country developed into a country of free and equal individual farmers that increasingly espoused a liberal ideology. This myth depict the Danes as emanating from the collective of decent farmers that later also came to encompass the decency and diligence attributed to the working movement. In other words, the myth of the Danes as decent and culturally similar workers corresponds to what we above refer to as the myth of the common man.

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1 The author himself does not use the concept of ‘myth’ here, though it falls into our understanding of national making in the sense that these aspects offer an understanding of the Danish history that gives significance to certain narratives of the past and ‘defines how the people of a nation see themselves’ (Jespersen 2004: 187).
In sum these two myths of the Danish nation and the Danes suggested that the consequences of the defeat against Bismarck’s Germany in 1864 gave rise to strong feelings of national exclusiveness (Jespersen 2004: 201). Via the folk school reforms, then, in a Grundtvigian\(^2\) perspective (ibid: 203): ‘social responsibility, Christianity and national identity were inextricably linked in a higher entity—that of Danishness’. The formation of the universal Danish welfare state epitomizes the significance of national exclusiveness in Denmark. The values of the peasant society were fused with a wider recognition of the nation, the state and the people. For a long period of time, then, the Social Democratic party carried the national myths of a country that managed well on its own and, like in Sweden, implemented reforms that leveled the social cleavages in the society.

4.3. Norway

In his comparison of the impact of the Social Democratic parties for developing the “Scandinavian model” in Sweden and Norway, the Norwegian historian Francis Sejersted (2011: 165–166) notes that the “people’s home” metaphor did not take hold in Norwegian politics in the 1930s, despite the fact that the two parties were inspired by each other in many policy areas. While the Swedish Social Democrats used this metaphor, the Norwegians ‘had a whole arsenal of accumulated metaphors, pictures, and ideas that expressed national fellowship’, often connected to the (at the time very) democratic constitution of 1814, and the later struggle for full national independence from Sweden (ibid). Sejersted concludes that ‘[i]n Sweden there were no national symbols tied to history that were equally applicable. Sweden was the land of the future, destined to create new symbols of fellowship from the currency of the times.’ (ibid: 166).

In 1905, the union between Norway and Sweden was dissolved (an arrangement that was made between the states in 1815, when Denmark was forced to lend over Norway to Sweden) and Norway became an independent nation-state in its own right. The struggle for independence has left a strong mark on the formation of Norwegian national identity (Elgenius 2012). The

\(^2\) Nikolaj Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872) is an important figure in the official national narration in Denmark. He has written several psalms and poems and is e.g. recognized for his ideas of education formation also for the less privileged classes in the Danish society.
celebration of the national day in Norway—to celebrate its constitution from 1814 on the 17th of May—feature a much celebrated flagging of nationhood (ibid: 112–115; see also Blehr 2000).

A first dominant myth, then, relates to Norway as a strong independent state. The significance of the national day celebrations points towards an exclusive national narrative that celebrates the national community against foreign imposition (by the Danes, Swedes, or the Nazis) on Norwegian autonomy. Secondly, the independence movement consistently looked into the origins of Norwegian history to construe particular traits that define Norwegians as Norwegians. This includes ideas of the Norwegian people as particularly close to nature and closely attached to smaller local units, but also that the Norwegians are akin to conform to an egalitarian view on the social structuring of the national community (Blehr 2000: 50–51). With the interwar transformation of the Social Democratic party, from a party oriented towards class struggle into a “people’s party”, these narrations of Norwegian history merged with reformist ambitions to level social cleavages and to counteract economic crisis (Sejersted 2011: 162–166).

5. The analysis

a. The Sweden Democrats

The SD organized an annual meeting on the 10th of June 1989 where the newly formed party decided on its first party programme. The second sentence reads: ‘We believe that an ethnically and culturally homogenous nation is better equipped to obtain a peaceful and democratic development, compared to a multi-cultural, heterogeneous state formation’ (Sverigedemokraterna 1989).

Certainly, the party has changed quite drastically since then, though, it already here laid out the basic contours of its political agenda. The overall aim is to turn Sweden into a homogenous national community; populated by culturally similar individuals. All the native Swedes should enjoy the same basic democratic rights, and it claims to present a democratic viable alternative in Swedish politics contrary to the parliamentary parties who only wish to secure the interests of the privileged few, “the elite”.
The SD developed from a Neo-Nazi like organization to now attracting voters from all the other parties—plus those who usually abstain from voting. During its history, extremist views were gradually abandoned (such as demands for reinstating the death penalty or resistance towards extra-European adoptions), and party members expressing extremist views were occasionally expelled. Today, SD claims to represent the man on the street, to advocate a “responsible” immigration policy (in their view, Swedish immigration policy is extreme) and tough policies regarding integration. In the party documents, the SD refers to the days of the Social Democracy under Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who was in office 1946–1969. This period was the People’s Home at its best and the national community the party wishes to restore.

The early 1990s provided a fertile ground for new immigration-skeptic parties in Sweden, and between 1991 and 1994 the right-wing Populist Party Ny Demokrati (“New Democracy”, NyD) achieved representation in the Swedish parliament. Meanwhile the SD mobilized in the streets and had limited interest in parliamentary activities. The NyD used a rhetoric that mobilized fragmented voters against the establishment, high taxes, bureaucracy, and gradually also immigration; however the party quickly disappeared from the political scene (Westlind 1996). The SD was yet not capable of occupying a stable position in Swedish politics. In 2001, the party was in practice split into two and the more extremist-prone activists formed a new party (Nationaldemokraterna, “The National Democrats”), a move that facilitated the transformation of the SD into a more pragmatic and moderate party (Art 2011).

The electoral breakthrough came in 2010, when the SD crossed the four percent electoral threshold to the national parliament with 5.7 percent of the overall votes. Before 2006, when it gained seats in approximately half the country’s local municipalities, the SD was a quite marginal phenomenon in Swedish politics and its position in the political competition was rather weak as a consequence.

i. National exclusiveness

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3 Socio-economically, the SD voters are in between the two blocs in national politics in terms of opinion preferences (Sannerstedt 2008). The party attracts mainly men, but not necessarily the socially marginalized people. Comparatively, though, the party attracts voters with strong working class identity (Nilsson & Schön 2010).
In a speech on May Day in 2004, the SD Party Secretary, Björn Söder (2010), paid his respect to the previously mentioned Rudolf Kjellén and “the People’s Home” as a mobilizing metaphor:

The basic idea was to realize an ideological compromise, combining Conservatism and its respect for traditional values with democracy and reforms against social injustices. Instead of simply watching when the people was divided into different class interests, he tried—just like Verner von Heidenstam—to creating a fellow feeling and solidarity, by means of emphasizing our common past and everything that unites us. This vision of Sweden, some decades before Per Albin Hansson did, he labeled the People’s Home.

This speech epitomizes the ambition of the SD to, on the one hand, appreciate the conservative organic view of the nation and its homogenous population, on the other hand, the admiration of “old” Social Democracy’s ambitions to transgress class cleavages and unite the Swedish people in the People’s Home. The myth of national exclusiveness that SD wishes to restore is fully embedded in its uses of the “People’s Home” as a mobilizing metaphor for social cohesion and cultural homogeneity.4

The People’s Home is both a rhetorical means to pursue democratic reforms and also the founding myth of Sweden from the 1930s onwards. It is this seamless fusion between *demos* and *ethnos* (Trägårdh 2002: 83) that, arguably, appeal to the SD:

Sweden is the land of the Swedes. By this, the Sweden Democrats does not imply that we, the Swedes, are better than others, rather Sweden is the only place on earth where we have an absolute right to act and develop our special character and identity (Sverigedemokraterna 2003).

In the party programme from 2003 the SD makes references to biological diversity; the different species are all needed for the good of the nature, and analogously, the different cultures are needed for the good of humanity. As SD conceives it, the Social Democratic governments of

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4 At the SD party congress in November 2011, the SD defined its ideology as rooted in 'social conservatism' and thus not merely nationalism. Probably, this terminological shift signifies a wish to broaden the party’s political agenda (Hellström et. al 2012).
later decades have deserted the idea of the People’s Home. In its election manifesto from 2010, the SD explicates why this, according to the party, is the case:

Our country has let too many people in too quickly […]. The irresponsible and undemanding Swedish integration and immigration politics has also caused segregation, rootlessness, criminality and increased tensions. The multi-cultural societal order today makes a serious threat to the internal cohesion and stability that conditions the whole solidarity of the Swedish welfare model.

To sum up, the SD envisions Sweden and Swedishness as something belonging to an ideal construction of ‘the heartland’, epitomized by the metaphor of the “People’s Home”. This is what makes the Swedish national community exclusive. The SD seeks to capitalize on a common heritage, by means of invoking the political myth of national exclusiveness to, on the one hand, appreciate the ’old’ Social Democracy and, on the other hand, to criticize the ’new’ Social Democrats for having let the native population down by letting in too many foreign people too quickly.

**ii. The Common Man**

For the SD, the Swedish national identity is today being ridiculed, the immigration to Sweden from ‘culturally remote regions and countries’ has negatively impeded the Swedish welfare state, and the naïve appreciation of multi-culturalism is counterproductive for the efforts to assimilate new immigrants into the Swedish society. As a consequence, the common people has to suffer from the deterioration of the welfare state, high levels of criminality and the gradual abundance of national traditions and values that historically has provided the natives with a sense of common belonging.

According to the rhetoric, the SD speaks frankly about for instance Islam and it is the only party that speaks for the man on the street. The common man is of native origin. SD’s definition of Swedishness is repeated in many party programmes and policy documents and reads as follows (See e.g. Sverigedemokraterna 2003; Sverigedemokraterna 2010): ‘Swedish applies to the one who has a principal Swedish identity, and is from her own perspective and is by others regarded as Swedish.’ The party defines this view as “open Swedishness”: anyone willing to assimilate
well into the nation is free to do so. At the same time, this ambition can take generations to realize, since in this view cultural belonging determines personal identification.

The figure of the common man is rooted in myths about the freedom-loving, democratic-prone Swedish workers and farmers (the yeoman) that contributed to configure the nationalist conservative currents of the 19th century, as well as the Social Democratic movement during the early 20th century (see e.g. Trägårdh 2002; Stråth 2012). Thereby, myths about the common people are embedded in popular narratives of the Swedish national soul.

Finally, then, the references to the myth of the common man enable the SD to distinguish between, on the one hand, “the people” and “the elite”, and on the other hand, between decent workers that try to make the everyday go around, and those at the bottom of society—including e.g. foreigners—being more crime-prone and less equipped to live up to the standards of the Swedish society. The common man refers to the common Swede who is tired of being ridiculed by the political and cultural elites to speak freely about immigration, which here means being against (too much) immigration into Sweden.

b. The Danish People’s party

In 1973 the Danish Progress Party gained almost 16 percent of the overall votes with a political rhetoric that was neo-liberal, anti-tax, and fundamentally anti-elitist (See further Meret 2010). In 1995, under the chairmanship of Pia Kjaersgaard, the DPP was formed as a splinter group from the Danish Progress Party. In the 1998 elections, the DPP gained half of their votes from people that earlier had casted their votes on the Progress Party. In these elections, the DPP gained approximately seven percent of the votes and their presence created much controversy and antipathies among the mainstream political actors. In 2001, however, the DPP became the supporting cast of the mainstream right government under Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Trads 2002; Bjerre 2009).

The DPP aspired to become a socially responsible party and gradually let go with the neo-liberal tendencies (Trads 2002: 26), which also better corresponded with their target groups in the
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electorate that showed to be pro welfare-state arrangements (Meret 2010: 106). It adapted a political language that spoke for “the weak” in society. In the recent national elections, when the Social Democrats again seized governmental power, the DPP was made part of the opposition, yet its’ position in Danish partisan politics is considerably stronger (in the last national elections in 2011 it received 12.3 per cent of the votes) than e.g. the SD in Sweden. In addition, its’ strong anti-immigration stance has been taken up by the other parliamentary parties in Denmark (Hervik 2011).

i. National exclusiveness
During the DPP annual meeting in 2006, the party’s chairperson Pia Kjærsgaard accuses the Social Democrats for having neglected the elderly. In her speech at the annual convent in 2006, the message is that: ‘A real Social Democrat votes for the Danish People’s Party’ (Dansk Folkeblad 2006). Otherwise the myth of national exclusiveness, in DPP’s political language, is not mainly oriented towards Denmark under Social Democratic governance.

In its comprehensive “working programme” (Arbejdsprogram), the party (2009) refers, more generally, to the particularities of Denmark’s history. According to the programme, Denmark has generated a culture with certain values (such as gender equality, freedom, tolerance, humor and diligence) that has persisted over time. Even a tiny nation, such as Denmark, has over time developed a certain cultural heritage that needs to be protected against (too much) foreign elements.

The DPP claims to protect the (Social Democratic) welfare state and warns for the dangers of multiculturalism, and in particular it capitalizes on popular fears of radical Islamism (Meret 2010). In 2001, the party let publish a book, partly a manifest, to explain what hitherto has went wrong in Denmark. The problem, as the party sees it, is the naïve appreciation of multi-cultural elements and that the political elite has avoided to speak frankly about the negative consequences of the current immigration from e.g. the Islamic countries (Thulesen Dahl et. al. 2001).

According to the party Denmark is not an immigrant country and it explicitly states that

5 Concerning the social composition of DPP’s electorate, Susi Meret (2010: 228) shows that in the 2007 elections, the party had a relatively higher percentage of workers amongst its voters (+24 percent in relation to the average of all parties) than the Social Democratic party did (+7 in relation to the average).
Denmark needs to protect its cultural heritage against foreign elements. Otherwise, Denmark — as we know it — will practically cease to exist. They argue that a tiny country like Denmark needs to secure its own borders and protects itself against (too) much foreign influence. Therefore, the party fights against the development of Denmark into a multi-ethnic state.

What makes Denmark distinct, according to the 2009 party programme, is its proud traditions of monarchy and Christianity. Certainly, the Danish constitution allows freedom of religion, but at the same time, the DPP follows the Danish constitution and claims it is only the Lutheran, evangelical Christian Church that should be sponsored by the state. In this view, the DPP distances itself from the “cultural radicals” who in their resistance towards old traditions and norms neglect their own cultural background. The moralizing capacities of the political myth of national exclusiveness underpin the foundation of the Danish national community and as such it makes references to narratives extending the nation; e.g. western civilization and ideals of Christianity.

The myth of national exclusiveness, in DPPs interpretation, is not anti-statist. In the programme, the welfare state is fully appreciated and given full recognition. The DPP wants to protect those marginalized in the Danish society, and proudly announces that the Danes appreciate high taxes in order to maintain a well-functioning public sector (though, they argue that the international competition demands measures that allow for the rationalization of the public sector). The DPP writes extensively on the need to fight corruption and bureaucracy.

The myth of national exclusiveness is invoked to describe a little nation that obtained a high standard of living thanks to a historically limited immigration to the country:

The form of life that we have chosen in Denmark is unique. It is conditioned by our culture, and in such a small country as ours, it cannot survive if we allow mass immigration of foreign religions and foreign cultures. A multicultural society is a society without inner coherence and unity, and this is the reason why the multicultural societies of this world are shaped by a lack of solidarity and, often, also by open conflict (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: #22).
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This interpretation clearly corresponds to the view that Denmark, at least after the defeat against Bismarck in the 19th century constitutes a ‘midget state’, yet nationally exclusive and in need of protection. It could thus be argued that the DPP radicalizes myths of Denmark as a midget state and a country of free and equal individuals (farmers) to authenticate claims for national cohesion. The Danes are perfectly capable of managing their own affairs, but following this line of reasoning it is impossible for the Danish welfare state to handle too much immigration.

Denmark belongs to the Danes and the DPP works hard against any development towards a multi-ethnic society—associated with parallel societies and ghettos—that risk undermining the basic solidarity of the Danes. This vision entails memories of a common cultural heritage that continues to prosper, provided that the immigration remains limited and the integration works smoothly to teach “them” how to adjust to the Danish culture. However, Islam is seen as incompatible with the Danish value system, and as a consequence most Muslims should be repatriated and be sent back “home”.

In various passages of the 2009 party programme, Islamism is mentioned as a totalitarian ideology similar to communism or Nazism. The DPP e.g. opposes Turkey becoming member of the EU as the country is conceived as belonging to the Middle East with its incompatible value-system, and not in Europe. In DPPs view, poverty is culturally determined, and Denmark should not import the problems of “the third world” but help those suffering in the heath. Again, the myth of Denmark as a little nation sustains the party mobilization against foreign elements that allegedly threaten community cohesion.

In sum, the rhetoric says that Denmark is on the right way to restore the glory of the great Danish homogenous nation. This is very much due to that the DPP acted as a supporting party for the right-wing governmental coalition. It has helped many people to return to “their homes” and put pressures on the remaining immigrants to fully adapt to the Danish culture. The DPP combines an organic conceptualization of the nation with a pro-welfare stance, i.e. the welfare depends on solidarity between the citizens and is shaped by a common trust in the country’s values and traditions.
ii. The Common Man

When the DPP gained ownership of the immigration issue in the Danish political debate, also the other parties—including the Social Democrats—started to conceptualize the concerns of the common man in terms of values, traditions and the need of enhancing the state’s efforts to integrate immigrants into the Danish society (Meret 2010: 109). The common man believes in the freedom of rights and refuses to be curtailed by the political and cultural elites who intervene in their everyday life. This tradition, unique for the Nordic countries it is said, appreciates individual integrity and individual rights; i.e. individual responsibility combined with a strong sense of diligence (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: #11; cf. Thulesen et. al 2001: 193). In this view, the Nordic people have fought hard to achieve the freedom which is now being threatened by religious and ideological movements that leave little space for individual autonomy.

The DPP warns about the consequences of that governments, in a spirit of political correctness (Dansk Folkeparti 2009: #2), dismiss deviant opinions of “the people”. The common man is separated from non-natives (including non-native religions), the politically correct elite that governed the country before 2001, and criminals.

The DPP makes it explicit that the natural foundation of the Danish society is the nuclear family. However, the party’s emphasis on family values and the traditional Christian Danish family is less important than its resistance to Islam (Dansk Folkeparti: #24). The DPP advocates cultural-conservative views on adoption, abortion, Gay-marriage and on gender. At the same time, it expresses its dislike with ‘other cultures’ (predominantly Islamic) that, according to the party, hardly merge with the concerns of the common man: ‘In Denmark, the immigration from in particular Islamic countries has brought with it other and more feudal family patterns. These values are not compatible with the views on gender roles and women’s rights that have been the norm in Denmark’ (ibid; cf. Thulesen Dal 2001: 190).

The common man, following this strand, refuses foreign ideas that resist the values of freedom, tolerance, diligence and Christianity that came as a result of increased immigration. The myth of
the common man resonates with the idea that the Danes share a common right to protect itself against unwanted visits. Both the programme from 2009 and the book from 2001 show a great trust in the Danes’ capability of managing (best) their own affairs without too much involvement of the state that only risk unfair discrimination against the Danes in their own country. The common man is of native origin and akin to commit to the values of Christianity, freedom of speech and tolerance.

c. The Progress Party

In Norway, the Progress Party (PP) has during the last years grown to become (one of) the largest opposition parties in the national parliament of Norway, and in the last national election in 2009 it was supported by almost one quarter of the Norwegians voters. The PP has a long and rather stable position in Norwegian politics. Already in 1973, the party crossed the electoral threshold and gained four seats in the national parliament under the name of its leader, Anders Lange. The party was established only two weeks before the elections and initially it argued for reductions in taxes and public intervention (Fryklund & Peterson 1981: 212).

In 1978, Carl I Hagen was elected party leader and continued on this post until 2006 (Ekeberg & Snoen 2001). Even though the party already in the 1970s argued against development aid, ‘immigration was not made into a significant political issue by the PP until the mid-1980s’ (Hagelund 2003: 52–53). During the 1990s, the immigration issue gained salience in the party’s repertoire as they also started to warn about the dangers of cultural heterogeneity; i.e. immigration was transformed from an economic to a cultural issue.

What is significant for the PP is its liberalist and explicit anti-statist stance, though this position has become more pragmatic over time. The argumentative logic is that the welfare state gives priority to immigrants instead of native Norwegian taxpayers. The PP is concerned with the alleged discrimination against Norwegians, and argues that the immigrants do not need special treatment.

In the 1990s, social inequalities were increasingly linked to questions about cultural diversity, and according to this line of argumentation, cultural diversity risks to nurture fragmentation, and
create further inequality and injustice in the Norwegian society. Following Hagelund (2003: 57), the immigration issue was not only problematized, the debate was also moralized and polarized between the PP and the rest of the Norwegian parties. The PP consequently distances itself from racism (including the SD and similar parties), to instead talk about honesty and tolerance.

The PP explicitly endeavors to unite the employers and the employees against the (Social Democratic) state, which—according to the PP—has intervened too much in welfare politics.\(^6\)

\textit{i. National exclusiveness}

In its party programme, the PP refers to liberalism as its ideological foundation, which differs from the outspoken conservatism and nationalism of both SD and DPP. The PP speaks—comparatively—very little about a particular Norwegian national origin. In the programme, it is mentioned that the party is rooted in ‘Norwegian and Western tradition and cultural heritage, being based on a Christian view of life and Humanistic values’ (Fremskrittpartiet 2009). However, much more central is the anti-state stance:

\ldots people are better equipped than politicians to decide what is best for themselves and those nearest to them. […] This means that ordinary people should be given better opportunities to take care of themselves and their families, and state control should be kept to a minimum. […] Power should be transferred from the politicians to ordinary people. We wish to accomplish this through letting the inhabitants keep more of their tax money, and by leaving more of the tasks of the public sector to individuals, the private sector and the NGOs (Fremskrittpartiet 2009).

The stance against immigration follows from this anti-statist view. In its official programme, the party demands that ‘Norway’s reception of people from countries outside of the Western civilization should be sharply limited’. Here, immigration is depicted as a cause to internal conflicts, as well as an imminent threat:

\footnote{6 Considering the party’s original critique of high taxes and welfare state interventionism from the mid-1970s, Cas Mudde (2007: 47) classifies the party as neo-liberal populist.}
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There are reasons to fear that a continued immigration of asylum seekers, in an extent only close to that of recent years, will lead to serious conflicts between ethnic groups in Norway. It is ethically indefensible to not drastically reduce immigration to prevent conflicts in Norwegian society (Fremskrittspartiet 2009).

However, in a report about 'immigration and integration' from PP’s parliamentary group, the negative stance towards immigration is also motivated by the party’s liberal roots. With special address to immigrants from Muslim countries, this report states that ‘it cannot under any circumstances be accepted that Norwegian law is e.g. replaced with Islamic Sharia law, even if this was, hypothetically, done by means of democratic processes. Sharia law is fundamentally anti-liberal’ (Fremskrittspartiet 2007: 8).

In sum, it makes little sense to discuss the PP’s programmatic appeals as rooted in myths of national origin. Rather the myth of national exclusiveness articulates itself in trans-national narratives of e.g. western civilization and human rights.

Myths of national exclusiveness in the party programme are rooted in ideas of a country of individual nationals, capable of managing their own affairs, deceived by politicians prone to regulations, too high taxes, and too extensive welfare services. In comparison to the SD and the DPP, the PP does not—at least in its party programmes—use figures or metaphors that invoke a specific Norwegian “national character”.

What is central is the separation between state and society. In turn, foreign cultures should not be forced on to the native Norwegian society:

Expressions from other cultures should be integrated at a natural pace and should not be a task for the public sector. Norwegian culture lives in a natural interaction with other cultures, and therefore it does not need internal measures to absorb new influences—they are best received when they are not being forced. (Fremskrittspartiet 2009).

The critique that underlies this claim is, arguably, the idea that the state is used by the elites to disseminate “foreign culture” in the country. However, what is identified as the main problem is
not foreign culture as such (apart from immigrants coming from Muslim countries), but rather “the elites” who are in command of the state.

**ii. The Common Man**

In the election campaign of 1989, Carl I. Hagen debated with the current Social Democratic Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland. His ambition was to show that the PP was the new worker’s party (Ekeberg & Snoen 2001). Hagen separated between those that deserved welfare state assistance and those that did not. His message was that the decent worker should vote for the PP instead of the Social Democrats.

According to Magnus Marsdal (2008), the success of the Norwegian Progress Party in the 2005 general elections (22 percent) can be explicitly linked to the inability of the Norwegian Social Democratic Party to attract ordinary workers. After decades of being the governing party in Norway, it has—according to Marsdal—distanced itself from the people that it claims to represent. In this context, the PP has emerged as a party that claims to speak directly to people’s hearts (ibid: 281). In other words, it claims to speak for the common man; i.e. the decent Norwegian workers.

The PP’s programme makes explicit that the party wishes to ‘introduce an active integration policy based on the rules, norms and values that are supposed to be common for the whole population, and which must have precedence before the interests of individual groups’. It is also said that immigrants should only receive social benefits, ‘given the condition that they are willing to integrate and learn Norwegian’, and furthermore that welfare services ‘should increasingly be linked to citizenship or other appropriate delimitations’. Even though “the other” is not ascribed to a certain essence, it is clear that these demands presuppose a view that immigrants are unwilling to integrate, and—in contrast to the “decent” common man—allegedly take undue advantage of the nation’s welfare services.

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7 Marsdal (2008: 280) argues that the PP successfully plays on the populist divide between the people and the Oslo intelligentsia.
A distinction is made between “decent citizens” and those over-using welfare services: ‘We believe that the efforts to expose those who abuse the welfare system, and thus contribute to undermining the welfare system that has been created in Norway, must be intensified.’ (Fremskrittspartiet 2009).

Certainly, the immigration issue is used strategically by the PP to attract more voters, but the resistance towards immigration is foremost being motivated by a liberalist kind of populism, pitting “the common man” who takes responsibility for her/his own life, against the political elites that wishes to expand the state and give resources to the indecent others. The PP uses of the myths of national exclusiveness do not project ideas of restoring the former glory of the Social Democratic era; rather the theme of national exclusiveness clings on to individualist visions of a native self-contained citizenry. Yet, the myth of the “common man” is fully recognized and attributed to the native decent worker.

6. Concluding discussion
References to the myth of national exclusiveness bolster views of “the people” that, hypothetically, combines demos with ethnos. These particular myth fuels political stances that champion the need of cultural affinity in democratic regimes. The references to “the common people” aim to bridge the gap between the voters and their representatives. Arguably, these myths gain salience in contemporary European societies where the traditional political parties fail, as it seems, to satisfy the demands of the broader masses (Mair 2011). The political identities of the mainstream parties are increasingly blurred, which in turn invites new political actors to occupy an underdog position (hence, a niche) in relation to the established elites (ibid.).

In this paper, we have analyzed three such “new” political actors—the Scandinavian RPP parties the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti), and The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in Norway. We have asked the question if and how these parties make use of national myths to occupy a stable position in the political competition of the votes. We have suggested that the uses of national myths in the political environment represent, potentially, a relevant political opportunity structure in the electoral market. From our analysis we can conclude that both the SD and the DPP make use of national myths of national
exclusiveness and the common man to gaining credibility in the political space. This is in line with our basic hypothesis. However, this is not the case with the PP in Norway.

The three parties have attracted considerable proportions of voters from the working class—i.e. previously the prime supporters for Social Democratic governments and policies—during recent elections. In terms of re-appropriation of the heritage of Social Democracy, and of its traditional model of the welfare state, the SD stands out as the party most reaffirming “old” Social Democracy, e.g. frequently using “the People’s Home” metaphor and also being prone to combine welfare state reforms with cultural conformist policies. The myth of national exclusiveness is by SD both constituted by a strong welfare state and a re-appropriated (Social Democratic) past, but under conditions of cultural homogeneity.

The other extreme of our study is the PP, which neither reaffirms the Social Democratic past, nor calls for an expanded welfare state. Rather, in the Norwegian case, national exclusiveness consists of a nation in which the individual “common man” is managing her/his own affairs, and the intervening state—and its Social Democratic politicians—should enjoy less power to interfere in the daily life of ordinary citizens. More clearly, the PP demonstrates allegiance to trans-national loyalties such as human rights and western civilization that yet serves to confirm a distance to the unwelcome (Muslim) others in the country.

In between, we find the DPP, whose ideas of national exclusiveness are constituted by extensive welfare arrangements, but where Social Democracy is not seen as a reference of particular historical importance.

As put by Kitschelt and McGann (1996: 138): ‘Workers are not attracted to the extreme Right because of its free market appeal but because of its insistence on restricting the access to the welfare state to nationals, thus expressing a certain “welfare chauvinism”’. Taking into account the possible issue convergence of these three parties over time, the similarities between these parties rest on the moral separation between the “common man” loyal to the welfare state and “the others” that, allegedly, exploit the system. It is not their specific views on the economy
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In their populist mobilization efforts, the three parties—Labour (market versus state); rather it is their particular nativist approach to the welfare state that unites the three parties.

Partly, these findings should be interpreted in relation to the earlier research (e.g. Rydgren 2010), which suggest that countries still dominated by socio-economic cleavages provide less favorable political opportunities for the RPPs to thrive on their (socio-cultural) anti-immigration and cultural protectionist agenda. Sweden has often been seen as a country dominated almost exclusively by the socio-economic political cleavage, and thus, it is not completely unforeseen that the SD, in order to have political success, makes active interventions along the socio-economic political dimension and in class politics. On the other hand, even though the socio-economic cleavage has been important in Norway, the cleavage structures also convey the centre-periphery cleavage—pitting the urban elites against the people in rural areas. This shows through in the PP rhetoric. This also invites further analyses of which particular political opportunity structures the PP use in its ambitions to gain electoral fortunes and thus increased political credibility.

It is important to compare the relative need of the parties to expand its electorate. To achieve credibility in public space, then, these three parties act on nation-specific settings to dwell on their particular historical legacies to attract voters and thus invoke and radicalize claims for national cohesion.

Ultimately our analysis shows that the historical legacy of these parties and shifting ideological positioning in the overall competition of the votes mirror their different relations to both the old Social Democratic national heritage and the new Social Democrats. Our comparison of three nationalist parties in similar political environments displays that processes of national myth-making takes different paths and are not recognized as equally salient by the parties themselves. What unties the three RRP parties put into scrutiny here, however, is the combination of welfare-chauvinism and cultural conformism, rooted in the appreciation of the native decent worker.
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