

Religious Change in Europe (1980-2008)

Paper to be presented at the SISP Annual Conference

Venice (16– 18 September 2010)

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1. Introduction.

This paper is a first tentative approach to do a descriptive account of changes in religiosity in Europe over the last thirty years. The ultimate purpose of the paper is to be the introductory chapter of a collective book on Religion and Politics edited by José Ramón Montero, Paolo Segatti and Kerman Calvo. Given this ultimate aim, the paper has more a descriptive than an explanatory character.

Our paper does not examine the relation between religiosity and political behaviour. However, we look at the evolution of religiosity in Europe over the last thirty years with the aim of providing other chapters in the book with the context in which religiosity has an impact on politics in general and on Europeans' voting behaviour in particular. Most studies of religion and voting behaviour fit into two broad categories¹ (Esmer and Petterson 2007: 491; Manza and Wright 2003: 297). The first category includes studies that compare the electoral choices of voters belonging to different religions or denominations. The second type of studies looks at the impact of levels of religiosity -measured not only as practice but also beliefs and values- on the choice for different parties. As we argue below, this ultimate goal has somehow conditioned our selection of indicators to measure religiosity.

Our main concern in this paper is with Europe. In the following section we discuss different paradigms with diverse predictions regarding changing levels of religiosity in Europe and elsewhere. However, in relation to Europe, most of the existing evidence point at a decline in levels of religiosity, although the extent of this might differ depending on the indicator, and we find important exceptions such as Italy, or the possibility of a religious revival in Eastern Europe. This explains why the dominant paradigm to look at religious change in Europe is what is known in the literature as Secularization Theory. However, as we argue below, Secularization Theory does not explain why European countries with similar levels of development score so differently in religiosity, or why these differences in religious observance can still be seen by different denominations. Also the causal mechanisms proposed by Secularization Theory to explain the decline of religiosity in many European countries are not fully demonstrated. Hence, Secularization Theory needs to be contrasted- also in Europe- with other paradigms. This is

¹ Manza and Wright identify two additional ways in which religion might have an impact on voting behaviour (297). But as they argue, these are secondary to the other two.

why, to avoid predetermination in our dependent and independent variables, in the rest of this paper we refer to religious change and not to secularization.

This paper has the following structure. In the following section (2) we review the main existing theories to explain religious change at the macro level; and, in particular, the two major paradigms of Secularization Theory and Religious Markets theory. In this section we also do a quick revision at trends in changing levels of religiosity following four different indicators and looking at 31 countries included in the European Values Survey (EVS) data base. In section 3 we look at the implications of each of these major paradigms for changes in religiosity at the individual level and we also review a different type of literature on changes of religiosity at the micro level. From both types of literature, we derive a number of hypotheses of change at the individual level with regard to all European societies or to specific types of European societies. In section 4 we explain the main characteristics of the EVS data set and we justify theoretically and empirically the selection of the four indicators of religiosity we have used in the paper. In section 4 we look at some longitudinal trends (from 1980 to 2008) of changes in religiosity in Europe (and in different types of European societies) following the four indicators of religiosity selected. **In section 6 we offer some preliminary regression models (using only church attendance as our dependent variable) to do an exploratory test of the hypotheses exposed in section 3. Multilevel section??** And finally, in section 7 we offer some conclusions of the paper.

2. Debates on the independent variable: current debates on the factors with an impact on religious change.

It is no exaggeration to state that the sociology of religion is torn apart between two competing paradigms: Secularization Theory, particularly vigorous in Europe, and Religious Markets Theory, with a greater predicament in the United States. Although the two offer diverse explanations for religious change, the differences between them are also historical in origin, related to the different impact of the Enlightenment on the American Constitution and the French Revolution. This in turn, has led to different interpretations of secularism made by Europeans and Americans. (Esmer and Petterson 2007: 482; Davie 2003: 61). Whereas secularism, in the USA, is interpreted as a guarantee of religious freedoms through the non interference of the state in the regulation of religious affairs, French secularism was more preoccupied with keeping religion at a distance from government with the idea that the state needs to be protected from religion just as much as the state should protect citizens' religious freedoms. Thus, secularism in Europe tends to have a suspicious view of religion and religiosity; whereas in the USA, secularism is made compatible with the vitality of religiosity among its citizens. As we argue below, these two different traditions have had an effect on the way each paradigm understands the concept of secularization.

2.1 Explanations on "the demand side": Secularization theory and the "existential security" hypothesis.

Explanations on "the demand side" are also frequently grouped together and labeled as Secularization Theory since most of these arguments take the gradual waning of religion in modern societies for granted. Classical Secularization Theory, largely based upon the works of

sociology's founding fathers -Marx, Durkheim and Weber-, linked the decline of religion with the advent of industrial society. As argued by Weber, and later developed by sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s (Berger 1967, Martin 1978, Wilson 1969), the development of western rationality made the world calculable, predictable and controllable in such a way that God and religion were no longer required in explanations of natural and social phenomena. Additionally, rational science, based upon systematic doubt, came into conflict with religion, which rests on belief (Schluchter, 1981). To other brands of Secularization Theory, based upon the seminal work of Durkheim (1995 [1912]), the link between modernization and declining levels of religiosity was explained by a "functional" argument: the traditional role played by religion and the church in promoting social cohesion is gradually replaced in industrial society by specialized organizations which were often linked to the rise of the welfare state. Stripped of their basic social purpose, religious institutions, or so this theory predicted, would lose influence in relation to other social institutions. These two brands of Classical Secularization Theory posed two predictions with regard to changing levels of religiosity. First, defenders of this earlier view of secularization conceived modernization as a universal process that would spread at different paces in different parts of the world. Therefore, religiosity would decline at different speeds in different parts of the world depending on the spread of modernization; but always within the general trend of universal decline. Second, levels of religiosity should fall further and fastest in affluent industrial or postindustrial societies where modernization also spread fastest.

These two brands of Secularization Theory came under strong criticism from 1990s onwards (see section 2.2 below). Much of this criticism is related to the ambiguity of the concept of secularization. Many of the earlier defenders of this perspective saw secularization as a macro process driven by a decreasing role of religious institutions on non-religious spheres. Berger, one of the earliest defenders of secularization –who later switched his position to deny secularization as a universal process- defined secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols" (Berger 1973: 113). Along the same lines, Chaves (1994) defined secularization "as the declining scope of religious authority". On the opposite camp, those critical with the idea of secularization as a universal trend, have argued that the decline of some religious institutions might be compatible with the maintenance -or even revival- of religiosity at the individual level, particularly with regard to beliefs and values. Therefore, these critics argue, we should look at trends at the individual level in order to be able to talk about a religious decline (see section 2.2 below for this criticism). On the whole, Classical Secularization Theorists paid attention mainly to the macro process of secularization and too often assumed this process necessarily implied a general decline in individual religious commitment (Finke and Stark 2003: 102). Thus, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of secularization has generated a great deal of confusion on debates about religious change. Here, we have selected our four indicators of religiosity with the aim of trying to overcome this confusion. Thus, we have selected denomination and church attendance as classical indicators on levels of religiosity – and also as those most frequently used indicators in studies of voting behaviour-. However we have also selected one example of religious values (importance of God in life) to have one indicator that might reflect a more private dimension of religiosity; and confidence in churches as a proxy of the potential influence of religious institutions on the non-religious spheres of individuals (See Table 1 and Section 4 below). Following Table 1, we do now a first revision of the evolution in these four indicators for the 31 countries for which we have data in the European Value Survey (EVS), looking at the first and last observation available for each country in the EVS. The aim is to do a first

assessment of Secularization Theory –as said the theory with greater predicament in Europe- before looking at other explanatory frameworks.

Table 1 shows trends in religiosity in 31 countries covered by the European Value Survey attending to the four mentioned indicators on religiosity. Those countries in the first thirteen rows cover the longest period of time (from 1980 to 2008 in most cases); below these, the period coverage is considerably shorter (from 1990 to either 2000 or 2008 in most cases), or even shorter in the last four rows (from 1995 to 2008 in three out of four cases). Data for most Western European countries are in the upper section of the Table, except for Finland, Portugal and Switzerland; most Eastern European countries are in the two sections below, except for Hungary.

Looking first at religious denomination, in the first column, there has been a decline on the percentage of those who assign themselves to a particular religion in nineteen out of thirty-one countries (and therefore there was an increase in religiosity following this indicator in twelve of the countries examined). This decline in denomination applies, to different degrees, to all western European countries except for Portugal –however, the longitudinal observation for Portugal is very short: only five years, from 1990 to 1995-; and is particularly sharp in France, Great Britain and Sweden. If we look at Eastern Europe the picture is mixed: there has been an increase in denomination in a majority of Eastern countries, and the trend is quite clear in most countries that were part of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and the Baltic Republics, in short all of them except Belarus), but also in Serbia; and very important in Bulgaria. On the other hand there is a decline in denomination in the Czech Republic, Slovenia or East Germany; and a very sharp decline in Hungary.

With regard to church attendance -the most frequently used indicator to measure the impact of religiosity on voting behaviour- there has been a decline in religiosity in sixteen countries, a revival in fourteen countries, and only one country where levels of church attendance remains the same. Among Western countries, we can only observe very slight increases in church attendance in Great Britain, Iceland and Finland; but all three cases depart from very low levels in the 1980's and 1990's, so this modest growth can hardly be called a religious revival. More remarkable is the fact that, in Italy, levels of church attendance remain almost the same, with a relatively high score (around 30% of the population) despite the three decades passed between the two observations. Levels of church attendance also remain relatively high in Portugal.² On the opposite extreme, drops in church attendance among Western countries are most remarkable in Ireland and Spain. Turning to Eastern European countries the comparison between patterns in denomination and church attendance are quite telling. All those countries where increases in denomination were quite sharp (most former Soviet Union plus Bulgaria and Serbia) show, by contrast, very modest growth—or even no change at all- in church attendance; and in all cases, these slight increases depart from very low levels in any case. This suggests that increases in denomination in some of these countries might reflect individual's ethnic adscription rather than actual religious practice. On the other hand, however, there are clear and sharp increases in church attendance in Slovakia, Romania and, above all, in Poland.

² However, in this case, there is only five years between the two observations which makes this result not very significant.

Table 1. Levels of Religiosity by Country and Wave (1980-2008): percentage of non-denominated population, weekly church attendance, importance of God in life, and confidence in churches.

	% Non denominated population		% Weekly church attendance		% God important in life		% A great deal of confidence in Churches	
	1980	2008	1980	2008	1980	2008	1980	2008
Since 1980 (EVS I)								
Belguim*	25	36	30	18	60	47	24	13
Denmark	6	11	3	2	35	26	11	9
France	29	50	11	7	38	38	16	11
G.Britain	10	50	13	17	50	50	17	14
Germany W.	10	15	18	13	50	53	16	10
Hungary*	8	42	19	10	39	45	21	16
Iceland*	1	5	2	3	63	63	20	13
Ireland*	1	7	82	64	84	76	51	25
Italy	7	12	32	31	73	84	25	24
Malta*	0	1	92	82	-	-	70	50
Netherlands	40	51	24	11	48	40	11	8
Spain	9	20	40	15	61	49	24	10
Sweedden	7	26	4	3	29	29	8	9
Since 1990 (EVS II)	1990	2008	1990	2008	1990	2008	1990	2008
Bulgaria	68	16	5	7	24	49	12	20
Czech Republic*	60	65	7	8	24	26	9	5
Estonia*	87	75	2	3	-	-	-	-
Finland	12	14	3	7	49	57	8	13
Germany E.	65	68	13	3	27	24	18	6
Latvia*	64	41	2	6	-	-	17	26
Lithuania*	37	20	15	14	-	-	15	14
Poland	6	1	33	58	86	90	48	33
Portugal**	21	12	38	37	66	84	27	37
Romania	6	1	19	27	75	94	38	59
Russia	66	37	1	4	25	52	23	27
Slovakia**	27	23	31	40	54	63	20	30
Slovenia	27	29	20	18	34	46	14	10
Switzerland	10	20	22	12	65	63	8	8
Since 1995 (EVS III)	1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008	1995	2008
Belarus*	37	48	6	6	28	50	21	22
Moldova	16	2	10	13	69	85	35	31
Serbia	18	4	6	11	45	73	9	16
Ukraine	37	31	9	8	48	68	28	22

Comentario [SPN1]:
Guillermo, para versiones futuras si seguimos con esta tabla es quizás sensato agrupar las dos primeras categorías, es decir también los que tienen bastante confianza en la iglesia no? No es muy importante pero ya lo hablamos.

Source: European Values Survey (1980-2008).

Question wordings:

“Do you belong to a religious denomination?” (Yes, No)

“Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?”
(Dichotomized from original: Weekly and more; Less than weekly)

“How important is God in your life?” Originally 10 points scale, recoded into a dummy variable for this analysis: (1-5 not important; 6-10 important).

(...) could you tell me how much confidence you have in (...) Churches: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (Recoded as "A great deal" vs. "Less than a great deal").

* Final observation made in 2000 (not 2008).

** Final observation made in 1995. (not 2008).

Only with regard to importance of God (third column in Table 1) we find enough evidence of a religious revival, also in Europe. Following this indicator, out of twenty-seven countries with data available, there has been a decline in religiosity only in seven, whereas levels of religiosity grew in sixteen countries, and in four they have remained the same. Also, even in those countries where the importance of God decreases, this decline is quite slim: only in Belgium and Spain there has been a change over 10% between in this item. Among western countries, increases in this item are higher, again, in Italy and Portugal. Turning to Eastern Europe this is the only indicator that shows a clear religious revival in all countries, including Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia which showed a decline in the two previous items.³ As in denomination, increases are sharpest in the countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union (this time including also Belarus, although we lack data from the Baltic Republics) but also in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania.

Last but not least, the EVS data shows a clear decline trend with regard to confidence in churches (last column in Table 1). Nineteen out of thirty countries show a loss of confidence in churches; whereas we find the opposite trend only in ten countries. This decline is unequivocal among western European countries, again with the exception of Italy where confidence in the church remains at very similar levels despite the thirty years lapse.⁴ In Ireland and Malta, loss of confidence in the church show quite dramatic drops, although they departed from very high levels of confidence. In the cases of Belgium and Spain, the decline in this item is also quite sharp. In Eastern Europe, the evidence with regard to this indicator is more mixed than in previous items. On the one hand, Eastern European countries are divided in two groups of almost equal size in relation to gains and losses in confidence in churches. On the other hand, in those countries where there is a gain in confidence, patterns of growth are, on average, quite moderate; except in the case of Romania where the increase is remarkable. Also, Poland, one of the clearest examples of a religious revival in other items, shows a clear loss of confidence in the church in the twenty years lapse between the two observations. In sum, other indicators rather than confidence in churches seem to represent better the possibility of a religious revival that is discussed in the literature (Greeley 1994, 2003; see below section 2.2 on this)

What does the data in Table 1 tell us about changes in religiosity in Europe over the last three decades? Considering three of the four observed variables, the predominant trend for the whole continent is that of a religious decline. The only exception is importance of God, but since this probably reflects a more private sphere of religiosity, it is questionable that it may have the same impact on political and electoral behaviour (in short, in the public sphere) as the other three. With the data available, this decline of religiosity is undeniable for Western

³ Only East Germany - a very exceptional case in itself- shows a very slight decrease in the importance of God.

⁴ And maybe Portugal where, as said, the EVS observations cover a very short period of time.

European Countries except for the case of Italy –a case of frozen levels of religiosity rather than resurgence-, and a reasonably grounded doubt on the case of Portugal (which, to confirm, would need data for a longer longitudinal analysis). True, looking at Eastern Europe there is an argument for a revival on religiosity, particularly with regard to denomination and values; although not so much on church attendance and confidence in the church, except for Romania, Slovakia, Poland, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria (where there is greater consistency across different indicators). Also, if by secularization we mean, as the early theorists argued, the “declining scope of religious authorities” (Chaves 1991: 4) then the argument for a predominant trend of decline is even stronger, since our data clearly shows a loss of confidence in churches in two out of every three countries examined.

However, the data in Table 1 also contradicts Classical Secularization Theory in a number of ways. To begin with, religious decline is clearly not a universal phenomenon, not even in Europe. There is evidence to argue for a revival (or alternatively frozen levels) of religiosity in a minority of the countries examined. Also Classical Secularization Theory does not provide an answer to why countries with similar levels development still present considerable differences in levels of religiosity (as the comparison between Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, on the one hand, and Sweden and Denmark, on the other suggests; or the comparison between Hungary and Poland also suggests) or why countries with similar levels of development have diverged so much in their evolution over the last thirty years (as the comparison between Italy and Spain clearly underlines). Last but not least, if -as argued by Classical Secularization Theory- modernity with its greater stress on rational science erodes the irrationality of religion we should expect an earlier and greater impact of modernization on Catholicism (which contains a more complex system of supernatural beliefs) than in the more rational types of liberal Protestantism, when in fact the opposite seems to be the case.⁵ In the following, we review how other theoretical models have tried to respond to these contradictions.

To start with, some of these criticisms prompted some modified versions of “demand side” explanations. Among these, the “existential security” thesis developed by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) figures prominently. Norris and Inglehart depart from the assumption that nations around the world differ sharply in their levels of sustainable human development and socioeconomic inequality, and thus in the conditions of human security and vulnerability to risks. People who experience risks to their lives or their families’ (ego-tropic risks) or to the societies they live in (socio-tropic risks) turn to religion far more than those that grow under safer, more predictable conditions. Thus, according to Norris and Inglehart, variance in religiosity across the world is explained by variance in the existential security experienced by individuals. However, unlike the classical Secularization Theory, existential security is not only determined by the economic wealth of the country but also by socioeconomic inequality. The impact of existential security on religiosity works both at the macro contextual level and the micro individual level although the evidence they show suggests the first effect is stronger than the second (Norris and Inglehart 2004: pp). Despite this last finding, Norris and Inglehart’s existential security theoretical framework offers a number of propositions on how certain individual characteristics might explain variations in levels of religiosity both within and across societies, so we will come back to this framework in the section about individual determinants of religiosity (see section 4 of this paper). Also, in Section 5 of the paper we look at the extent

⁵ See Gorski (2003: 113-4) for this argument

to which longitudinal trends in levels of religiosity correlate with levels of human development by different European countries, as predicted by Norris and Inglehart.

2.2 Explanations on “the supply side”: Religious Markets Theory and the State regulation of religion.

Classical Secularization Theory was the dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion for most of the 20th Century. Yet, as we have just said, there were issues that this paradigm could not explain: why did levels of religious belief and practice vary so much in (equally) modern societies? Also, from the 1980’s onwards, evidence began to be gathered that religious practice and belief in the USA, one of the most affluent and modern societies in the world, far from declining, was actually on the increase. This gave way to a critique of secularization theories, which is often referred to as theories “on the supply side”. This group of theories challenges the claim that modernization necessarily leads to secularization.

Drawing on neoclassical economics and rational choice, theories on “the supply side” argue that the degree of religiosity in a society is determined by the nature of its “religious market”. The core proposition of these theories is that competition between religious denominations and state *deregulation* on religion has a positive effect on religious involvement. In places where a given religion or denomination enjoys a monopoly, lack of competition leads to complacency, resulting in lower church attendance and generally lower levels of religiosity. On the other hand, where religious pluralism prevails, and different churches compete for the faithful -competition rather than mere pluralism being the driving force of religious vitality: see Finke and Stark 2003: 103 for this argument- each church faces the threat of losing their congregations to their competitors and works harder which, in turn, leads to increased levels of religiosity at the aggregate level (Finke and Stark 1992, 2003; see also Chaves and Gorski 2001, Gorski 2003: 113-15, Norris and Inglehart 2004: 11-13 & 95-100 or Esmer and Pettersson 2007: 489-90 for good accounts on the main propositions from the “religious markets” theory). Explaining levels of religiosity by the degree of religious pluralism was first applied to the USA (Finke and Stark 1992) but it has also been used to explain the early decline of religion and religiosity in Scandinavian countries where, it is argued, state regulations favored established and stagnant churches which in turn led to declining rates of church attendance (Stark and Iannacone, 1994). The Religious Market Theory has also been applied to explain the revival of religion in Eastern Europe (see Greeley 1993 and 2004 and the discussion below)

Theories on “the supply side” have thrown considerable doubt on Secularization Theory but, after almost two decades of debate, the claim that religious pluralism fosters religious participation remains highly in dispute. In fact the earlier prevailing view was that pluralism eroded religious faith. For Durkheim, religious pluralism destroyed the hegemonic power of a single pervasive theological faith feeding skepticism and doubt (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 12). Also explanations on “the supply side” might well be valid for the USA; but they fail to explain, for instance, why in many Islamic societies, where Islam enjoys an almost perfect monopoly, levels of religiosity remain among the highest in the world (Esmer and Pettersson 2007: 490).

As said, theories on the “supply side” do not only revolve on the concept of religious plurality but also on the State regulation of religion. In this respect, theories “on the supply

side” also predict that where there is a strong constitutional division between Church and State that protects religious freedom of worship and toleration of different denominations, religiosity will flourish. Thus, the end of non-democratic communist regimes in Eastern Europe provides an excellent opportunity to test the state regulation hypothesis. During the Soviet era, religious organizations were strongly constrained or persecuted throughout most of Central and Eastern Europe. Religion was not destroyed but it was strongly discouraged in most of these societies. The collapse of communism brought a radical change in the relationship between Church and State in Eastern Europe with freedom of religion becoming officially recognized as a basic human right. This, in turn, has led a number of theorists to predict a revival of religion in former communist countries (Greeley 1994 and 2003). We have already seen some data in Table 1 that could confirm this expectation. In Section 5 of the paper we look at longitudinal trends in former communist countries beginning in 1990 up to 2008.

2.3 Religious change in Europe by predominant religious denomination.

In general, most theories on religious change give some role to the predominant religion of the society in which changes in the level of religiosity occur. Thus, the predominant religious cultural traditions in any society, such as the legacy of Protestantism and Catholicism in Western Europe, are expected to have an impact in the pace of these changes. For that reason, in this paper we have also checked for trends in these changes according to whether the predominant religion of the country is Protestant, Catholic or Orthodox.

The relevance of religious denominations has been made compatible with some of the above revised theoretical approaches: modernity with its greater stress in individualism, it is argued, progressed earlier and faster in Protestant than in Catholic environments. Protestants are personally responsible before God in religious matters whereas the Catholic Church with its extensive, dogmatic creed imposes a more collective identity upon its faithful (Gabriel and Kaufmann, 1980). Thus, as a general rule, the decline of religiosity is thought to have started earlier and advance faster in the Protestant world than in the Catholic world- all other things being equal (Jagodzinski and Dobbeleare 1995: 81). In fact, following Weber’s original argument it was the Protestant Ethos that favored the initial development of capitalism in those areas of Europe that were predominantly Protestant (Weber 1930 [1904]). However, one should notice that this is not an argument about the effects of modernity in the pace of religious change; but rather the opposite: it is an argument about the impact of different religious denominations on the pace of modernity.

Following the opposite reasoning, other authors, as briefly mentioned above, have underlined the apparent paradox that religious decline should have started and gone faster in Protestant rather than in Catholic Europe, since Catholicism, when compared to liberal Protestantism, contains more elements of superstition that confront more strongly the rationality of modernity (Gorski 2003:113-4). This apparent paradox might be explained by the Sociopolitical Conflict Model (SPMC) as defended by Gorski (2003: 115). Here, varying degrees of religious vitality might be the consequence to varying responses to the secularist movement. In most places, Catholics responded to the socialist threat by building social milieu and political parties of their own. The result of this effort was Christian Democracy which remains a relevant political force in many parts of Europe. Similar responses were seen also in

some Protestant Countries such as Norway and the Netherland; but the resulting movements were not as broad or deep as their Catholic counterparts perhaps either because the Protestant Churches lacked a centralized leadership structure or because the Protestant Churches were more dependent, and therefore, less autonomous from the state (Gorski 2003: 117). Nonetheless the fact remains that, on the whole, European Catholicism gave more organized political responses to secularizing threats and this might explain why the erosion of religion began later and at slower speed in Catholic Europe. In this respect there might be significant differences even within Catholic Europe (between Spain and Italy for instance) that could explain their differences in the degree they have experienced religious decline in the last few decades. The SPMC model could contribute also to explain differences between protestant countries (the very low levels of religiosity in Sweden in relation to Norway where there is a stronger presence of politically organized religion). Notice, however, that this somehow a circular argument in which religion has an impact on politics and the latter, in turn, has an effect on varying degrees of religiosity across countries.

3. Determinants of religious change at the individual level.

While most influential works in the sociology of religion focus on grand themes of macrocultural transformation and contextual determinism, the explanatory mechanism for religious dynamics is inherently at the individual level. Religious change will only occur if large proportions of individuals change their preference or views with regard to religion and alter their religious choices. This section looks at some of the implications in the previous theoretical models in relation to religious change at the individual level. From these implications we have derived a number of hypotheses that we will verify later in multivariate analysis using religious engagement, measured as church attendance, as our dependent variable. Also, in this section, we have added a few additional hypotheses derived from the literature on change in religiosity at the micro level which are not directly related to the theoretical frameworks at the macro level explained in the previous section. However, this section is still quite exploratory and we have not completely established all our hypotheses at the individual level yet.

Individual level hypotheses across all types of European Societies

From Classical Secularization Theory we derive two hypotheses at the individual level. First, since modernity spreads a new type of rationality that erodes religion, and to the extent that access to this new paradigm might depend on the level of education, we expect to find across all societies a negative relationship, at the individual level, between educational level and levels of religiosity.

Second, to the extent that Classical Secularization Theory assumes that the spread of modernity is a linear long term process in which old values are replaced by new ones by socialization processes and generational replacement, we expect older cohorts to show higher levels of religiosity than new cohorts across all societies (see, for instance, Tilley 2003, for an application of these hypotheses to the British case using panel data). Nonetheless, we set this hypothesis against the counterhypothesis, based upon research in the USA, which denies the cohort effect, and therefore the existence of a universal process of secularization (see, for instance, Argue, Jonson and White 1999).

Following the modified version of the secularization thesis known as the existential security model defended by Norris and Inglehart (2004), we expect religiosity levels to be stronger among those groups of society who are more vulnerable to risks. Hence, women, the unemployed, and individuals with low incomes will show higher levels of religious involvement than, at the opposite extreme: men, individuals inserted in the labour force and/or enjoying high levels of income.

Although we will not be able in this article to check the validity of some of the following hypotheses linked to gender differences, the repeated observation that religiosity levels are higher among women than men have also been explained by other factors such as differences in the socialization processes experienced by men and women (Mol 1985; Suziedelis and Potvin 1981, Thompson 1991), or the structural location of women in society in relation to men as family raisers with a lower participation in the labour force (Vaus and McAllister 1987; see also Miller and Hoffmann 1995 for a general revision of gender differences in levels of religious involvement). However, family status has also been seen as a factor determining higher levels of religious involvement regardless of gender (Chaves 1991). Since our data includes marital status we have derived from the previous observation the general hypothesis that married individuals will show higher levels of religiosity than individuals who remain single, across all types of societies.

The debates in the literature about the effects of age and the life cycle on levels of religiosity are more controversial and ambiguous. Norris and Inglehart (2004: ~~p.~~) seem to conclude that the elderly might be a group vulnerable to risk in some societies (industrial societies with medium levels of human development) but not in others (postindustrial societies). In other parts of the literature when a relationship between age and religiosity has been observed this has been explained by three theoretical processes. First there is a traditional model that focuses on developmental processes and assumes that as people get older there is a natural tendency to turn to religion (Bahr 1970). There is an alternative life cycle model, derived from studies in the USA, which attribute change, not to developmental processes, but to correlated changes in social roles, linked especially to marriage and the early phases of parenthood. According to this model, once children become adolescents, levels of religiosity in parents decline once again (Chaves 1991; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy and Waite 1995). A third interpretation characterises observed variations in religiosity by age as a statistical artefact associated either with cohort replacement or period effects which would confirm the secularization thesis at the micro level (Tilley 2003: ~~pp.~~).

4. Data and dependent variables.

Much of the contemporary debate about religious change and secularization remains partial or selective. Using different indicators of religious change, such as church attendance or religious beliefs might lead to very different set of conclusions. If we want to offer a systematic overview of religious change in Europe we need to take into account a wide range of indicators of religiosity across cases. Although we have introduced these indicators in the discussion of Table 1 above, in this section of our paper we outline in greater detail our sources of evidence and the measures we have used to describe these patterns of religious change. Also, we briefly discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of using different forms measurements of religiosity.

As we saw in Table 1 our source of data is the European Values Survey (EVS). The EVS is part of the World Values Survey (WVS), and has an international coverage. Besides its wide geographical coverage, particularly complete in Europe, EVS allows us to perform a comprehensive longitudinal analysis the first wave 1980 until the fifth wave in 2008 (see the following section).

The choice of EVS is especially useful given the large number of religious variables inserted in its questionnaire. In the rest of this section we pay special attention. Authors from different theoretical views have reached unequal conclusions by using different dependent variables (Feldkircher 1998:87). Therefore, one of our main goals is longitudinally studying the different dimensions of religion in order to find out if, as suggested by previous works (and also by Table 1) there has been a decline in levels of religiosity; or, on the contrary, these changes might be more properly called a transformation in forms of religiosity in Europe.

For our longitudinal analyses in the next section we use four indicators that measure religiosity in four different ways: behaving (religious practice), belonging (religious denomination), values (importance of God) and institutional religiosity (confidence in religious institutions). These four DV have been widely used in sociology of religion, and all have been included in the five waves of the EVS with a very similar wording and response categories.

Religious Behaviour is probably the most commonly used DV when measuring religiosity in social sciences because his power to correlate with other constructs measuring religiosity (Jagodzinski and Dobbeleare 1995:86). It is assumed that a regular acquaintance with religious speeches in church has an influence on the social and behaviour of the attendees. But the strength of this measure lies mainly in the fact that regularly attendance to religious services implies a high level of commitment due to the big inversion that this attendance implies. Its use is very common through national and cross-national surveys and has been included with very similar wordings and categorizations in the five waves of the EVS.

However, the use of this variable is not exempt of criticism. First, not all religions (at least those present in Europe) insist in the same degree on the need to attend Mass as a religious precept. Protestants, for instance, have a much more personal view of spirituality, whereas weekly church attendance represents a main prescription for Christian Catholics. However, and considering that we will control by religious denomination and that we focus also on comparing, not only crosscuts, but longitudinal slopes, this should not be an important problem in our empirical analysis. Also, in our longitudinal analysis we look not only at behaviour but also at indicators of denomination, religious values and institutional religiosity.

The *Religious Belonging* indicator measured as the respondent's religious denomination, is another common way to study trends in religiosity. This is a particularly important indicator in countries with high levels of religious heterogeneity, pillarised countries⁶ or countries where there is a strong Christian-democrat party. The main difference with religious behaviour is that religious denomination refers to a simple self-labelling which does not necessary imply a high level of commitment.

⁶ Countries like Netherlands in which vertical religious divisions cut on different social institutions like school, university, hospitals, newspapers, trade unions...

Religious Values: As we briefly pointed out when discussing Table 1, some authors have noted that church attendance and religious denomination have lost their strength as indicators of religiosity due to the evolution of religiosity from collective forms of engagement towards a more individual religiosity, exercised in the private sphere. The privatization and individualization erodes the traditional view of religion, having as a consequence a more abstract personal and private understanding of religiosity. This is why many authors have pointed to the need of using indicators that reflect these changes in personal spirituality, with indicators which are capable to study these new forms of religiosity. Although not as common as the previous indicators, the variable “importance of God in your life” is considered by literature as a good tool to measure these changes in religiosity. We use this variable to measure the religious values as the “goals that people prioritize for their society, community, families, and themselves” (Norris and Inglehart 2004: pp). It does not refer to a social form of religion as church attendance, or a rigidly labelling as religious denomination is; and it is more in line with these new ways of spirituality. Moreover it is a variable also useful for comparison, since importance of God is valid for a huge variety of religions no mattering their dogmas or precepts. We have selected it also for methodological reasons since it is included in the five waves of the EVS. Nevertheless, it is open to question whether these indicators of religious beliefs and values, which reflect a more private and individual form of spirituality have the same degree of impact on political and electoral behaviour.

Religious institutionalization. As argued extensively in section 2 of this paper, the early thinkers of secularization were not so preoccupied with levels of religiosity in the private domain, but with the influence of religion on the non-religious and the public sphere. Since the aim of the book in which this chapter is inserted is on the effects of religion on citizens political behaviour, we have included an indicator of institutionalized religion, which measures the citizens’ degree of confidence in religious institutions. Whether people are religious or not, in the public or in the private sphere, if citizens see the church as a trusted institution, this increases the probability of the church influence on voting behaviour. This variable is also particularly interesting since it is included every wave of the EVS, with identical wording, which makes it particularly useful for its longitudinal study (See footnote in Table 1 for the questions wordings of all four variables and the way they have been recoded for our analyses).

5. Trends in religious change in Europe: Longitudinal analyses.

In this section we look at longitudinal trends of religious change following the explanatory frameworks that we revised in section 2 of this paper. Although, we have data in the EVS for 31 countries, we want to look at the longest trends possible so we have taken into account only those countries included in the last 2008 EVS wave. This gives us 18 countries altogether which, we think, gives us enough number of cases to fit the different categories of our dependent variables (level of Human development, religious denomination, and communist past). The eighteen countries considered to observe the longitudinal trends can be seen in Tables A1, A2, and A3 in the Annex of this paper.

Thus, Graphs 1 to 3 reflect changes in religiosity in Europe from 1980 to 2008. All observations in the graphs represent the average of the countries considered in each category at that particular point in time (that is the average of cases and not of individuals). Since not all eighteen countries have data for the five waves, when possible (in fact, only in a few cases), we


have tried to reduce this mortality by introducing the average for that country between the previous and the subsequent observations. Then, we have only considered the average of countries –and thus introduced an observation in the graph- when we had at least 60% of the observations (that is countries) in any particular category of our dependent variables (all these details are explained in the footnotes of Tables A1, A2, and A3).

Religious trends by level of human development

Thus, in Graph 1 we observe trends in religiosity by the level of human development of the countries examined, as measured by the PNUD⁷ from the United Nations, in 2009. This measure takes into account the level of economic development as well as the degree of social inequality within countries. As can be seen in the graphs (and it is explained in the footnote of Table A1) we have broken down this measure in three categories: low, medium, and high level of human development. Our goal is to measure changes in levels of religiosity (in each of our four indicators) following the hypotheses derived from Secularization Theory and, in particular, by the “existential security” model as developed by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Thus, our expectation, following this model, is to find an inverse correlation between the level of human development and levels of religiosity.

Looking at Graph 1, we find this correlation both in the indicator of religious values (importance of god) and the degree of confidence in churches. Also, as could be expected from the “existential security” model, we only find evidence of a clear trend upwards in countries with low levels of development. However, high and medium level countries show a similar trend with regard to denomination; as do medium and low level countries with regard to church attendance. Also, among low development countries (all eastern European countries) the growth in denomination and religious values is quite noticeable; but it reflects in only very moderate rates of growth in church attendance and the degree of confidence in the church.

Graph 1. Four religious indicators by level of human development. Source: see Table A1 in Annex




⁷ Human Development Index, based on life expectancy, literacy and standard of living.

Religious trends by predominant religious denomination

Graph 2 shows trends in religiosity by religious denomination: Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Here we have included a “mixed” category where the main religious denomination does not reach 60% of the “labelled” population. Our goal in this case is to measure if patterns of change in religiosity still depend heavily on the predominant religious denomination of the country as was in the past and has been observed in the literature. The “mixed” category (involving “mixed” Protestant and Catholic populations) was included merely as proxy to check the impact of religious pluralism on levels of religiosity, as predicted by the Religious Markets theory. As shown in the graphs, levels of religiosity in Catholic countries remain much higher than in Protestant countries in every indicator, with the greater distance perhaps with regard to church attendance. Nonetheless, both types of countries show either a flat line or a trend downwards in three dimensions of religiosity, in all except in religious values (importance of god) where there is a moderate growth, particularly among Catholic countries. “Mixed” countries are placed in a sort of “middle position” between levels of religiosity in Protestant and Catholic Countries in all dimensions except with regard to confidence in churches where they resemble more closely the Protestant Countries than the Catholic ones. Thus, from this little evidence we find no support to the argument made by Religious Markets Theory. Moreover, in no dimension of religiosity do “mixed” countries show a clear trend upwards. Orthodox countries show a certain revival of religiosity. It must be noted, however, that their level of church attendance is well below that of Catholic, or even “mixed” countries.

Graph 2. Four religious indicators by religious denomination of the country.

Source: see Table A1 in Annex




Religious trends by communist past

Graph 3 divides the eighteen countries of our data base in two blocks: countries which were former communist states or belonged to one; versus countries that were not communist in the past. Observations for former communist countries begin in 1990, at the outset or right after, their regime transition. In all dimensions of religiosity (except in the degree of confidence in churches), former communist countries depart from levels of religiosity below their non-communist counterparts. But, in the three dimensions, their rising levels of religiosity cross that of non-communist countries at some point between the early 1990s and the year 2000. Only with regard to confidence in churches, former communist countries present higher levels of religiosity than non-communist ones for the whole period, but the evolution of the trend is quite flat in the graph. Again, the trend upwards is more manifest in denomination and religious values, and not so much in church attendance where former communist countries show levels of religiosity just above those of non-communist past countries. Nonetheless, the evidence gathered, stretching up to 2008, would seem to confirm the existence of a religious revival in former communist countries.

It is difficult to do an overall evaluation between all these trends since we find a high correlation between three of our categories in our dependent variables: most former communist countries are also low development countries, except East Germany and Slovenia; and, at the same time, they are also Orthodox countries, except, this time, for East Germany, Slovenia, and Poland. As we can see in Tables A1, A2, A2, (and also in Table 1 above) Poland is a clear case of religious revival. Thus, religious denomination, that is the Orthodox Church, does not seem the key variable to explain religious resurgence in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, among former communist countries, the two middle development cases show a clear decline in the case of East Germany; and a very slight decline in the case of Slovenia. This leaves space to argue that, in Eastern Europe, low levels of development –linked to a greater vulnerability to risks, following Norris and Inglehart’s argument- might be reinforcing regained religious freedoms in explaining a religious revival which is, nonetheless, more obvious with regard to denomination and religious values than in church attendance. Other than that, our longitudinal trends also show that there is still a considerable gap between Catholic and Protestant Europe; and that religious pluralism (as measured with our “mixed countries”) category seems to have very little impact on levels of religiosity.

Graph 3. Four religious indicators by political past. Source: see Table A3 in Annex



6. Determinants of religious change at the individual level

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In this section we do a first and very exploratory evaluation of the hypotheses on the individual level determinants that we have detailed in section 3 on this paper. Table 2 shows the logistic regressions for the eighteen countries included in the last 2008 EVS (last column in Table 2) and for each category of countries we have distinguished in the previous section of longitudinal trends (by religious denomination of the country, by level of human development and by communist part). The dependent variable is weekly church attendance (1) versus the remaining individuals in the data set (0), thus including those who do not belong to any particular denomination.

Considering all regression models, we find very small adjusted R squares, a sign that the model predicts only a slight portion of the variance of the dependent variable. Model would fit much better the data if we included attitudinal variables or ideology in our models, increasing its R square levels. However, we are not aiming at developing very complete models, but at finding whether sociodemographic profiles of religious individuals are homogeneous across European societies. Additionally we want to do an exploratory evaluation of our hypotheses as these were detailed in section 3. Nonetheless, the Adjusted R Squares show our predicting model is more powerful for Catholic, Orthodox, medium development, and with no communist past countries than in other categories. Other variables that might be related to Classical Secularization Theory, like the level and extent of urbanization also find a significant

relationship with levels of religiosity and in the direction that could be expected. Individuals in large and big cities (who might be more closely connected with the tenets of modernization) have fewer probabilities to turn to religion than individual in medium and small towns.

With regard to the hypotheses detailed in section 5, we find (from the Classical Secularization Theory) that, as expected, levels of education correlate negatively with church attendance if we look at the model that including all countries. However, the hypothesis does not hold for Catholic countries where, on the contrary, the educational level correlates positively with religiosity.

As expected, women attend church more frequently than men in all types of societies. However in “mixed” and high development countries, the relationship is weaker than in the remaining categories. More vulnerable groups with regard to income (that is, lower income groups) do not show a greater tendency to attend church if we look at the model for all societies. However, a negative correlation between income and religiosity is apparent in Catholic and Protestant countries; whereas a positive correlation between these two variables exists in Orthodox countries. Thus, at least in Orthodox countries, vulnerability with regard to income does not explain higher levels of religiosity but rather the opposite. We do not find stronger effects of vulnerability groups with religiosity in medium and low development countries as could be expected from the existential security hypotheses; except for the aforementioned stronger relationship between women and religiosity in low and medium development countries in relation to high development countries.

We find no relationship between marital status and church attendance in any of our models; and thus we have no evidence to support the hypotheses, as explained in section 2, that presume a correlation between these two variables.

Of course many of the main hypotheses exposed in section 3 were related to cohort effects on levels of religiosity across different types of societies. In these models since we only have the 2008 data we cannot simultaneously include cohort and age since we would incur in problems of multicollinearity. For future versions of this research we want to develop regression models including both variables based upon a pool data base with the five waves of the EVS. Nonetheless, in nearly all the models included in Table 2 (except significantly enough in protestant societies), age is positively correlated with religiosity; and that relationship seems stronger in Catholic, and medium developed countries; and, on the other hand, weaker in countries with a communist past. If these are not life-cycle effects (and they could be) then they would seem to confirm some of exposed hypotheses exposed in section 5. However, we will have to wait for the pool data analysis to find out.

Table 2. Logistic Regressions: Religious denomination in different types of European Societies (by religious denomination, development and communist past)

	Religious Denomination				Human Development			Communist Past		All
	Rom. Cat.	Orthodox	Protestant	Mixed	Low	Medium	High	No	Yes	all
Gender (Reference category: male)	-0,24 **	-0,38 **	-0,22 **	-0,21 **	-0,33 **	-0,20 **	-0,26 **	-0,31 **	-0,30 **	-0,25 **
Age	0,02 **	0,06 **	0,00	0,02 **	0,06 **	0,01 **	0,01 *	0,00	0,05 **	0,02 **
Cohort (Reference category: born between 1911 and 1930)										
Born between 1931 and 1950	-0,08	0,85 **	-0,58 **	-0,15 *	0,72 **	-0,25 **	-0,36 **	-0,23 **	0,62 **	0,05
Born between 1951 and 1970	-0,25 **	1,95 **	-1,03 **	0,01	1,70 **	-0,52 **	-0,65 **	-0,57 **	1,43 **	0,20 **
Born between 1971 and 1990	-0,10	2,89 **	-0,85 **	0,11	2,69 **	-0,47 **	-0,55 **	-0,53 **	2,39 **	0,59 **
Habitat (Reference category: small -less than 5.000-)										
Medium -between 5.001 and 50.000-	-0,46 **	-0,10 **	-0,66 **	-0,25 **	-0,24 **	-0,56 **	-0,51 **	-0,46 **	-0,41 **	-0,50 **
Large -between 50.001 and 500.000-	-0,66 **	-0,55 **	-0,89 **	-0,62 **	-0,59 **	-0,88 **	-0,71 **	-0,80 **	-0,64 **	-0,79 **
City -more than 500.000-	-0,82 **	-0,65 **	-1,40 **	-0,53 **	-0,76 **	-1,03 **	-0,86 **	-0,94 **	-0,77 **	-0,95 **
Marital Status (Reference category: single)	0,14 **	0,13 **	0,16 *	-0,02	-0,01	0,09 *	-0,10 *	-0,17 **	-0,03	0,03
Education (Reference category: university)										
Primary School or less	0,79 **	0,66 **	0,27	0,37 **	0,75 **	0,78 **	0,09	0,36 **	0,82 **	0,72 **
Secondary School	0,20 **	0,03	-0,62 **	0,61 **	0,18 **	-0,20 **	0,28 **	0,11 **	0,00	0,09 **
Income	0,00	0,00	0,06 **	0,10 **	0,04 **	0,01	0,03 **	-0,01	0,02 **	0,04 **
Work Status (Reference category: employed or self-employed)										
Retired	-0,06	0,33	-0,07	0,45 **	0,36 **	-0,06 **	-0,09	-0,10	0,33 **	0,13 **
Housekeeper	0,75 **	0,67 **	0,54 **	0,58 **	0,68 **	0,84 **	-0,06	0,15 **	0,65 **	0,62 **
Student	0,28 **	0,27 **	-0,04	0,60 **	0,26 **	0,29 **	0,07	0,12	0,26 **	0,25 **
Unemployed	-0,04	0,32 **	-0,42 **	0,04	0,22 **	-0,06	-0,46 **	-0,30 **	0,21 **	0,05
Constant	0,58 **	-2,83 **	3,01 **	-0,95 **	-2,99 **	1,53 **	1,78 **	2,35 **	-2,55 **	-0,02

Coefficients estimated by the model. Source: EVS (2008); * Significant at 0,05 level; ** Significant at 0,01 level.

Variables: Man: woman is reference category; Age: numerical variable (18-98).

For countries included in each category, see Tables A1, A2, and A3 in Annex.

Consider that the sample size (different in each column) has a positive influence in the amount of significant relationships showed above.

Table 3. Logistic Regressions: Church attendance in different types of European Societies (by religious denomination, level of development and communist past)

	Religious Denomination				Human Development			Communist Past		All
	Rom. Cat.	Orthodox	Protestant	Mixed	Low	Medium	High	No	Yes	all
Gender (Reference category: male)	-0,33 **	-0,55 **	-0,38 **	-0,31 **	-0,46 **	-0,23 **	-0,06	-0,17 **	-0,43 **	-0,29 **
Age	0,02 **	0,03 **	0,01	0,02 **	0,01 **	0,01 **	0,01 **	0,01 **	0,01 **	0,01 **
Cohort (Reference category: born between 1911 and 1930)										
Born between 1931 and 1950	-0,15 **	0,21 **	-0,13	-0,35 **	-0,09	-0,22 **	-0,33 **	-0,29 **	0,00	-0,22 **
Born between 1951 and 1970	-0,39 **	0,42 **	0,05	-0,54 **	-0,15	-0,58 **	-0,52 **	-0,64 **	0,00	-0,47 **
Born between 1971 and 1990	-0,54 **	0,69 **	0,14	-0,54 **	-0,23 *	-0,83 **	-0,91 **	-0,98 **	0,01	-0,68 **
Habitat (Reference category: small -less than 5.000-)										
Medium -between 5.001 and 50.000-	-0,33 **	0,00	0,16	0,01	-0,18 **	0,00	-0,10	0,15 **	-0,30 **	-0,06 **
Large -between 50.001 and 500.000-	-0,69 **	-0,10	0,04	-0,25 **	-0,29 **	-0,63 **	-0,62 **	-0,50 **	-0,38 **	-0,45 **
City -more than 500.000-	-0,69 **	-0,48 **	0,24	-0,32 **	-0,81 **	-0,40 **	-0,33 **	-0,29 **	-0,81 **	-0,57 **
Marital Status (Reference category: single)	0,40 **	0,12	-0,08	0,07	0,20 **	0,49 **	0,63 **	0,48 **	0,22 **	0,41 **
Education (Reference category: university)										
Primary School or less	0,15 **	0,57 **	-0,26	0,71 **	0,47 **	0,68 **	0,60 **	0,72 **	0,48 **	0,69 **
Secondary School	0,26 **	0,23 **	-0,07	0,13 **	0,55 **	0,12 **	0,77 **	0,44 **	0,39 **	0,44 **
Income	0,02 **	0,02	-0,09 **	0,10 *	0,02 **	-0,02 **	0,11 **	0,02 **	0,01	0,02 **
Work Status (Reference category: employed or self-employed)										
Retired	0,00	0,37 **	0,46 **	0,44 **	0,39 **	-0,07	0,38 **	0,10 *	0,41 **	0,20 **
Housekeeper	0,57 **	0,50 **	0,45 *	0,64 **	0,18 **	0,86 **	1,03 **	0,85 **	0,28 **	0,75 **
Student	0,22 **	0,11	0,31	0,57 **	0,22 *	0,30 **	-0,01	0,19 **	0,28 **	0,24 **
Unemployed	-0,19 **	0,12 **	-0,38	0,03 **	-0,13 *	-0,36 **	0,32 **	-0,15 *	-0,09	-0,10
Constant	-1,28 **	-3,91 **	-3,25 **	-3,08 **	-2,01 **	-1,35 **	-3,09 **	-1,72 **	-2,28 **	-1,89 **

Coefficients estimated by the model. Source: EVS (2008); * Significant at 0,05 level; ** Significant at 0,01 level.

Variables: Man: woman is reference category; Age: numerical variable (18-98).

For countries included in each category, see Tables A1, A2, and A3 in Annex.

Consider that the sample size (different in each column) has a positive influence in the amount of significant relationships showed above.

Table 4. Logistic Regressions: Importance of God in different types of European Societies (by religious denomination, level of development and communist past)

	Religious Denomination				Human Development			Communist Past		All
	Rom. Cat.	Orthodox	Protestant	Mixed	Low	Medium	High	No	Yes	all
Gender (Reference category: male)	-0,28 **	-0,51 **	-0,55 **	-0,36 **	-0,42 **	-0,30 **	-0,43 **	-0,42 **	-0,38 **	-0,37 **
Age	0,03 **	0,05 **	0,04 **	0,05 **	0,06 **	0,03 **	0,02 **	0,02 **	0,06 **	0,04 **
Cohort (Reference category: born between 1911 and 1930)										
Born between 1931 and 1950	0,25 **	0,64 **	0,23 **	0,17 **	0,89 **	0,13 **	-0,13 *	0,05	0,85 **	0,37 **
Born between 1951 and 1970	0,39 **	1,63 **	0,31 **	0,69 **	2,02 **	0,18 **	-0,13	0,03	1,92 **	0,82 **
Born between 1971 and 1990	0,76 **	2,63 **	0,70 **	1,38 **	3,25 **	0,44 **	0,06	0,21 **	3,13 **	1,52 **
Habitat (Reference category: small -less than 5.000-)										
Medium -between 5.001 and 50.000-	-0,19 **	-0,05	-0,36 **	-0,10 *	-0,21 **	-0,10 **	-0,07	0,04	-0,31 **	-0,21 **
Large -between 50.001 and 500.000-	-0,41 **	-0,26 **	-0,49 **	-0,24 **	-0,24 **	-0,47 **	-0,33 **	-0,33 **	-0,31 **	-0,39 **
City -more than 500.000-	-0,18 **	-0,39 **	-0,72 **	-0,45 **	-0,48 **	-0,22 **	-0,35 **	-0,25 **	-0,43 **	-0,43 **
Marital Status (Reference category: single)	0,15 **	-0,06	-0,09	-0,07	-0,14 **	0,18 **	0,04	0,04	-0,13 **	-0,01
Education (Reference category: university)										
Primary School or less	0,55 **	0,71 **	-0,14	0,11	0,66 **	0,62 **	0,14	0,38 **	0,75 **	0,59 **
Secondary School	0,15 **	0,17 **	-0,31 **	0,31 **	0,24 **	-0,11 **	0,25 **	0,10 **	0,07 **	0,11 **
Income	-0,03 **	0,02 **	-0,02 *	0,10 **	0,01 **	-0,01 **	0,03 **	-0,01	-0,01	0,01 **
Work Status (Reference category: employed or self-employed)										
Retired	0,08	0,21 **	-0,04	0,38 **	0,42 **	-0,04 *	-0,07	-0,07	0,42 **	0,17 **
Housekeeper	0,77 **	0,63 **	0,51 **	0,57 **	0,72 **	0,80	0,38 **	0,47 **	0,71 **	0,70 **
Student	0,16 **	0,38 **	0,09	0,53 **	0,40 **	0,18 **	-0,02	0,05	0,36 **	0,22 **
Unemployed	-0,06	0,27 **	-0,22 *	0,27 **	0,21 **	-0,06	-0,12	-0,13 **	0,22 **	0,14 **
Constant	-1,25 **	-3,31 **	-1,59 **	-3,52 **	-4,21 **	-1,22 **	-1,11 **	-0,85 **	-4,05 **	-2,27 **

Coefficients estimated by the model. Source: EVS (2008); * Significant at 0,05 level; ** Significant at 0,01 level.

Variables: Man: woman is reference category; Age: numerical variable (18-98).

For countries included in each category, see Tables A1, A2, and A3 in Annex.

Consider that the sample size (different in each column) has a positive influence in the amount of significant relationships showed above.

Table 5. Logistic Regressions: Confidence in Church in different types of European Societies (by religious denomination, level of development and communist past)

	Religious Denomination				Human Development			Communist Past		All
	Rom. Cat.	Orthodox	Protestant	Mixed	Low	Medium	High	No	Yes	all
Gender (Reference category: male)	-0,30 **	-0,46 **	-0,27 **	-0,29 **	-0,38 **	-0,24 **	-0,28 **	-0,31 **	-0,32 **	-0,32 **
Age	0,02 **	0,03 **	0,03 **	0,01 **	0,02 **	0,02 **	0,03 **	0,02 **	0,02 **	0,02 **
Cohort (Reference category: born between 1911 and 1930)										
Born between 1931 and 1950	-0,25 **	0,30 **	-0,10	-0,23 **	0,01	-0,24 **	-0,09	-0,09 *	-0,01	0,00
Born between 1951 and 1970	-0,41 **	0,80 **	-0,02	-0,38 **	0,25 **	-0,40 **	-0,08	-0,13 *	0,18 **	0,12 **
Born between 1971 and 1990	-0,36 **	1,31 **	0,50 **	-0,15	0,60 **	-0,26 **	0,25 *	0,14 *	0,55 **	0,53 **
Habitat (Reference category: small -less than 5.000-)										
Medium -between 5.001 and 50.000-	-0,40 **	-0,21 **	0,00	-0,16 **	-0,34 **	-0,06	-0,44 **	-0,15 **	-0,41 **	-0,32 **
Large -between 50.001 and 500.000-	-0,68 **	-0,34 **	-0,19 **	-0,33 **	-0,48 **	-0,42 **	-0,49 **	-0,47 **	-0,47 **	-0,49 **
City -more than 500.000-	-0,63 **	-0,40 **	-0,50 **	0,05	-0,43 **	-0,39 **	-0,58 **	-0,48 **	-0,36 **	-0,42 **
Marital Status (Reference category: single)	0,06	-0,08	-0,09	-0,31 **	-0,08 *	0,04	-0,04	-0,07 *	-0,09 **	-0,12 **
Education (Reference category: university)										
Primary School or less	0,34 **	0,65 **	-0,09	0,06	0,65 **	0,42 **	0,05	0,21 **	0,76 **	0,35 **
Secondary School	0,15 **	0,14 **	-0,21 **	-0,17 **	0,14 **	-0,04	0,01	-0,02	-0,01	-0,02
Income	0,00	-0,02 **	0,00	-0,06 **	-0,01 *	-0,02 **	0,03 **	-0,01 *	-0,02 **	-0,02 **
Work Status (Reference category: employed or self-employed)										
Retired	0,00	0,31 **	-0,19 **	0,17 **	0,23 **	-0,08	-0,09	-0,08 *	0,22 **	0,10 **
Housekeeper	0,33 **	0,47 **	0,35 **	0,02	0,44 **	0,46 **	0,16 **	0,23 **	0,46 **	0,27 **
Student	0,21 **	0,04	-0,05	-0,02	0,18 **	0,14 *	-0,12	-0,01	0,15 **	0,05
Unemployed	-0,13 **	-0,06	-0,54 **	-0,21 *	-0,13 **	-0,20 **	-0,18 *	-0,20 **	-0,08 *	-0,11 **
Constant	-0,01 **	-1,01 **	-0,86 **	0,25 **	-0,27 *	-0,35 **	-0,88 **	-0,54 **	-0,31 **	-0,50 **

Coefficients estimated by the model. Source: EVS (2008); * Significant at 0,05 level; ** Significant at 0,01 level.

Variables: Man: woman is reference category; Age: numerical variable (18-98).

For countries included in each category, see Tables A1, A2, and A3 in Annex.

Consider that the sample size (different in each column) has a positive influence in the amount of significant relationships showed above.

7. Conclusions.

In this paper we have offered an overview of changes in religiosity in Europe over the last three decades. From that overview, we have observed a predominant pattern of religious decline in at least three of the four indicators we have examined (in all except in religious values, as measured by importance of God in one's life, where we found symptoms of a reviving religiosity in most European countries) However this decline does not represent a universal pattern and there are important exceptions. On the one hand, among Western European countries, the pattern of decline is more clearly predominant; although there are important exceptions such as Italy, where religiosity has remained basically in the same levels over the three decades. On the other hand, the final diagnosis of decline is far from obvious for Eastern Europe where a number of countries such as Rumania, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria are giving signs of a full-fledged religious revival. In other Eastern European, those under former soviet rule, there are also signs of increasing levels of religiosity but this affect denomination and have little effect on other traditional measures such as church attendance.

However, different levels and trends in religiosity are not only between East and West. Our data, in particular the examination of longitudinal trends, has also shown that a gap still exists between Catholic and Protestant Europe, and between countries with different degrees of human development. In this last respect, differences in trends at the macro level seem to conform, to some extent, to the expectations derived from secularization theory. However, we have also seen that Secularization Theory, in its various forms, does not explain all differences, so we tried to apply other explanatory frameworks to these changing trends and, in particular, the religious markets/state deregulation theories. This theory, in its variant of state deregulation, could be an explanation for the apparent resurgence of religion in Eastern Europe; but the increasing levels of religiosity we witness in this group of countries might also be fed by the low levels of human development (and therefore of existential security) that afflicts most of these countries in relation to western European countries. We have also applied this theory in its pluralism variant (although in a very basic way and only at the aggregate macro level), but so far we have found no evidence to support that pluralism fosters higher levels of religiosity. Last, we have tried to apply some of the implications of each of these models at the individual level, but in this respect, we need to refine our analysis with a pool data set in order to distinguish life-cycle from cohort effects.

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ANNEX

Table A1. Changes in levels of religiosity in four indicators by level of Human Development. (See Graphs 1 to Graph 4 in the text).

	% not labeled population					% weekly Church attendance					% importance of God in life					% Confidence in Churches				
	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008
High																				
France*	29	39	41	43	50	11	10	9	7	7	38	34	34	33	38	16	12	12	12	11
Germany W***	10	11	25	15	15	18	18	13	16	13	50	45	54	52	53	16	12	5	10	10
Netherlands*	40	50	52	55	51	24	20	17	14	11	48	44	45	46	40	11	8	7	6	8
Sweedan	7	18	8	25	26	4	4	4	4	3	29	25	26	28	29	8	6	6	7	9
Switzerland*		10	9	14	20		22	15	14	12		65	56	60	63			8	8	8
	21	25	27	31	32	14	15	12	11	9	41	43	43	44	45	13	8	8	9	9
Medium																				
Finland		12	12	12	14		3	4	5	7		49	54	56	57		8	11	13	13
G.Britain*	10	44	30	16	50	13	14	14	14	17	49	44	42	40	50	17	19	14	9	14
Germany E***		65	76	66	68		13	4	6	3		27	20	23	24		18	3	6	6
Italy*	7	16	17	18	12	32	37	38	40	31	67	73	75	76	84	25	26	26	27	24
Slovenia		27	24	30	29		20	22	17	18		34	42	41	46		14	12	12	10
Spain	9	15	15	18	20	40	29	25	25	15	61	57	67	55	49	24	22	17	15	10
	30	29	27	32		19	18	18	15		47	50	49	52		18	14	14	13	
Low																				
Bulgaria		68	34	30	16		5	7	9	7		24	40	44	49		12	21	12	20
Moldova			16	7	2			10	14	13			69	74	85			35	43	31
Poland**		6	4	5	2		33	56	59	58		86	86	85	90		48	30	33	33
Romania		6	4	3	1		19	20	24	27		75	80	88	94		38	45	48	59
Russia		66	47	48	37		1	2	3	4		25	43	42	52		23	24	24	27
Serbia			18	6	4			6	9	11			45	54	73			9	16	16
Ukraine			37	45	31			9	9	8			48	51	68			28	29	22
		23	21	13			16	18	18			59	63	73			27	29	30	

Source: European Values Survey (1980-2008). Low development: 0,700 - 0,900. Medium development: 0,900 - 0,960. High development: 0,960 - 1. (Source PNUD, UN, 2009). At least 60% of cases (countries) necessary to calculate the average percentage of the category in each observation. * Linear average estimated data for Great Britain, France, Italy and Netherlands in 1995; and Switzerland in 2000. ** Importance of God not asked in Poland, 1995. *** Human Development Index for Germany reunified.

For question wordings and operationalization of each dependent variable, see Footnote in Table 1 in the Text.

Table A2. Changes in levels of religiosity in four indicators by religious denomination of the country. (See Graphs 5 to Graph 8 in the text)

	% Not labeled population					% Weekly Church attendance					% Importance of God in life					% Confidence in Churches				
	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008
Catholic Countries																				
Italy*	7	16	17	18	12	32	37	38	40	31	67	73	75	76	84	25	26	26	27	24
France*	29	39	41	43	50	11	10	9	7	7	38	34	34	33	38	16	12	12	12	11
Poland**		6	4	5	2		33	56	59	58		86	86	85	90		48	30	33	33
Slovenia		27	24	30	29		20	22	17	18		34	42	41	46		14	12	12	10
Spain	9	15	15	18	20	40	29	25	25	15	61	57	67	55	49	24	22	17	15	10
	15	20	20	23	23	28	26	30	30	26	55	57	61	58	61	22	24	19	20	18
Protestant Countries																				
Finland		12	12	12	14		3	4	5	7		49	54	56	57		8	11	13	13
Germany E.		65	76	66	68		13	4	6	3		27	20	23	24		18	3	6	6
Sweeden	7	18	8	25	26	4	4	4	4	3	29	25	26	28	29	8	6	6	7	9
		32	32	35	36		7	4	5	4		34	33	36	37		11	7	9	9
Orthodox Countries																				
Bulgaria		68	34	30	16		5	7	9	7		24	40	44	49		12	21	12	20
Moldova			16	7	2			10	14	13			69	74	85			35	43	31
Romania		6	4	3	1		19	20	24	27		75	80	88	94		38	45	48	59
Russia		66	47	48	37		1	2	3	4		25	43	42	52		23	24	24	27
Serbia			18	6	4			6	9	11			45	55	73			9	16	16
Ukraine			37	45	31			9	9	8			48	51	68			28	29	22
			26	23	15			9	12	12			54	59	70			27	29	29
Mixed Countries***																				
G.Britain*	10	44	30	16	50	13	14	14	14	17	49	44	42	40	50	17	19	14	9	14
Germany W.	10	11	25	15	15	18	18	13	16	13	50	45	54	52	53	16	12	5	10	10
Netherlands*	40	50	52	55	51	24	20	17	14	11	48	44	45	46	40	11	8	7	6	8
Switzerland*		10	9	14	20		22	15	14	12		65	56	60	63		8	8	8	8
	20	29	29	25	34	19	18	15	14	13	49	50	49	49	52	15	12	9	9	10

Source: European Values Survey (1980-2008). At least 60% of cases (countries) necessary to calculate the average percentage of the category in each observation. * Linear average estimated data for Great Britain, France, Italy and Netherlands in 1995; and Switzerland in 2000. ** Importance of God not asked in Poland; ***Mixed: Countries in which the main religious denomination does not reach the 60% of the labeled population. Data: EVS, 2008.

For question wordings and operationalization of each dependent variable, see Footnote in Table 1 in the Text.

Table A3. Changes in levels of religiosity by political trajectory (former communism) of the country. (See Graphs 9 to Graph 12 in the text).

	% not labeled population					% weekly Church attendance					% importance of God in life					% Confidence in Churches				
	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008	1980	1990	1995	2000	2008
No Communist Past																				
France*	29	39	41	43	50	11	10	9	7	7	38	34	34	33	38	16	12	12	12	11
Germany W	10	11	25	15	15	18	18	13	16	13	50	45	54	52	53	16	12	5	10	10
Netherlands*	40	50	52	55	51	24	20	17	14	11	48	44	45	46	40	11	8	7	6	8
Sweedeen	7	18	8	25	26	4	4	4	4	3	29	25	26	28	29	8	6	6	7	9
Switzerland*		10	9	14	20		22	15	14	12		65	56	60	63			8	8	8
Finland		12	12	12	14		3	4	5	7		49	54	56	57		8	11	13	13
G.Britain*	10	44	30	16	50	13	14	14	14	17	49	44	42	40	50	17	19	14	9	14
Italy*	7	16	17	18	12	32	37	38	40	31	67	73	75	76	84	25	26	26	27	24
Spain	9	15	15	18	20	40	29	25	25	15	61	57	67	55	49	24	22	17	15	10
	16	24	23	24	29	20	17	15	15	13	49	48	50	50	51	17	12	12	12	12
Former Communist Countries																				
Bulgaria		68	34	30	16		5	7	9	7		24	40	44	49		12	21	12	20
Germany E		65	76	66	68		13	4	6	3		27	20	23	24		18	3	6	6
Moldova			16	7	2			10	14	13			69	74	85			35	43	31
Poland**		6	4	5	2		33	56	59	58		86	86	85	90		48	30	33	33
Romania		6	4	3	1		19	20	24	27		75	80	88	94		38	45	48	59
Russia		66	47	48	37		1	2	3	4		25	43	42	52		23	24	24	27
Serbia			18	6	4			6	9	11			45	54	73			9	16	16
Slovenia		27	24	30	29		20	22	17	18		34	42	41	46		14	12	12	10
Ukraine			37	45	31			9	9	8			48	51	68			28	29	22
		40	29	27	21		15	15	17	17		45	53	56	65		26	23	25	25

Source: European Values Survey (1980-2008). At least 60% of cases (countries) necessary to calculate the average percentage of the category in each observation. * Linear average estimated data for Great Britain, France, Italy and Netherlands in 1995; and Switzerland in 2000. ** Importance of God not asked in Poland

For question wordings and operationalization of each dependent variable, see Footnote in Table 1 in the Text.

