Between rights and market. The mechanisms of economization of the refugee reception in Italy.

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*draft version

Abstract
For at least 25 years, Europe has faced the challenge of migration. In recent years, due to the crisis in North Africa and the Middle East, the number of arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers from the Mediterranean has increased exponentially. This phenomenon, that is putting a strain on the political cohesion of Europe, is leading to the activation of new public policies, for the initial reception of asylum seekers. This rapid activation of new public policies is taking different forms of connection between public policies and private companies in the countries of Southern Europe.

In recent years, many public policies connected with the provision of essential public services - i.e. health, education, elderly care, etc. - opened to the logic of neoclassical economic rationality. Even the reception of asylum seekers is being implemented through the public construction of the dynamics of supply and demand in the market.

The research describes the mechanism of belief formation of policy makers. The argument of analogy is used in the black box situation with the support of epistemic authorities. Expectations are compared with the effects of daily practices of social inclusion/exclusion of refugees.

Then pilot projects carried out in Italy are presented which have tried to manage the reception of refugees outside the logic of the services market. For instance, the families reception in Asti and Milan; and the pilot project "Nor guests nor aliens, then what?", experiencing the opportunity to free of charge hospitality for asylum seekers in Italian families in their own homes.

Keywords
Economization, refugees, analogy, social inclusion.
Outline

1. Introduction
2. The reception organization in Italy
   2.1 SPRAR Reception
   2.2 The italian expenditure and condition in reception facilities
3. The economic assumptions over the public policies: the relationship between economy and society.
   3.1 The formalists: the rational maximizer
4. The mechanism of economization in refugee reception
   4.1 The black box situation
   4.2 The epistemic authorities in the emergency
   4.3 The analogism required
   4.4 The economization turn: from the markets to the refugees
5. The effects of the mechanism
   5.1 Tenders
7. Conclusion
A lot of money is moving over the heads of asylum seekers. Yet, migrants continue to live in conditions unworthy. The reception centers for asylum seekers (CARA) are jobs creators in areas where unemployment was already the rule before the crisis. The workers involved may be people who work with commitment and passion. But their action alone is useless when is the whole mechanism that does not work.

Raffaella Cosentino, La Repubblica

1

1. Introduction

At least 25 years, Europe faces the challenge of migration. In recent years, due to the crisis in North Africa and the Middle East, the number of arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers from the Mediterranean is increased exponentially. Thousands of people daily cross the borders of Europe looking for a safe place where they can be welcomed.

Migrants are also arriving in large numbers from areas where conflict is ongoing such as Afghanistan, Somalia and Eritrea. The numbers of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean in the first five months of 2016 was estimated at 197,696 with 41 per cent of these being Syrians\(^2\). And the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that 1,475 migrants died attempting to cross the Mediterranean between January and May 27 2016\(^3\).

This movement of people is creating unregulated illegal trafficking of people, with high costs incurred by refugees to criminal organizations (De Haas 2006, Freedman 2016).

Since the beginning of this year until March, the EU countries have received 217,210 asylum applications (including Syrians and others), in total by 2015 will reach 1.3 million requests. By comparison with the refugees in Turkey, which are 2,748,367 out of a population of 75 million inhabitants, it is as if Italy were to host 1.6 million Syrian refugees. The number of asylum seekers in Europe has constant flow over time, with significant increases in recent years in most European countries (Table 1).

\(^1\) http://inchieste.repubblica.it/it/repubblica/rep-it/2013/10/16/news/clandestini_il_grande_business_da_lam pedusa_a_roma-68743833/


This phenomenon, that is to putting a strain on the political cohesion of Europe, is leading to the activation of new public policies, for initial reception of asylum seekers (Wihtol de Wenden 2015).

Reception policies that countries implement derive from 1951 Refugee Convention or other refugee laws, such as article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights - if asylum is Claimed in Europe.

He may be recognised as a refugee and given refugee status if the person's circumstances fall into the definition of "refugee". Article 1 of the Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as:

"A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

What is interesting to analyze at this stage, is: a) how the public policy response to an emerging social needs, is leading to the formation of a "market of services", emerging in the field of refugee reception; b) if the positive expectations of market dynamics of the policy makers, are translated into daily practices of social inclusion / exclusion in the reception of refugees by the companies involved.

The paper analyzes the reception organization in Italy, describing the mechanism of formation of the policy makers' beliefs through interviews and compare it with a first investigation of the results produced by the model adopted.

2. The reception centres in Italy

The Interior Ministry identified under the heading of "centers for immigration" different places for the temporary stay. These structures are divided into: first aid and reception centers (CPSA), shelters (CDA), reception centers for asylum seekers (CARA) and centers for identification and expulsion (CIE).

**First aid and reception centers (CPSA)**

Hosting foreigners at the time of their arrival in Italy. In these migrant centers receive the first necessary medical care, they are registered, may apply for international protection. Subsequently, depending on their condition, they are transferred in other types of centers.

These structures are:
- Agrigento, Lampedusa
- Cagliari, Elmas
- Lecce - Otranto
- Ragusa, Pozzallo

**Reception Centres (CDA) and the reception centers for asylum seekers (CARA)**

The reception centers (CDA) guarantee first welcome the stranger within the national territory, for the time necessary to its identification and assessment on the regularity of his stay in Italy. Who requires international protection is sent in reception centers for asylum

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seekers (CARA), for the identification and the start of procedures relating to international protection. The time to stay in CARA should not exceed by law 35 days, after which applicants should receive a residence permit and seeing the protracted reception in suitable places. According to data of 2010, when were in operation seven centers "mixed" CDA-CARA with a total capacity of 3,500 seats (Ancona, Bari, Brindisi, Caltanissetta, Crotone, Foggia, Rome-Castelnuovo di Porto) and two "pure" CARA for a total of 560 seats (Gorizia and Trapani).

The average stay in these centers can actually extend for several months.

These structures are:
- Gorizia, Gradisca d’Isonzo
- Ancona, Arcevia
- Roma, Castelnuovo di Porto
- Foggia, Borgo Mezzanone
- Bari, Palese
- Brindisi, Restinco
- Lecce, Don Tonino Bello
- Crotone, Loc. S.Anna
- Catania, Mineo
- Ragusa, Pozzallo
- Caltanissetta, Contrada Pian del Lago
- Agrigento, Lampedusa
- Trapani, Salina Grande
- Cagliari, Elmas

**Identification and expulsion centers (CIE)**

Foreigners arrived in Italy without a residence permit, they do not require international protection, or do not have the requirements are held in immigration detention (Cie). The residence time (18 months maximum) is functional to the identification procedures and to subsequent expulsion and repatriation.

These structures are:
- Torino
- Roma
- Bari
- Trapani
- Caltanissetta
In fact the reception centers have numbers and widespread placement on the territory, does not coincide with the list made by the ministry. Already the aggregate data of the Interior Ministry indicate a numerical distribution in temporary structures widespread in the Italian regions, which in March 2016 comes to 110,000 admissions.\(^5\)

### 2.1 SPRAR Reception

A special form for the reception of refugees is implemented by the central service of the protection system for asylum seekers and refugees (SPRAR) that promotes the activation of collaborative projects between the central ministry, local institutions and local non-profit organizations active in the reception of migrants.\(^6\)

The reception of asylum seekers, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary and humanitarian protection has as main objectives:

- Ensuring measures of assistance and protection of the individual person;
- Facilitate the path towards the (re) conquest of autonomy.

The SPRAR reception is considered "integrated." This means that the basic materials operations, such as provision of food and accommodation, are contextual services designed to facilitate the acquisition of tools for autonomy. The services guaranteed in SPRAR territorial projects are:

- health care;
- social care;
- Multicultural activities;
- Schooling of minors;
- Linguistic and intercultural mediation;
- Guidance and legal information;
- Services for accommodation;
- Services for employment;
- Training services.

In providing all these services, it is necessary that the host location of the individual beneficiary, may take into account the complexity of his person (in terms of rights and duties, of expectations, of personal characteristics, history, cultural and political context of origin,

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\(^6\) Cf.: Central Service of the protection system for asylum seekers and refugees, Manuale operativo per l’attivazione e la gestione di servizi di accoglienza e integrazione per richiedenti e titolari di protezione internazionale. http://www.sprar.it/images/attivita_e_servizi/Accoglienza_integrata/manuale.pdf
etc.) and its needs. To ensure this taking charge and to enable a person to express themselves even in the event of need, the SPRAR is focusing on building and strengthening of local networks, involving all local actors in support of hospitality projects as a whole and, at the same time, the individual paths of the individual beneficiaries. The stay at these centers should have a maximum duration of six months.

2.2 The italian expenditure and condition in reception facilities

The Interior Ministry data provide information on the Italian spending on the reception system: in 2011 the asylum system absorbed approximately 120 million euro (Cara, Cpsa, Sprar e Fer), to which must be added 740 million of euros for the (extraordinary) manage of the so-called "emergency North Africa". In recent IMF estimates of countries expenditure for asylum seekers, Italy is in the average of similar countries in refugee reception (Table 2).

![Graph showing fiscal cost of asylum seekers from 2014 to 2015]

Table 2: Fiscal Cost of Asylum Seekers, 2014-16 (Percent of GDP) (Source: IMF staff estimates based on authorities' information and/or other sources.)

Assumptions behind estimates vary across country. For example, assumptions about per head spending (both for staying applicants and for immigrants transiting to other destinations); length of stay of and benefits received by rejected applicants; and coverage of benefit-related spending (e.g., security and education) and local government costs.

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7 IMF: Ayar et al., The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges, 2016
The peculiarity of the Italian case is that in an emergency condition such as that of 2011 (in fact similar to that of 2014 and 2015), the volume of expenditure for asylum seekers is in line with those of other countries in ordinary situation (Table 3). Even the pro-capita expenditure confirms that in Italy you do not have a particularly high expenditure, less than Sweden and Germany, and in line with other European countries⁸.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total expenditure (million of euros)</th>
<th>Asylum seekers</th>
<th>Pro-capita expenditure (euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>33035</td>
<td>23884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>29710</td>
<td>38640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>40355</td>
<td>21311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>47335</td>
<td>14319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>26940</td>
<td>14848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 2009 data.

Table 3: Expenditure for asylum seekers (Source: Leone Moressa Foundation, calculations based on Eurostat data, Emn and Interior Ministry)

The level of the expenditure, in line with other countries, should indicate, hypothetically, a good standard of institutional reception, in line with other Northern European countries largely involved with the refugee policy. In fact, internal⁹ and independent sources¹⁰, and the European Court of Human Rights also, condemned Italy for the conditions of refugee reception.

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⁸ Public expenditure on the reception of refugees is used as a critical issue for the reception of refugees in the public debate of European countries. The economic development of the countries neighboring Syria, does not appear to suffer from particular difficulties. The GDP of Lebanon, for example, is constantly growing, as well as a positive impact on the local economy of the refugees has been detected (Cali et al. 2015).


In 2014 case of Tarakhel v Switzerland, the applicants complained against the housing conditions, defined as extremely poor, in particular due to the lack of hygienic and health services. The Court held that:

“[I]n view of the current situation as regards the reception system in Italy, and although that situation is not comparable to the situation in Greece which the Court examined in M.S.S., the possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers removed to that country may be left without accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, is not unfounded.”\(^{11}\)

The research question is connected with the understanding of the mechanism by which, Italian refugee receptions, despite the good level of expenditure and long time of policies of reception, still have so negative output in refugee reception, in terms of temporary policies, overcrowded facilities with inhuman conditions and possibility of social integration (Dallavalle 2016).

3. The economic assumptions over the refugee reception

To understand the mechanism leading to the adoption of specific forms of reception policies is necessary to refer to the models currently in use in the general field of welfare policies and economic policies.

The political economy responses to the crisis has produced a mix of aggressive monetary policy and neo-liberal domestic and local policies (Ito, 2016). These policies are based on visions and expectations of seemingly clear and positive results in public opinion and decision-makers (Stokes 2001). The theoretical assumptions are anchored in the principles of neoclassical economics and are associated with an anthropological vision of man as a "rational maximizer" (Thevenot, 2006).

The scientific debate tends to be divided between supporters and opponents to this policies. The first recalling the power of the individual utility (Cook, 1968) as an engine of economic innovation (Epstein, 1968), the latter the need of redistribution to the economic development

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\(^{11}\) ECHR, Tarakhel v Switzerland, Application No 29217/12, 4 November 2014. - See more at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/reception-conditions/access-forms-reception-conditions/conditions-reception#foototeref7_3t66nn1
also (Aghion et al., 1999). The positions contain both valid arguments, although they adopt different paradigms to understand what economy is and the relationship between economy and society.

The main reference paradigms that are trying to explain these policies, can be attributed to four different areas of research, that had developed historically mostly separate.  

1. Economic. Economic has developed two main paradigms on economy: formalism and political economy. The first adopts the anthropological vision of man as a "rational maximizer" for the study of economy (Belshaw, 1965), the latter studying the political and institutional construction of economy (Polanyi, 1944).

2. Anthropology. Studies on non-Western societies shown that market economy and profit are just one type of economic organization (Guyer, 2004). In doing so, however, they reify a "culturalist" paradigm of economic action, where economy is shaped by culture.

3. Economic sociology. Have taken the market economy as a product of society, looking for external factors of influence on the economy (Embedness) (Swedberg, 2004). By doing so, while working to relativize the economic action, they also "diluted" the problem of the economy in external factors situated in society.

4. Economization. The most recent approach could be used is developed around the idea of "economization". In this vision the effects and economic action are not studied in the light of anthropological a priori, but are analyzed in their implementation (Caliskan & Callon 2009; Callon, Millo & Muniesa, 2007). Particular attention is placed on the role that the economic theories have in performing specific forms of economies (MacKenzie, 2008). Significant researches using this approach have already been developed to describe the processes and the effects of financial economy (MacKenzie, 2007).

The research adopts the economization approach to explain the mechanisms of influence of economic theory in the reception refugees policies through policy maker’s beliefs.

3.1 The formalism position

The formalist approach between the economic theories have had the most influence in the recent history of economics and politics. This conceives human action as a constant individual choice between different options to maximize their utility (Cook, 1968; Epstein, 1968). The objectives are defined and from outside (culture). The model places the individual in a situation of scarcity of resources, constantly engaged to obtain the maximum

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12 Is not possible recall here a debate that is the basis of the foundation of social science and the disciplinary division between Economy, Sociology and Political science. I only report four general paradigms that could be useful to frame and understand the mechanisms involved in the policies described.
in terms of time, money, goods, etc. The model poses as ends, not only financial values, but also religious, ethical, power (Caliskan & Callon, 2009: 373).

The model has the benefit of being easily extended to many individual and collective fields of human activity. The model has an anthropological character: it poses a form of human action with constant rationality, committed everywhere with the same mode of action, although the end may change for cultural reasons. The model allows to hypothesize possible behaviors of individuals along individual utility curves.

The model has the advantage of potentially wide extensive capacity. It can produce explanatory hypotheses about the behavior of individuals and collectives in a wide range of situations: from finance to organizations; from work to education. His greatest explanatory power is however achieved in the conditions of a market price, where the encounter between supply and demand seems to better comply with the principles of the model (Firth, 1967). In such conditions the model is able to develop descriptive models that also develop significant predictive capabilities.

Individuals acting in conditions of scarcity can be modeled, by analogy, as an institutional act in conditions of scarcity. At this level, the explanatory and predictive models of individual behavior can easily generate prescriptive models about the conditions to maximize the overall public benefit (Thevenot, 2006). If the anthropological model places the individual as a constant rational maximizer, and the benefit to the community as the sum of individual utilities, the task of the institutions may appear to create the conditions for which each individual can better pursue their own individual utility:

Because selection could result in blatantly under-efficient and even socially unbearable situations if left unattended, the twofold concern of economics is as follows: to unfold the variables that could explain the different levels of market efficiency and to urge governments to follow the experts’ advice and expertise either in designing the markets or in structuring national (or transnational) economies. [...] We could compare these economists to designers of prosthetic equipment for the disabled, the nature of which is to optimize behaviours where humans do not have the capacity or as yet the means to do so on their own. (Caliskan & Callon, 2009: 380)

The shift of economic theory by explanatory power of individual behavior to the prescriptions for institutional policies, marks the gap between the economy, as a matter of research for social science, to the economization practices, as performative capacity of economic theory to affect the social reality.
4. The mechanism of economization in refugee reception

The economization practices in welcoming refugees following primarily macro-processes, but to find an effective explanation about their reproduction it has been understood in their implementation at the micro level. The analysis of the mechanisms of formation of belief in policy makers developed by Rydgren (2009) may be a useful tool to investigate the black box of belief formation.

Following the explanatory model of analytical sociology, the following paragraph seeks to show how the practice of economization is implemented at the micro level of the policy makers.

The analysis uses twenty semi-structured interviews with policy makers at local and national level to describe the process and beliefs that lead to the current form for the reception of refugees\(^\text{13}\). Those interviewed are chosen from different levels and institutions that cooperate to manage refugee reception: municipalities, prefectures, regional offices, ministry of the interior.

The in-depth interviews were conducted in Italian language and explored basic subjects including: the process and the actors involved in the decision making; the respective roles; personal beliefs over the market output and the policy developed; personal expectations for the outcomes. The interview questions were designed in a flexible and open way to allow participants to drive the interview focus. This dialogical approach (Crouch & McKenzie 2006) to conducting the interviews gave interviewees as much space as possible to describe their experiences in their own time. Key points conditioning the policy makers action emerging from interviews are: 1) the lack of knowledge and structures; 2) the public opinion; 3) the funds.

\(^{13}\) Interviews are still ongoing in order to arrive at minimum of eight interviewees for each level of government.
4.1 The lack of knowledge and structures: the black box situation

Often people form their beliefs on the basis of others’ beliefs (Rydgren 2009: 83). This is true in every area of social life and the all the period of personal life. The formation of beliefs about the explanation of social facts can not ignore the beliefs as social construction. Especially in a highly differentiated society (Luhmann 1995) it has become structurally impossible, due to the high disciplinary specialization, for an individual to have a conscious experience of the complexity of knowledge s/he uses. The stratification of knowledge in various social fields is widespread and specialized as to make impracticable any attempt to an holistic epistemology. The multidisciplinary research carried out by scientists in past epochs, appear, in highly differentiated societies, structurally impracticable. In this condition for action at limited rationality, unable to consider all the variables involved in decision-making, dissemination and transmission of beliefs takes a central role in decision making.

There are two social conditions in which the formation of belief takes place primarily through social influence: the black box situation (Boudon, 1989) and the condition in which personal beliefs deviate from those of the standard environment (Rydgren 2009: 83). The first condition seems to be the one closest to the condition of the policy makers in the management of reception of refugees. Interviewers agree that refugee policies are still considered as temporary and emergency:

“There is no stable structures for the refugee reception. When the government changes, may change everything. There isn’t any interest in the political actors at national level to invest in refugee reception.” (IM 3)

“We [local authorities] are left alone in managing refugee reception, it is still considered a temporary problem.” (IM 2)

Here is emerging a situation where individuals are engaged with a new or unknown situation, in a position where s/he has to choice quickly in a fields without a consolidated form of knowledge (black box situation). Subject in this position usually use knowledge brought by epistemic authority (Kruglanski 2013).
The condition can be considered new for the specific configuration that elements go to take (eg. the addition of a different element in the fields, such a new technology available), or to vary the scale and size of the problem (eg. exponential increase in the number of migrants). In such conditions the validity of the policies and practices implemented before may fail because: i) the fact takes on new configuration and dimensions compared to the previous condition; ii) the new configuration the interventions of the policy maker does not respond as expected to.

4.2 The epistemic authorities in the emergency

In front of the black box situation, requiring a rapid choice, the role of epistemic authorities comes into play. This may derive from the social role played by the subject, its recognition and public visibility (Raviv et al. 1993) and the transferability of the knowledge. Its social role makes it look like a holder of a knowledge-established and applicable to the current situation. It is not possible to verify personally the heuristic foundations of the knowledge, but is necessary to trust it. In this condition a rational choice, that should be based on an objective evaluation of different possibilities (Sanderson 2002), comes to be based on trust in a particular subject (Hurley 2006). In addressing the black box situation the rational strategy of comparative assessment between competing options can be lost, in favor of the trust in the solution proposed by a person identified as epistemic authorities.

As far the arrival of migrants in Italy is a well-established position stably at least since the 80s of the last century, this has not yet found its ordinary management stabilized, but it is primarily working with periodic "crisis" and "emergencies" in the reception management (Zincone & Caponio 2006). These periodic crises and emergency management have not led to the formation of stabilized structures, institutions and recognized knowledge in addressing the reception management.

“Government still continue to call it an “emergency”, everybody knows it is false, but it could used for instrumental political or electoral purposes, or as excuse for bad policies." (IM 1)

“There were good example of policies developed with the SPAR projects, but there is not a constant and strategic policy able to implement and expand these.” (IG 2)

The emergency interventions produce and reproduce temporary interventions that, due to the stability of the flow of migrants, then become long-term interventions. Their foundation and legitimacy linked to contingency does not allow the formation of a consolidated
institutional knowledge, its refinement, its verification and implementation. The intervention is temporary, designed to deal with an emergency, therefore does not require the consolidation of knowledge and practices consolidated because, in theory, designed to an early end.

“With every new recent crisis in the Mediterranean area central government make some changes to the regulation of refugee policies to give public announcement. After there are really few interest for the implementation and the follow up… until the new crisis” (IP 5)

This condition of constant temporariness of reception interventions delegated to the policy-maker to build a solution quickly and, hopefully, even occasionally. In condition of epistemic uncertainty, and hoped temporary intervention, the construction of belief over the form that intervention should take, is usually thought using the logical form of the analogy.

4.3 The analogism required

One way to make logical inferences about the observed facts of the argument is the use of the analogy (Sacksteder 1974). This does not have the value of the nomological deductive logic, because instead of inferences developed on empirical observation, it replaces inferences borrowed from other fields. The argument that defines analogy working as follow: it observed the same property on an object and also on a second, and deduce that the second object also has other properties belonging to the former. Although the analogy is fallacious argument from a logical point of view, this is widely used in everyday life to make easier and flowing the individual and collective behavior. By individuals or institutions with similar roles and characteristics are expected similar behaviors, although this belief is often empirically contradicted. The analogy is, however, very much used because it has the ability to make more fluid social interaction and to stabilize social relations. By a person acting a professional role, we expect standardized behaviors observed from some of his colleagues. Even if the feedback, in some cases, could be negative (eg. the subject does not behave as expected) this does not lead to question the analogy argument, for its practicality and effectiveness in everyday life. It is more reliable to use a form of intervention that already contains some known and reliable characteristics, compared to other possibilities that do not contain any known characteristic (Rydgren 2004). Under uncertainty a form of rationally action works to a reduction in risk (Beck 2009).
In the state of uncertainty in the reception of migrants, given by the black box situation, the policy maker, especially at the local level, has to decide in a position of great uncertainty, under the pressure of not always convergent duties and expectations. The main factors that influence the decisions on the reception mode, found in interviews with policy maker, can be identified as:

1. The national and international legislation on the protection of refugees (Hathaway 2005)
2. The negative representation of the theme on public opinion and its instrumental use for electoral purposes (Bruno 2016; Hatton 2016)
3. The limited funds allocated in public budgets for the reception management

On the first factor of influence the policy maker has so far responded with emergency policies. To the second factor has responded with a widespread of asylum seekers away from cities, trying to reduce the public visibility of the phenomenon.

“Everybody are sad for the died in the Mediterranean sea when they saw it in TV, but nobody want them close to their home.” (IM 3)

“Keep the refugee centre out from the city is a way to don’t increase social conflicts” (IP 2)

The interviews show that to the third factor of influence has responded by developing a practice of economization of hospitality.

“Are limited and fixed depending from the number of refugees in each province. They allow you to pay only livelihood, not to plan and invest.” (IR 4)

“Public tenders for refugee reception services could be considered a good strategy to solve the problem. Otherwise you could also consider different specific projects for the reception.” (IP 3)

In the black box situation, in which the decisions are taken under uncertainty, it is mobilized an epistemic authorities able to provide a useful knowledge for the situation, although it can operate in the logical form of the analogy.

Is needed a knowledge that is able to manage the economic resources available in the most efficient and effective way in the reception for refugees. Knowledge used has to be easily extended to the situation thanks to the analogy: it must have already shown heuristic and

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14 IMF: Ayar et al., The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges, 2016
operational effectiveness in other fields, and can transport own characteristics in other social spheres, in order to support the argument analogy.

4.4 The economization turn: from the markets to the refugees

Among the consolidated knowledge above considered, the formalist approach is probably the one that best adapts with the mechanism described. It is not holding, such as the institutionalist or the anthropological economic approaches, of a contextual knowledge or medium range theory, but it is the bearer of an anthropological vision, of potentially universal human action. The image of the individual action as a constant rational maximization, can be applied to every area of society, as an heuristic device, but also as a prescriptive instrument (the economization turn).

Public policies developed following this economic approach are usually identified as neoliberal (Prasad 2006) because they seek to increase the occasions in which the individual can act as a rational maximizer, with the goal of profit or other. Social fields were previously managed by public institutions, are ideally delivered to the agency of individual actors committed to maximize their own profit.

This model of public policies can be easily translated and reproduced in many spheres of society, going to increase behavioral patterns aimed at maximizing profits. At the individual utility maximization it is also used to develop more efficient institutional behaviors, of those developed public from acting (Borcherding et al. 1982).

In the framework of uncertainty generated by the black box, the argument of the analogy is mobilized to find effective and efficient solutions. The argument that best seems to meet the heuristic and operational requirements of the situation, appears to be to the formalist approach to the management of public economic resources: it is able to clearly define both forms of action of the individuals involved (maximizing the utility) and to set up a clear and easy role for policy makers. The policy makers, in fact, does not need to organize the reception of refugees and can delegate it to private, considering them able, theoretically, to deliver a better service at lower cost for the public.

“Bringing the refugee reception policies to the private level allow us to solve many organizational problems easily. In that way we can also expect to maximizing the quality of the service promoted and having the most efficient use of public resources.” (IG 5)

The fact that such assumptions are the subject of debate within the same epistemic authority involved (Cancian 1996, Chick & Dow 2001) does not enter the already complex system of
beliefs of the black box, for which, this explanation and prescriptions, generating apparent easy solutions for the policy makers. The solution is certainly more easy to use and perform of other more complex forms of explanation of social action (Caliskan & Callon 2009). Each categorization (eg. human being as a rational maximizer) is always a narrowing of possible categorizations; however, it is not always true that a type of effective categorization in the context (eg. the rational maximizer in the market price), can have the same explanatory or prescriptive capacity in other contexts (eg. reception of refugees).
This explanatory and prescriptive model generates forms of reception management in Italy, in the form of the services market.

5. The effects of the mechanism

The main effects of the described mechanism on policies related to the reception management, are primarily an high percentage of assigns, made by the local prefectures, to private entities in the reception management. The data on the number of direct contracts made by the prefectures are of not easily access. It is given to the autonomy of local institutions in dealing with the reception of refugees.

The many local journalistic investigations, and also the judicial investigations, talking about many cases of widespread direct assignments throughout the national territory. In such cases the prefecture, local office of the Interior Ministry, identifies the private entities they consider most appropriate in the management of the reception, and commission them the reception management. In such situations the choice of the entity in charge is discretionary.

Its supposed ability in carrying out the task can hardly be determined a priori, because of the development of public policies that previously did not exist.

These phenomena have also produced situations outside of legality: overcrowding, unacceptable hygienic conditions, lack of necessary services for the beginning of a process of integration.

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16 Cf.: Ambrosini, M., Marchetti, C., Cosa c'è di sbagliato nei Centri per l'immigrazione, lavoce.info http://www.lavoce.info/archives/16112/cosa-ce-di-sbagliato-nei-centri-di-immigrazione/

17 Cf. eg: http://www.redattoresociale.it/Notiziario/Articolo/493927/Centinaia-di-migranti-ammassati-nel-degrado-E-nessuno-controlla
5.1 Tenders

If such discretionary assignment activities is contested by other state authorities (e.g., the judiciary, anti-corruption authorities, the Court of Auditors, political parties, etc.), or is deemed inadequate by the local prefectures, it usually passes to be assigned through tenders. The call asks participants an economic and technical offer for the reception service. In the call for tender are described the aspects of the service which must be guaranteed. The recent call for tenders from the Como Prefecture is a good example of the contents of the tender specifications used, which contain:

- administrative management services
- general support services to people.
- cleaning and sanitation
- Meal delivery
- Supply of goods
- Services for social integration

The service for integration in particular shall include:

“For all subjects there is a linguistic and cultural mediation service to guarantee coverage of the following services: a) linguistic and cultural support; b) information service on the legislation on immigration, the rights and obligations and of the foreigner; c) socio-psychological support; d) health care to be carried out at local health centers or family doctors, including mandatory vaccinations, […] including the movements of the guests that may be necessary to ensure the support; e) to area counseling, information and assistance in dealing with the competent Police Headquarters for inclusion in the system of protection for applicants for international protection, asylum and refugees, including the movement of guests to and from the local police station as may be necessary to ensure the conduct of assistance; f) ensure that guests can also make phone calls through the use of prepaid international phone cards to be provided as part of the Pocket Money, also ensuring the opportunity for guests to call, providing them with mobile phones or fixed telephone stations and / or public.”

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18 Cf.: PROCEDURA DI GARA APERTA AD EVIDENZA PUBBLICA PER L’INDIVIDUAZIONE DEI SOGGETTI A CUI AFFIDARE I SERVIZI DI ACCOGLIENZA NEL TERRITORIO DELLA PROVINCIA DI COMO AI CITTADINI STRANIERI RICHIEDENTI PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE PER IL PERIODO 01.01.2016 - 31.12.2016
http://www.prefettura.it/FILES/AllegatiPag/1167/Bando_gara_servizi_accoglienza_stranieri_2016.pdf
The ranking to determine the winner the tender takes account of a score that evaluates both the technical offer of the services, and the economic offer down from the standard price, set by the contract. The national standard price for individual reception for day is 35 € per day. Markdowns offered in the tender is even up to 21 € per day.

“Public tenders are a good way to reduce the cost of the services for the citizens. Market competition is a good strategy to spend public money for refugee reception in the best way as possible.” (IG 4)

The cost of the service dynamics have repercussions in the internal organization of the entities. Like any company, wishing to remain competitive in the market, looking to reduce operating costs by saving on staff, goods and services; so, the companies managing the refugee reception, can not escape the price trend reduction for the adjudication of service. Such a dynamic not necessarily produce negative effects on the service offered. In many competitive markets this has a positive effect in terms of costs and quality of service offered. The reception management of refugees in an area has not, however, the characteristics of a competitive market: the demand (the number of refugees to be admitted) is regulated by the state and fixed, and the refugees can not choose between different services offered. The contract, once assigned, is fixed for a long period of time, except for serious misconduct. In this configuration of "reception-service " the "refugee-consumers" do not have the possibility to choose between different offers, as would happen in a competitive market, if the successful tenderer does not offer a satisfactory reception service. This monopolistic condition produces a reduction in initial costs through tender, but then, there is not possibility of control by the refugee-consumer over the quality of the service provided. Is missing, in other words, the sanctioning power of the consumer against a uncompetitive company described by Hirschman as exit option (1970). Episodes of protests have occurred by the refugees against the inhuman conditions of reception (voice option). These did not have significant effects on the mechanism, both for the lack of a political actors interested to respond to requests, and for the suspended citizenship status of the asylum seeker. Using Hirschman concepts (1970), it could be argued that in such conditions for refugees has been withdrawn the possibility to exit and voice. These policies are producing a kind of market with not the benefits for the consumers expected by the optimal form of market.

In this condition of diffused bad policies in the reception system, for inclusion and protection, some alternative examples are emerging locally\(^\text{19}\). These are examples where the reception is subtracted from the logic of the services market and given to small structure or families, or an example where are trying to totally subtract from the logic of economic exchange. These example would be followed and compared in the results with the other and also for describing the political frame adopted by policy makers involved.

In Asti\(^\text{20}\) was organized a reception of refugees in the city families. At first the families were chosen directly by the state, then they started to spontaneously offer themselves for the reception. Families are provided with a refund for expenses of € 400 per month, and the applicant is accompanied by consultants for the administrative procedures, learning the language and training. The pilot project, whose evaluation is in progress, it seems to have positive effects on the inclusion and well-being of asylum-seekers, and also for families who find themselves to deal with the economic crisis, may have a support for the economic livelihood. Among the host families many are of foreign origin. This kind of reception seems to have a positive impact of mirroring by the asylum seeker towards the personal path of social integration done by the host family.

A similar experiment was started from the beginning of 2016 also in Milan. The municipality promoted a public tender for families to host a refugee in their own home\(^\text{21}\). Hospitality provides a refund of 350 € per month for families. The cost reduces by 70% the standard cost for the state for the reception. To the call responded forty families who are starting to host.

The most radical experimental project in this direction is the one proposed by the artist Mario Rizzi for the reception of refugees in the city of Pistoia. The artist, with the project “Nor Guest Nor Aliens, Then What?” proposed to the families of the city to accept freely a refugee in their own home for a short period of time. The project try to test the possibility of a form of

\(^{19}\) Cf.: Storie dalla rete dello SPRAR. L’accoglienza una opportunità di crescita per i territori. SPRAR http://www.cittalia.it/images/file/SPRAR_Opuscolo_Storie.pdf

\(^{20}\) Cf.: http://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/09/06/news/l_accoglienza_e_diffusa_a_chi_ospita_un_migrant e_vanno_400_euro_al_mese-122298119/

\(^{21}\) Cf.: http://www.comune.milano.it/wps/portal/ist/it/news/primopiano/tutte_notizie/politiche_sociali/bando_famig lie_disposte_accogliere_profughi
solidarity with the refugees not mediated by the money. The reception would free. A form of hospitality that has been already done in Italy in the war and post-war period. Some families already given their willingness, is ongoing the research of a minimum number of family for the start of the project.

7. Conclusion

The reception of refugees in Italy is a social process that is putting a strain on established forms of social solidarity. On the one hand the economic crisis has exacerbated inequalities and social hardship, on the other the public debate uses an alarmist and distorted representation of the phenomenon. In this context, the policy maker is developing temporary public policies that often become stable. Under uncertainty the policy maker is going to use a model of explanation of phenomena with the mechanism of the analogy, which borrows from the services market mechanism the tools for organizing the refugee reception. In such conditions it is has been show the mechanism that leads to the affirmation of the neoclassical formalist economic model for the management of public services. Thus, direct assignments in the refugee reception are carried out by private entities, or are made with public tenders. This leads to the formation of a monopoly in which the refugee-consumer has not the possibility of exit and even voice. In this condition inhuman treatment prevails, for hygienic, environmental and relational conditions.

Some local pilot projects are developing alternative forms of hospitality: Asti and Milan are experiencing reception in volunteer families connected to a monthly expense refund. A pilot project in Pistoia is trying to organize the reception free of charge in families, not mediated by the money.

Further research steps could follows the implementation of pilot projects by comparing the outputs with those produced by the standard refugees centres.

8. Bibliography


