TOWARDS NEW PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES?
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES INTRODUCED BY THE JOBS ACT

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Abstract

The reorganization of the public employment services (PES) may represent the mother of all challenges for the Jobs Act. This work will aim to understand the direction of change that Italian PES may undertake, analysing the impact of the new mechanisms introduced by the Jobs Act and paying particular attention to the features of the public-private governance of the system. Here, we will try to find some comprehensive indicators, in the attempt to summarise these different regional configurations, including also variables related to regional political systems. Then, in light of this operation, we will be able to analyse characteristics of local systems of PES, using a specific governance profile for each region, making some hypotheses based on very simple assumptions. At the same time, a term of comparison to understand the process of reform regarding Italian PES can be delivered from the comprehension of the German system of labour market policies, interested by a deep process of reorganization during the so called “Hartz reforms” in the Two-thousands.

The context of the reform

Last labour market reforms have brought in a new light the Italian system of public employment services (PES), gaining a renewed strategic role in the redefinition of the labour market policies of this country. In particular, here we are focusing on the delegation about the modernization of PES contained in the “Jobs Act” (law 183/2014). For this, much attention will be given to the decree 150/2015, with the institution of the new state agency called Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche Attive.
These are interventions which reflect the typical patterns of the so called “Management by Objectives” (MBO),\(^1\) used to verify, on the basis of measurable indicators, the efficiency and effectiveness of public services\(^2\).

The Jobs Act intervenes on active labour market policies and employment services from two different points of view, one institutional and the other functional (ISFOL 2016). In this contribution we will be particularly interested to the first aspect, paying attention to the current characteristics of the governance of PES, both to the relationship between public and private operators and the relationship between central and regional levels of government. In particular, our aim will be to understand the direction of change that Italian PES may undertake, analysing the impact of the new mechanisms introduced by the Jobs Act.

Strong changes in this field are not a novelty for Italy. In the last twenty years, there has already been an important process of decentralisation and liberalization of PES. In particular, the most important change is made, starting from the decree 469/1997, with the rethinking of the relationship between central government and local autonomies in the management of labour market policies, transferred by the State to regions and provinces. Beyond that, the opening to private operators, first with the device of temporary work, introduced by “Treu reform” (law 196/1997), and then completed with the “Biagi reform” (decree 276/2003), enabled the access of new private providers in the system, the so called “work agencies”. The relationship between public and private operators started to be regulated with a new governance device, the accreditation. This measure represents a prerequisite for the delivery of services by private actors, using public funds. We must always keep in mind, however, that it was not an indiscriminate liberalization strategy. It was, rather, a mixed system of coexistence between public and private, remaining still in the context of regional planning (Cicciomessere and Sorcioni 2009). This has been the way in which regions structured their governance of employment services, realizing different models (D’Onofrio and Morocco 2013). The coexistence resulted in more cooperative or competitive forms, depending in particular on the regulation of the accreditation device and reflecting the experiences of public-private partnership already established in each territory. We should consider, first of all, that the implementation of the accreditation devices, however, has proceeded hardly (Spattini and Tiraboschi 2015)\(^3\). Only in the last two years we can see that in the

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\(^1\) Literature on this topic is enormous. For its application in the field of employment services, see OECD (2006) and Mosley et al (2001)

\(^2\) It is expected that the Ministry of Labour should adopt a three year programming plan of the active labour market policies and an annual fixation of target to control the implementation of the plan.

\(^3\) In 2010, 7 years after the Biagi reform, only in 4 regions (Friuli Venezia Giulia, Lombardy, Tuscany, Veneto) approved a system of accreditation for employment services. In all the other regions there. In other 7 regions (Campania, Emilia Romagna, Liguria, Marche, Piedmont, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige) the accreditation was defined only by regional legislation, without being implemented through specific resolutions. In the remaining 9 regions (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Lazio, Molise, Puglia, Sicily, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta) the regional rules did not contain any reference to accreditation.
majority of the regions there is a system of accreditation\textsuperscript{4}. With the exception of Emilia Romagna and Liguria, where the accreditation is still present only in the legislative definition but it lacks the specific regional resolutions for his complete implementation, Umbria and the autonomous province of Bolzano register the absence of any reference to an accreditation device. However, the existence of a regional regulation is not a full guarantee of operability and efficiency of the system. Italian PES, therefore, despite a deep reorganization process started in the nineties, still show limitations and problems, due to a significant delay in the implementation and an high degree of territorial fragmentation. The question of the relationship between public and private operators is, in fact, still uncertain, articulating itself on very different local configurations. Those territories showing an already well established system could be identified in those having produced for first a regional law on the labour market after the Biagi reform (Emilia-Romagna\textsuperscript{5}, Tuscany, Veneto, Lombardy, Friuli-Venezia Giulia). Within these models is defined the relationship between public and private operators, consequence of specific choices of regional governance systems. The preference for a certain model of governance of PES, in this view, depends very much on the role assigned to private providers. There could be an equalization between public and private operators, in terms of power and tasks, showing a decline of public hands, or otherwise, the jobcentres can continue to be at the core management of the system, ensuring the provincial structures to be the main providers. These different addresses are not far from differences in terms of politics, regarding the characteristics of decision-making of the territories (Gualmini and Fargion).Examples are some regions, like Emilia Romagna, Marche and Tuscany, who took an openly hostile attitude in general towards the system designed since the Biagi reform\textsuperscript{6}. In fact, they have realized policies that have sought to defend more strongly the position and the role of the public actor. Simultaneously with the Jobs Act, however, we have to consider also law 56/2014, that abolished the provinces, making jobcentres, the structures through which they delivered employment services, at the dependence of the regions. These measures should be completed by a constitutional centralization of legislative power over these matters in the hands of the state, with the approval of the constitutional reform, pending, however, the corresponding referendum, to be scheduled in the next months\textsuperscript{7}.

\textsuperscript{4} Very often it has been the need to accredit operators to implement the Youth Guarantee program to push many regions to regulate the regional accreditation system. Calabria, in particular, has a system that is only active for the provision of services within the Youth Guarantee program.

\textsuperscript{5} Nevertheless, Emilia Romagna has been among the first to legislate on the subject (regional law 17/2005), but highlighting the centrality of the public's role in employment services and specifying that the accredited operators can only act in a way which should be “integrative and not substitutive of the functions of the provinces”.

\textsuperscript{6} Marche, Tuscany, Emilia – Romagna, the Autonomous Province of Trento and Basilicata also came to promote appeals, then rejected before the Constitutional Court (sentence no. 50/2005)

\textsuperscript{7} The constitutional reform changes the article no. 117 of the Constitution assigning to the State the exclusive power on the subject of the active labour market policies
A new governance for PES: quasi-market schemes and re-centralization

Now, considering the limits of the previous reforms, we want to hypothesize if the previsions of the Jobs Act could lead to a sort of “re-centralization” of PES, to the point that we can think at isomorphic pressures (Di Maggio and Powell 1983). The reasons for this speculation could be evident if we focus on the contents of the law no. 183/2014 and the decree no. 150/2015. Respect to the previous situation, there are three patterns of reforms that could represent a signal of this:

- the prevision of a single central regulation of the accreditation device
- the power assigned to the ANPAL to intervene in place of regions whereas their services are not efficient
- The same power to the ANPAL for the management and the diffusion of new forms of quasi-market in the provision of the services, like the case of a new instrument, the so called assegnolib

This last scheme represents one of the major innovation in the renewal of the active labour market policies in Italy, relying on a quasi-market mechanism to deliver the employment services (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993, Bruttel 2005). According to this scheme, the jobseeker, after an accurate profiling phase, carried out by jobcentre’s staff, receives a voucher quantified in terms of his difficulty to get a job. The same jobseeker, at that point, can freely choose how to spend those resources, among the provision of placement services provided by public and private operators, in competition to “gain” the public resources directly assigned to the user, whereas the public provider can continue to act as one of the competing actors. It is important to understand what could be the impact of these policies in their implementation, considering the configuration of the Italian pes. We have to consider first of all the characteristics of territorial fragmentation seen just before, with very different regional

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8 The decree 150/2015, recognizes to the work agencies already authorized the right to request to the ANPAL to be accredited "to the employment services throughout the national territory". For this purpose, it is up to the same ANPAL established the “National List of accredited operators to perform functions and tasks in the field of active labour market policies" , in which are recorded in addition to authorized work agencies, even "the agencies wishing to operate in the regions that have not set up their own accreditation system" (art . 12 ).

9 This consists in three situations: the agency may substitute regions in the case in which these do not follow the so called LEP (Livelli essenziali di prestazioni), the minimum standards fixed by the Minister of Labour to be observed in each region (art. 9) ; the central regulation of the accreditation can be used in those regions without accreditation schemes in order to cover this legislative absence (art. 12); the voucher of assegnoliber is managed directly by the agency when public jobcentre fail the maximum time of 60 days, fixed by law, to provide it (art. 20).

10 According to the decree no. 150/2015 this measure is not directed to all the categories of jobseekers, but only to those unemployment benefits recipients

11 To be distinguished from the case of privatization, where a former public sector function is moved permanently into the private sector with a change in the owner’s structure and in the way of financing (Struyven and Seurs 2004)
trajectories. But, what is clear, is that the model promoted at central level, above all with the diffusion of the assegno di ricollocazione, needs some structural conditions in the governance of employment services. Precisely, we can guess that it is only through a larger space reserved for private actors that such scheme could be implemented, through an equalization between public and private operators, which becomes necessary for the competition among them. It is clear that this could be the case, for instance, for those regions already showing large space for private operators, like in the case of Veneto and that of Lombardy. The Lombard model of governance\footnote{Cf. Regional law no. 22 of 28th September 2006 and regional Council decree no. 9254 of 14th October 2013}, in particular, arouses much attention because it has developed practices that seem likely to be extended throughout the entire national territory, as it could result from the addresses of the central government on the subject of placement. Here, since 2006, active labour market system have been managed with the so called Sistema dotale, a quasi-market scheme in employment policy very similar to that of the assegno individuale di ricollocazione (Giubileo 2013). It is likely, therefore, that Lombardy could already be prepared to implement these new policies, without showing particular problems with respect to the addresses promoted at national level.

Not by chance, the reform gives to the ANPAL the power to intervene over regions when these can reveal situations delayed or incomplete. What we have seen suggests that this is a real possibility considering that the models of governance in many regions have been implemented only in recent times. This, however, could not be the case of those regions where there is already an operating and consolidated model. These are characteristics that refer often to the increased institutional capacity of regions, due to the presence of operational schemes already well established. Whereas there is greater institutional capacity, it is possible that those regions could be more able to preserve the specific nature of their models, negotiating the specific agreements with the Ministry of Labour provided by the reform\footnote{The decree 150/2015, in fact, grants for regions the possibility to negotiate a specific agreement in order to regulate the relationship with the central government for the management of employment services and active labour market policies (art. 11).}. But this is a different case respect to those "regions" weaker under these points of view. It is, therefore, fundamental to understand the predisposition of each territory with respect to these schemes of quasi-market.

**Contracting-out in Italian PES: the political determinants of regional governance**

Many studies try to evaluate quasi-market and contracting out decisions in employment policies by using the explanatory power of comparisons across countries (Finn 2011, 2013, 2015; Struyven and
Steurs 2004; Bredgaard and Larsen 2006). Among them, some studies about “privation” of social policies (Lopez de Silanes et al. 1997, Koening 2009), examine empirically how local governments choose their mode of producing service, distinguishing also ideological reasons. According to these, the pressure for a larger space for privates must come from voter preference for liberal issues, such as lower taxes, lower public budgets, making in house provision less affordable. In this way, to capture ideological attitudes about government, they usually control for the fraction of votes in each county for a centre-right gubernatorial candidate.

Similarly, if we consider that the decree 150/2015 requires some space for private providers, according to the ideological reasons seen we can suppose that these kind of policies might work with major favour where there is more consensus for centre-right coalitions. This is coherent with some features about the process of formation of the Jobs Act. In particular, the reference to the assegno individuale di ricollocazione has been the result of the activities of those exponents of the actual coalition of the Renzi's Government who are more on the right wing of it. Maurizio Sacconi, for the party Nuovo Centrodestra, proposed, and then withdrew, in February 2014, a bill in which it was assumed that each person would have had a budget available to it, proportional to its distance from the labour market, choosing freely the provider where to spend the budget and specifying that the payment for the providers should be outcome based. In the same manner, Pietro Ichino, previously elected with the list Scelta Civica and then returned into the ranks of the Democratic Party, has been in recent years one of the greatest promoters of quasi-market models in employment policies, pushing for the first definition of a contratto di ricollocazione in the “Stability Act” of 2014 (law 147/2013), as a form of agreement in cases of outplacement. Its contribution, moreover, has been strong also in the drafting of the Jobs Act.

This may appear to be relevant to the understanding of the institutional divergence between regional models of PES governance. As we have seen, there are regions having expressed hostility respect to an easier access of the private providers, and regions that, by contrast, have created models that tend toward equalization between the public and private operators, to the point that we can easily think to Emilia – Romagna and Lombardy at the two sides of a hypothetical continuum.

As already said, since these are different often related to the characteristics of decision-making style, we can include in our consideration variables related to political and ideological reasons, just looking

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14 These kind of studies examine how far the condition for quasi-market to be succeeded are present in the emerging employment and training services markets. Most of them focus on the cases of Australia, the Netherlands, Germany and UK, which provide the most typical patterns of these kind of reforms.

15 The lect. p, 4th comma, art. 1 of the law no. 183/2014 has been the result of an amendment of the senator Ichino talking about “the promotion of special links between unemployment benefits and placement activities, also with agreements involving specialized operators [...] with the provision of adequate forms of remuneration, proportioned to the distance from the labour market, granted only in case of effective matching, using regional funds for this scope”
at the correlations between voting patterns and the presence of various configurations of regional PES.

**Understanding regional divergence**

The picture presented so far suggests that the Italian configuration of PES may seem somewhat inhomogeneous. More precisely, in order to better understand the configuration of regional PES systems, we will take into consideration not only the characteristics of the labour markets, but also the link with the characteristics of the local economy and the political and institutional dynamics that characterize the regional governments. When we are able to place a region with respect to these variables we can find its distance with the other regional cases and, in this way, try to understand the predisposition and the starting conditions of each region with respect to the implementation of the last reform. For this purpose, we present a multivariate analysis with the aim of highlighting the positioning of each region with respect to the variables that seem to describe and characterize it. The synthesis, obtained through the principal component analysis, will highlight the main correlations between elementary indicators directly measurable, so as to assess the "distances" among regions, according to different points of view, as many as the factors interpreted (Bolasco 1999). In light of this operation, we can analyse characteristics of local systems of PES, using a specific governance profile for each region, making some hypotheses based on very simple assumptions.

First of all, considering the fact the the ANPAL should intervene only in those region not so strong according to their institutional capacity and administrative efficiency, those that do not perform high values on these indicators may be subjected to the imposition of the new procedures. In this way, the more regions register high performance in the management of pes, the less they undergo the intervention of the new national Agency.

The second hypothesis is that, according to the fact that the new mechanisms promoted by the central level resemble the governance of the Lombardy model, we should pay attention at the position of regions respect to the Lombard case. The more they are similar to the Lombard system, the more we will see that the implementation of the reform will be easier.

The third one is related to ideological reasons. Considering a very simple assumption, since this process of homogenization and re-centralization of procedures introduces quasi-market mechanisms that aim at strengthening the role of private providers at the local level, we can suppose that where the stronger are centre-right coalitions, the more this kind of option can be welcomed in those territories, helping the implementation of the new governance.
The four dimensions used to outline the various regional situations are represented by labour market, competitiveness, political and institutional characteristics and by the features of regional PES and active labour market policies. Each one has been operationalized through a set of indicators for the same period\textsuperscript{16}. The first proposal concerns the size of the labour market, including regional workforce\textsuperscript{17}, employment rate by gender\textsuperscript{18}, long-term unemployment\textsuperscript{19}, irregular employment\textsuperscript{20}, post-graduate condition of employment\textsuperscript{21} and temporary workers\textsuperscript{22}. The second regards local competitiveness levels and includes indicators such as regional GDP\textsuperscript{23}, labour productivity\textsuperscript{24}, operators in research and development\textsuperscript{25} and the level of university attractiveness\textsuperscript{26}. The third dimension calls into question some variables related to the political and institutional characteristics of the regions. We shall consider the difference between coalitions\textsuperscript{27} and the vulnerability index\textsuperscript{28} (Vassallo 2005), in all the elections from 1995\textsuperscript{29}, as regards the dimension of politics. The administrative effectiveness and quality of regulation are used for the quality of institutions (Nifo and Vecchione 2015)\textsuperscript{30}. Finally, the dimension of interest here, that is the governance of employment services and active policies, will be involved in the coverage of such policies at the regional level\textsuperscript{31}, the presence of accredited operators\textsuperscript{32}, the timing of implementation of regional laws on labour market regulation\textsuperscript{33}.

On the basis of the principal component analysis it has been possible to identify the relational structure of the variables and dimensions that characterize the different regional systems. Specifically

\begin{itemize}
  \item[16] Most of the indicators refer to the year 2014. Both in relation to the availability of data and the quality of the analysis some variables refer to different years, but still belonging to a very limited time frame.
  \item[17] Rate of participation to the labour market, people 15-64, ISTAT, 2014
  \item[18] Two indicators: rate of employment for men and for women, ISTAT, 2014
  \item[19] Over 12 months unemployed, ISTAT, 2014
  \item[20] Ratio between irregular labour units and the total labour units, ISTAT, 2012
  \item[21] Employment status three years after the degree, ISTAT, 2014
  \item[22] Ratio between number of workers with this contract and the total of the workforce, ISTAT Coesione, 2012
  \item[23] Ratio between regional GDP over national GDP, Eurostat 2014
  \item[24] Added value per worker, ISTAT, 2012
  \item[25] Units expressed in full-time equivalents per thousand inhabitants, ISTAT, 2013
  \item[26] Ratio between net migration of students and total of students enrolled, ISTAT, 2014
  \item[27] Difference calculated subtracting the votes of the centre-left from those of the centre-right, in order to highline positive values for the centre-right consensus
  \item[28] Average difference, in absolute value, less than the index of change (the variation, in absolute value, in the difference between coalitions registered in each election respect to the previous one)
  \item[29] Here we are considering only the interval 1995 - 2012 since it is the period before the irruption in the Italian political system of the Movimento 5 Stelle, that can alter the measurement of the dimension of the two coalitions respect to the previous elections. However, our interest is for the most consolidated tendencies, even without taking into account the most recent periods.
  \item[30] Both the two are taken from the Institutional Quality Index on Italian regions and provinces, 2012 (https://sites.google.com/site/institutionalqualityindex/dataset)
  \item[31] Ratio between the average number of subjects involved in active labour market policies and the total of the unemployed, Inps Open Data, 2014 (https://www.inps.it/portale/default.aspx?iMenu=103)
  \item[32] Ratio between private accredited operators over public operators, Isfol 2015
  \item[33] For each region has been calculated a score subtracting 0.5 point from a total of 11 points for each semester passed from the beginning of 2004 (considering the approval of Biagi Law in September 2003) until the end of 2014, corresponding to a score of 0.
\end{itemize}
emerged two main components, explaining the 75.44% of variance. The first dimension (Table 1), which is also the one that sums up the major part of variance, is positively correlated with all the variables that characterize the labour market, affecting its quality, and those variables that are associated with development and competitiveness. Similarly, are also highly correlated those variables that refer to the institutional capacity of the regions, even for what concerns the timing with which each region has implemented the laws about labour market regulation. We can refer to this first dimension calling it "quality and institutional capacity of local labour markets".

Tab. 1 Quality and institutional capacity of local labour markets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT 1 (59.1 % of variance)</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Correlation with the component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Correlation with the component</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional workforce</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s rate of employment</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s rate of employment</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate condition of</td>
<td>0.906</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators in research &amp;</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of regulation</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative effectiveness</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary workers</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour productivity</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of implementation of</td>
<td>0.611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regional laws on labour market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of university attractiveness</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular employment</td>
<td>-0.866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term unemployment</td>
<td>-0.953</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: personal elaboration on data ISTAT 2012, 2013, 2014; IQI 2012

The second component (Table 2), instead, highlights the highest correlation coefficients related to the characteristics of the regional political systems. This high positive correlation shows that it is relevant

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34 In this dimension it is also included the percentage of workers with temporary contracts. An indicator which refers to the characteristics of flexibility of labor markets but which is also important for the understanding of the local configurations of PES. The spread of forms of contract such as this, in fact, highlights, at the same time, the importance assumed by work agencies, which may be part of the system of accreditation.
not only the stability of the political system (invulnerability index), but also the prevalence of a centre-right/liberal orientation, joining a high coefficient with respect to the mean difference between centre-right and centre-left coalitions. At this dimension, the lack of contestability of regional and prevalence of centre-right coalitions is accompanied by the regions' ability to produce wealth (regional GDP). We refer to this dimension calling it "stability of regional political systems with liberal orientation". The prevalence of the centre-right sides is also consistent with two indicators that refer to the configuration of PES, as consequences of choices reflecting the ideological background. The first is represented by the ratio between accredited operators and jobcentres, positively correlated, indicating a higher space to privates in the management of the intermediation between demand and supply of labour. The second is the extension of the coverage of active labour market policies, negatively correlated with the second component, since this feature may be less associated with the policies of a centre-right government.

Tab. 2 Stability of regional political systems with liberal orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT 2 (16,3 % of variance)</th>
<th>Correlation with the component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invulnerability index</td>
<td>0,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between coalitions</td>
<td>0,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(centre-right predominance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of accredited operators</td>
<td>0,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional GDP</td>
<td>0,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage of active labour market</td>
<td>-0,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Jointly observed, the two dimensions indicate that there is a relationship between the quality of local production systems, labour markets, their institutional capacity and the stability of political systems, in particular with regard to the prevalence of a liberal orientation (Figure 1). It is immediately clear a separation between regions of the centre-north and of the centre-south, on the first dimension, going from left to right. To answer to the first hypothesis, if we go on the right part of our diagram we can see here those regions showing good labour-market conditions and high levels of institutional capacity. We can identify in these regions those that may maintain their prerogatives in terms of its their employment welfare model. Going from the first to the fourth quadrant, we can distinguish between those northern regions that, despite having an institutional development and a particularly
high quality of the labour markets, are at the opposite of that liberal orientation defined by the second dimension.

In particular, the profiles of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, show a strong institutional capacity, an excellent learning from the point of view of the regulation of labour markets, a reversed trend as regards the beneficiaries of active policies respect to “liberal regions”. So they are, at the same time developed regions, with a good performance of their labour markets and which have a well-established governance structure, ranging apart from a liberal orientation. It can be assumed that these regions may have greater holding power of their models in front of the perspective of a re-centralization promoted at central level with the last reform. Not by chance Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany represent the case of two regions having already an agreement with the government preserving the typical traits of their models.

The more we go to the left and we have scarce regions in terms of job quality, production systems
and institutional capacity. Looking at the second and the third quadrant there are only southern regions. To be in a more critical position we find Sicily, Calabria, Campania and Puglia. It is on these cases that may occur to a greater extent the interference of the central level, since the poor conditions are attributable not only to the backwardness of the economic context and a low quality of employment, but even at very weak institutional structures.

To answer the second hypothesis, we find in the first quadrant regions that are closest to Lombardy. In particular, the more it goes on the upper right and the more we find that these regions, likewise, indicate an already established governance structure and operational features that we can feel more "members" in the governance discourse promoted at the level of national government. Obviously the region showing the highest values is Lombardy. The closest profile is that of Veneto. Then, more spaced there are Piedmont, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Marche (manifesting a more "attenuated" position than the other "red" regions). These are regions which still occupy an intermediate position but at the same time revealing a good fit for the model promoted by central government. It could be interesting to focus on the profiles of Veneto and Lazio, in particular, because also these two regions have anticipated the mechanisms of the reform. In both the cases we have two projects – Progetto Mobilità for Veneto and the plan for Alitalia’s dismissals for Lazio – that have already used, in an experimental way, quasi-market mechanisms, to manage outplacements schemes. There remains in an intermediate position also the profile of Abruzzo and, towards more efficient or less efficient positions, respectively, Liguria and Sardinia.

Finally, for what concerns the third hypothesis we can distinguish, in the first and second quadrant, among those regions which, regardless to the conditions observed from the point of view of the first dimension, show the higher consensus for centre-right, which is greater the more one goes towards the upper part of the graph. It is the case, above all, of Sicily. Indeed, some signs of this preparation we can see them from some of the latest measures approved by the region in the field of active politics\textsuperscript{35}. By virtue of its special status, Sicily has set up its own testing of contratto di ricollocazione. Although the relationship between public and private operators is conceived in the direction of an equalization between the two, in a manner very similar to what happens in Lombardy, it remains mainly a complementary and not a competitive model (Caruso and Cuttone 2015). Since this is still a very recent application, institutional capacity is still very low and the region suffers limits also due to backward condition of the economy and a labour market characterized by low employment quality system. Differently from Sicily, Campania and Puglia which, although in the second quadrant possess intermediate values, like the case of Calabria. Going down, in the fourth quadrant, we find the case

\textsuperscript{35} Discipline on the contratto di ricollocazione approved by the Sicilian region finds its genesis in art. 63 of law 912/2015 and was later specified in detail by a decree of the Department of Family, Labour and Social Policies (12/2015).
of Umbria, which is much different from a liberal system and is however different from the cases of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, showing a greater institutional delay since it is a region where the Biagi reform has not implemented in no way since 2003. Therefore, the intervention of the national level could be higher while having a context quite developed but discreetly away from an ideological point of view. In a position closer to that of Umbria, but far more backward in terms of economic, institutional and labour market we find the case of Basilicata, which, in fact, only recently has come to implement their own labour policies system\textsuperscript{36}. We should consider this as an extreme case in which there is in no way neither an institutional nor an ideological predispositions.

We have to say, however, that, despite this complex panorama, it is clear that only the implementation we will see in the next months (or years!) could make us able to a complete answer to the hypothesis we have discussed.

**Hartz reforms and Jobs Act: closer systems of PES but still different**

Many of the elements related to the new governance of PES in Italy could be related to the case of Germany. Very often Italian government refers to the German “Hartz reforms”\textsuperscript{37} as an example to follow. A comparison between these two systems could be useful to the extent that it may help us in the attempt to predict the implementation of the Jobs Act.

If we look at the past twenty years we find reform processes in both countries, concerning the same policy arenas, almost in the same way: contracting out of employment services, liberalization of employment contracts and review of unemployment benefits (Gualmini and Rizza 2011). In both cases we see a modernization of labour policies starting in the same system of welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990), which evolves in a direction that takes a mix of approaches to human capital development and labour market attachment (Lodemol and Trickey 2001). This transition, however, is characterized by different features. In the German case, with the Hartz Reforms, there has been a more organic and integrated reorganization of both passive and active policies. In the Italian case, on the contrary, before the Jobs Act, passing through Treu reform, the Biagi one and the Fornero of 2012 (law no. 92), the path has been more incremental, marked by fragmented actions and deep territorial differences, as we have seen previously. The Jobs Act now, particularly with regard to the employment services, seems to make Italian system closer to the German one. There are two elements that seem to be inspired by the German case. The first is represented by the presence of a state agency,

\textsuperscript{36} Look at the regional law 30/2015

\textsuperscript{37} Four different acts implemented from 2003 to 2005, during the period of the “red-green coalition, Gerhard Schröder’s government formed by the coalition between the parties Spd and Die Grunen
which is very similar to the configuration of the Bundesagentur fur Arbeit. The second is the quasi-market scheme, based on a model voucher, of the assegno di ricollocazione, very similar to the "voucher for activation and placement" (Activierungs und Vermittlungsgutschein)\textsuperscript{38}, both for the freedom to choose granted to the jobseeker, the kind of services and the prevision of outcome-based payments for the providers. But there are also other features reflecting a common trend. At the basis of the German reforms there was, in fact, the design for which the centres for "local work-agencies" - Agenturen fur Arbeit) should take the form of unitary structures according to the model of "one-stop shop" (OECD 1999, Sartori 2013), creating a new system of multifunctional centres that should integrate the three key dimensions of employment policies: the management of subsidies, active policies and placement services. The Italian situation until now has always shown many gaps on the subject of subsidies management, both considering the absence of a universal coverage\textsuperscript{39} and for the failure to implement the principle of conditionality, with the absence of a link between the obligation to participate at the active measures and sanctions with the cut of subsidies, whose decisions have always remained in the hands of the INPS (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale). This time, instead, the Jobs Act sets for the first time new forms of gradual sanctions, with different and progressive reductions of the benefits in consequence of the gravity of the violations. And it is a task of the jobcentres to manage these mechanisms, granted by a new computer network information between local jobcentres, INPS and ANPAL. With these previsions it is clear that the configuration of the local jobcentres in Italy should progressively move towards that of the one-stop-shop model. What is equally clear, is that we should wait for the implementation of these innovative design, since it will involve three different institutional actors - local jobcentres, INPS and ANPAL – and this could not be so easy.

Despite these new elements, however, there is an important limitation continuing to mark the distance respect to the German model. It is represented by the enormous gap in terms of resources involved. The level of resources spent in Italy for PES, in fact, is one of the lowest in Europe, with the 0,3% of the GDP. This data appears even more serious when we take in consideration the level of Germany, which is ten times bigger at the 3% of the GDP (Bergamante and Marocco 2013). The supposed virtues to make reforms without adding new resources, in the belief to produce less waste of public

\textsuperscript{38} Introduced first by the Job AQTIV in 2002 and, then, reformed in 2011 with the “Improving opportunities for the job placement Act” (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Eingliederungschancen)

\textsuperscript{39} In particular, there remain a strong passive policy like the so called cassa integrazione guadagni, evolving from an emergence measure to an ordinary one, together with the standard unemployment benefits (from Aspi – Assicurazione sociale per l’impiego and Mini-Aspi with the Fornero reform to Naspi – Nuova assicurazione sociale per l’impiego with the Jobs Act, changing the requirements in the direction of a little extensions of the recipients). There remains no kind of benefit for those who do not have any work experiences in the past. The only experience of integration between passive and active labour market policies, before the previsions of the Jobs Act, has been that of the so called (“derogation subsidies” – ammortizzatori sociali in deroga), considering the specific condition of emergence due to the crisis (law no. 350/2008 and decree no. 185/2008).
money, risk to be an enormous mistake of all the Italian last governments for a field, like that of PES, which requires more resources and staffs with increasing specialization, to manage more complex labour market policies. So, despite the fact that the Italian system of PES appears to take a direction which is very similar to that already established in Germany, after the Hartz reforms, the implementation of the new measures still depends on the resources at disposal, and in relation to this aspect Italy represents a case which is very problematic, respect to Germany. To the point that risk to be an important limitation for a successful implementation. From another point of view, these measures are expected to change the organization and the logic of the Italian PES, but, as we saw earlier, this passes through the capacity to realize an homogeneous system across territories. This is not obvious, while, on the contrary, Germany already registers a greater degree of uniformity, despite being in the presence of a federal system.

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