SISP2026
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SISP Conference 2026

«Multilateralism Contested»

SISP2026 Sections and Panels

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Section 4 - Political Communication

Managers: Fabio Bordignon, Rossella Rega

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Political systems have always evolved in interaction with media systems. Yet the present phase signals more than incremental change. The growing centrality of digital infrastructures and the rapid integration of artificial intelligence into information environments, electoral campaigns, institutional communication, and platform governance are reshaping the structural conditions under which political representation, participation, and public deliberation take place. What is at stake is not simply technological innovation, but a transformation in the communicative architecture and institutional ecology of democracy.

The concentration of economic, technological, and communicative power in a limited number of global digital actors raises fundamental questions about sovereignty, transparency and democratic accountability. When the infrastructures that organise visibility, access to information, and agenda-setting are privately governed and algorithmically structured, the boundaries between political authority and economic power become increasingly blurred. Democratic institutions are thus required to operate within communication environments whose rules they do not fully control. At the same time, alternative models of media and digital governance – including authoritarian configurations – offer competing visions of how communication, control, and legitimacy can be organised in the digital age.

Within this broader structural transformation, emergent phenomena such as generative AI, deepfakes, hybrid disinformation campaigns, data-driven campaigning, and algorithmic microtargeting further complicate the relationship between communication and democracy. These developments do not merely affect the circulation of individual messages; they reshape the epistemic common ground that democratic politics presupposes. Yet digital environments also continue to generate new forms of participation and mobilisation.

At the same time, the restructuring of communication infrastructures has profound implications for the configuration of the public sphere. Processes of polarization, incivility, and the fragmentation of audiences are increasingly intertwined with platform architectures. Digital communication environments can simultaneously expand opportunities for visibility and intensify echo chambers, hate speech, and the circulation of antagonistic narratives, while fostering the emergence of fringe and alternative platforms that operate at the margins of mainstream communicative environments. Understanding how these dynamics reshape democratic mechanisms is central to contemporary research in political communication.

Recent (and forthcoming) electoral cycles – including national, regional, municipal, and constitutional referendum campaigns – provide crucial empirical arenas in which these dynamics can be observed and analysed. Such contexts illuminate how political actors adapt to evolving media logics, how citizens navigate hybrid information environments, and how institutional communication responds to increasing fragmentation, personalization, and platform mediation.

These transformations also demand sustained methodological reflection. Scholars of political communication are confronted with phenomena that challenge established analytical categories and require methodological pluralism: approaches capable of combining qualitative and quantitative methods, computational techniques, as well as fostering dialogue across disciplinary boundaries.

The Standing Group on Political Communication invites panel proposals that address these transformations from diverse theoretical perspectives and empirical approaches. We welcome contributions on electoral communication; platform governance and content moderation; media effects, public opinion, and political behaviour; political leadership and mediated personalization; digital participation and mobilisation; the transformation of the public sphere, including affective polarization, incivility, echo chambers, and the fragmentation of audiences; regulation of the digital sphere; disinformation and hybrid information disorders; AI-driven communication and algorithmic mediation; and the evolving relationship between media systems and political institutions.

Comparative research and interdisciplinary approaches are particularly encouraged. Panels and papers may be presented in Italian or English.

Proposals are expected to fall within the following broad research areas:

Media systems, infrastructures, and democracy

political systems and media systems
platform governance and content moderation
regulation of digital media
public and institutional communication
e-democracy
media and digital governance in hybrid or authoritarian contexts
AI, automation, and the integrity of political discourse

generative AI and political communication; deepfakes
algorithmic and manipulation strategies; disinformation campaigns
epistemic trust, information integrity, and legitimacy in AI-mediated publics
ethics of political communication in the age of automation and algorithms
Elections, referendum, and campaign transformations

electoral communication and campaign management (national/regional/local)
referendums and direct democracy
data-driven and AI-driven campaigning, microtargeting, and political advertising
professionalization of electoral campaigns and campaign infrastructures
Transformation of the public sphere, participation, and political behaviour

digital media and new forms of political participation, mobilisation, and engagement
media effects on citizens, public opinion, polarization and fragmentation
echo chambers, (re)intermediation, disintermediation
political incivility, hate speech, toxicity, conspiracy theories, radicalization processes, and the role of fringe and alternative platforms in political communication
Actors, leadership, and political-cultural dynamics

political leadership and communication; mediated personalization
rhetoric, narratives, frames, and storytelling; popularization and celebrity politics
populist and anti-system communication
digital parties, movements, and organisational change
Journalism, institutions, and strategic communication

politics and journalism; news production, agenda-setting, and accountability
public and institutional communication (including crisis communication)
scientific communication in political contexts (e.g., health crises)
Internationalisation and conflictual environments

globalization of political communication
political communication and digital technologies in international relations and conflicts
international migration and its narrative(s)
political communication and climate change
Methods and research innovation

methods and techniques of data collection/processing in communication studies
computational methods, platform data, big data, experiments, mixed methods
The section is also open to considering proposals on additional topics related to the field of political communication. Innovative and interdisciplinary approaches that establish dialogue between communication sciences and other disciplines, such as computer science, cultural and media studies, political philosophy, etc., are particularly encouraged.
 

Panel 4.1 Climate politics in an age of competing crises: Issue competition and green backlash across parties, movements, media, and public opinion (I)


Climate change remains one of the most pressing long-term challenges of our time, yet its position within political agendas is increasingly shaped by a context of overlapping crises. Geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and energy security concerns are intensifying competition among issues, raising questions about the resilience of climate politics in contemporary democracies.
This panel focuses on how climate change is (de)politicised, (de)prioritised, or contested in an era of issue competition, where environmental concerns must compete with other urgent demands. To what extent does the Green Transition remain a central political priority? How do political actors navigate trade-offs between climate goals and other policy imperatives?
At the same time, recent years have witnessed the emergence of various forms of green backlash, ranging from resistance to specific policies (e.g. energy transitions, agricultural reforms) to broader scepticism towards climate action. Such backlash is expressed and mediated across parties, social movements, media systems, and public opinion, often interacting with processes of polarisation, populist framing, and the circulation of misinformation.
This panel invites contributions that examine how climate change is framed, debated, and challenged across different arenas, as well as how support for climate action is sustained or eroded. We particularly welcome papers that explore these dynamics in Italy and beyond, including comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. A wide range of methodological approaches is encouraged, including qualitative and quantitative analyses, experimental designs, and theoretical contributions.

Possible topics include (but are not limited to):
- Issue competition and the positioning of climate change in political agendas
- Green backlash: actors, narratives, and policy resistance
- Party strategies and political communication on climate issues
- Environmental movements and counter-movements
- Public opinion dynamics and climate attitudes
- Polarisation and electoral dynamics related to climate politics
- Media narratives, misinformation, and conspiracy theories
- Policy trade-offs in the Green Transition
- The role of EU climate policy and governance

Chairs: Cecilia Biancalana, Francesco Visconti

Discussants: Riccardo Ladini

What does Climate Change mean? A Focus Group Study in Italy
Gaetano Scaduto, Roy Kemmers, Willem de Koster
Abstract
Climate change is among the most prominent political issues of the twenty-first century. Yet, we still know little over what ordinary citizens actually mean when they talk about “climate change” (CC) and about the “pictures in their heads” appearing when they think about it. Existing research has focused on attitudes, beliefs, levels of concern, and policy preferences, while what how ordinary people make sense of the issue remained underexplored. Indeed, similar attitudes can originate from different meanings for different people (e.g., poor, rural pensioners and young, affluent tech engineers can both be not concerned about climate change). Theoretically, we conceptualise “climate change meanings” as subjective definitions of what CC is (and is not) and the relational context in which people place it. We argue how this conception is analytically distinct from extant conceptualizations and studies of “climate change attitudes”, “understandings”, “beliefs”, “discourses”, “narratives”, and “issue frames”, and why meanings precede and structure the frames and attitudes that people recognise as legitimate. The study aims to uncover (1) which meanings can be observed in Italian public opinion and (2) the worldviews, justifications, and experiences that sustain them. Italy provides a particularly interesting context where the issue is “politicizing but is not yet politicized”(Biancalana & Ladini, 2022) public concern and policy support are rising after years of relative indifference, and extreme weather events have intensified media and political attention. Yet, qualitative public opinion research remains scarce. Using original data collected in 17 focus groups conducted in different regions of Italy with more than 80 individuals in spring 2026 and analysing transcripts through inductive thematic analysis, the research identifies four distinct meaning structures: the Reformist-Conflictual, the Valenced, the Planetary-Natural, and the Anti-Institutional. The Reformist-Conflictual view frames climate change as a political clash over power and systemic reform. The Valenced portrays it as a universal human moral crisis rooted in greed and indifference. The Planetary-Natural defines it as a natural phenomenon largely outside human control. Finally, the Anti-Institutional perspective treats climate change as a symptom of a corrupt global system or elite conspiracy. Finally, the Anti-Institutional perspective treats climate change as the consequence of a corrupt global system or elite conspiracy. By uncovering these meanings the study illustrates how identical attitudes can stem from radically different interpretations of what climate change is, often independent of, if not orthogonal to, political ideologies.
Beyond Material Interests? Comparing the Micro-Foundations of Decarbonisation Policy Support Across 27 EU Member States
Pietro Michael Lepidi
Abstract
Factors influencing public opinion support for decarbonisation policy within capitalist democracies have highlighted the importance of explanations stemming from both policy types and individual attributes. However, more cross-sectional public opinion research is needed to expand the number of countries analysed, take into account different explanations for support that are often studied separately within a single analytical framework, and provide a precise operationalisation of decarbonisation policy support beyond proxy measures such as climate concern, willingness to pay, or general environmental attitudes. This article provides new cross-sectional evidence on support for decarbonisation policy across all 27 European Union member states. Using data from the sixth wave of the European Investment Bank Climate Survey (N = 18,698), it examines individual-level support for three specific decarbonisation policy proposals: a progressive tax on carbon emissions, a carbon wealth tax targeting actors profiting from fossil fuel production, and fossil fuel tax credit reform redirecting support toward renewable energy. The article organises established determinants of decarbonisation policy support into two broad families of explanations. Material cost-based explanations emphasise income, distributive policy effects, and direct experience with climate-related losses. Heuristic-based explanations emphasise ideological orientation, institutional trust, and knowledge of climate change. The analysis compares the relative empirical strength of these explanations using multiple model specifications, including multilevel regression models and variance decomposition through LMG analysis. The findings show that support for decarbonisation policy in the EU27 is more consistently associated with heuristic-based explanations than with material cost-related factors. Institutional trust, left-of-centre ideological orientation, and climate knowledge are strongly and consistently associated with support across policy designs. By contrast, income and recent direct experience with climate-change-related extreme weather events do not significantly predict support. The article, therefore, argues that public support for decarbonisation policy in the EU cannot be understood primarily as a problem of material compensation and climate policy cost concerns. It instead underscores the importance of long-term cognitive, ideological, and trust-based drivers of support. The findings also show that decarbonisation policies can be highly popular when they target fossil-fuel production and high-end users rather than ordinary consumers.
Ideology Trumps Reason? Scientific Literacy as a Driver of Participation in Climate Protests
Martín Portos
Abstract
Public debates often assume that scientific literacy will encourage civic engagement on science-intensive issues such as climate change. We test this assumption by examining whether scientific literacy predicts participation in climate protests—and whether any effect is conditional upon ideology. Using original survey data from Spain collected during peak climate mobilization—a context characterized by significant political polarization around climate issues— we find that scientific literacy is positively associated with climate protest participation, but only among left-leaning citizens; among right-leaning citizens, scientific literacy has no statistically meaningful effect. These results indicate that ideological alignment ultimately overrides the mobilizing potential of scientific literacy. Conversely, at high levels of scientific literacy, predicted protest participation increases sharply among left-leaning citizens while remaining low among right-leaning citizens; at low levels, probabilities remain uniformly low across the ideological spectrum. Results are robust across alternative operationalizations of climate participation and when ideology is measured using vote recall rather than self-placement. These findings suggest that scientific literacy is unlikely to drive individual climate action unless it aligns with individuals’ political identities.
Environmentalism At Any Cost? Climate Attitudes and Governance Preferences
Elisabetta Mannoni
Abstract
Climate change has become one of the most salient political issues in contemporary democracies, yet little is known about how climate attitudes relate to citizens’ support for different forms of governance. Existing research has mainly focused on environmental behaviors and policy preferences, while the implications of climate concern for democratic legitimacy remain underexplored. Recent studies suggest that environmentally concerned individuals may be more supportive of technocratic governance in the environmental domain, raising broader questions about the relationship between environmental concern and support for different forms of governance. This paper examines whether different dimensions of climate attitudes are associated with support for democracy, technocracy, autocracy, and military rule. The study relies on original comparative survey data collected in January 2025 in eight European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom; N≈15,217). The findings show that climate attitudes do not uniformly predict weaker democratic orientations. Prioritizing environmental protection over economic growth is associated with a more democratic profile overall, including lower support for autocratic and military forms of rule. By contrast, perceiving climate change as a serious threat is associated with greater support for technocratic governance and, more weakly, for non-democratic alternatives, while remaining positively associated with support for democracy itself. The results suggest that climate concern is politically multidimensional and while climate threat does not appear to undermine democratic support directly, it may increase citizens’ openness toward forms of governance perceived as more decisive, expert-driven, and less constrained by procedural limits.
Does Climate Matter at the Polls? Environmental Attitudes and Voting in the 2024 European Elections
Paolo Amantini, Claudio Cozzi Fucile
Abstract
The 2024 European elections were elections of “firsts”: the first European Parliament elections held after the COVID-19 pandemic amid ongoing wars, energy insecurity, and a worsening climate emergency. This paper focuses on the latter issue. Specifically, we hypothesise that (H1) individuals who prioritise environmental protection over economic growth are more likely to vote in the elections. We further hypothesise that this group is more likely to vote for (H2a) green and ecological parties and (H2b) left-wing parties (S&D and The Left). Finally, (H3) we investigate whether younger voters continue to support green and ecological parties. To test these hypotheses, we use data from the 2024 European Election Study (EES). Our findings show that prioritising the environment does not increase electoral turnout (H1). However, as expected, it significantly increases the likelihood of voting for green and ecological parties (H2a) and for left-wing parties (H2b). Younger voters appear less likely to support both green and left-wing parties and to participate in the European elections. Keywords: 2024 European Election, Environmental Protection, polycrisis, Electoral turnout, youth.
 

Panel 4.1 Climate politics in an age of competing crises: Issue competition and green backlash across parties, movements, media, and public opinion (II)


Climate change remains one of the most pressing long-term challenges of our time, yet its position within political agendas is increasingly shaped by a context of overlapping crises. Geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and energy security concerns are intensifying competition among issues, raising questions about the resilience of climate politics in contemporary democracies.
This panel focuses on how climate change is (de)politicised, (de)prioritised, or contested in an era of issue competition, where environmental concerns must compete with other urgent demands. To what extent does the Green Transition remain a central political priority? How do political actors navigate trade-offs between climate goals and other policy imperatives?
At the same time, recent years have witnessed the emergence of various forms of green backlash, ranging from resistance to specific policies (e.g. energy transitions, agricultural reforms) to broader scepticism towards climate action. Such backlash is expressed and mediated across parties, social movements, media systems, and public opinion, often interacting with processes of polarisation, populist framing, and the circulation of misinformation.
This panel invites contributions that examine how climate change is framed, debated, and challenged across different arenas, as well as how support for climate action is sustained or eroded. We particularly welcome papers that explore these dynamics in Italy and beyond, including comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. A wide range of methodological approaches is encouraged, including qualitative and quantitative analyses, experimental designs, and theoretical contributions.

Possible topics include (but are not limited to):
- Issue competition and the positioning of climate change in political agendas
- Green backlash: actors, narratives, and policy resistance
- Party strategies and political communication on climate issues
- Environmental movements and counter-movements
- Public opinion dynamics and climate attitudes
- Polarisation and electoral dynamics related to climate politics
- Media narratives, misinformation, and conspiracy theories
- Policy trade-offs in the Green Transition
- The role of EU climate policy and governance

Chairs: Cecilia Biancalana, Francesco Visconti

Discussants: Giacomo Salvarani

Selective Politicisation and Climate Issue Competition in Italian Flood Coverage: Sourcing Disaster Narratives During the Emilia-Romagna Floods
Flavio Piccoli
Abstract
Climate change increasingly competes with other urgent concerns within contemporary political and media agendas, particularly during moments of crisis in which responsibility, emergency response, and governance become highly salient. This article examines how climate change was selectively incorporated, politicised, and marginalised within Italian mainstream media coverage of the May 2023 Emilia-Romagna floods. Drawing on research on agenda-building, sourcing, and climate communication, the study analyses how media actors distributed interpretative authority across political elites, experts, institutional actors, citizens, and activists during a major extreme weather event. The article adopts a mixed-methods design combining quantitative content analysis of reported speech with semantic mapping and network-oriented analysis. The corpus includes 915 newspaper articles and 787 television news items published or broadcast by major Italian national outlets during May 2023, containing over 3,800 instances of reported speech. The analysis compares sourcing patterns across media formats and examines how climate change entered public debate through different actors, thematic domains, and phases of coverage. The findings show that disaster coverage largely reproduced stable hierarchies of interpretative authority. Political and institutional actors dominated agenda-building around responsibility, funding, and governance, while experts primarily acted as epistemic authorities providing causal explanations and contextualisation. Citizens and volunteers were highly visible, especially in television coverage, but were largely confined to testimonial and emotional roles. Within this broader structure, climate change occupied a secondary yet analytically significant position. It appeared in only a limited share of coverage and was more frequently introduced by journalists than by quoted actors. References to climate change were concentrated amongst scientific experts, opposition politicians, and climate activists, while remaining marginal in discourses centred on emergency management and reconstruction. The article argues that climate change operated as a selectively politicised interpretative resource rather than as a stable explanatory framework. Its visibility depended on specific combinations of expertise, journalistic framing, and political contestation, and it frequently competed with more immediate narratives focused on institutional response, territorial management, and economic recovery. The study contributes to debates on climate politics, media systems, and issue competition by showing how mainstream media structure the boundaries of climate relevance during extreme weather events within a polarised pluralist media system.
Framing Climate Issues in Digital Environments: Evidence from Populist and Mainstream Parties in Italy
Elisa Iannone
Abstract
ABSTRACT SISP Elisa Iannone – University of Cagliari Title: Framing Climate Issues in Digital Environments: Evidence from Populist and Mainstream Parties in Italy As populist parties increasingly transition from challengers to governing positions across Europe, questions arise regarding how they reshape communication and issue framing within contemporary democracies. In recent years, climate change has progressively become one of the most salient issues in international political agendas, while at the same time competing with a broader context of overlapping crises. Following the peak of public attention fueled by the Fridays for Future mobilizations in 2019, climate-related issues had to compete with other urgent socio-economic and geopolitical concerns, raising questions about perceptions of priorities and the politicization of the climate change crisis in an era of issue competition. Although climate change has gained greater visibility in political debate than in previous decades, its politicization remains uneven across parties and political arenas, as well as among electors. Rather than being framed as a broad, transformative political project, climate politics has, in many cases, been articulated through fragmented, policy-specific controversies concerning energy transitions, environmental governance, sustainable infrastructure, and the allocation of EU recovery funds. Within this context, climate-related debates have been reframed in technocratic terms, shifting attention from transformative environmental agendas toward questions of governance capacity and policy feasibility. These developments are relevant for the study of populist communication: populist discourse typically challenges institutional politics, criticizes elites, and draws support from disaffected groups by emphasizing the shortcomings of the established political actors and institutions. However, climate politics and environmental transitions, which are considered more conventional topics for mainstream parties, are frequently framed through narratives of urgency and crisis, features that also characterize populist political communication in general. Although populist parties initially distanced themselves from such issues, recent developments suggest a progressive incorporation and strategic reframing of climate-related issues over time. At the same time, notwithstanding their anti-establishment communication strategies, populist parties have progressively entered institutional and governmental arenas across Europe. While participation in national government was limited at the turn of the millennium, by 2021 populist parties had entered government in at least ten European countries. Considering this progressive integration, it becomes relevant to investigate whether traditional parties, motivated by vote-seeking strategies and competition for disaffected voters, are also adapting their communication styles accordingly. Existing findings on the systemic integration of populist parties remain mixed, particularly regarding whether participation in government moderates populist rhetoric and communication styles, or alternatively reinforces political polarization. This paper investigates how Italian populist and mainstream parties frame climate-related issues in digital environments, depending on their inclusion in government, coalition dynamics, and issue salience. More specifically, the study explores whether participation in government affects populist communication styles, emotional tone, and framing strategies in climate-related political discourse. The Italian case is relevant due to the coexistence of different types of populist parties and change in coalition across the Conte I, Conte II, Draghi, and Meloni governments. These shifting alliances provide a useful setting for observing how populist and mainstream actors adapt their communication strategies across changing institutional arrangements. The study employs a text-as-data approach on a longitudinal dataset of Facebook posts published by Italian MPs between 2018 and 2024, from the beginning of the 18th legislature to the weeks following the 2024 European Parliament election. More specifically, the analysis combines computational text analysis techniques, including topic detection, textual similarity measures, and sentiment analysis, to investigate how climate-related communication changes across parties and coalition composition. These methods are employed to examine variations in issue salience, discursive convergence, and affective framing across parliamentary actors.
Not Quite Denied. Normalizing Frames in Italian and Spanish Party Communication on Environmental Disasters
Cecilia Castellani, Damiano Kerma
Abstract
Although climate change may have risen to global acknowledgement in political agendas, there is little to no unanimity on how public policies should appropriately address the issue, with contrasting narratives fuelling inconsistent, fragmented, or downright detrimental stances by policymakers and public opinion. Even natural disasters, despite their dramatic impacts, have been shown to sprout multiple – and usually contested – interpretive frames in political discourse. Recent research on Italian climate narratives and media coverage has highlighted how political actors strategically adapt climate-related issues to their ideological positioning and political interests, oscillating between politicization and depoliticization dynamics. As a matter of fact, critical climate-related events give way to a number of alternative framing strategies to reshape the perceived urgency, causes, and consequences of climate change. In this working paper, we refer to the notion of secondary denialism to assess normalizing framing strategies deployed by political parties following environmental disasters. Secondary denialism has been loosely defined as a wide range of political (and discursive) attitudes that, while not openly dismissing climate change, profoundly downplay its urgency and limit any solution proposals to purely administrative, technological, or market-oriented interventions. Building on existing literature on environmental communication and attribution framing, the paper specifically focuses on how parties resignify climate-related emergencies across multiple communicative arenas. We do so by adopting a cross-country, comparative multimodal analysis of political discourse by major Italian and Spanish parties following the 2023 Emilia-Romagna floods and the 2024 Valencian cold drop (DANA). We triangulate institutional sources by nine parties from the whole political spectrum to provide a comprehensive overview of how climate-related crises are framed in relation to audiences and medium affordances, inside and outside institutions. Scraped data include relevant social media posts (IG and TikTok) and parliamentary sessions on emergency measures. A multimodal qualitative approach is used to expand frame analysis with elements of visual analysis to account for meaningful non-textual information as well. Our first results resonate with existing literature on normalizing frames depicting environmental crises as either unavoidable events or easily solvable management chores. Intense blameshifting is also present, as expected. Specifically, politicization strategies appear to be articulated alongside three main framing axes, namely the urgency/normalization, economic/human, and local/systemic cleavages, with significant differences across communicative arenas. Moreover, normalizing frames appear to be deployed by the political left as well, depending on governance involvement. While still being an early exploratory study, our paper wishes to contribute to the existing literature by focusing on party narratives, instead of media frames, to explore what communication strategies are deployed to normalize climate-related emergencies into manageable, administrative problems.
Climate Litigation and Civil Society: A Study on the Impact of Climate Litigation on Public Opinion
Costanza Azzuppardi, Giuseppe Naglieri
Abstract
Climate litigation has emerged as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon with increasing relevance for global climate governance. Yet, despite its growing prominence, systematic empirical knowledge of its societal impacts remains limited. The CLIMPACT project addresses this gap through the first large-scale, cross-jurisdictional empirical study evaluating the impacts of climate litigation across multiple domains. Drawing on an integrated legal, sociological, and economic framework, the project analyses a dataset of 500 climate cases spanning diverse litigation pathways and national contexts. Within this broader framework, this paper focuses on the sociological impacts of climate litigation on public opinion, adopting a mixed-methods approach that operates across three analytical levels. At the macro level, traditional media analysis — covering a minimum of four outlets per country — applies TF-IDF techniques to identify dominant narratives surrounding selected judicial cases. At the meso level, survey data collected from NGOs initiating or supporting litigation, as well as from individual litigants, shed light on how organised actors strategically communicate climate litigation to drive policy and public opinion change. At the micro level, the analysis examines social media discourse on Meta platforms to capture how litigation is received and reframed in digitally mediated public debate. The methodology is applied to a sample drawn from the first tier of country clusters, spanning North and South America, Europe, Australasia, and Africa. The findings are expected to contribute to a comparative understanding of the sociological impacts of climate litigation, offering empirical insights into how litigation shapes public debate, mobilises collective actors, and influences climate governance. In doing so, the study aims to advance the systematic assessment of the societal consequences of climate litigation at a global scale.
Talking as one? Issue Convergence and Alliance Integration in the Italian AVS
Enea Fiore
Abstract
When niche parties enter electoral alliances, they face a fundamental communicative dilemma. On the one hand, coalition politics rewards coordination. Parties that present a unified public front signal governing credibility and reduce the risk of vote fragmentation among ideologically proximate electorates (Greene & Haber, 2016; Sagarzazu & Klüver, 2017). On the other hand, niche parties derive their electoral value precisely from their distinctiveness, that is their ability to mobilize specific issue publics that larger, mainstream parties cannot efficiently target (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2014). Converging communicatively with coalition partners risks diluting the very brand that makes niche parties electorally relevant. This paper examines the communicative strategies of niche parties across different alliance configurations, arguing that the form of organizational integration shapes the incentives for discursive convergence or differentiation. We distinguish between two configurations with opposite communicative implications. In a pre-electoral coalition (PEC) dominated by a large mainstream party, the niche partner’s electoral incentive runs toward differentiation. With a senior partner absorbing the bulk of the coalition’s vote share, the niche party maximizes its own returns by preserving a distinct communicative profile that intercepts electoral segments the mainstream party cannot reach. By contrast, in a party merger between organizationally comparable parties, the logic reverses. Since a merge is premised on the consolidation of a fragmented vote into a coherent electoral offer, communicative distinctiveness between partners carries high reputational and electoral costs, as it undermines the very rationale of the joint entity in the eyes of voters. Moreover, when no dominant partner can absorb the alliance’s electoral returns, genuine communicative convergence therefore becomes advantageous. It builds a credible joint identity, signals organizational commitment to voters, and enables the rebranding that neither party could achieve independently (Bélanger & Godbout, 2010; Lees et al., 2010). To examine this argument empirically, I analyze the Italian case of Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra (AVS), a party merge formed in 2022 between the ecologist party Europa Verde (Greens) and the socialist-democratic party Sinistra Italiana (SI). AVS offers a theoretically compelling case for two reasons. First, it constitutes a merger between two organizationally comparable niche parties, neither of which holds a dominant position over the other. Second, AVS operates simultaneously within a broader centre-left coalition led by the Partito Democratico (PD), Italy’s largest progressive party and the principal opposition force to the current right-wing government led by Fratelli d'Italia. This dual embeddedness, a party merge nested within a broader PEC-like coalition, allows us to test both sides of our argument within a single case. This paper analyzes the social media communication published by the official party profiles of SI, Greens, PD and their respective leaders between 2021 and 2024. The observation window begins prior to the formation of AVS and spans two electoral cycles, the 2022 general election and the 2024 European Parliament elections, in which AVS grew to become one of the most electorally significant actors in the Italian left. Specifically, the paper tests for discursive convergence within the party merge between SI and Verdi, and within the pre-electoral coalition between AVS and its dominant coalition partner, the PD. Within the AVS merge, the analysis further examines whether and to what extent topics owned by each party are progressively adopted by the other. This allows testing whether parties engaged in organizational integration tend to maintain distinct communicative identities over time or whether they develop a shared discursive space. Combining Random Forest classification with BERTopic (Grootendorst, 2022) and index of issue convergence (Sigelman & Buell, 2004), the paper tracks the evolution of communicative distinguishability between party pairs over time and across the topic space. The results confirm that discursive convergence is indeed a feature of the party merge but not of the pre-electoral coalition. SI and Greens display a progressive convergence both in terms of communicative distinguishability and in terms of thematic overlap. This pattern does not extend to the relationship between either party and the PD. Finally, within AVS, convergence appears to operate through reciprocal issue adoption, with SI progressively incorporating environmental topics from Greens’ ownership domain while the Greens absorbs redistributive and political framing from SI's agenda. This finding is consistent with the incentive structure whereby the construction of a shared discursive space allows merging parties to consolidate a fragmented left-wing vote without eroding one another's electoral base (Invernizzi, 2024; Greene & Haber, 2016). At the same time, the absence of convergence toward the PD reflects the complementary incentive to preserve a distinct communicative profile within the broader coalition, avoiding overlap with the agenda and electoral weight of the dominant partner.
 

Panel 4.2 The "Trumpization" of Political Discourse: Narratives of War, Peace, and Crisis in an Era of Simplification (I)


The contemporary landscape of political communication is undergoing a profound transformation characterized by what scholars often tentatively label as "Trumpization" (Morini, 2020). This phenomenon, deeply rooted in the broader framework of populist communication styles (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), is defined by extreme simplification, the emotionalization of language, and the strategic use of "anti-intellectual" storytelling.

The primary objective of this panel is to examine how these simplified communication patterns are utilized by politicians in their communication both regarding the most critical issues of the modern world like war and peace, but also in a daily political communication routine. We argue that the "Trumpization" of discourse is not merely a stylistic choice but a strategic tool used to frame complex political issues - such as the war in Iran, political tensions in European countries - into binary, easily digestible stories of "us versus them" or "hero versus villain."

We also aim to explore whether this shift towards radical simplification facilitates public understanding of global and local political challenges or, conversely, enables misleading public opinion.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:
- Theoretical Frameworks: The evolution of "Trumpization" and its relation to populist rhetoric and political tabloidization.
- Narratives of Conflict in Iran.
- Case Studies in National Politics: For instance, the framing of judicial reforms in Italy or the "SAFE" security initiatives in Poland as narrative-driven tools, political rhetoric during 2025 and 2026 elections (eg. Germany, Hungary).
- The role of fear and hope in constructing simplified political messages during times of crisis.
How social media algorithms amplify emotionalized and simplified stories of war.
- The impact of oversimplified political narratives on social polarization and quality of democracy.

References / Bibliography
Hayes, A. S. (Ed.). (2018). Communication in the Age of Trump. New York: Peter Lang.
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 319–345.
Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Historical Institutionalism. Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261.
Morini, M. (2020). Lessons from Trump’s Political Communication: How to Dominate the Media Environment. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chairs: Olgierd Annusewicz

Discussants: Mehmet Yavuz

"Versailles is over". Invective in political discourse, from allusions and sarcasm to insults and ridicule. Has Donald Trump influenced the way politicians insult?
Olgierd Annusewicz
Abstract
One of the hallmarks of the Trumpization of political communication is the simplification and brutalization of political language, particularly evident in how competing politicians describe each other. While mutual insults, criticism, and name-calling are certainly nothing new, it seems that the general model of "allusions and subtle sarcasm" has given way - in terms of frequency and intensity- to the model of "insults and ridicule." This paper will analyze Donald Trump's style of naming political opponents and compare it to the mechanisms of criticism of opponents in European democracies. Can we speak of a lasting change and impoverishment of political language, or is this a temporary phenomenon? What might contribute to the perpetuation of this model of influencing an opponent's image? The study will utilize a qualitative content analysis of parliamentary speeches and television debates related to election campaigns and current politics in the US, Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Italy.
Manufacturing Simplicity: A Systematic Literature Review of Astroturfing as a Mechanism of Discursive Reduction in Computational Propaganda
Katarzyna Szelest-Karpowicz
Abstract
In the contemporary media ecosystem, the proliferation of hidden electoral campaigns has fundamentally altered the depth of democratic debate. This paper presents a systematic literature review examining astroturfing-the artificial manufacturing of mock-grassroots support-not merely as a tool for generating digital volume, but as a primary mechanism of radical discursive simplification. The core objective of this study is to synthesize existing academic research on how coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) and bot networks are structurally deployed to strip nuance from complex socio-political crises, reducing them to binary, emotionally charged slogans. Through a qualitative meta-analysis of literature from the past decade, the paper maps the operational reliance of computational propaganda on the "rhetoric of reduction." Because automated systems and state-sponsored troll farms cannot effectively simulate complex deliberation, they naturally default to radical oversimplification to polarize public opinion. Crucially, this review identifies a significant epistemological gap in current political communication studies: while the technical detection of astroturfing has advanced, there remains a critical lack of theoretical frameworks evaluating how this algorithmically enforced simplicity structurally erodes the cognitive complexity of public discourse. Ultimately, this presentation offers a conceptual roadmap to guide future empirical research toward filling these urgent analytical voids.
The Factory of Drama: Giorgia Meloni, Political Performance, and the Dramaturgical Transformation from Opposition to Government
Jonathan Kamkhaji, Claudio Radaelli, Laurie Boussaguet
Abstract
Dramaturgical approaches to politics have long conceptualized it as both drama and performance: a domain in which narratives construct heroes, villains, and victims, while political actors stage identities, emotions, and claims to authority before different audiences. This article builds upon dramaturgy to develop a comparative analysis of two landmark speeches by Giorgia Meloni delivered under radically different institutional conditions: her 2019 rally speech in Rome’s Piazza San Giovanni as opposition leader ("Sono una donna...") and her 2022 inaugural address to the Italian Parliament as Prime Minister. We develop an integrated dramaturgical framework combining three dimensions of political communication: narrative structure, symbolic performance, and emotional appeals. Drawing on the Narrative Policy Framework, dramaturgical theories of political performance, and scholarship on political emotions, we examine how Meloni constructs characters, plots, and morals; mobilizes symbols, gestures, staging, and embodied performances; and activates distinct emotional registers across the two speeches. Our analysis shows that dramaturgy is not a stable feature of political style but a strategic response to audience expectations and institutional position. In the opposition speech, Meloni performs a populist drama structured around antagonism, indignation, and identity-based mobilization. Heroes and victims merge into “the people,” villains are personalized political elites, and the emotional repertoire is dominated by anger, pride, and implicit fear. In contrast, the inaugural parliamentary speech performs a drama of legitimation. The central hero is Meloni herself as underdog-turned-governor; antagonism is muted; symbolic references emphasize institutional continuity and national responsibility; and the dominant emotions become pride and hope. The shift is accompanied by a transformation in performance style, from charismatic and interactive mobilization in the piazza to restrained displays of competence and adequacy in Parliament. The article contributes to scholarship on political communication, dramaturgy, and populist leadership by demonstrating how narrative, symbolism, emotion, and performance interact to produce distinct forms of political authority. More broadly, it advances the concept of the dramaturgical loop by showing how political leaders simultaneously author and perform policy dramas while adapting them to changing institutional roles and audiences.
 

Panel 4.2 The "Trumpization" of Political Discourse: Narratives of War, Peace, and Crisis in an Era of Simplification (II)


The contemporary landscape of political communication is undergoing a profound transformation characterized by what scholars often tentatively label as "Trumpization" (Morini, 2020). This phenomenon, deeply rooted in the broader framework of populist communication styles (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and the mediatization of politics (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), is defined by extreme simplification, the emotionalization of language, and the strategic use of "anti-intellectual" storytelling.

The primary objective of this panel is to examine how these simplified communication patterns are utilized by politicians in their communication both regarding the most critical issues of the modern world like war and peace, but also in a daily political communication routine. We argue that the "Trumpization" of discourse is not merely a stylistic choice but a strategic tool used to frame complex political issues - such as the war in Iran, political tensions in European countries - into binary, easily digestible stories of "us versus them" or "hero versus villain."

We also aim to explore whether this shift towards radical simplification facilitates public understanding of global and local political challenges or, conversely, enables misleading public opinion.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:
- Theoretical Frameworks: The evolution of "Trumpization" and its relation to populist rhetoric and political tabloidization.
- Narratives of Conflict in Iran.
- Case Studies in National Politics: For instance, the framing of judicial reforms in Italy or the "SAFE" security initiatives in Poland as narrative-driven tools, political rhetoric during 2025 and 2026 elections (eg. Germany, Hungary).
- The role of fear and hope in constructing simplified political messages during times of crisis.
How social media algorithms amplify emotionalized and simplified stories of war.
- The impact of oversimplified political narratives on social polarization and quality of democracy.

References / Bibliography
Hayes, A. S. (Ed.). (2018). Communication in the Age of Trump. New York: Peter Lang.
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), 319–345.
Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Historical Institutionalism. Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261.
Morini, M. (2020). Lessons from Trump’s Political Communication: How to Dominate the Media Environment. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chairs: Olgierd Annusewicz

Discussants: Malgorzata Kaczorowska

Freedom, Responsibility and Crisis: Presidential Narratives of Covid-19 Vaccination in Italy, Germany and Poland
Valeria Carmen Caputo
Abstract
In an age in which political crises are increasingly narrated through simplified, polarising and personalised repertoires, the COVID-19 pandemic offers an important opportunity to examine a different form of crisis communication: institutional, constitutional and symbolically integrative. This paper focuses on non-executive heads of state in parliamentary republics and analyses how they addressed one of the most politically and symbolically contested issues of the pandemic: vaccination policies and the debate on vaccine mandates. Rather than approaching vaccine mandates as a merely technical or legal question, the paper conceptualises them as a democratic dilemma located at the intersection of individual freedom, collective responsibility, public health, trust in institutions and the legitimate boundaries of state coercion. The central research question is how heads of state discursively framed this dilemma during the COVID-19 crisis. More specifically, the paper asks how they articulated the relationship between liberty and obligation, how they responded to dissent and protest, and how they mobilised constitutional principles and national historical memories to legitimise, qualify or resist coercive public health measures. The paper compares the public discourse of three presidents: Sergio Mattarella in Italy, Frank-Walter Steinmeier in Germany and Andrzej Duda in Poland. These cases are selected because they share a broadly similar institutional condition: presidents with limited executive powers but significant symbolic authority. At the same time, they differ in political culture, historical memory, and levels of institutional trust. Italy offers a Western European case in which presidential discourse has often been associated with constitutional continuity and civic responsibility. Germany provides a case marked by both West German and East German political legacies, where debates on coercion and trust were shaped by specific historical sensitivities. Poland represents a post-socialist Eastern European case in which suspicion toward state compulsion and conflicts over liberal-democratic authority were especially salient. This comparison allows the paper to explore how similar symbolic offices may produce different narratives of freedom, responsibility and public authority under conditions of crisis. Theoretically, the study draws on the literature on political symbols, crisis communication and democratic leadership. In particular, it builds on Harold Lasswell’s understanding of symbols as devices that organise political meanings and orient collective behaviour. Presidential discourse is analysed as a form of crisis simplification, but one that differs from antagonistic or populist simplification. While “Trumpized” political communication tends to personalise conflict, polarise meanings and frame crisis through enemies, betrayal and direct identification with “the people”, institutional crisis narratives may simplify complexity in a different way: by linking fear, sacrifice and uncertainty to constitutional continuity, civic duty and democratic endurance. Methodologically, the paper adopts a qualitative political discourse analysis, supported by thematic coding of symbolic categories. The corpus consists of public speeches, official statements, interviews and institutional messages delivered by the three presidents during the key phases of the debate on vaccination policies and vaccine mandates in 2021 and 2022. The analysis focuses on discursive segments in which vaccination, mandates, restrictions, protest, freedom and responsibility are justified, contested or redefined. These segments are coded according to the symbolic categories mobilised, including freedom, responsibility, solidarity, public health, coercion, constitutional order, trust and national memory, and according to the political functions they perform. The paper argues that presidents with formally limited powers can become relevant actors in the symbolic management of crisis, even when they do not directly control policy decisions. It also shows that the meaning of freedom in pandemic politics varied across national contexts: as responsible participation and civic solidarity in the Italian case; as democratic deliberation, social trust and historical caution in the German case; and as a more explicit boundary against state compulsion in the Polish case. By comparing these presidential narratives, the paper contributes to the study of political discourse in an era of simplification. It shows that simplification is not necessarily populist, polarising or “Trumpized”. Heads of state may also produce institutional forms of simplification aimed at preserving democratic legitimacy while addressing fear, dissent and uncertainty in times of emergency.
Civil Society Organizations in the Age of Trumpized Political Discourse: Crisis Narratives, Delegitimation, and Strategies of Civic Mobilization
Agnieszka Bejma
Abstract
This presentation examines how the Trumpization of political discourse reshapes the operating environment of civil society organizations. Understood as a mode of political communication characterized by simplification, personalization, emotionalization, antagonism, and the constant production of crisis narratives, Trumpized discourse affects not only electoral politics and public debate, but also the legitimacy and agency of organized civil society. The paper focuses on the ways in which civil society organizations are positioned within narratives of war, peace, and crisis. In polarized political contexts, such organizations are frequently portrayed as representatives of external interests, liberal elites, ideological agendas, or threats to national sovereignty and social order. This process of delegitimation transforms CSOs from recognized democratic actors into contested political subjects whose motives, funding, and social role are publicly questioned. At the same time, the presentation considers how civil society organizations respond to this changing communicative environment. It analyzes the strategic tension between resisting simplified and antagonistic political narratives and adapting to the emotional, media-driven logic through which contemporary publics are mobilized. Particular attention is paid to the communicative and organizational strategies used by CSOs to defend democratic norms, sustain civic engagement, counter disinformation, and rebuild trust in fragmented public spheres.
The Transnational Diffusion of 'Trumpism': A Critical Discourse Analysis of Rhetorical Simplification and Brutalisation among Democratic Leaders
Malgorzata Kaczorowska
Abstract
This paper addresses the transnational impact of Donald Trump and 'Trumpism' on the transformation of contemporary political discourse. Defined as a right-wing politico-ideological movement, 'Trumpism' is anchored in radical populism, economic nationalism ('America First'), anti-globalism, and protectionism. It is further characterized by a transactional approach to international relations, the securitization of migration, and a confrontational, authoritarian leadership style manifested in a permanent critique of elites. The primary research objective is to determine and analyse the extent to which this specific communicative matrix has permanently reconfigured the language of leaders within the world’s key democracies. The subject of this comparative analysis, grounded in the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), comprises the public and diplomatic statements of leading political leaders of democratic states: the Prime Minister of Canada (Mark Carney), the Prime Minister of the UK (Keir Starmer), the Chancellor of Germany (Friedrich Merz), as well another selected heads of state and governments. The study focuses on identifying linguistic mechanisms such as the structural simplification of messages, the dichotomization of the social world ('us' versus 'them'), and the redefinition of semantic correctness norms under the influence of the US leader. Indeed, as discourse analysis reveals, in terms of communication and leadership style, 'Trumpism' inherently entails a confrontational rhetoric, direct and aggressive communication with the electorate, scepticism toward democratic institutions, and the cultivation of a 'strongman' image that fights against the establishment. The paper poses questions regarding the evolutionary trajectory of political elites' rhetoric under the influence of the Washington model led by Donald Trump: whether the observed shift constitutes merely a symptomatic response to new media realities or a profound reorientation of the international communication paradigm. The analysis demonstrates that the diffusion of Donald Trump’s language has triggered processes of systemic brutalization and tribalisation of public debate at the intergovernmental level. This phenomenon compels mainstream leaders to adapt populist tools in order to maintain their electoral legitimacy. In conclusion, the author posits the thesis that 'Trumpization' is not an ephemeral phenomenon, but rather a new, destabilizing quality in global political communication. The erosion of traditional, inclusive diplomatic language in favour of an aggressive, dichotomous, and transactional rhetoric permanently reshapes interactions among the leaders of democratic states, while simultaneously undermining the institutional foundations of the multilateral order.
 

Panel 4.3 The European Far-Right Politics of Truth in Digital Spaces


This panel aims to gather early-career and senior scholars from diverse disciplinary and methodological backgrounds that explore the European far-right politics of truth in digital spaces. The panel welcomes submissions from all disciplines aiming to study synergies between the far-right apparatus of truth, political parties, legacy media and online subcultures; to compare differences and similarities in truth claims and appeals to journalistic and/or scientific authority; to understand the amplifying role of algorithms; to explore the emerging role of generative AI in the legitimation of stigmatising conspiracy theories; to investigate its influence in policymaking, trust in academic findings, voter behaviour, and political violence.

In political science, the relationship between the far right and truth has been explored through Gramsci's concept of hegemony (Schilk, 2025), populism studies (Ylä-Anttila, 2018), network analysis (Deem, 2023), and post-truth frameworks (Cassidy, 2020). By often implying a complete departure from objectivity as if far-right discourses primarily appealed to emotions, existing studies have overlooked how the far right strategically leverages digital spaces to perform journalistic and/or scientific authority. Moreover, by focusing on specific national contexts through mono-disciplinary lenses, existing scholarship fails to provide a comprehensive analysis of the European far-right politics of truth in digital spaces, obscuring how its transnational nature has facilitated the circulation of extremist ideologies that directly threaten democratic stability and social cohesion. According to Maly (2024), digital media affordances have fundamentally transformed the contemporary far right's metapolitical project. Beyond enabling ordinary citizens to exercise unprecedented influence through networked communication (Castells, 2009), digital platforms and their algorithmic systems of recommendation have amplified truths that systematically discriminate against minority groups (Buarque, 2024). In a nutshell, this panel expands research studies focused on far-right actors active on social media platforms producing common truths rooted in racial hatred, legitimise conspiracy theories linked to violent extremism, and maintain symbiotic relationships with far-right intellectuals, political parties, and legacy media segments. Given the potential impacts of an essentially discriminatory politics of truth amplified by algorithms, this panel makes a timely contribution to the discipline. The panel thus invites researchers to examine these issues from diverse disciplinary and methodological perspectives and to consider, among others, the following research questions:

1: What are the shared truths produced by European far-right media outlets/intellectuals across digital platforms?
2: How has the European far-right digital apparatus of truth benefitted from algorithmic recommendation and GenAI?
3: How do far-right media/intellectuals operate symbiotically with legacy media, parties, online subcultures?
4: How has the European far-right politics of truth legitimised stigmatising conspiracy theories?
5: How has European far-right politics of truth undermined trust, influenced policy, voting, violence?

Bibliography:
• Deem, ‘Feminine, Not Feminist”: Trad Truth-making on Social Media’, Ethnologia Europaea, 53(2) (2023), pp.21-40.
• B. Buarque, The Power of the Alt-Right Multitude: How and Why Alt-Right Conspiracy Theories Have Been Legitimised in Online Spaces. [online] University of Manchester (2024). Available at: https://www.librarysearch.manchester.ac.uk/permalink/44MAN_INST/bofker/alma992987527698101631.
• F. Schilk, ‘The Metapolitics of Crises: How the New Right Weaponises Narratives to Mainstream Far-Right Ideology’, Int J Polit Cult Soc (2025).
• I. Maly, Metapolitics, algorithms and violence: new right activism and terrorism in the attention economy (London: Routledge, 2024).
• J. Cassidy, ‘How Post-Truth Politics Transformed and Shaped the Outcome of the 2016 Brexit Referendum’, in S. Giusti and E. Piras (Eds.), Democracy and Fake News (London: Routledge, 2020), pp. 53-63.
• M. Castells, Communication Power (London: Oxford University Press, 2009).
• T. Ylä-Anttila, ‘Populist Knowledge: ‘Post-truth’ Repertoires of Contesting Epistemic Authorities’, European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 5(4) (2018), pp. 356-388.

Chairs: Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Beatriz Lopes Buarque, Alessio Scopelliti, Polina Zavershinskaia

Discussants: Beatriz Lopes Buarque

Performing Heimat: TikTok and the Discursive Politics of Belonging in South Tyrol
Katharina Crepaz
Abstract
This paper examines how two right-wing populist regional actors in South Tyrol—Süd-Tiroler Freiheit (STF) and Liste JWA—construct and circulate political “truths” through their TikTok presences. The paper investigates how these actors produce alternative truth regimes that combine historical claims, demographic anxieties, and ethnonationalist imaginaries with the vernacular, affective and highly personalized styles characteristic of TikTok. Through a critical discourse analysis enriched with multimodal discourse theory, the study analyses a corpus of STF and JWA TikTok videos (2023–2025). The analysis focuses on discursive strategies (nomination, predication, argumentation), the affective staging of belonging and threat, and the use of platform-specific semiotic resources - viral audio, on-screen text, filters, humor, and vernacular aesthetics - to normalize and legitimize exclusionary narratives. The paper traces how claims to represent the “real people” of South Tyrol are established through appeals to history, pseudo-scientific demographic reasoning, anti-elite rhetoric and stylized performances of authenticity. The paper argues that TikTok’s algorithmic infrastructures amplify specific kinds of affective truth-making, enabling regionalist far-right actors to hybridize ethnonationalist tropes, minority-language protection narratives and anti-immigration frames within an emotionally resonant and easily shareable repertoire. This aligns with emerging research showing how far-right actors mobilize the platform’s participatory and memetic cultures to diffuse radical ideas through everyday, relatable content.
Reshaping Truth and Visibility Through GenAI. Synthetic Images in the Communication Strategies of European Far-Right Parties and Leaders
Melissa Stolfi, Emma Garzonio
Abstract
Digital platforms have become central contexts for the production, circulation, and legitimization of polarizing narratives and “truth politics”, fostering symbolic constructions of conflict, the reactivation of the “us versus them” dichotomy, emotional mobilization in digital publics, and the shaping of political debate. Within this context, the growing use of GenAI tools represents a significant turning point in visual communication, particularly for political and institutional actors, enabling the rapid, scalable, and highly customizable production of synthetic content capable of amplifying identity-based, ideological, securitarian, and conspiratorial narratives. This paper contributes to the debate on the relationship between far-right, digital platforms, and contemporary regimes of truth by examining how AI is integrated into the communication strategies of EU far-right actors. Starting form a literature review on populist and nationalist discourse and frames - such as the opposition between “the people” and “the elites”, the popular sovereignty, the defense of borders, the anti-immigration and security narratives, the rehabilitation of conservative values and national identity, and Euroscepticism (Canovan 1981; Stanley 2008; Prospero 2019) - and considering the contemporary far right as a transnational metapolitical project embedded in the affordances of digital media (Maly 2024), the study investigates how AI-generated images contribute to the construction of emotionally compelling “truths” and crisis scenarios capable of legitimizing discriminatory representations, anti-elite narratives, and imaginaries of political, cultural, and social decline. The underlying assumption is that GenAI intensifies the aestheticization of conflict by activating immediate affective responses through simplified and polarized narratives that operate simultaneously at cognitive and emotional levels (Nightingale & Farid 2022). Rather than functioning merely as visual propaganda, AI-generated imagery may play a broader role in shaping symbolic authority, credibility, and authenticity claims within platformized communication environments. The empirical analysis focuses on synthetic images published over a three-month period during the 2025 on IG and Fb by the verified accounts of parties and leaders belonging to the ID European Group. The sample includes Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs and Herbert Kickl (Austria), Vlaams Belang and Tom Van Grieken (Belgium), Dansk Folkeparti and Morten Messerschmidt (Denmark), Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond and Martin Helme (Estonia), Perussuomalaiset and Geert Wilders (Finland), Rassemblement National and Marine Le Pen (France), Alternative für Deutschland and Alice Weidel (Germany), Lega and Matteo Salvini (Italy), Svoboda a přímá demokracie and Tomio Okamura (Czech Republic). Meta platforms were selected because of their centrality in contemporary visual political communication and the availability of publicly accessible data and collection tools, including the Meta Library API, which facilitate comparative analysis across national contexts. Methodologically, the study adopts a multi-step analytical pipeline designed to distinguish natively synthetic images from photographs that have undergone AI-assisted post-production editing. The first stage consisted of visual screening aimed at identifying artefacts commonly associated with diffusion-based image generation processes. Whenever available, files were subsequently examined through C2PA standards to detect metadata related to algorithmic generation and editing histories. In cases where content credentials were unavailable, images were analysed using machine-learning-based detection tools employed as probabilistic classifiers and interpreted inferentially rather than deterministically (Corvi et al. 2023; Mahara & Rishe 2026). This procedure enabled the development of a classification system capable of differentiating varying degrees and forms of AI intervention, ranging from “no evidence” and “probable retouching/editing” to “strong AI manipulation signals” and “likely fully synthetic” content, while also distinguishing among manipulation, compositing, and suspicious editing practices. Images classified as synthetic were then subjected to qualitative visual analysis to identify similarities and differences in the production and use of GenAI by EU far-right parties and leaders. Attention was devoted to visual aesthetics, narrative formats, and production practices, including AI-enhanced post-production, transformations based on existing photographs, and entirely synthetic image generation. A further thematic coding process revealed recurring aesthetic, symbolic, and narrative patterns in the representation of conflict and the construction of truth claims, as well as the political issues for which far-right actors most frequently rely on GenAI images. Finally, a selected subset of images was analysed through digital methods aimed at exploring processes of recirculation, recontextualization, and semantic transformation across digital environments. Beyond proposing an operational methodology for identifying AI-generated images through freely accessible online tools, the paper argues that the European far right employs generative AI not simply as an aesthetic or propagandistic resource, but as a device for producing and reshaping regimes of truth and visibility in platformized publics. In doing so, generative AI strengthens the algorithmic circulation of emotionally polarizing content and contributes to the normalization and legitimization of discriminatory imaginaries, exclusionary narratives, and stigmatizing representations (Vaccari & Chadwick 2020; Pilati & Venturini 2025; Feitsma & Whitehead 2026). The study thus offers a contribution to the interdisciplinary debate on generative AI, digital platforms, and the ongoing transformation of far-right political communication in Europe.
From Sleeping Giants to Everyday Citizens: How Authoritarianism Shapes Visual Narratives and Public Characters
Selen Sarikaya Eren
Abstract
How do artists and their visual work contribute to building hope and solidarity in the fearful atmosphere of increasing authoritarianism, censorship and repression? The paper answers this question by triangulating visual analysis with semi-structured interviews conducted with the artists who created illustrations in support of protests and post it online. It compares two eventful protests where visual production was at peak: 2013 Gezi Protests and 2025 Saraçhane Protests in Turkey. Character theory is applied in visual analysis for comparing the heroes,villains and victims in visual narratives as different emotional packages artists build in two instances of increased repression with different levels of authoritarianism. The study also gives particular attention to preceding art practice, and how the visual language and individual styles of the artists aesthetize the collective emotions. Preliminary analysis shows artists’ moral intuitions, need of self-expression experienced as a strong affective reaction, and platform-affordances shape and drive the protest art as artifacts created to nurture affective commitments and moral emotions in order to sustain the protests. The findings also demonstrate how twelve years of increasing authoritarianism shaped the visual narratives of protests.
 

Panel 4.4 Hybrid Campaigns between Pop Culture, Platforms and AI


Electoral campaigns are increasingly characterized by the growing relevance of bottom-up communicative forms shaped by platform cultures. Campaign discourse is no longer defined only by institutional or party-centered conventions, but is increasingly reworked through vernacular styles, pop references, irony, and participatory practices rooted in digital environments. What is changing is not only the toolkit of campaigning, but the way electoral communication is produced, circulated, and publicly re-elaborated.
This panel aims to collect papers that explore how these shifts are reshaping contemporary electoral campaigns. Campaign periods can therefore be a useful setting in which to observe how different actors – including political elites, campaign professionals, platforms, and citizens – interact, how practices are hybridized, and how institutional and popular registers converge. This mingling may take shape through participatory practices that reinterpret campaign messages through appropriation, parody, remix, memes and grassroots intervention. In this regard, campaigns can also be seen as environments in which low-threshold and playful forms of engagement acquire political relevance, including through dynamics that may be captured by the notion of silly citizenship.
By lowering the threshold of content production and expanding the speed and scale of manipulation, generative AI acts as a booster of these processes strengthening both organized campaign communication and more diffuse forms of popular re-elaboration. AI-generated images, synthetic videos, and deepfakes intensify the circulation of hybrid and platform-native content, while further blurring the boundaries between official and unofficial communication, strategic messaging and playful appropriation, authenticity and manipulation. These developments raise important questions about democratic quality, information integrity, and the evolving boundaries of political participation in digital environments.
This panel welcomes theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions from political communication, visual and electoral studies, and related fields. Particular emphasis is placed on comparative research as well as recent case studies examining the adoption of AI in political campaigns. We strongly encourage methodological pluralism, encompassing qualitative, quantitative, computational, and mixed-method approaches.

Chairs: Junio Aglioti Colombini, Roberta Bracciale, Lorenzo Mosca

Discussants: Massimiliano Andretta

Dancing through Intertexts: Humor, Meme Literacy and Political Engagement on TikTok
Antonio Martella, Junio Aglioti Colombini
Abstract
A woman in a beige suit, white shirt and pointed heels dances to a remix built around Donald Trump’s words: ‘Kamala is at a dance party with Beyoncé.’ The outfit evokes Kamala Harris’s public style, the gestures recall her campaign appearances, the audio refers to Trump’s attack on Harris’s campaign, and the performer is a well-known American YouTuber and actress. With more than 57 million views, 9.3 million likes, 52,000 comments and 670,000 shares, the video captures the trend’s core dynamic: political meaning emerges through the recognition and connection of pop-cultural, political, and platform-native references. Originating from Trump’s 2024 rally attack on Harris and Beyoncé participation in her rally, the remix transformed celebrity endorsement, partisan spectacle, and rally aesthetics into a reusable TikTok sound. Detached from its initial context, it became an open memetic template through which users reworked campaign discourse across performance, captions, routines, partisan cues, and pop-cultural references. The contribution is situated at the intersection of research on hybrid campaigning, platform vernaculars, and political memes (Cervi et al., 2021; Wiggins, 2019). In contemporary platform politics, electoral communication is increasingly produced and re-elaborated through popular culture, humor, and participatory formats rather than only through institutional campaign messages (Cervi et al., 2023). TikTok makes this visible because its architecture encourages replication, variation and embodied imitation, fostering what Zulli and Zulli conceptualize as technological mimesis and imitation publics (2022). Music challenge memes and playful political performances show how sounds, dances and lip-syncs operate as templates through which entertainment acquires political relevance (Vizcaíno-Verdú & Abidin, 2022). Scholarship on meme discourse also shows that memes do not simply circulate as humorous objects, but as multimodal constructions that condense narratives, signal belonging, target opponents and organize shared interpretations (Wiggins, 2019; Han and Zappavigna, 2023). Building on this literature, the analysis treats intertextuality as a key mechanism of memetic resonance (Huntington, 2015; Tulloch, 2023). The trend works as users attach the same audio to recognizable repertoires: Harris’s public image, Trump’s performative style, MAGA iconography, Beyoncé and celebrity endorsement, everyday life, and TikTok-native comic formats. These references require different forms of meme literacy (Milner, 2013; Zenner & Geeraerts, 2018). Some are immediately visible, such as campaign clothing, flags, or captions; others are more implicit, such as gestures, choreographic echoes, ironic reversals, or platform-specific jokes. Humor is equally central, not only as a general tone but as a directional practice: jokes can be self-directed, aimed at political opponents, addressed to out-groups, or left deliberately ambiguous (Zulli & McKasy, 2025). The case of ‘Dance Party with Beyoncé’ thus suggests that hybrid campaigning on TikTok may travel not only through endorsements, attacks, or issue positions, but also through outfits, gestures, sounds, dance moves, and shared memetic practices. Intertextuality can therefore be understood not merely as an ornamental layer of the meme, but as one of the mechanisms through which the audio becomes politically legible, affectively engaging and shareable. Against this background we formulate these research questions: RQ1. How do videos in the ‘Dance Party with Beyoncé’ trend combine humor and intertextual references to transform an electoral campaign episode into a TikTok-native memetic template? RQ2. Which configurations of humor, intertextuality and TikTok-native performance are associated with higher engagement, measured through views, likes, comments, and shares? Methodology The empirical analysis draws on a TikTok dataset built by querying the phrase ‘Dance Party with Beyoncé’ through the platform’s search interface, yielding 327 videos associated with 40 unique remix-related music IDs. These music IDs were then used as seeds to collect data through the TikTok Research API, resulting in a corpus of 25,498 videos published between 25 October and 11 November 2024. From this corpus, the top 5% of most-viewed videos were selected, producing a subset of 1,274 videos that accounts for 94.3% of total cumulative views. The videos were manually coded by two trained coders (Krippendorff’s α from 0.75 to 1). The analysis focuses on three dimensions: intertextual references, coded as politics, celebrities/music, digital folklore, everyday life, entertainment media or local lore; humor directionality, coded as self-directed, other-directed, mixed, unclear or absent; and TikTok-native performance, captured through dance, lip-sync, impersonation, point of view and dominant performance frame. Engagement is measured through views, likes, comments and shares, treated as distinct user response (Ceccobelli et al., 2020; Martella & Bracciale, 2022). Separate negative binomial regressions test the associations with intertextual density, political anchoring, humor directionality, and performance formats. Preliminary findings Preliminary findings suggest that intertextuality is not a marginal feature of the trend, but one of its main conditions of intelligibility. Creators repeatedly anchor the sound to campaign, celebrity, and ordinary-life frames, turning the same audio into pro-Harris performance, anti-Trump ridicule, partisan identity signaling, celebrity impersonation, everyday comedy, or ambiguous political play. Moreover, videos containing at least one intertextual reference appear to show higher median views, likes, comments and shares than those without such references. Preliminary comparisons also suggest that other-directed humor may outperform self-directed humor across the same engagement metrics.
Preaching Against Oligarchy. J. Talarico and the Democratic Rearticulation of Southern Political Culture
Silvano Poli, Daniele Battista, Michele Varini
Abstract
In recent months, James Talarico's campaign for the U.S. Senate in Texas has been one of the main stories in American politics. After defeating J. Crockett in the primary, Talarico raised the highest amount ever raised by a Senate candidate in the first quarter of 2026 – $27 million. His campaign has boosted Democratic hopes in a winnable state where they haven't won a statewide race in over thirty years . His candidacy has attracted national attention due to its electoral potential and the originality of its message, leading some to consider it the future of Democratic politics . It combines progressive Christianity, criticism of Christian nationalism, anti-billionaire populism and calls for social renewal. For this reason, Talarico has been presented as the "fresh face" of the midterm elections and as the new Democratic discourse, and alternative to both Trumpism and technocratic liberal progressivism . However, Talarico's newness lies not only in his break with Texas's current Republican establishment, but also in his ability to re-inscribe the Democratic platform within historically recognizable repertoires of regional political culture. Talarico's campaign communications are analysed here as an example of how the political culture of southern states is expressed. The three-part classification of U.S. political cultures – moralistic, individualistic, and traditional – proposed by Elazar (1966, 1984) provides a general framework for analysis. According to Elazar, the South's political culture was traditionally characterised by governmental inertia, limited mass participation, and non-autonomous bureaucracies. Furthermore, the success of that work has been attributed to the development of a set of indicators to measure political culture – the Elazar-Sharkansky model (Sharkansky, 1969) – which has since been applied to a wide range of phenomena, but not to political communication. The distinctiveness of Talarico's campaign might then lie in a paradox: a progressive campaign in a context long dominated by the Republican Party. However, well before the 1960s and 70s realignment (Tonello, 2007); in the late 19th century, South States saw the emergence of the anti-monopolistic populist tradition, a tradition that has had a lasting impact on American political language (Kazin, 2017). We therefore ask whether, in Talarico’s campaign, religious, populist, and Southern repertoires traditionally associated with the Republican right are being rearticulated to the point of becoming resources for a new Democratic discourse; and, if so, in what way and with what characteristics. In this sense, the research helps to address a dual gap. On the one hand, it demonstrates how Christian language can be used as a counter-hegemonic resource in the construction of a democratic and left-wing populism (Laclau, 2005; Lakoff, 2002; Glynos & Howarth, 2007). Conversely, the paper puts forward a cohesive strategy with the potential to reignite interest in political cultures and integrate historical-discursive analysis, political rhetoric and multimodal analysis of campaign communication. This study integrates the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA) to reconstruct the historical references invoked by the campaign. It analyses the discursive strategies and aims to understand the historical roots of Talarico's message (Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009), It also examines decisive stylistic features such as the homiletic rhythm, analogies, antitheses, repetitions etc. (Finlayson, 2007; Burke, 1969; Charteris-Black, 2011). From an operational perspective, the central categories are codified through observable sub-dimensions. Each sub-dimension is then evaluated on an intensity scale based on the number of elements it contains. The analytical material includes a series of texts considered to be of "high ideological density," such as the launch speech/video, the "Why I'm Running" proclamation, and the speech following the primary victory. The textual corpus is complemented by a visual ethnography of Talarico's social media profiles (Pink 2007; 2008) aimed at identifying continuities or dissonances between the discursive and visual dimensions. Finally, the degree of reception of this model is investigated through a sub-corpus of media reception focused on the framing of major newspapers of different political orientations: Texas Tribune as a lean-left source; Houston Chronicle as a mainstream/centre source; The Texan as a lean-right source. This comparison allows us to observe how the same communicative repertoire is interpreted, normalized, or delegitimized in different media environments. The analysis's aim is to reveal that Talarico does not merely incorporate "religion" (Albanese, 2007) into a progressive platform but enables us to explore how old political figures can be reinterpreted in the context of democratic politics with culturally identifiable references for the South. In this sense, the case demonstrates how progressive political communication can attempt to compete not only on the level of policy, but on the deeper level of cultural translatability, regional political memory, and the rhetorical construction of the people. Albanese, C. L. (2007). A republic of mind and spirit: A cultural history of American metaphysical religion. Yale University Press. Burke, K. (1969). A rhetoric of motives. University of California Press. Charteris-Black, J. (2011). Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Elazar, D. J. (1966). American federalism: A view from the states. Thomas Y. Crowell. Elazar, D. J. (1984). American federalism: A view from the states (3rd ed.). Harper & Row. Finlayson, A. (2007). From beliefs to arguments: Interpretive methodology and rhetorical political analysis. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9(4), 545–563. Glynos, J., & Howarth, D. (2007). Logics of critical explanation in social an
Astroturfing as a Tool of Hidden Electoral Campaigns and Future Research Horizons, Artificial Grassroots in the Polish Cyber-Ecosystem
Katarzyna Szelest-Karpowicz
Abstract
This presentation explores the phenomenon of astroturfing-the artificial manufacturing of apparent grassroots political support-as a highly sophisticated mechanism of hidden electoral campaigning. By blending a comprehensive literature review with empirical observations from the contemporary Polish political landscape, this study examines how coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) deforms democratic deliberation. The primary objective is twofold: to identify the operational deployment of bot networks, comment factories, and algorithmic manipulation during recent electoral cycles in Poland, and to map the significant research gaps regarding these practices in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Utilizing a hybrid approach of critical literature analysis and descriptive case studies, the presentation demonstrates how domestic political actors increasingly rely on non-transparent digital proxies to shift public discourse and amplify polarized narratives. The paper concludes by outlining necessary methodological shifts, arguing that the localized specificities of the Polish cyber-ecosystem demand new, interdysciplinary frameworks to bridge existing empirical gaps in political communication studies.
 

Panel 4.5 Corruption, organized crime and public narratives: dynamics, representations and policy challenges (I)


In recent decades, corruption and organized crime have become central topics in social science debates, not only as institutional and economic phenomena, but also as issues shaped by public representation and interpretation. In contemporary mediated environments, narratives play an important role in making corruption and criminal practices visible, framing their meanings, and influencing public perceptions and reactions.

This panel aims to explore corruption and organized crime as dynamic and evolving phenomena, whose boundaries and interpretations are redefined across different contexts. Particular attention is devoted to the interaction between institutional mechanisms, media ecosystems and grassroots dynamics, where multiple actors—political elites, journalists, civil society organizations and citizens—contribute to shaping public understandings.

The panel also invites reflection on the role of media systems in these dynamics, including conditions of media capture and information control, which may affect how corruption and organized crime are represented and understood. At the same time, the contribution of social media and digital environments to the diversification of actors, frames and forms of engagement is of particular interest.

Finally, the panel seeks to connect these analytical perspectives to policy debates, focusing on the implications for anti-corruption strategies and governance. Understanding how corruption and organized crime are constructed and perceived can provide valuable insights for designing more effective institutional responses, improving transparency, and fostering informed civic engagement.

The panel welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions, including case studies and comparative analyses, from different disciplinary perspectives. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

· corruption and organized crime across political and institutional contexts

· media representations, framing processes and public perceptions

· media capture, agenda-setting and information control

· the role of digital platforms and social media

· anti-corruption policies and governance challenges

· civic mobilization, whistleblowing and claims-making

· relationships between corruption, organized crime and political systems

· comparative and cross-national perspectives

Chairs: Marco Antonelli, Roberto Mincigrucci, Alberto Vannucci

Discussants: Fernanda Odilla

Ambiguous connections: reputation, secrecy and corruption between ‘ndrangheta and politics in Australia
Anna Sergi, Alberto Vannucci
Abstract
This study examines the interactions between 'ndrangheta (mafia from Calabria) and politics in Australia through an analysis of case studies across five decades. Drawing on a typology that crosses mafia reputation with various forms of political proximity, the research illuminates how ambiguity characterises the ties between politicians and alleged mafia members. These ambiguous relationships manifest along a spectrum, ranging from secret dealings that enhance mafia 'auras' and reinforce criminal reputations, to overt corrupt exchanges exposing diverse transactional models. By exploring the origins of mafia reputation in each case, this study shows how reputational foundations generate ambiguous connections and shape their outcomes—whether they remain concealed in secrecy or materialise into identifiable corrupt transactions. The analysis contributes to understanding how the blurred boundaries between mafia reputation, ambiguity, secrecy, and corruption operate within the Australian context, revealing the mechanisms through which the ‘ndrangheta’s presence interacts with political spheres and the conditions under which these interactions remain hidden or become exposed.
Breaking Rules and Roles: Experimental Evidence on Gendered Expectations in the Evaluation of Women Politicians
Maria Zuffova, Jozef Michal Mintál, Klára Kaničárová
Abstract
The mere suspicion of corrupt behaviour by politicians provides a valid context for testing the adverse effects of double standards, as it activates the normative expectations held toward them, and these expectations are not gender neutral. Research building on social roles, role congruity, and expectation states theories has shown that because of gender stereotypes and performance expectations stemming from them, women politicians are evaluated differently from their male colleagues (Alexander and Andersen 1993). When women politicians, stereotypically seen as possessing communal traits such as honesty and integrity, violate ethical norms or legal rules, they are more likely to face harsher judgment and punishment than men. Gender and corruption research suggests that because women politicians are stereotypically portrayed as more honest, ethical, and trustworthy than men, the public is less likely to view them as engaging in corruption. Barnes and Beaulieu (2014), for instance, show experimentally that mere identification of a candidate as a woman systematically decreases the probability of respondents expressing strong suspicion of election fraud, even when the scenario contains suspicious cues. At the same time, this implies that if women break these stereotypes and behave in a corrupt or unethical manner, the backlash against them is likely to be much stronger than against their male colleagues in the same situation (Carlin, Carreras, and Love 2020; Dulani et al. 2021; Eggers, Vivyan, and Wagner 2018; Reyes-Housholder 2020). Some of this evidence is highly context-dependent (Batista Pereira 2021). In countries where corruption is widespread, people have been found to reject corrupt behaviour by politicians and street-level bureaucrats regardless of gender (Carreras, Vera, and Visconti 2024; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018; Klašnja, Lupu, and Tucker 2021). In such contexts, the benevolent gender stereotype that women are inherently more honest appears weakened: citizens may no longer assume that women are less prone to accepting bribes or misusing public funds, nor that previously honest women politicians or bureaucrats will resist corrupt pressures. Without these expectations, citizens are not necessarily more critical of corrupt behaviour by women (Brierley and Pereira 2023). The preference for non-corrupt politicians and bureaucrats is what matters. However, we know relatively little about what happens when gender stereotypes toward a woman politician suspected of corruption are purposefully activated or deactivated. Our understanding of how to mitigate the effects of double standards in the evaluation of female versus male politicians, triggered by breaking role expectations, remains limited. In this study, we examine these questions by fielding a survey experiment (target n ≈ 5,000+) in two democracies: Slovakia and the United States. These countries differ in gender norms, corruption prevalence, and perceptions, yet all represent democracies with accountability mechanisms in place. Electoral accountability renders women politicians more risk-averse, as they are aware that they tend to face harsher punishment than their male colleagues in cases of misconduct or corrupt behaviour. The effects are likewise different when corruption is treated as a social norm, since punishment carries less weight. We expose participants to different scenarios in which a male politician comments on a female politician implicated in corrupt behaviour, thereby activating or deactivating stereotypical expectations about gender roles. We expect stereotype activation to reduce punitive responses among women and to observe greater egalitarianism among men with daughters, with both effects moderated by education level and field of study. The findings are mixed and do not fully support some of our proposed hypotheses.
Beyond Compliance: whistleblowing as an anti-corruption policy tool. Comparative insights from training evaluation in Italy, Bulgaria and Spain.
Francesca Rispoli, Alberto Vannucci
Abstract
Whistleblowing has increasingly become a central anti-corruption policy tool within the European governance framework, particularly following the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/1937. While existing research has mainly focused on legal compliance and institutional implementation, less attention has been devoted to how whistleblowing is understood and internalized by those involved in training and organizational practice. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing participants’ evaluations of an international whistleblowing training course delivered in Italy, Bulgaria and Spain. Using qualitative content analysis, the paper examines how participants interpreted the most relevant aspects of whistleblower protection and reporting systems. The findings reveal significant cross-country differences in the perceived meaning and function of whistleblowing. Italian respondents framed whistleblowing as a civic and ethical practice linked to collective responsibility, institutional trust and anti-mafia culture, emphasizing testimonies of corruption victims, the role of ANAC and the “right to truth”. Bulgarian respondents primarily approached whistleblowing as a legal and compliance mechanism, focusing on regulatory updates, internal procedures, personnel adequacy and organizational implementation. Spanish respondents stressed the psychological and relational dimensions of reporting, highlighting the importance of trust, psychological support, data protection and the practical challenges faced by local public administrations. The paper argues that training environments represent a crucial site for evaluating the perceived effectiveness of whistleblowing as an anti-corruption policy tool. Participants’ reflections reveal not only different learning priorities, but also distinct national cultures of accountability, protection and institutional trust. The comparative analysis identifies three prevailing models of whistleblowing culture: a civic-ethical model in Italy, a compliance-oriented model in Bulgaria, and a psychosocial-effectiveness model in Spain. The study contributes to the literature on anti-corruption governance, policy implementation and organizational culture by showing that the effectiveness of whistleblowing systems depends not only on legal harmonization, but also on context-sensitive training approaches capable of addressing diverse institutional, cultural and psychological dimensions.
Civic Monitoring and Transparency in Confiscated Assets: The Case of Libera
Camilla Galaverni
Abstract
Although Italian legislation on the social reuse of assets confiscated from the mafias is among the most advanced in the world and represents one of the most significant policies in the fight against the mafia in Italy, the existing regulatory framework is not sufficient to guarantee the transparency, accessibility and quality of the data held by local public administrations, nor to automatically ensure that confiscated assets are put to good use. Over the years, Libera (one of the leading social anti-mafia organizations in Italy) has promoted a campaign aimed at increasing the accessibility and publicity of data relating to confiscated assets, monitoring the ability of local authorities receiving the assets to publish their lists on their official websites. Libera, in fact, was the organization that promoted the mobilization which led to the appoval of Law 109/1996 on the social reuse of confiscated assets, through a petition launched in the network’s first year of existence. In recent years, civic monitoring has often been put forward - both by some of the academic literature and by civil society organizations - as a potential solution to the limitations on citizens’ participation and oversight that persist in the representative democracies of the Western world. At the same time, however, lines of research have challenged the direct causal link between transparency, access to data and better governance, focusing instead on the conditions that make a government accountable. This work is part of a broader, ongoing doctoral research project aimed at analyzing the “Monitoring Communities” model proposed by Libera, as well as the monitoring practices carried out by local branches of the organization - sometimes more independently from the standardized guidelines. Part of the research sample consists of the national campaigns “RimanDATI” and “Il PNRR ai raggi X”, analyzed as examples of the application of the monitoring communities model promoted by the organization. This paper will present an initial analysis of the RimanDATI campaign, focusing in particular on the development of the monitoring community, the forms of coordination between national and local levels, the expertise and resources mobilized, the technical and advocacy tools employed, and the outputs generated by the campaign. The analysis will help to interpret the model of monitoring communities proposed by Libera and to situate it within the broader discussion on civic monitoring practices, examining the forms of transparency pursued through the campaign and the value that such transparency holds in terms of public participation, open data and accountability. The broader research project aims to provide a preliminary reflection that challenges the assumption that greater transparency automatically leads to better governance, and thus to discuss the relationship between civic monitoring and the advocacy/accountability nexus. The methodology employed, based on a qualitative approach, combines a secondary documentary analysis of the materials produced as part of the campaign with semi-structured interviews conducted with both national coordinators and activists involved in monitoring activities. The triangulation of sources aims to reconstruct not only how the campaign is narrated, but also how it unfolded, what tensions and challenges emerged, and which organizational practices supported its implementation. Theoretically, the contribution is situated at the intersection of corruption studies and social movement studies and seeks to conceptualize civic monitoring as a form of transformative democratic conflict. Initial evidence seems to show that, while promoting civic participation and collective monitoring, the campaign unfolds predominantly through highly coordinated and centralized organizational infrastructures. At the same time, it appears that the approach adopted by the organization tends to take a collaborative stance towards public administrations, prioritizing forms of support over more openly confrontational practices.
 

Panel 4.5 Corruption, organized crime and public narratives: dynamics, representations and policy challenges (II)


In recent decades, corruption and organized crime have become central topics in social science debates, not only as institutional and economic phenomena, but also as issues shaped by public representation and interpretation. In contemporary mediated environments, narratives play an important role in making corruption and criminal practices visible, framing their meanings, and influencing public perceptions and reactions.

This panel aims to explore corruption and organized crime as dynamic and evolving phenomena, whose boundaries and interpretations are redefined across different contexts. Particular attention is devoted to the interaction between institutional mechanisms, media ecosystems and grassroots dynamics, where multiple actors—political elites, journalists, civil society organizations and citizens—contribute to shaping public understandings.

The panel also invites reflection on the role of media systems in these dynamics, including conditions of media capture and information control, which may affect how corruption and organized crime are represented and understood. At the same time, the contribution of social media and digital environments to the diversification of actors, frames and forms of engagement is of particular interest.

Finally, the panel seeks to connect these analytical perspectives to policy debates, focusing on the implications for anti-corruption strategies and governance. Understanding how corruption and organized crime are constructed and perceived can provide valuable insights for designing more effective institutional responses, improving transparency, and fostering informed civic engagement.

The panel welcomes theoretical and empirical contributions, including case studies and comparative analyses, from different disciplinary perspectives. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:

· corruption and organized crime across political and institutional contexts

· media representations, framing processes and public perceptions

· media capture, agenda-setting and information control

· the role of digital platforms and social media

· anti-corruption policies and governance challenges

· civic mobilization, whistleblowing and claims-making

· relationships between corruption, organized crime and political systems

· comparative and cross-national perspectives

Chairs: Marco Antonelli, Roberto Mincigrucci, Alberto Vannucci

Discussants: Anna Sergi

Piani di investimento pubblico in contesti emergenziali e sviluppo delle reti corruttive. Il caso della ricostruzione in Irpinia
Tommaso Cerutti
Abstract
Il presente contributo si propone di indagare il concetto di “cultura dell’emergenza” e la sua connessione con la proliferazione della corruzione e delle infiltrazioni della criminalità organizzata in occasione dell’implementazione di piani di investimento pubblico straordinari, erogati in seguito a disastri naturali. Formalizzato per la prima volta nel 1989 dalla Corte dei Conti, questo concetto si configura come «una fuga dalle regole e una ricerca sistematica dell’eccezionalità, che si riflette nella incessante emanazione di norme di accelerazione dei procedimenti e nella moltiplicazione dei centri di spesa, per poi approdare sempre più spesso alle “ordinanze in deroga a qualsiasi contraria norma”» (della Porta, Vannucci 1994, p. 107). Da questo punto di vista, l’emergenza si configura non solo come un evento oggettivo che produce conseguenze misurabili. Essa riveste contemporaneamente sia il ruolo di frame discorsivo utilizzato per giustificare l’implementazione di provvedimenti e l’ottenimento di risorse, sia di "tecnica di governo", determinante per la normalizzazione di strumenti di intervento straordinario. A partire da queste considerazioni il contributo cercherà di dare risposta alle seguenti domande: (Q1) Quali fattori di contesto hanno favorito l’emergere della “cultura dell'emergenza” nella gestione dei piani di investimento pubblico a partire dagli anni Ottanta del Novecento? (Q2) In che modo tali modalità di gestione influiscono negativamente sull’aumento dei livelli di corruzione reale? Per rispondere a queste domande il contributo si concentrerà sul caso della ricostruzione in Irpinia, avvenuta in seguito al terremoto del 1980. La peculiarità che rende particolarmente interessante il caso selezionato è data dal fatto che il piano di investimento attivato in quella occasione fu caratterizzato dalla coesistenza di un piano per lo sviluppo industriale dell’area colpita dal disastro a fianco dei fondi per la ricostruzione, secondo quanto previsto dalla l. 219/1981. Inoltre, è con l’Irpinia che si afferma per la prima volta un meccanismo di allocazione dei fondi simile a quello implementato ancora oggi in Italia. L’analisi considererà il problema all’interno della cornice teorica dell’istituzionalismo storico, utilizzando come strumento metodologico il process tracing nella sua variante explaining outcome (Beach, Pedersen 2019). Considerando il caso selezionato, ci si concentrerà cioè nel dare una minima spiegazione sufficiente della risultante finale (lo sviluppo di reti corruttive), usando una combinazione eclettica di meccanismi teorici e/o meccanismi non sistematici e orientati sullo stesso. Nel ricostruire la sequenza di eventi, saranno utilizzate: la letteratura disponibile sul tema; fonti di natura parlamentare (tra cui le relazioni della Commissione parlamentare di inchiesta Scalfaro sull’Irpinia); fonti di natura giudiziaria (tra cui le sentenze dell’inchiesta «Mani sul terremoto»); fonti di natura giornalistica (in particolare articoli provenienti dall’Archivio Storico del “Corriere della Sera”). Nella prima parte, ci si focalizzerà sulla ricostruzione del quadro teorico relativo alla gestione degli investimenti pubblici in contesti afflitti da calamità naturali, prestando attenzione all’aumento del rischio di corruzione negli appalti, particolarmente accentuato per il caso italiano. In quest’ottica, si guarderà alla questione dei modelli di governance dei piani di investimento pubblico, inquadrando il piano per la ricostruzione dell’Irpinia all’interno del processo di evoluzione della gestione di questi piani nel corso della storia dell’Italia repubblicana con una valutazione dell’impatto di modelli di gestione top-down e bottom-up. A partire da queste considerazioni, si guarderà al processo di esecuzione dei piani spacchettandolo in macrofasi (risposta e ripresa, quest’ultima ulteriormente suddivisa in pianificazione, implementazione e post-implementazione) (Khorram-Manesh et al. 2021). In questo senso, sarà valutato il ruolo giocato dall’emergenza, secondo la triplice accezione menzionata, nel condizionare le modalità di intervento. Per ognuna di queste fasi saranno analizzati i principali rischi di corruzione e malversazione dei fondi e le modalità di sviluppo delle reti corruttive e dell'infiltrazione della criminalità organizzata in questi contesti, attraverso lo studio di alcuni casi concreti. Nel fare ciò si terrà nuovamente conto di prospettive di lungo periodo, che aiuteranno a meglio contestualizzare gli avvenimenti dell’Irpinia.
An Alien Conspiracy? The Narrative Construction of ’Ndrangheta Places
Grazia Enerina Pisano
Abstract
For decades, the ’ndrangheta was regarded as a strictly local issue and phenomenon confined to Calabria. This localized framing created a false sense of security in other territories, which considered themselves naturally "immune" to mafia presence, often referring to the existence of social and civic "antibodies" capable of resisting a phenomenon perceived as external and foreign, originating in Calabria. Even as the organization expanded, academic and journalistic discourses frequently resorted to external metaphors such as "contagion", "colonization" or "transplantation", emphasizing the perceived foreignness of the ’ndrangheta in relation to territories subsequently "infected" or "colonized". How do Italian newspapers narrate the places of the ’ndrangheta, and what are the effects of such narratives on the collective imaginary and on the public perception of the mafia phenomenon? Narratives are not neutral products; rather, they construct "types" of reality and, considering their powerful influence on people's perceptions of the world, it is important to understand the processes through which they are generated. Although news reporting has traditionally been considered the clearest opposite of narrative, this study aims to analyze their narrative character and, specifically, the spatial dimension. From this perspective, and considering the transnational dimension of the ’ndrangheta, this contribution seeks to understand the narrative processes and the elements shaping the characterization of places. To address these questions, the study combines quantitative and qualitative approaches on a corpus of approximately 29,000 articles published between 2000 and 2024 in major Italian national newspapers (online and print): Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, Il Giornale, Avvenire and Il Fatto Quotidiano. The quantitative analysis of word frequencies was conducted using "WordStat" software. Given the size of the corpus, and building on the results of the quantitative analysis, the qualitative analysis focuses on four case studies that exemplify the "glocal" dimension of the ’ndrangheta. Regarding the local dimension, the study examines the province of Reggio Calabria and, in particular, the town of San Luca, long represented as a mafia stronghold. For the national dimension, the analysis concentrates on two territories of expansion, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna, through the "Infinito" and "Aemilia" cases: two turning points that revealed the presence of the ’ndrangheta and its locali (local branches) in new territories. For the transnational dimension, the focus shifts to Germany and, more specifically, Duisburg, where the 2007 Ferragosto massacre brought the least known and least studied Italian mafia organization into international visibility by exporting an internal feud beyond national borders.
The Ambivalence of Media Capture: Vulnerabilities and Resilience Across European Democracies
Roberto Mincigrucci, Rita Marchetti, Anna Stanziano, Marco Mazzoni
Abstract
The concept of media capture has become increasingly prominent in recent years, used to describe forms of media functioning that deviate from the ideal of independent and impartial journalism. Originally rooted in regulatory capture theory (Stigler, 1971), the concept was developed to describe the collusion between political elites and media owners in transitional democracies (Besley & Prat, 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008) and later expanded to include economic instrumentalization in consolidated democracies (Corneo, 2006; Petrova, 2008). While this literature effectively identified the subordination of newsrooms to vested interests, we argue it is insufficient for understanding the complexity of the contemporary media ecosystem. Our critique identifies two primary limitations in the traditional framework. First, from an epistemic perspective, the notion often implies a binary ideal of complete independence which rarely exists. Since journalism is inherently embedded in social networks and subject to influences, defining exactly when a source is definitively "captured" is empirically slippery. Second, from an ecosystemic perspective, the platformization of society has fundamentally shifted the locus of control. The focus can no longer remain solely on "media" intended as traditional outlets, but should be expanded to "information" more broadly, as algorithms and tech giants mediate visibility and the spread of disinformation. Building on these considerations, our study proposes an approach that examines media capture by moving beyond the boundaries of the media sphere alone. While media structures remain central, the analysis integrates the broader political environment and the societal context. To explore these dynamics, the study presents a qualitative analysis of case studies selected across different vulnerability levels, based on the Media Capture Risk Map index produced within the Bridgegap project. The cases emerge from high-risk contexts (Bulgaria and Hungary), medium-risk contexts (France and Italy), and low-risk contexts (Sweden and Germany). The analysis brings to light the profound ambivalences surrounding the concept of media capture. We demonstrate that even in low and medium risk contexts, significant structural vulnerabilities exist that prevent the media from exercising their social and democratic function. For instance, in Germany, "soft regulatory capture" and economic nationalism led state authorities and the domestic press to protect a fraudulent national champion while actively attacking foreign investigative journalists. In Sweden, private wealth accumulated from public welfare was used to secretly finance an alternative media ecosystem to bypass traditional journalism and intimidate critics. In France, concentrated corporate ownership has been aggressively weaponized to silence corruption investigations and impose ideological shifts, while in Italy, the structural politicization of the public broadcaster (lottizzazione) continues to blur the lines between independent reporting and government crisis management. At the same time, the research highlights that across all contexts (ranging from low-risk to high-risk environments) specific socio-cultural conditions, professional dynamics, and systemic counterweights consistently offer opportunities for resilience. Whether through the robust independence of legacy public service media, the intervention of transnational investigative journalism, the disruptive power of digital disintermediation, or specific professional adaptations in heavily captured systems, these elements enable the media ecosystem to resist undue influences, challenge monopolized narratives, and maintain a vital degree of editorial agency. Particular attention is also dedicated to the ambiguous role of digital media. On one hand, digital platforms and alternative online outlets are often easier to “capture” or manipulate. On the other hand, they can provide crucial alternative spaces when legacy media are heavily captured by institutional or economic power centers. This dual dynamic is visible across different risk levels. In Italy, for example, social media disintermediation and online leak portals successfully disrupted the state broadcaster's attempt to monopolize the narrative of a government crisis. Similarly, in a high-risk context like Hungary, platforms such as YouTube enabled the widespread circulation of critical investigations such as the documentary Dynasty, which exposed compromising information about Viktor Orbán's inner circle. This allowed alternative counter-narratives to successfully bypass the government's tight control over the domestic media landscape, demonstrating that in a hybrid media ecosystem, digital spaces can offer vital opportunities for resilience and challenge institutional control even in the most restricted environments.
Mafia research? Nein danke! - A review of and agenda for mafia research in German political science
Ronald Schleehauf
Abstract
In 1989, Manfred Sapper observed in the German Political Science Quarterly (Politische Vierteljahresschrift, PVS) that the "transformation of the mafias […] into internationally operating enterprises raises so many inherently politological questions that the silence in teaching and research outside of Italy is unjustifiable". Over three decades later, that silence has only partially been broken in German political science. This paper presents a review of the literature on Italian mafias in Germany across the five subfields of international relations, policy research, political sociology, comparative and European politics, and political theory, asking what each has contributed and what it owes. All three major Italian mafia organisations are documented as very active in Germany; the 'Ndrangheta in particular has received special attention due to the 2007 Duisburg massacre. However this attention has not translated into a thorough and sustained study of the phenomenon beyond criminology. The review finds some isolated but noteworthy contributions in the different subfields: Political theory has produced an original work, in Hofmann's (2003) framework of the "partial state of exception", which situates the mafia's challenge to democratic governance within a Weberian and Schmittian theory of state authority. Comparative politics has the strongest recent empirical contribution, in Hauser's (2022, 2025) study of 'Ndrangheta expansion in Germany as a case of expansion into an established democracy. The subfield of IR presents a curious inversion: German scholars have contributed to the study of transnational organised crime as actors of international politics, yet this work is disconnected from the German case, operating either at the level of global norms and institutions, or empirically focussing on global south cases. In policy research, Brombacher (2025) offers both a diagnostic on Germany's dire ranking in the Global Organised Crime Index and a concrete reform agenda centred on asset legislation modelled on the Italian framework, drug market regulation, and the establishment of a civil society observatory; Norberti (2017) complements this by mapping the existing anti-mafia civil society landscape in Germany, revealing a picture of committed individuals and isolated initiatives rather than a consolidated movement. In political sociology, research profits from Italian contributions on the German case with Sciarrone and Storti (2011) establishing the multi-causal framework for understanding mafia expansion, rejecting both the contagion thesis and the underdevelopment thesis. The research agenda proposed here invites contributions to fill the identified gaps and to establish a distinct German strand of politological mafia research that might give new answers to the foundational question of whether categories developed in the Italian context, such as Dalla Chiesa's (2017, p. 237) "organic relationships with political power," hold for mafia activity far from its territories of origin.
 

Panel 4.6 How AI is Reshaping Political Communication


For the past years, the intersection of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and political communication has been consolidated through empirical studies (Barredo-Ibáñez et al., 2021; Foos, 2024; Jungherr et al., 2026; Tomi? et al., 2023). As generative Large Language Models and algorithmic micro-targeting become integrated into the political landscape, it is pertinent for the field to move beyond the novelty of these technologies toward a deeper understanding of their long-term systemic impacts.
One of these dimensions involves the infrastructure of modern political campaigns that increasingly rely on autogenerated content from generative AI in their production, and also use AI to monitor social media activity and public sentiment in real-time, while employing AI-powered chatbots to provide voters with personalized information regarding candidates and issues.
Parallel to this, political journalism has begun to deploy AI across the editorial workflow—from research, including idea generation and data mining, to identifying story angles, enhancing fact-checking, and assisting in text development. However, this automation across campaigning and reporting raises questions about transparency and the autonomy of democratic processes. Ethical concerns remain regarding the proliferation of deepfakes and the potential for voter manipulation through microtargeting (Hackenburg & Margetts, 2024), as well as the prevalence of AI-generated misinformation (Garimella & Chauchard, 2024).
This panel invites papers that examine the use, regulation, and ethical implications of AI in political contexts. We welcome contributions on: the evolution of disinformation and the impact of deepfakes and AI-driven voter manipulation; algorithmic campaigning and platform power in shaping
elections; AI in Political Journalism and the impact on the news cycle and editorial integrity; institutional adoption: how political parties and governments internalize AI in communicative routines.
By bringing together diverse approaches, this panel seeks to map the state of the art and set possibilities for a research agenda in the field.

REFERENCES

Barredo-Ibáñez, D., De-la-Garza-Montemayor, D.-J., Torres-Toukoumidis, Á., & López-López, P.-C. (2021). Artificial intelligence, communication, and democracy in Latin America: a review of the cases of Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico. El Profesional de La Información. https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2021.nov.16

Foos, F. (2024). The Use of AI by Election Campaigns. LSE Public Policy Review, 3(3). https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.112

Garimella, K., & Chauchard, S. (2024). How prevalent is AI misinformation? What our studies in India show so far. Nature, 630(8015), 32–34. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-01588-2

Hackenburg, K., & Margetts, H. (2024). Evaluating the persuasive influence of political microtargeting with large language models. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(24). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2403116121

Jungherr, A., Rauchfleisch, A., & Wuttke, A. (2026). Artificial Intelligence in Election Campaigns: Perceptions, Penalties, and Implications. Political Communication, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2025.2611913

Tomi?, Z., Damnjanovi?, T., & Tomi?, I. (2023). ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS. South Eastern European Journal of Communication, 5(2), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.47960/2712-0457.2.5.17

Chairs: Paulo Ferracioli, Manoella Fortes Fiebig

Discussants: Cecilia Biancalana

Affective Fandom and Platform Power: How Digital Politics Reshapes Economic Priorities in Europe
Elena Varotto
Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of fandom‑based politics to describe an emerging mode of political engagement shaped by platform architectures, emotional identification, and the cultural repertoires of fan communities. In contemporary digital ecosystems, political leaders and parties are increasingly consumed as symbolic brands, while policy debates are reframed through aestheticized narratives, affective intensification, and algorithmic amplification. Drawing on mediatization theory, affective polarization research, and fandom studies, the paper argues that political participation is progressively shifting from deliberative engagement to affective consumption. The central research question examines how the fan‑like reconfiguration of politics reshapes economic priorities and democratic resilience within European political systems. The study employs a qualitative, multi‑layered methodology combining frame analysis, narrative reconstruction, and visual‑aesthetic coding. It investigates how political actors mobilize symbolic repertoires, emotional grammars, and platform‑specific aesthetics across Instagram, Facebook, and Telegram. Particular attention is devoted to the construction of polarizing dichotomies, the personalization of conflict, and the transformation of political identity into digital belonging. Through case studies from Italy and Spain, the analysis illustrates how fan‑driven narratives—such as anti‑taxation frames surrounding property levies or crisis‑centered energy discourses—can influence fiscal debates, redirect political attention, and weaken long‑term industrial strategies. These dynamics are situated within broader debates on platform governance, digital capitalism, and geopolitical vulnerabilities, including European dependencies on private data‑analytics infrastructures, cyber‑security incidents, and the political consequences of algorithmic opacity. Pedro Sánchez’s call at the World Economic Forum for greater transparency in algorithmic decision‑making provides an institutional anchor for discussing democratic resilience under conditions of platform power. The paper contributes to digital politics scholarship by: (1) conceptualizing fandom‑based politics as a hybrid formation integrating affective, aesthetic, and algorithmic dimensions; (2) demonstrating how emotionally charged narratives can distort economic policy agendas; (3) offering an analytical framework to assess democratic vulnerabilities generated by platform‑mediated polarization. Keywords: digital politics; affective polarization; fandom; platform governance; economic distortions; democratic resilience.
Intelligenza artificiale nella comunicazione politica: approcci, applicazioni e sviluppi nella letteratura scientifica
Federico Regaldo
Abstract
La sempre maggior diffusione dell’intelligenza artificiale (AI) nella comunicazione politica è destinata a ridefinire notevolmente la dinamica del fenomeno, offrendo nuove opportunità e problematiche, in termini di sviluppo dei sistemi democratici. La presente systematic literature review esamina la produzione scientifica più recente (2021-2025) sulla sua applicazione nella comunicazione politica, con l’obiettivo di mappare l’attuale stato dell’arte e individuare le principali direttrici di sviluppo. La ricerca è stata condotta mediante l’applicazione del framework PRISMA, selezionando 48 contributi tra articoli e monografie, provenienti da database internazionali e letteratura interdisciplinare. I risultati hanno permesso di identificare cinque macro-aree tematiche, relative all’impiego dell’AI nella comunicazione politica, ossia l’impiego dell’AI nelle campagne elettorali, il ruolo dell’AI nella diffusione di informazioni false e deep fake, l’impatto dell’AI generativa nella produzione di contenuti politici, la trasformazione della comunicazione politica verso l’algoritmia e infine la connessione tra l’AI e la partecipazione elettorale sui social media, con un particolare focus su come e in che modo i principali partiti politici Italian i oggi stiano utilizzando questi strumenti. L’analisi della letteratura esistente evidenzia la duplice valenza dell’AI, ossia la sua natura ambivalente, in quanto, da un lato, essa costituisce una vera e propria infrastruttura capace di potenziare la personalizzazione e l’efficacia comunicativa, e dall’altro, essa comporta rischi legati all’opacità, la manipolazione informativa e la frammentazione dello spazio pubblico.
AI Transparency as Political Strategy: a comparative analysis of fact-checking agencies in Latin America and Europe
Paulo Ferracioli, Manoella Fortes Fiebig
Abstract
In the contemporary digital landscape, fact-checking organizations face the dual challenge of integrating Artificial Intelligence (AI) to increase their efficiency while safeguarding their authority as credible arbiters of truth in the public sphere. As AI tools become widely adopted in different professions, the disclosure of their use is increasingly employed not merely as a technical standard but as a political strategy to maintain institutional legitimacy. This study explores how fact-checking agencies in diverse media systems navigate the tension between technological reliance and the preservation of professional trust. Fact-checking emerged in the mid-2000s, primarily rooted in the United States, with an initial focus on the verification of political discourse (Cherubini & Graves, 2016; Graves, 2018). As digital misinformation proliferated, the field underwent a "debunking turn," shifting toward identifying viral false content (Graves, 2018; Cazzamata & Sarısakaloğlu, 2025). Defined broadly as the systematic evaluation of public statements (Vlachos & Riedel, 2014) or viral online claims (Graves et al., 2023), fact-checking is currently experiencing a profound metamorphosis: the integration of "automated fact-checking" (AFC) (Graves, 2018). Since the advent of generative AI in late 2022, newsrooms have faced an accelerated cycle of tool adoption (Cazzamatta & Sarısakaloğlu, 2025; López-Borrull & Lopezosa, 2025). While recent studies confirm that AI can technically support tasks such as stance detection, summarization, and multilingual processing—thereby enhancing efficiency (Augenstein et al., 2024)— these tools remain auxiliary rather than autonomous. Current evidence indicates that verification remains a human-led endeavor, with professionals selectively integrating AI to assist, rather than replace, their editorial judgment (Lelo, 2024; Mahl et al., 2026). Despite the growing reliance on these technologies, critical concerns regarding the risks of indiscriminate use persist. Because AI development happens in high speed, assessing the long-term impact on journalistic practices remains a complex challenge (Nanz et al., 2025; Vinhas et al., 2026). Journalists have raised significant alarms regarding the limitations of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly their tendency toward "hallucinations," the reproduction of algorithmic bias, and a documented deficiency in capturing the nuanced "newsworthiness" of complex events (Cools & Diakopoulos, 2026). Furthermore, there is professional apprehension that training models on proprietary output may erode journalistic autonomy and compromise their editorial voices. Notably, adoption patterns are uneven; empirical research suggests higher utilization rates among Brazilian practitioners compared to their British and German counterparts, potentially reflecting distinct levels of professional skepticism toward automated systems across different media ecosystems (Cazzamatta & Sarısakaloğlu, 2025). By adopting a comparative framework, we conducted seventeen structured, in-depth interviews with editors and fact-checkers from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Spain, Honduras, and Switzerland. Participants were selected based on their active status between 2025 and 2026, as verified through the Duke Reporters' Lab and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). These sessions, carried out via videoconference from December 2025 to April 2026, ranged from 45 to 75 minutes in length; conducted in English, Spanish, and Portuguese, all transcripts were systematically organized and archived for rigorous qualitative analysis. The findings suggest that transparency serves as a defensive mechanism to mitigate audience skepticism and counter potential accusations of algorithmic bias. While practitioners across both regions emphasize that AI remains a subordinate tool—underpinned by the necessity of human supervision—the strategic communication of this oversight varies. We observe that fact-checkers articulate "human-in-the-loop" narratives to reinforce their role as the ultimate gatekeepers of political discourse, thereby defending their legitimacy as autonomous political actors. Furthermore, the divergence between Swiss and Latin American agencies reveals that organizational autonomy and market pressures significantly shape the practice of transparency. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate regarding the necessary degree of transparency throughout the verification process. While no consensus exists concerning whether minor AI-assisted tasks, such as automated copy-editing, require disclosure, there is broad agreement that the use of AI in more complex analytical tasks must be explicitly communicated to the audience. Since the international consolidation of this activity, process transparency has been a core asset for fact-checking organizations; this commitment appears to persist as these agencies navigate the integration of AI.This research contributes to the literature on political disinformation by framing AI transparency as a deliberate institutional strategy to navigate the dynamics of the information ecosystem and secure the fact-checkers' position within the democratic public sphere.
Algorithmic Exposure Fairness and Strategic Message Adaptation in Political Campaigns
Clara Fochler
Abstract
New forms of social media use content-based, individualised algorithms to determine visibility and reach. Previous research suggests these algorithmic ranking systems primarily benefit populist actors. However, recent elections have also seen non-populist candidates whose victories have been attributed to their social media presence, raising the question: Do these algorithms force mainstream politicians to adopt populist rhetoric, or have non-populists learned to strategically exploit the same platform dynamics? To isolate the causal effect of algorithmic design, this study compares two multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) simulations: an EngagementMARL system (simulating current platforms that rank content by predicted engagement) and a FairMARL system (implementing fairness constraints that equalize candidate visibility while still accounting for user engagement patterns). I parameterize both systems with empirically derived voter populations from six EU countries, using survey data on voter issue positions and short-video social media age distributions, and test them across three polarization contexts (polarized, semi-polarized, non-polarized). Candidates in the MARL are modeled as dynamic signalers who observe algorithmic feedback and update their rhetorical strategy (populist vs. democratic communication). Voters have spatial utility functions and engage with content probabilistically based on ideological proximity, personal issue salience and attention for political content. I then test: How does engagement-optimized ranking shift candidate strategies toward populism relative to the fairness baseline? Does this shift differ across political contexts? By comparing long-run strategic adaptation under algorithmic conditions and counterfactuals, this study provides evidence for whether platform design choices meaningfully influence political discourse trajectories and whether fairness constraints could mitigate populist incentives.
 

Panel 4.7 When Citizens Vote on Institutions: Referendum Politics and Campaign Communication


Referendums on constitutions or institutional reforms put citizens in the position of deciding on the rules of democracy itself. This makes them qualitatively different from ordinary elections, and a distinctive object of study for political communication. Yet the way citizens arrive at their vote is not necessarily an evaluation of constitutional design. Referendum campaigns activate partisan identities, generate intense affective dynamics, and are fought through media narratives, negative campaigning, and elite rhetoric that often reframes institutional questions as existential political conflicts. Direct democracy, in this sense, is never unmediated: it is always filtered through the communicative environment in which the vote takes place.

The March 2026 Italian constitutional referendum on the reform of the judiciary provides the empirical anchor of this panel. The campaign exposed a deep fault line: the Meloni government presented the reform as a necessary intervention against a politicized judiciary, while the opposition and much of the legal profession denounced it as a threat to judicial independence and the separation of powers. The rhetoric was often harsh, with a polarized elite, media, and public discourse on both sides, resonating with democratic backsliding narratives. The result – a defeat for the government, with unexpectedly high turnout – arguably represents the first moment in which the Meloni government faced a tangible political setback. The 2026 case also took place amid an escalating international crisis, inviting reflection on how war and instability interact with domestic campaigns and public attitudes. More broadly, the Italian case offers a rich context for studying how direct democracy functions in a polarized political and media environment.

The panel seeks contributions that engage with these dynamics and contribute to a conversation about the communicative and attitudinal dimensions of direct democracy in polarized times. This includes how parties, media, and digital platforms framed the 2026 referendum, but also how referendum campaigns more generally produce distinct communicative logics: the binary yes/no structure, the difficulty of communicating complex institutional content, the tendency toward personalization and moralization of the debate. On the attitudinal side, the panel is interested in citizens’ attitudes and orientations toward democratic institutions, the concentration or distribution of power, and the role of the judiciary in a democracy. Comparative perspectives are welcome – across Italian referendums, countries, or between referendums and general elections. Presentations are expected to be delivered in English.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

• Negative voting, anti-government voting, and retrospective accountability through referendums
• Referendum question wording, information asymmetry, and voter competence
• Electoral abstention and mobilization in referendums
• Sociodemographic and attitudinal cleavages in referendum voting
• Democratic backsliding and the plebiscitary logic of referendums
• Political and institutional trust, attitudes toward the judiciary
• Elite communication, negative campaigning, personalization and affective polarization in referendum campaigns
• Fan-like engagement and identity-expressive voting in institutional referendums
• The role of international crises, war and its effects on domestic referendum politics
• The domestic consequences of the 2026 Italian referendum
• Media framing, agenda-setting, and social media dynamics in the 2026 campaign
• Narratives and strategies of political parties in the 2026 campaign
• Comparative perspectives on constitutional referendums and their political consequences

Chairs: Domenico Fruncillo, Giacomo Salvarani, Rossana Sampugnaro

Discussants: Francesca Montemagno

Il pluralismo informativo nella tv referendaria: il caso della “riforma Nordio” tra agenda setting, frame analysis e questioni aperte
Christian Ruggiero, Mauro Bomba, Andrea de Rosa
Abstract
La consultazione referendaria svoltasi il 22 e 23 marzo 2026, che ha avuto come oggetto la riforma costituzionale dell’ordinamento giudiziario, comunemente nota come “riforma Nordio”, ha rappresentato un momento di messa alla prova del potere della comunicazione politica ed elettorale nell’orientare la pubblica opinione e nell’influenzare la mobilitazione elettorale. In questo contesto, è interessante focalizzare l’attenzione sul ruolo ricoperto da una piattaforma di comunicazione politica tradizionale ma tuttora significativa nel panorama italiano. La rilevanza del mezzo televisivo nel determinare l’agenda politica, pur in un ambiente ormai solidamente ibrido (Chadwick, 2013), e nell’influenzare le preferenze dei cittadini, è infatti supportata da consolidate indagini sul consumo mediale in Italia. In particolare, secondo i dati emersi dal 21° Rapporto Censis sulla comunicazione, la televisione nel suo complesso mantiene un ruolo di primo piano, raggiungendo il 93,2% dell’utenza complessiva in Italia, e i telegiornali generalisti si confermano la prima fonte di informazione diretta per il 43,9% della popolazione (Censis, 2026). Anche per l’Osservatorio annuale sul sistema dell’informazione di AgCom, i telegiornali continuano a essere un elemento trainante per l’audience complessiva rappresentando, “all’interno della programmazione quotidiana, momenti di forte attrazione, come dimostrano i picchi di audience che coincidono con i loro orari di messa in onda” (AgCom, 2026, p.12). Infine, il Trust Score di Reuters (2025) certifica una generale fiducia nei telegiornali da parte degli spettatori italiani, con un punteggio che si colloca mediamente al 60%. Alla luce di quanto sopra, il ruolo di un osservatorio sui telegiornali nazionali mantiene una rilevanza scientifica, volta a confermare il ruolo del medium televisivo nell’ecosistema informativo, e in termini di sollecitazione del dibattito pubblico, con particolare riferimento all’adeguatezza degli strumenti utilizzati per vigilare sul rispetto del pluralismo dell’informazione e alla cosiddetta “par condicio” (Allegri, 2020). È per questo che l’Osservatorio TG, promosso dal Dipartimento di Comunicazione e Ricerca Sociale della Sapienza Università di Roma e dalla Fondazione sul giornalismo italiano “Paolo Murialdi”, ha realizzato, nel mese di campagna elettorale, un’attività di monitoraggio dell’equilibrio nell’attribuzione degli spazi informativi alle ragioni del Sì e del No da parte dei telegiornali serali delle principali reti nazionali (Tg1, Tg2, Tg3, Tg4, Tg5, Studio Aperto e TgLa7). Nella definizione operativa delle unità di tempo per il monitoraggio radiotelevisivo, seguendo un framework consolidato (Sani, 2001), la ricerca distingue tra: tempo di antenna (durata dei servizi dedicati al tema referendario) e, entro questo, tra tempo di parola (interventi diretti di esponenti politici o dei comitati referendari) e tempo di notizia (spazio dedicato da conduttori e giornalisti a presentare e commentare l’argomento e le posizioni in campo). Partendo da questa distinzione, è stata costruita una scheda di analisi del contenuto allo scopo di rilevare: • tempi di notizia e di parola degli esponenti politici, comitati e personalità coinvolti nel dibattito relativo al referendum, distinguendo lo schieramento referendario, il partito di appartenenza, l’eventuale ruolo istituzionale; • collocazione delle notizie relative al Referendum nell’agenda dei sette telegiornali, tanto in termini di rilevanza quanto in termini di posizionamento rispetto ad altre tematiche, quanto alla presenza di riferimenti al Referendum in servizi non espressamente dedicati alla campagna elettorale, con conseguente classificazione del frame di riferimento (politica, cronaca, etc.) (Marini, 2006). Il disegno della ricerca replica le metodologie comunemente utilizzate dagli enti regolatori per garantire il rispetto della par condicio, aggiungendo elementi utili a mettere alla prova i limiti e le potenzialità di questo strumento. Le metriche regolatorie, focalizzate sulla misurazione quantitativa dei tempi di parola e di notizia nei telegiornali, mostrano infatti macro-limiti strutturali nel contesto comunicativo contemporaneo: ad esempio, l'approccio quantitativo non decodifica la propaganda indiretta. Come rilevato nei procedimenti AGCOM (delibera n. 52/26/CONS), la copertura giornalistica di vicende giudiziarie ordinarie o delle disfunzioni della magistratura non rientra nei tempi referendari, pur esercitando un potente effetto di priming legittimando la retorica sull'urgenza di riformare un sistema inefficiente. Associare la giurisprudenza alle inefficienze agisce dunque come frame implicito per il Sì, aggirando i vincoli della par condicio. Ulteriori criticità frequentemente sottolineate nel dibattito sulla capacità di queste misurazioni di esercitare la propria funzione democratica sono relative alle difficoltà nella distinzione tra: tempi istituzionali e tempi di campagna elettorale, tra informazione e comunicazione politica, ruolo e partecipazione di personalità esterne alla politica al dibattito referendario, collocazione di esponenti politici in spazi ibridi, ambiguità nella classificazione di contenuti provenienti dai social media e integrati nel flusso dei TG. Questi altri aspetti che possono condizionare l’efficacia della misurazione verranno trattati con un approccio che combina analisi del contenuto quantitativa e rilevazione qualitativa di elementi problematici. M.R. Allegri, 2020, Oltre la par condicio, Angeli A. Chadwick, 2013, The Hybrid Media System, OUP AgCom, 2026, Osservatorio annuale sul sistema dell’informazione CENSIS, 2026, L’informazione nel mirino. XXI Rapporto sulla comunicazione R. Marini, 2006, Mass media e discussione pubblica, Laterza Reuters, 2025, Digital News Report – Italy G. Sani, 2001, Mass media ed elezioni, il Mulino
L'altra campagna: i content creators e il referendum 2026
Rossana Sampugnaro, Martina Faia, Pierpaolo Letizia
Abstract
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Lo sdoganamento del podcast nella comunicazione politica italiana: il caso Meloni a Pulp Podcast
Sebastiana Risso, Federico Regaldo
Abstract
Il presente contributo analizza la partecipazione del Presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni alla puntata numero 51 di Pulp Podcast - format condotto da Fedez e Mr. Marra e distribuito su YouTube e Spotify - pubblicata il 19 marzo 2026, a pochi giorni dal referendum costituzionale sulla riforma della giustizia (22–23 marzo 2026). L'episodio rappresenta un caso studio inedito nel mondo della comunicazione politica italiana: per la prima volta, un Presidente del Consiglio in carica ha utilizzato un podcast come strumento esplicitamente inserito in una strategia di campagna elettorale. Attraverso una metodologia mista, che integra l'analisi quantitativa dei dati di performance sui social media (in particolare di Instagram) forniti dalla piattaforma Not Just Analytics, con una componente qualitativa basata sulle dichiarazioni di esperti di comunicazione politica, il paper esamina le ragioni strategiche della scelta comunicativa adottata da Meloni, i suoi effetti in termini di engagement, visibilità e reach, nonché le dinamiche retoriche e conversazionali emerse nel corso dell'intervista. I risultati mostrano che l'episodio ha generato oltre 1,8 milioni di visualizzazioni su YouTube, circa 315.000 menzioni nell'ecosistema digitale nella settimana successiva alla pubblicazione e una crescita significativa dei follower Instagram di tutti gli attori coinvolti. L'analisi evidenzia altresì i limiti strutturali del formato, in particolare l'assenza di domande di approfondimento da parte dei conduttori e le asimmetrie comunicative interne all'intervista. Il caso Meloni–Pulp Podcast viene inoltre contestualizzato all'interno delle più ampie trasformazioni della comunicazione elettorale contemporanea, con particolare riferimento al modello statunitense della Podcast Election del 2024 (Trump–Rogan) e al crescente fenomeno della disintermediazione mediale. Il paper inoltre analizza come la partecipazione del Presidente del Consiglio abbia contribuito a legittimare definitivamente il podcast come arena del discorso politico in Italia, inaugurando una nuova fase nei rapporti tra classe dirigente, piattaforme digitali e pubblici giovani storicamente difficili da raggiungere attraverso i media tradizionali.
Framing the Reform: Polarization, Expertise, and Ideology in the 2026 Italian Judiciary Referendum on Instagram
Francesco Piacentini, Margherita Bordignon, Giovanni Pagano
Abstract
The 2026 judiciary system referendum in Italy carried a heavy political burden. With a higher turnout than expected resulting in a decisive victory for the “no” side, the referendum marked the most notable - if not the first - major setback for Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her government since taking office. While the immediate political consequences were limited to internal score-settling within the governing majority, from a communication standpoint, the 2026 Referendum is of particular interest for two main reasons. First, it initially received little media coverage before becoming, almost overnight, one of the most heavily debated topics, despite the concurrent escalation of the international situation, specifically the attacks on Iran by Israel and the United States, along with all the resulting implications for the global economy and international security. Second, public discourse surrounding the referendum was widely criticized as ‘ugly’; participating actors were perceived as hyper-polarized, driven by ideological rather than technical motives, and frequently acting in malicious bad faith. This paper investigates the digital debate surrounding the referendum. Relying on framing theory, we address three core questions: What were the dominant frames emerging during the debate? How did different actors characterize their arguments, specifically, did they leverage ideological or technical talking points? Finally, how aggressively charged were these arguments, particularly regarding the use of personal attacks against adversaries? We focus our analysis on Instagram, examining 94 prominent actors who shaped the debate. These actors are grouped into three main role-based categories: politicians, representing political mobilization; experts (e.g., judges and legal scholars), representing the technical and institutional standpoint; and highly visible media figures (including journalists, influencers, and celebrities), representing the information and public-engagement dimension. We then assess whether their framing patterns align with the role-specific expectations associated with these categories. Contradicting popular perception, preliminary results suggest a surprisingly technical, yet still highly polarized, digital debate structured around starkly oppositional frames. On the one hand, supporters of the yes-vote relied on a diseased lobby frame, depicting the current judicial system as an unaccountable oligarchy plagued by internal factions, while presenting the referendum as a necessary act of civil progress. On the other hand, advocates for the no-vote mobilized an authoritarian Trojan horse frame, construing the reform as a political tool aimed at subjugating the judiciary to the executive branch.
 

Panel 4.10 Visual Democracy. Images, Platforms, Gender and the Reconfiguration of the Public Sphere


Nelle democrazie contemporanee la politica si organizza sempre più dentro ambienti visuali, nei quali immagini, video brevi, meme, interfacce, template estetici e repertori di visibilità modellati algoritmicamente non costituiscono più un semplice supporto della comunicazione pubblica, ma una delle sue condizioni strutturali. In gioco non vi è soltanto la crescente centralità della comunicazione visiva nella politica, quanto una trasformazione più profonda della democrazia stessa, che riguarda i modi in cui visibilità, legittimità, partecipazione e conflitto vengono ridefiniti attraverso culture visuali di piattaforma, architetture della distribuzione e logiche di engagement. In questa prospettiva, la sfera pubblica appare sempre meno come uno spazio unitario di confronto discorsivo e sempre più come un ambiente ibrido, stratificato e infrastrutturato, attraversato da media diversi, forme di mediazione eterogenee e dinamiche di potere opache (Chadwick 2013; Van Dijck e Poell 2015).
Il panel assume dunque la nozione di visual democracy come chiave analitica per indagare come la vita democratica venga ristrutturata dall’intreccio tra culture visuali, mediazione algoritmica e platform governance. La nozione non rinvia soltanto alla rappresentazione della politica attraverso immagini, ma ai modi in cui le immagini partecipano attivamente alla produzione di soggettività politiche, forme di riconoscimento, modalità del dissenso e asimmetrie di partecipazione. In questo senso, la visual democracy designa un campo nel quale la politica prende forma attraverso logiche estetiche, pratiche vernacolari (Brilli 2021; Zurovac 2021), infrastrutture sociotecniche e regimi diseguali dell’attenzione. La trasformazione del dibattito pubblico, del resto, passa oggi anche dalla riconfigurazione delle sue voci, dei suoi ritmi e delle sue forme di esposizione, in un contesto in cui la visibilità è distribuita in modo selettivo e la legittimazione pubblica si gioca sempre più dentro ecologie mediali complesse e interdipendenti (Bentivegna e Boccia Artieri 2021; Boccia Artieri 2025).
Un primo asse del panel riguarda dunque la trasformazione della sfera pubblica. Negli ambienti di piattaforma i pubblici non si limitano a discutere, ma vengono continuamente assemblati, segmentati e modulati da recommendation systems, architetture del feed, pratiche di moderazione e metriche di engagement. Immagini e video svolgono qui un ruolo cruciale, perché condensano affetti, accelerano la circolazione e rendono porosi i confini tra informazione, performance identitaria, intrattenimento e propaganda. La comunicazione politica si riconfigura così attraverso scorciatoie visuali, condensazioni memetiche e repertori simbolici fortemente emotivi, imponendo di superare approcci esclusivamente testocentrici allo studio della democrazia e della comunicazione politica. La piattaformizzazione della sfera pubblica, infatti, non modifica soltanto i canali della discussione, ma incide sulle condizioni di accesso alla visibilità, sulle gerarchie dell’attenzione e sui criteri di rilevanza pubblica, ridefinendo in profondità l’ambiente democratico.
Un secondo asse riguarda il rapporto tra mainstream e margini. Ricerche recenti mostrano come culture polarizzanti, ostili o anti-democratiche non possano essere comprese isolando soltanto gli spazi apertamente estremisti (Boccia Artieri et al. 2025). Molte forme di violenza simbolica, radicalizzazione discorsiva e delegittimazione dell’avversario circolano infatti in ambienti digitali ordinari, spesso in forme ironiche, ludiche, apparentemente innocue o esteticamente accattivanti. Questo è particolarmente evidente nel dominio visuale, dove le immagini possono naturalizzare gerarchie, codificare ostilità e produrre esclusione senza apparire immediatamente come contenuti esplicitamente politici o palesemente aggressivi. Guardare alla visual democracy significa allora interrogare il continuum tra margini e mainstream, oltre ai modi in cui le affordance delle piattaforme amplificano codici marginali, li rendono culturalmente disponibili e li reinscrivono nel senso comune digitale.
Un terzo asse riguarda il rapporto tra visualità, polarizzazione e inciviltà. Le piattaforme non incentivano soltanto la partecipazione, ma anche forme specifiche di conflitto pubblico, nelle quali la visibilità premia spesso intensificazione, semplificazione, antagonismo e provocazione. In questo quadro, l’incivility non rappresenta soltanto una patologia del discorso democratico, ma può diventare una vera e propria strategia comunicativa, capace di produrre attenzione, rafforzare appartenenze e ridefinire i confini del dicibile (Bentivegna e Rega 2024). Le forme visuali giocano qui un ruolo decisivo, perché rendono l’ostilità più rapidamente condivisibile, più facilmente memetizzabile e insieme più difficilmente classificabile secondo i criteri tradizionali dell’aggressione discorsiva. La democrazia visuale contemporanea si misura quindi anche con repertori di ostilità diffusa che si esprimono attraverso ironia, ridicolizzazione, insinuazione, stereotipizzazione e pratiche di esposizione ostile dell’altro.
Un quarto asse riguarda il genere e la politica della visibilità. Misoginia online, discorsi anti-gender e pratiche di harassment non costituiscono una deviazione esterna rispetto alla comunicazione democratica, ma uno dei terreni in cui l’ordine visuale della democrazia si manifesta con maggiore evidenza. L’ostilità di genere si inscrive spesso in meme, short videos, performance ironiche, influencer cultures, ambienti di gaming e spazi comunicativi semi-privati. Si tratta di forme spesso hidden in plain sight, normalizzate attraverso umorismo, ripetizione, estetizzazione e convenzioni specifiche di piattaforma. La loro analisi consente di comprendere come l’esclusione democratica venga prodotta non solo attraverso istituzioni o discorsi espliciti, ma anche tramite repertori condivisi di visibilità che definiscono chi può apparire, parlare e partecipare senza essere delegittimato, ridicolizzato o attaccato. In questo senso, le culture visuali di piattaforma costituiscono un osservatorio privilegiato per comprendere la dimensione simbolica e affettiva della vulnerabilità democratica.
Un quinto asse riguarda il metodo. Se la democrazia è oggi sempre più mediata da infrastrutture visuali e algoritmiche, anche la ricerca deve rinnovare i propri strumenti. Il panel accoglie contributi che mettano in dialogo comunicazione politica, media studies, gender studies, platform studies e visual methods, così come disegni di ricerca mixed methods che combinino analisi computazionale, etnografia digitale, discourse analysis, interface analysis, semiotica del visivo e audience research qualitativa. In questo quadro, particolare attenzione sarà rivolta ai lavori capaci di connettere processi macro, come piatatformizzazione, governance algoritmica, moderazione dei contenuti, con dinamiche meso e micro, come creatività vernacolare, culture partecipative, circolazione memetica, esposizione quotidiana e pratiche situate di interpretazione. Allo stesso tempo, il panel intende confrontarsi criticamente con semplificazioni troppo lineari del potere algoritmico, assumendo che i processi di selezione, esposizione e polarizzazione debbano essere analizzati in modo empiricamente situato, senza ricadere in spiegazioni monocausali, come il dibattito sulle filter bubbles ha mostrato con chiarezza (Bruns 2021).
Invitiamo quindi contributi teorici, empirici o comparativi che affrontino uno o più dei seguenti temi:
• trasformazioni della sfera pubblica nell’intreccio tra visualità, piattaforme e governance algoritmica;
• immagini, meme, short videos e repertori vernacolari della comunicazione politica;
• platformization della visibilità pubblica e ridefinizione di legittimità, partecipazione e conflitto;
• relazioni tra fringe e mainstream nella circolazione di immaginari politici, simboli e codici culturali;
• misoginia online, anti-gender politics, visual hate e forme di ostilità hidden in plain sight;
• estetizzazione della politica, culture dell’ironia e normalizzazione dell’incivility;
• affordance di piattaforma, moderazione dei contenuti e dinamiche di amplificazione o invisibilizzazione;
• attivismi visuali, pratiche contro-egemoniche e costruzione di pubblici alternativi;
• approcci metodologici innovativi allo studio della comunicazione politica visuale, incluse prospettive mixed methods, computazionali ed etnografiche.

Chairs: Giovanni Boccia Artieri, Stefano Brilli, Elisabetta Zurovac

Discussants: Fabio Bordignon

Da V per Vendetta a Telegram: culture visuali e costruzione dell’appartenenza nei Guerrieri ViVi
Camilla Folena, Enrico Mariani
Abstract
Il contributo esplora le forme di costruzione identitaria della “forza di lotta” dei Guerrieri ViVi, una microsfera pubblica sviluppatasi da sensibilità antivacciniste ed evolutasi in un network che eccede sia il contesto digitale sia il tema originario del dissenso vaccinale. Questa ricerca si inserisce nel più ampio dibattito sulla crisi delle autorità epistemiche e sull’habitus di sospetto sistemico diffuso negli ecosistemi mediali. Nelle democrazie contemporanee, segnate da crisi fiduciarie ed epistemiche, la verità diventa un campo conflittuale e il creder-vero si configura come risorsa simbolica attorno a cui si articolano identità collettive e forme antagoniste di produzione del senso. All’interno di un quadro in cui la “verità ufficiale” appare al tempo stesso delegittimata e ipermobilitata, emergono forme di post-affidabilità (Boccia Artieri, 2025), fondate su meccanismi performativi che producono appartenenza simbolica e processi di identificazione collettiva. La fiducia si mostra relazionale, soggettiva e situata, sostenuta da processi partecipativi che performano un “sentire insieme”, pur presupponendo verticalità asimmetriche nella strutturazione delle narrazioni. Il paper analizza come tali pratiche comunicative e partecipative, utilizzino diversi repertori delle culture visuali per la costruzione dell’identità di movimento e per la legittimazione pubblica della propria idea del vero. Lo studio si basa su un’etnografia digitale (Hine 2015) condotta tra febbraio e maggio 2026 all’interno di un cluster di quaranta canali Telegram riconducibili alla rete dei Guerrieri ViVi, individuati nell’ambito di un più ampio programma di ricerca sulle Telegramsphere fringe (Brilli, Zurovac 2025). La raccolta e l’osservazione dei canali sono state sviluppate a partire dalla funzione “canali simili” offerta dalla piattaforma e integrate attraverso una prospettiva qualitativa orientata all’analisi delle pratiche piattaformizzate, dei repertori visuali e dei flow discorsivi (Markham, Gammely 2017) che strutturano l’identità collettiva del movimento. L’attenzione del team di ricerca è volta a tutelare l’anonimato degli utenti, dedicandosi alla ricostruzione dei discorsi e delle estetiche ricorrenti su tali canali. Fin dalle prime osservazioni esplorative è emersa la centralità della dimensione visuale (Aupers 2020; Aiello 2023), che si esprime in modo molto evidente nella rielaborazione di elementi della pop culture, a partire dallo stesso simbolo VV, che attinge all’immaginario del film V per Vendetta. L’approfondimento di questo filone di analisi porta a distinguere: (1) le pratiche visuali del disvelamento - dagli screenshot delle fonti mainstream, ai video di formazione autoprodotti dal movimento, passando per i contenuti digitali, dall’approfondimento su YouTube all’ironia cospirazionista su TikTok - attraverso cui i canali costruiscono l’idea di una verità “occultata” da media, istituzioni e sapere esperto; (2) le pratiche visuali identitarie, che uniscono memetiche, locandine e pacchetti di sticker digitali che codificano l’immagine piattaformica del movimento ViVi, alle produzioni visuali urbane - volantini, cartellonistica, sticker e graffiti - che, d’altro canto, coniugano la radicalizzazione discorsiva digitale con la messa a terra di azioni di guerriglia ‘pacifica’ nei contesti sociali più sfaccettati del Paese. Le prime evidenze esplorative mostrano, inoltre, come i Guerrieri ViVi non operino attraverso una semplice chiusura informativa nei confronti dei media mainstream, bensì tramite quella che definiamo sincronizzazione antagonista: la continua riappropriazione oppositiva sia dei temi del dibattito pubblico sia delle rappresentazioni mediali del proprio movimento. In secondo luogo, il dominio del visuale nello sviluppo delle pratiche identitarie e di disvelamento fa emergere la continua decontestualizzazione e ricontestualizzazione di simboli, eventi storici, prodotti culturali ed estetiche della pop culture che si saldano nell’immaginario visivo di questa microsfera pubblica, agendo come dispositivi di aggregazione collettiva e rafforzamento identitario. L’analisi mostra inoltre come la pratica del “risveglio” non operi soltanto sul piano cognitivo o informativo, ma costituisca un vero e proprio vincolo normativo e affettivo, che richiede ai partecipanti di riconoscersi come soggetti consapevoli e moralmente distinti rispetto alla massa ‘addormentata’. La credibilità emerge come fenomeno relazionale e performativo, in cui i Guerrieri della ‘minoranza lucida’ devono mostrare, attraverso pratiche online e offline, la loro aderenza al pensiero del movimento.
Quando l’inciviltà diventa visibile. Modalità di rappresentazione e percezione dei comportamenti politici incivili
Rossella Rega, Sara Bentivegna
Abstract
La comunicazione politica contemporanea è sempre più caratterizzata dalla circolazione di immagini, screenshot, meme, contenuti social e resoconti giornalistici che rendono pubblicamente visibili episodi di inciviltà politica. Sebbene la letteratura abbia ampiamente analizzato l’inciviltà come fenomeno politico e comunicativo, minore attenzione è stata dedicata alle modalità attraverso le quali i cittadini ne vengono a conoscenza. Nelle democrazie contemporanee, infatti, l’inciviltà raramente arriva ai cittadini in forma diretta: più spesso viene veicolata da immagini, video, post e tweet che circolano nell’ecosistema mediale ibrido, o raccontata e reinterpretata dai resoconti giornalistici. Il contributo esplora dunque una questione ancora poco indagata: la percezione dell’inciviltà varia a seconda del modo in cui essa viene resa visibile ai cittadini? L’analisi si basa su una survey CAWI comparativa realizzata da Ipsos nel novembre 2024 in Italia, Germania e Regno Unito (N totale = 3.500), su campioni rappresentativi della popolazione adulta in ciascun paese. Agli intervistati è stata sottoposta una batteria di dodici episodi di inciviltà politica, valutati su una scala da 1 (molto civile) a 10 (molto incivile). Gli episodi differiscono per modalità di rappresentazione: alcuni mostrano direttamente il comportamento incivile attraverso immagini o fotomontaggi; altri lo presentano mediante screenshot di contenuti social; altri ancora lo riportano attraverso una mediazione giornalistica narrativa. L’analisi è guidata da tre domande di ricerca. In primo luogo, se modalità diverse di rappresentazione dell’inciviltà siano associate a livelli differenti di severità del giudizio. In secondo luogo, se tale relazione vari in funzione della norma violata, distinguendo tra attacchi alle persone, violazioni dei valori democratici e comportamenti che compromettono il corretto funzionamento delle istituzioni democratiche. Infine, se il peso della modalità di rappresentazione rimanga significativo una volta considerate le caratteristiche individuali dei cittadini, in particolare l’adesione ai valori democratici e la fiducia nella democrazia. I risultati mostrano che gli episodi che rendono l’inciviltà immediatamente osservabile attraverso una rappresentazione visuale diretta tendono a ricevere le valutazioni più severe: il gesto offensivo rivolto agli avversari nell’aula parlamentare è tra gli episodi giudicati più incivili in tutti e tre i paesi. La visibilità diretta, tuttavia, non agisce in modo autonomo, ma interagisce con la natura della norma violata: anche comportamenti veicolati prevalentemente attraverso il linguaggio – come gli stereotipi di genere o l’incitamento alla violenza – ricevono valutazioni molto alte quando intaccano principi ritenuti fondamentali per la convivenza democratica. In altre parole, la modalità di rappresentazione amplifica o rende più immediato il giudizio, ma non lo sostituisce: a contare in ultima istanza è se il comportamento viola o meno i principi democratici, riconosciuti dai cittadini con criteri largamente condivisi nei tre paesi. Questi risultati invitano a una riflessione più ampia, che porti a guardare all’inciviltà non più come semplice contenuto ma come fenomeno mediatizzato. Più che chiedersi quali comportamenti siano percepiti come incivili, il paper mostra come le modalità attraverso le quali tali comportamenti vengono resi visibili – immagini, piattaforme social e media informativi – contribuiscano a strutturarne l’interpretazione pubblica. Riconoscere questa dimensione mediatica della percezione dell’inciviltà non è un dettaglio tecnico: aiuta a comprendere come si formano, oggi, i giudizi dei cittadini sulla qualità del confronto politico in democrazia.
It Takes Two to Trust: Multi-modal Experimental Evidence of News Creators’ Influence on Trust-Based Decisions
Gaetano Scaduto, Augusto Valeriani
Abstract
While news trust declines across democracies, how news creators’ characteristics affect trust-based decisions, such as the choice to use news to inform important decisions about one’s health or finances, is still unclear. Through two conjoint experiments, a textual and visual one, we study how a news creator’s personal characteristics, sources of legitimacy, and relational practices aimed at showing audience recognition affect participants' trust-based choices in Italy. The visual experiment, which reproduces a “first-impression” scenario on Instagram, shows that a news creator’s gender, age, popularity, and professional label affect trust-based choices more than their journalistic practices signaling (1) a propensity to disclose editorial processes, (2) ease of accessibility, (3) attentiveness, and (4) responsiveness (or the lack thereof) to the needs of their audience. Yet, when this information is provided in a textual setting, implying consistent and long-standing engagement with these practices, they overwhelmingly regulate trust dynamics, overshadowing other characteristics.
Linguaggi visivi, immaginari e strategie simboliche delle leader politiche. Il caso di Giorgia Meloni ed Elly Schlein nelle elezioni europee del 2024 in Italia
Edoardo Novelli, Melissa Stolfi
Abstract
La campagna elettorale per le Europee del 2024 in Italia è stata caratterizzata dal confronto tra due donne alla guida dei due principali partiti del Paese: Elly Schlein, segretaria del PD dal 2023 e leader della principale forza di opposizione, e Giorgia Meloni, segretaria del partito di destra FdI dal 2014 e, dal 2022, prima donna a ricoprire la carica di Presidente del Consiglio. Un confronto testa a testa tra due leader femminili rappresenta uno sviluppo senza precedenti nella storia politica italiana, tradizionalmente caratterizzata da una leadership maschile (Campus 2010, 2015, 2023; Saccà e Massidda 2023), e in cui le poche donne leader – Emma Bonino per il Partito Radicale e Daniela Santanchè per La Destra – hanno storicamente guidato partiti marginali. Gli studi sulla rappresentazione della leadership politica si sono prevalentemente concentrati su figure maschili, analizzandone sia le forme e le estetiche (Cheles e Giacone 2022; Cheles 2023) sia il progressivo spostamento verso forme più seduttive e spettacolari della leadership democratica parallelamente alla diffusione delle moderne tecnologie della comunicazione (Schwartzenberg 1980; Debray 1997; Boni 2002; Barisione 2006; Karvonen 2010; Kane e Patapan 2012; Brizzi et al. 2021). La ricerca sulle donne in politica ha spesso adottato una prospettiva tipica dei gender studies, volta a indagare l’impatto degli stereotipi di genere (Jamieson 1995; Kahn 1996; Ryan e Haslam 2005; Kellerman e Rhode 2007; Jost 2008; Bligh et al. 2012; Stevens 2012; Campus 2023; Vezzosi 2024), o ancora si è focalizzata sull’analisi della copertura mediatica di leader e candidate, mettendo in evidenza gli stereotipi e i frame utilizzati nella loro rappresentazione (Boudillon 2005; Heldman et al. 2005; Campus e Vaccari 2007; Carlin e Winfrey 2009; Campus 2013; Ward 2017; Mudde e Snipes 2020). Al contrario, la ricerca specificamente dedicata alla postura visiva e alla costruzione retorica dell’autorappresentazione delle leader femminili rimane poco diffusa. Il confronto tra due leader donne costituisce quindi un caso insolito e apre una riflessione sugli stili comunicativi, sui modelli di leadership, sugli immaginari e sui riferimenti simbolici attivati da entrambe le protagoniste. Le due leader mostrano infatti una notevole abilità nell’utilizzo dei social media, rispecchiando le caratteristiche tipiche del “leader social” (van Aelst et al. 2012; Enli e Rosenberg 2018), e dimostrano piena consapevolezza della centralità di immagini e video nel favorire il coinvolgimento del pubblico, velocizzare la diffusione dei contenuti e sfumare i confini tra informazione, costruzione identitaria, spettacolarizzazione e propaganda. In questo contesto, la comunicazione politica tende a ridefinirsi attraverso linguaggi visuali immediati, dinamiche memetiche e sistemi simbolici capaci di suscitare un forte impatto emotivo. Basato sulla ricerca del progetto PRIN 2022, il contributo studia le campagne elettorali di Meloni e Schlein, in particolare analizzando le 664 immagini pubblicate sulle piattaforme Meta (Fb e IG) delle due candidate e dei rispettivi partiti durante le quattro settimane precedenti il voto (12 maggio-9 giugno). Attraverso una visual content analysis, lo studio esamina gli immaginari, i valori e le dimensioni simboliche e politiche mobilitate per costruire e consolidare la leadership e l’immagine pubblica, analizzando inoltre in che misura le tematiche e le questioni legate al genere siano enfatizzate oppure attenuate nelle rispettive narrazioni visive. L’analisi ha evidenziato l’adozione di opposte strategie di utilizzo dei social media e di costruzione della propria immagine da parte delle due candidate sia in termini quantitativi (account e produzione) sia in termini qualitativi (stili e modelli iconografici). Nei loro account personali compaiono 365 immagini di Schlein e soltanto 41 di Meloni. Questo rapporto si inverte negli account ufficiali dei partiti, nei quali Meloni è presente in 165 immagini, contro le sole 53 di Schlein. Nel caso di Meloni, è il partito a promuovere quantitativamente la sua immagine e a concentrare la comunicazione sulla sua figura; nel caso di Schlein, invece, sono i suoi account personali. Si tratta di una diversa pianificazione che risponde a leadership caratterizzate da livelli di consenso e forza diversi, dei quali anche la comunicazione social deve tenere conto. L’analisi di tipologie, formati produttivi, modelli rappresentativi e funzioni delle immagini evidenzia modelli di leadership differenti, basati su opposte strategie visive e di campagna, in sintonia con ideologie e aree politiche diverse. Ritratta da sola, sul palco, lontana dalla folla, o in compagnia di leader stranieri e figure di rilievo del mondo dello sport e dell’attualità, in fotografie in posa dallo stile quasi da studio fotografico, caratterizzate da una cura e un’attenzione estetica ispirate ai codici visivi della pubblicità, centrata su aspetti quali lo sguardo, i capelli, il sorriso. Giorgia Meloni, tramite i social network, procede a un riposizionamento della propria immagine al fine di sottolinearne l’autorevolezza, proponendosi quale “donna sola al comando”, leader che ha la responsabilità di prendere decisioni. Costantemente ritratta a contatto e immersa nella folla, in occasione di incontri e manifestazioni, con una netta predominanza di fotografie giornalistiche, spontanee, naturali e non in posa, anche a discapito della qualità e della loro leggibilità. Elly Schlein enfatizza il senso di collaborazione, mira ad affermare l’immagine di una leadership popolare e condivisa, nonché l’idea di una politica intesa come azione collettiva e scambio collaborativo. L’analisi mostra che, nonostante i vincoli e le affordance delle piattaforme digitali, emergono stili e modelli distinti di leadership, insieme a narrazioni visive del sé contrapposte, in un contesto in cui le immagini assumono il ruolo di co-creatori di soggettività politiche.
 

Panel 4.11 Conspiratorial Narratives and Radical Right Politics: Meaning, Mobilization, and Democratic Contestation


This panel explores how conspiratorial narratives shape contemporary political conflict and how they are strategically mobilized within radical right politics. Rather than approaching conspiracy thinking as an individual-level pathology or a marginal phenomenon, the panel examines how references to hidden power, manipulation, and betrayal become politically productive elements of ideological competition and identity formation.
The aim is to analyze how radical right actors draw on conspiratorial interpretations to construct political antagonisms, articulate perceptions of crisis, and define the boundaries between “the people” and perceived opponents. In this perspective, conspiracy narratives are not treated as isolated claims about factual accuracy, but as interpretive frameworks that help organize political meaning, justify distrust, and legitimize demands for political change.
By bringing together research on party discourse, political communication, and citizen attitudes, the panel investigates how conspiratorial narratives circulate between elites and the broader public sphere. Particular attention is paid to how these narratives contribute to processes of polarization, emotionalization, and the construction of threat in contemporary democracies.
The panel adopts a comparative European perspective in order to examine how conspiratorial narratives operate across different political contexts, including stable democratic settings where institutional structures appear resilient. This approach allows participants to assess the broader relevance of conspiratorial politics beyond cases commonly associated with democratic fragility.
Seeking to incorporate diverse theoretical and methodological approaches, the panel seeks to advance debates on radical right politics, democratic contestation, and the role of interpretive narratives in shaping political behaviour. It contributes to a growing research agenda that understands conspiracy narratives as embedded in broader ideological and communicative dynamics rather than as peripheral or purely irrational phenomena.

Chairs: Klaudia Koxha, Emilia Meini

Discussants: Klaudia Koxha

When Does Big Tech Become a Threat? Linking conspiracy beliefs and populist radical right
Jessica Rosco, Oscar Mazzoleni
Abstract
This paper provides an original contribution to the literature on radical right populist party support. The analysis examines how conspiracy beliefs and Big Tech’s perception are associated with populist radical right support — operationalized as the propensity to vote for the Swiss People's Party (SVP/UDC). Using original survey data collected in Switzerland in autumn 2025, three principal findings emerge. First, conspiratorial thinking is the single most robust predictor of SVP voting propensity. This result confirms the affinity between conspiratorial modes of reasoning and populist radical right support. Second, perceived dangers of Big Tech — capturing concerns about democratic accountability, power concentration, and opaque dealings with political elites — are independently and positively associated with SVP voting. By contrast, perceived benefits of Big Tech and generalized elite distrust do not exert statistically significant independent effects on voting intention for the SVP. Third, among individuals with high conspiratorial belief, the probability of voting for the SVP rises steeply as perceived Big Tech risks increase, whereas Big Tech attitudes are largely inert among low-conspiracy respondents. A symmetric pattern is observed for perceived benefits, which attenuate SVP support most markedly among strong conspiracy believers. These findings suggest that Big Tech does not constitute a standalone positional issue for the SVP electorate, but rather a domain onto which pre-existing narratives of elite manipulation and hidden power are projected. Big Tech firms are not simply another entry in the catalogue of elite actors that populist voters reject: their salience as political objects is conditional on beliefs about elite powers that citizens bring to their evaluation.
Post‑Acute Consolidation of Italy’s No‑Vax Telegram Sphere: Conspiratorial Infrastructures and Radical‑Right Articulations
Selenia Anastasi, Federico Pilati, Anita Lavorgna
Abstract
Within the FIS2-funded eDeTox project, this research examines how the Italian anti-vaccination Telegram ecosystem has consolidated, in the post-pandemic period, into a durable communicative infrastructure for the production and circulation of conspiratorial narratives whose thematic content has progressively migrated towards classic radical right repertoires - anti-EU sovereignism, opposition to NATO and pro-Russian framings of the war in Ukraine, rejection of European environmental and climate policies, and anti-immigration discourse. Rather than treating no-vax content as a residual epidemiological grievance, we conceptualise it as an interpretive framework - organised around the recurring topoi of betrayal, concealment and elite design - that outlives its founding crisis and is progressively recoded into a wider antagonistic worldview opposing “the people” to a transnational technocratic establishment. The analysis draws on a corpus of 377,130 messages from 85 Italian Telegram channels (10 purposively selected seeds and 75 derived channels identified through forwarding and link analysis), observed over a 4-year window from March 2022 to April 2026, i.e. after the dissolution of the acute pandemic emergency. Three analytical layers are combined: IN/OUT flow metrics and network-topology reconstruction; a Telegram-adapted Call-to-Action taxonomy capturing the communicative strategies deployed across the network (information, mobilisation, interaction); and a longitudinal topic-modelling pipeline that traces the substantive evolution of channel discourse across the observation window. Three findings speak directly to the analysis of conspiratorial narratives. First, the ecosystem displays a hub-and-spoke architecture with strong horizontal redistribution (IN-Gini = 0.785): a topology that mirrors and enables an elite-to-public loop in which a small set of authority-producing nodes filters conspiratorial content subsequently relayed in capillary fashion by peripheral channels, several of which display explicit sovereignist political orientations and routinely interface with the digital communication of radical right political entrepreneurs. Second, topic-modelling results document a clear diachronic translation of the ecosystem's thematic agenda: vaccine-centric topics decline steadily and are progressively replaced - without rupture of authorship, audience or rhetorical structure - by Ukraine-war, anti-EU, climate-policy and migration topics, each routinely articulated through a conspiratorial grammar in which European institutions, NATO, and globalist elites figure as coordinated adversaries of an imagined sovereign people. Third, a recurring trajectory at the channel level shows how individual nodes move from internal redistribution towards original editorial production, evidencing the concrete mechanism by which a narrow health grievance is generalised into a comprehensive sovereignist counter-public: same admins, same audiences, recycled rhetorical templates of betrayal and concealment applied to ever-broader issue cycles, with the figure of the enemy expanded from COVID-19 actors to a composite institutions bloc. These results contribute to current debates on conspiratorial politics and the radical right along three lines. First, they corroborate, in a Southern European context, the structural template documented by Zehring and Domahidi (2023) for the German Querdenken network and by Peeters and Willaert (2026) for the Dutch-speaking Telegramsphere, while specifying the Italian case through its distinctive “red-brown” convergence and the heterogeneity of its conspiratorial ecosystem. Second, they support reading conspiratorial narratives not as isolated factual claims but as productive interpretive frameworks that organise political meaning, justify distrust and legitimise demands for change, operating in continuity with the populist communication style of constructing an antagonistic relationship between a virtuous people and a corrupt establishment (Bastos and Tuters 2023). Third, they suggest that the structural openness of these networks coexists with a marked ideological closure of their link destinations - a leaky echo chamber configuration that may be politically more consequential than full enclosure, since it sustains the appearance of informational pluralism while preserving the coherence of the conspiratorial worldview and provides a permanent communicative reservoir on which radical right entrepreneurs can draw across successive issue cycles (Boccia Artieri et al. 2025). Positioned within a stable European democracy, the Italian case suggests that the consolidation of conspiratorial infrastructure beyond its triggering crisis is not exceptional but constitutes a recurrent mode of articulation between radical right politics and the broader European dynamics of polarisation, emotionalisation and threat construction. References Bastos, M., & Tuters, M. (2023). Meaningful disinformation: Narrative rituals and affective folktales. Big Data & Society, 10(2). Boccia Artieri, G., Bruns, A., Dehghan, E., & Iannelli, L. (2025). Fringe democracy and the platformization of the public sphere. Comunicazione politica, 26(1), 3-21. Peeters, S., & Willaert, T. (2026). ‘Dark metrics’ and the mainstreaming of political extremism on Dutch-speaking Telegram: A comparative reading of platform affordances. Platforms & Society, 3. Zehring, M., & Domahidi, E. (2023). German corona protest mobilizers on Telegram and their relations to the far right: A network and topic analysis. Social Media+ Society, 9(1).
Political Conspiracism: The case of Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory
Marco Solinas
Abstract
The paper aims to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework for political conspiracism and to examine the specific case of the conspiracy theory of ethnic replacement within contemporary far-right movements from a comparative perspective (see Caiani, Solinas and Trenz 2026; Bergmann 2025; Solinas 2025; Taguieff 2021). 1) The first part of the paper outlines the main features that characterize political conspiracism (PC) within the broader framework of conspiracy theories (CTs). It argues that PC operates through mechanisms and performs functions that differ from those of many other conspiracy theories. Rather than alleviating the anxiety triggered by unexpected, shocking, and circumscribed events, PC tends to exacerbate anxiety and to focus on long-term and ongoing social processes. The anxieties aroused and the crises intensified—or sometimes even invented—are subsequently capitalized upon by the movement that adopts the conspiracy theory in question. It is precisely the adoption of a conspiracy theory by a political movement or party, which places it at the core of its political programme or even of its ideological outlook, that gives PC its distinctive mobilizing capacity. Consequently, unlike many conspiracy theories, whose effects often include political apathy and abstentionism (see Douglas 2019), PC is able to mobilize because the movement presents itself as a force capable of confronting and defeating the alleged conspirators, thereby putting an end to the harmful consequences of the purported conspiracy. 2) As the second part of the paper demonstrates, this mechanism can be clearly identified in the conspiracist version of the ethnic replacement theory, one of the most influential and widespread narratives within contemporary radical and extreme right-wing movements. After distinguishing the strictly conspiracist version from alternative formulations of the theory, the paper shows how it radicalizes the polarization between the allegedly malevolent conspirators and the innocent, unsuspecting people, according to a logic characteristic of populist movements. Finally, it sketches the contours of a comparative analysis between the United States and Italy, highlighting the logic and political functions of political conspiracism.