SISP2024
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SISP Conference 2024

SISP2024 Sections and Panels

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Section 11 - European Union and European Studies

Managers: Edoardo Bressanelli, Igor Guardiancich, Sorina Cristina Soare

Read Section abstract
Scholars have described the period that began in the second half of 2008 – when the economic and financial crisis hit the EU – as the “polycrisis” or “permacrisis” of the Union. Starting with the Eurocrisis, moving on with the migration and refugee crisis, the long-process of withdrawal of the UK leading to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the new conflicts in its neighbourhood, the EU has been confronted with a dramatic string of unprecedented events. While the EU has managed to navigate through the storm, the crises have fuelled support for anti-EU and populist parties, contesting the EU and its policies sometimes from the highest executive office in some Member states.
The ongoing five-year cycle, initiated in 2019, represents a crucial juncture for the European Union, characterized notably by the absence of an absolute majority between the center-right (embodied by the European People’s Party) and the center-left (the Socialists and Democrats) in the European Parliament. As this cycle approaches its culmination, the EU is gearing up for the renewal of its Parliament in June 2024 and the subsequent selection of a new President of the Commission. The upcoming elections to appoint the next European Parliament, along with nine other parliamentary elections across European countries, are anticipated to witness the relative decline of mainstream parties and the emergence of various challengers in 2024. Moreover, the ongoing conflicts on the EU's doorstep and the 2024 US presidential elections are expected to exert significant influence on the trajectory of the European project. It is worth noting that these elections are likely to be influenced by the threat of online disinformation and the increasing role of artificial intelligence (AI) in shaping political discourse and electoral outcomes.
Despite these serious, we could call them ‘quasi-existential’ setbacks, it has to be, however, stressed that the mistakes that had been made in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis – for example the rushed endorsement of the doctrine dubbed “expansive austerity” – and which have done so much harm by alienating voters and governments, thereby fundamentally shaking the foundations of the European project of shared prosperity, have not been fortunately repeated. Above and beyond the ‘Hamiltonian moment’ represented by the relatively solidaristic answer to the challenges of the pandemic or the recently approved gas price cap in response to Russian threats, a shift away from economic towards social Europe, that had started under the aegis of the Juncker Commission, has continued unabated under the Von der Leyen Presidency.
If a list of the market-correcting policies supplanting market-making ones is beyond the scope of this summary, as they range from ecological measures such as the European Green Deal to regulatory breakthroughs such as the Digital Markets Act, just a brief look at the social policy domain indicates that a number of initiatives have been pushed forward or are being debated that would have been inconceivable just five years earlier. Planned or definitive legislative acts, such as the Minimum Wage Directive, the Platform Work Directive, the setup of Individual Learning Accounts represent paradigmatic changes in the conception of what a European social model signifies and may influence its design and operation for decades to come. It is in the light of these contrasting developments that the ninth legislative period of the European Parliament needs to be assed.
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The main goal of this Section is that of analysing, interpreting and explaining, from a variety of angles and using different methodologies, the challenges impacting upon and the ensuing changes on the EU political system, both at the supranational level and in a multi-level governance perspective. The analytical focus is placed on the EU institutions, actors and public policies. In an illustrative fashion, the Section welcomes contributions exploring:
- the validity of theories of EU integration to explain the more recent changes in the EU political system;
- the assessment of the Europeanisation of the member states, particularly but not only Italy;
- intra-institutional dynamics, such as the reforms adopted by the European Parliament to tackle corruption and limit foreign interferences;
- inter-institutional dynamics and power-relationships between the European Council, the Council of the EU, the Commission and the EP;
- the run-up to the 2024 EP elections and the reform of the electoral law, the Spitzenkandidaten process and policies to protect the integrity of elections;
- the results and consequences of the 2024 EP elections;
- the narratives about the EU in the media and in the public sphere;
- the current fractures between economic and social Europe and between market-making and market-correcting measures;
- the latest developments in the most salient policy fields, such as the labour market, social security and protection, energy capacity, environmental preservation, digitalization and its regulation (the EU Chips Act; the Data Act /Data Governance Act, the eIDAS Regulation, the eIDs, etc.);
- the implementation of the National Resilience and Recovery Plans;
- the tensions between the green transition and the need for energy security;
- the stepping up of security and defence coordination.
- the EU enlargement agenda (Eastern and Southeastern perspectives).
 

Panel 11.1 EU economic governance and policy: Towards growing interventionism in a changing geopolitical context (I)


There is a growing recognition that some of the neoliberal orthodoxies of the mid-1980s to early 2000s have recently come under pressure. Under the imperatives of the transition to a green economy and renewed geopolitical concerns brought to the surface by Russia's attack on Ukraine, a growing number of countries have resorted to unprecedented public intervention in the economy to support the ecological transition, protect domestic economies from aggressive global players, and restructure domestic production. Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the European Union (EU). Since the aftermath of the COVID crisis, the EU has introduced a wide range of interventionist initiatives, from industrial to climate to monetary policy. These interventions are designed to steer markets toward goals such as increased competitiveness, resilience, and even strategic autonomy.
The purpose of this panel is to take stock of recent changes in EU economic governance and its broad approach to liberal and open markets. In particular, the panel welcomes proposals on the following topics, among others: (1) challenges and opportunities for European institutions and European economic governance; (2) the political foundations of the changing role of the state and public intervention in the EU; (3) cooperation and conflict among EU member states in a changing geo-economic context; (4) European climate and industrial policy, the single market, and the future of European integration; (5) the implications of the European geo-economic transition for economic globalization.
Submissions from early career researchers and women are particularly welcome. We also encourage submissions that provide either empirically grounded theorizing or new empirical analysis using qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods.

Chairs: Donato Di Carlo, Manuela Moschella

Discussants: Donato Di Carlo

Italy under the new “ordo-Keynesian” economic governance regime of the EU
Simona Piattoni, Ton Notermans
Abstract
After a decade and a half of crises, the ordoliberal EU economic governance regime that has been created in Europe since the 1980s has been incrementally abandoned. Its replacement can be described as an inconsistent form of “supply-side Keynesianism” or “ordo-Keynesianism” that emphasises public support for investment as the key to growth and competitiveness. On the microeconomic side, this reorientation is marked by a turn to industrial policy, enabled by a significant relaxation of competition and state-aid policies and by a shift in the common commercial policy (CCP) towards more protectionism. On the macroeconomic side, it is reflected in the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the establishment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which seek to create more space for public investment while softening fiscal adjustment requirements. Finally, monetary policy has come to display a larger concern with growth by supporting fiscal expansion through the abandonment of the prohibition of monetary financing. This paper analyses in what ways this new, yet still inconsistent, economic governance regime will likely affect the Italian economy, in particular its growth prospects. As a deficit-prone and high public-debt member state, Italy will still be subjected to the constraints of the revised SGP and will effectively be hindered from engaging in state-aid policies to support domestic companies in their attempt to meet the ambitious green and digital objectives set by the EU. Meanwhile, the austerity measures required under the new fiscal framework are likely to fan opposition to those EU policies that are seen as engendering economic recession and to yield Eurosceptic governments that might jeopardize Italy’s permanence in the EU or induce her to flaunt the prescriptions of the SGP.
Politiche industriali, territori e ruolo dello Stato
Sara De Martino, Luigi Burroni, Beatrice Bianconi
Abstract
Negli ultimi anni, molti autori si sono concentrati sulla qualificazione e definizione delle politiche industriali, evidenziando che queste variano in base a fattori quali il periodo storico, il contesto economico e le teorie macroeconomiche prevalenti. A differenza di altre politiche, quelle industriali non si basano su quadri istituzionali precisi o indicatori universali (Välilä 2006), portando a definizioni sia ampie che ristrette. Le definizioni ampie le vedono come politiche che influenzano la competitività delle imprese e promuovono cambiamenti industriali e nei servizi (Beath 2002; Rodrik 2008), mentre quelle ristrette le vedono focalizzate su specifiche imprese e settori (Chang 1994). Dalla metà degli anni ‘90, l'Europa dopo varie trasformazioni economiche è passata ad un’economia basata sui servizi. In questo periodo, le politiche industriali hanno avuto un ruolo variabile: i paesi scandinavi e la Germania hanno implementato riforme economiche efficaci, mentre l'Italia ha sofferto per la mancanza di politiche adeguate (Burroni 2020; Burroni, Pavolini and Regini, 2022; Trigilia 2022). Nonostante la discontinuità nell'attenzione alle politiche industriali nella Comparative Political Economy, oggi si assiste a un rinnovato interesse per il loro ruolo, influenzato dai cambiamenti nelle economie locali, nazionali e internazionali (Iversen and Soskice 2020; Rodrik 2004; Aiginger and Rodrik 2020; Thatcher 2014). Nuova attenzione è stata rivolta alla dimensione territoriale delle politiche industriali. Il dibattito evidenzia l'importanza di coinvolgere i livelli locali nell'attuazione e progettazione delle politiche per superare il nazionalismo metodologico e comprendere meglio gli impatti delle politiche industriali (Reich 1982; Pinder 1982; Bianchi e Labory 2006). Integrare lo studio delle politiche industriali con l'analisi dei diversi sistemi locali è fondamentale per comprendere le loro implicazioni. La collaborazione tra competenze locali e risorse centrali è necessaria alla luce delle crisi economiche recenti come quella del 2008 e quella causata dalla pandemia. Anche questo paper si concentra sul rapporto tra territori e politiche industriali prendendo in considerazione una sottofamiglia di politiche industriali, quelle per la digitalizzazione, che negli ultimi anni hanno affrontato importanti trasformazioni presenti nei programmi nazionali come: Industria 4.0 (2016), Impresa 4.0 (2018), Transizione 4.0 (2019) e PNRR (2021). L’impatto territoriale delle politiche per la digitalizzazione è centrale, infatti il focus principale dell’intervento del governo italiano per le politiche di digitalizzazione, a partire dal 2016 in poi, è stato quello di guidare la definizione delle traiettorie di sviluppo tecnologico e digitale nazionale e delle regioni italiane. L’intervento dello Stato nelle politiche di digitalizzazione ha mirato ad adattarsi alle specificità tipiche del contesto territoriale che è modellato dalle interazioni tra attori pubblici e il sistema d’imprese già presenti. Questo paper si propone di analizzare la configurazione delle politiche di digitalizzazione e il loro impatto nel contesto fiorentino, utilizzando una metodologia di ricerca basata sul single case study. L’attività di ricerca è consistita: a) in una rassegna della letteratura approfondita b) nello sviluppo di una mappatura, che ha consentito l’individuazione e classificazione di attori ed interventi per la digitalizzazione in Toscana, effettuata su un lasso temporale di cinque anni (2019-2023), c) un caso di studio sull’area metropolitana fiorentina con metodologia mista quantitativa-qualitativa. Per il caso territoriale fiorentino è stato possibile individuare un totale di 95 iniziative di policy promosse ed organizzate da attori presenti su Firenze. L’analisi qualitativa ha mostrato la presenza di tre modelli di politiche pubblica e di interazione tra gli attori locali a sostegno della digitalizzazione e questi sono: 1) “Modello di base”: in cui l’azione principale dello Stato è quella di diffondere informazione e formazione su digitalizzazione di base attraverso seminari e webinar, incontri esplicativi su come applicare ai bandi di finanziamento per progetti con tematiche connesse alla digitalizzazione. Il target principale sono tutte le piccole e medie imprese, con un modello organizzativo a gestione familiare, già presenti e radicate localmente. Queste ultime appartengono a settori produttivi molto eterogeni e rispecchiano ad esempio il panorama tipico del “made in Italy” e servizi non avanzati. 2) “Modello delle grandi imprese ammiraglia”: in cui l’azione dello Stato è limitata ad un accompagnamento delle grandi imprese appartenenti a settori dell’alta tecnologia che già competono nei mercati internazionali sulla via alta. In tal senso l’attore pubblico gioca un ruolo di co-decisore, in cui cerca di creare vantaggi competitivi ed attrattivi per le imprese in questione le quali hanno già instaurato una solida rete di collaborazione. 3) “Modello delle start-up”: in questo modello giocano un ruolo chiave gli incubatori e gli acceleratori d’impresa che attivano le start-up nel processo di digitalizzazione esercitando una maggiore addizionalità degli interventi innovativi. Le conclusioni preliminari della ricerca riguardano interventi ed interazioni tra i diversi attori presenti nel contesto locale. Più precisamente l'attore pubblico a livello locale può usare gli strumenti di policy per la digitalizzazione con un approccio flessibile che dipende dal tipo di attore con cui interloquisce. Diverse coalizioni di policy utilizzano gli stessi strumenti secondo logiche e percorsi di intervento differenziati. Gli strumenti di policy differiscono per il tipo di "magnitudine" in termini di promozione della digitalizzazione: alcuni di questi promuovono l'avvio di un blando percorso di digitalizzazione, altri hanno una maggiore "addizionalità" nei confronti del contesto territoriale dove vengono applicati, altri a
A serious crisis that didn't go to waste? The EU, the Covid-19 pandemic and the role of ambiguity in crisis-management
Gianmarco Fifi
Abstract
Was the European response to the Covid-19 crisis coherent to the challenges posed by the pandemic? The paper argues that the response to the pandemic had little to do with the characteristics of the crisis at hand and was rather linked to pre-conceived priorities of key actors in Europe (particularly surrounding the need to foster the green transition). The pandemic was thus considered as the epitome of an exogenous shock, to which no clear long-term policy response could be given, if not one that strengthens on previous political economic plans. The paper contributes to the literature on crisis-management in the EU, arguing that the multiple streams framework's focus on ambiguity is a fruitful complement to the historical institutionalist emphasis on critical junctures, particularly when studying exogenous shocks.
 

Panel 11.1 EU economic governance and policy: Towards growing interventionism in a changing geopolitical context (II)


There is a growing recognition that some of the neoliberal orthodoxies of the mid-1980s to early 2000s have recently come under pressure. Under the imperatives of the transition to a green economy and renewed geopolitical concerns brought to the surface by Russia's attack on Ukraine, a growing number of countries have resorted to unprecedented public intervention in the economy to support the ecological transition, protect domestic economies from aggressive global players, and restructure domestic production. Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the European Union (EU). Since the aftermath of the COVID crisis, the EU has introduced a wide range of interventionist initiatives, from industrial to climate to monetary policy. These interventions are designed to steer markets toward goals such as increased competitiveness, resilience, and even strategic autonomy.
The purpose of this panel is to take stock of recent changes in EU economic governance and its broad approach to liberal and open markets. In particular, the panel welcomes proposals on the following topics, among others: (1) challenges and opportunities for European institutions and European economic governance; (2) the political foundations of the changing role of the state and public intervention in the EU; (3) cooperation and conflict among EU member states in a changing geo-economic context; (4) European climate and industrial policy, the single market, and the future of European integration; (5) the implications of the European geo-economic transition for economic globalization.
Submissions from early career researchers and women are particularly welcome. We also encourage submissions that provide either empirically grounded theorizing or new empirical analysis using qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods.

Chairs: Donato Di Carlo, Manuela Moschella

Discussants: Manuela Moschella

Different crises, same solution: the institutionalisation of joint purchasing in the EU.
Giorgia Castiello
Abstract
In the last years, the EU has been hit by several crises, the Covid-19 pandemic and the energy and security crises triggered by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. In order to tackle them and secure access to critical goods such as vaccines, energy and defence capabilities, the European Commission presented several proposals envisaging a joint purchasing mechanism. These proposals were advanced in the context of crisis and in areas that do not fall under the exclusive competence of the EU. Therefore, this work tries to explore the extent to which the European Commission acted as a supranational entrepreneur able to find solutions to cross-border challenges by presenting the EU Vaccination Strategy, the REPowerEU programme and the establishment of the EU Energy Platform and the EDIRPA regulation. By doing so this paper contributes to the literature on the EU’s role in periods of crises. The preliminary analysis reveals that in the health and energy sector the European Commission acted as a supranational entrepreneur and was able to find solutions to cross-national threats. It managed to secure vaccines for all Member States and contributed positively to tackling the pandemic; with the establishment of the EU Energy Platform, Member States were able to jointly purchase gas to replenish their national stocks and contribute to the EU’s supply diversification. Whereas, in the defence sector the role of the Commission was limited. Member States defined the agenda and reaffirmed once again the intergovernmental logic embedded in the sector. Nonetheless, the positive results obtained during the different crises led policy makers to transform those emergency measures in permanent ones with new legislative proposals. As a matter of fact, a new authority HERA was created for managing joint procurement of medical supplies; the newly adopted “Gas and Hydrogen Package” introduced a permanent mechanism for the joint purchasing of gas and a pilot mechanism for purchasing hydrogen with the aim of boosting the development of the market. The same model was then replicated for critical raw materials. The most recent proposal, the new European Defence Industry Programme regulation, was presented in March 2024 to accomplish the objectives enshrined in the European Defence Industrial Strategy of the European Commission, which calls for the reinforcement of joint defence procurement with the aim of reducing the fragmentation that characterises the European defence market. Whether the latest proposals will be as successful as those used during the latest crises in achieving results is yet to be seen, however it appears that the joint purchasing measure is becoming institutionalised and used more frequently in different policy sectors of the European Union.
Financialized Agency in the EU’s Climate Transition Strategy: The politics and policy of technological transformation and capital disciplining
Matteo Frisoni, Matteo Frisoni
Abstract
Scholarship on financing the climate transition within the EU emphasizes the dependency on the returns of institutional investors, the establishment of public investment platforms for climate-related asset classes, and the limited focus on capital allocation. Conversely, some scholars highlight state-like interventionist practices in economic governance and the strategic use of financial policy, bridging traditionally non-EU sectors such as industrial policy. This seemingly irreconcilable tension is examined through the European Green Deal policies, including financial regulation, industrial policy, and common recovery instruments. The article brings together the scholarship through the theoretical lenses of the political reproduction and contestation of financial dominance. Using interviews and quantitative text analysis of official documents and communications of EU institutions, the paper empirically investigates the diversity of policy design, instrument types, and technological specificity in the EU's strategy, along with changes from 2010 to present. While a financialized mode of public policy characterizes the overall financing strategy, the emergence of a "financialized EU agency" is identified, particularly evident in the geoeconomic turn in green industrial policy. EU actors increasingly orient their objectives towards strategic technologies and innovation areas, both in terms of public investment and regulatory tools. On the other hand, the core private-oriented, market-based financing mechanisms remained largely unchallenged, despite some contestation. The dissent, which originated mainly from the European Parliament and private stakeholders, aligned climate goals with broader justice objectives, but struggled to push for disciplining private finance and greater involvement of democratic states and communities in climate finance. As a result, policies show very limited focus on performance standards and corporate control, which are deemed fundamental to achieve the set objectives.
Explaining information exchange in EU oversight relationships
Camilla Mariotto
Abstract
A common market for financial services is a prerequisite for a functioning monetary union. In the European Union (EU), financial market integration has been slow and only in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, the EU took steps toward creating a banking union. One of the main elements consists of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and attributes the European Central Bank (ECB) the task of supervising the major European banks. The expansion of the ECB mandate reinvigorates the debate on its accountability relationship with the EP (Akbik 2022; Amtenbrink and Markakis 2019; Fromage and Ibrido 2018; Maricut-Akbik 2020) under confidentiality restrictions. How are executive actors, with a specific focus on the European Central Bank, held accountable to a democratically elected authority, while keeping independent from political interference? To address this question I investigate systematically the oversight relationship between the ECB and the European Parliament (EP) in the Banking Union and, specifically: a) how and why Members of the EP (MEPs) contest ECB supervisory decisions, and b) how and why the ECB is responsive to such parliamentary questions. Using an existing dataset on ECB hearings before the EP in the period between 2013-2022, the paper employs, first, topic modelling to estimate the policy topics that most prominently feature in individual questions and, later, assesses disagreement based on the semantic distance between the policy positions articulated by the two institutions. The empirical analysis considers economic (such as bank scandals), and national factors (for example, MEPs’ party affiliation, public support, trust in the ECB, and size of the parliamentary committee) that might affect MEPs’ scrutiny and ECB’s answers.
 

Panel 11.2 Behind and beyond the 2024 EP elections: EU institutions and politics


This panel welcomes contributions focusing on any aspect where intra and inter-institutional politics in the EU play a key role. The panel focuses on internal dynamics – e.g., voting coalitions in the Council and the EP, the internal organisation of the Commission – and inter-institutional aspects – e.g., the budgetary and legislative processes, agenda-setting dynamics, office appointments and oversight dynamics. It is particularly interested in theoretical and empirical papers focusing on the implications of the 2024 EP elections on the EU institutions, such as the appointment of the new European Commission, the allocation of key offices in the European Parliament, the (re)configuration of the political groups and the role of the Europarties. While the key focus is on institutional politics at the EU level, the panel is also open towards contributions looking at the relationships between Member States and Brussels. The panel does not endorse any specific methodological approach: quantitative analyses, small-n comparisons and case studies are all welcome. The panel aims to include theoretically driven contributions, assessing theoretical arguments and hypotheses, rather than descriptive or normative papers.

Chairs: Edoardo Bressanelli

Discussants: Nicola Chelotti

Multi-level politics in action: How national elections make European policies more responsive to public opinion
Michele Scotto Di Vettimo
Abstract
This paper analyses the link between policy-specific preferences for European integration and European Union (EU) policies between 1994 and 2024. The EU institutional arrangement enables national-level factors to influence the link between public opinion and EU-level policies. I argue that EU policy-making is skewed towards public preferences of those states where national elections are closer in the future. To support this claim, I use a Bayesian item response theory approach to construct policy area-specific series of public support for EU integration starting from 266 Eurobarometer questions. Then, I collect the texts of all EU legislative acts tabled between 1994 and 2024, and use a machine learning algorithm to identify clauses that expand EU authority. The results indicate that EU authority expansion is more associated with average public support for policy integration in a specific area when national-level public preferences are weighted by the proximity to national elections. This paper contributes to the existing literature on the opinion-policy link in the EU under territorial representation by showing the key role that national elections play in EU-level policy-making.
Convergence and divergence over Russia and China by key European far-right parties
Salvatore Vassallo, Ruth Hanau Santini
Abstract
European radical parties, divided between European conservatives and reformists (ECR) and the group Identity and Democracy (ID), have so far differed on several foreign policy issues, most notably Russia, especially in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While literature on European radical right parties has spiked in recent years, systematic analysis of their foreign policy stances, attitudes, discourses and differences remains underdeveloped, albeit with some exceptions (Liang 2007; Verbeeck & Zaslove 2015 & 2017; Balfour & Lehne 2024). When radical right leaders’ operational codes have been scrutinized, with the exception of a heightened sense of control over history, no other significant difference emerged with reference to their foreign policy (Ozdamar & Ceydilek 2020). This paper will examine to what extent voting patterns in the 2019-2024 European Parliament by Fratelli d’Italia, Rassemblement National and Alternative fur Deutschland have converged and diverged on non-Western powers and in particular on Russia and China, by focusing on post-pandemic timeframe. The analysis of voting patters will be complemented with a discourse analysis of the three female leaders, Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen and Alice Weidel on the role of Russia and China in international politics between 2020-2024. Departing from the assumption that foreign policymakers operate between ’two worlds’, domestic politics and international politics, absorbing and reacting to both, this paper will make a threefold theoretical contribution: the study of the radical right and coalition politics in the European Union. By examining the stances (and the rationale behind them) taken by three parties on pivotal foreign policy issues, it will first determine whether the so-called 'radical right parties' can indeed be considered members of a unified political family or whether the term is merely a broad category encompassing parties with different political trajectories and strategies. The second objective is to identify the factors that can lead parties, often united by anti-European rhetoric, to adopt positions that align them more closely with the core governing majorities of the EU. Third, the paper will enable to assess the extent to which so far understudied European radical parties' foreign policy stances is a qualitatively useful litmus test to empirically assess their convergence and divergence.
The EP as the last or intermediate stop ? A longitudinal comparison between Italian and Spanish MEPs (1994-2019)
Selena Grimaldi, Matteo Boldrini
Abstract
The international literature on MEPs' careers has grown in recent years. Much of this literature has mainly focused on identifying specific career paths and typologies of MEPs especially in relation to their previous and subsequent political experiences (Kakepaki & Karayiannis, 2021; Bigo-Nagy, 2019;.Salvati, 2016; Salvati & Vercesi, 2021). However, most of these studies either favoured a longitudinal perspective by sacrificing comparison -thus focusing on MEPs in only one member country- or by favoring comparison at the expense of the longitudinal perspective -that is, focusing only on one or maximum two legislatures. Few studies have tried to hold the two perspectives together by more effectively expanding our knowledge on the career profiles of MEPs (see for exceptions: Kopsch, et al. 2020; Dodeigne et al. 2022). Our work fits into this type of approach by proposing a comparison between two similar cases, namely two Southern European countries with a quasi-federal system or touched by an important regionalisation process, such as Spain and Italy, and by examining a rather long time period ranging from the IV to the IX EP legislature, i.e. from 1994 to 2019. Our dataset consists of 841 observations, 340 relating to Spanish MEPs and 501 to Italian ones. By taking into account the recent systematization and proposal of Dodeigne et al. (2022), our dependent variable is characterized by four distinctive career models: the EU shorter termers, the Stepping Stone MEPs, the EU long termers; the Multilevel Surfers. By relying on a multi-nominal regression analysis, our paper aims at understanding what types of MEPs prevailed in Spain and Italy and what political (party affiliation of MEPs; length of previous career, the populist tide) and socio-economic (gender, age) factors may have a specific impact in each career type.
A different perspective on the European public opinion
Rado Fonda, Riccardo Benetti
Abstract
The panel will present the results of research concerning the population of EU member states carried out in the run-up to the elections, focusing on possible differences of opinion among citizens from different areas of the continent. In particular, the data will focus on the Europeans' views on the international situation and the upcoming European elections
 

Panel 11.3 EU Foreign Policy in a Contested International Arena: Taking Stock of the 2019-2024 EU Institutional Cycle (I)


In 2019 the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, declared its ambitions to lead a 'geopolitical Commission', and hence to turn the EU into a ‘geopolitical’ actor. Against the backdrop of growing tensions between the United States and China, such an ambition has been at the centre of the European debates in the last five years. Indeed, the von der Leyen’ allegedly geopolitical EU has been put to test by multiple and diverse crises. Among these, there are the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war against Ukraine, the Israeli war against Hamans and the ensuing tensions in the Middle East. As the European Parliament's elections are taking place in spring 2024 and a new Commission is expected to take over, the panel aims to take stock of EU foreign policy during the 2019-2024 EU institutional cycle.
In this context, we welcome contributions examining the role of EU actors and their practices in foreign policy not only within the EU institutional context but also in EU interactions with other international actors. At the same time, we welcome contributions looking at the evolution of EU foreign policy from the perspective of non-European actors.

Chairs: Giulia Tercovich

Discussants: Giulia Tercovich

Rekindling the European Union’s relations with Africa: insights into the EU-AU partnership, the Samoa Agreement, and the Global Gateway.
Maurizio Carbone
Abstract
At the start of her term as President of the European Commission, in December 2019 Ursula von der Leyen chose to fly to Addis Ababa and meet her counterparts in the African Union (AU). This was a symbolic but also a strategic choice: Africa was hailed to be a constitutive element of the ‘geopolitical Commission’, the intention being also that of moving away from a relationship underpinned by donor-recipient dynamics to a partnership of equals. This paper, accordingly, interrogates the behaviour of the EU vis-à-vis Africa and seeks to ascertain whether any significant shift towards a more egalitarian and strategic partnership has materialised over the past five years. To do so, it analyses three momentous events: first, the launch of the Global Gateway in December 2021, which is expected to generate €150 billion of investment in infrastructure in Africa with the aim of countering the growing relevance of China in the continent; second, the adoption of the EU-AU Joint Vision for 2030 in February 2022 following a much controversial EU-AU Summit held just a week before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – and which caused some further distress between the two blocs; and third, the conclusion of the negotiations and then the tortuous path leading to the signature in November 2023 of the Samoa Agreement with the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), which is set to govern relations between the EU and 48 sub-Saharan African states for the next twenty years. Initial findings seem to point to the fact that Africa has indeed risen in the EU’s external agenda and that concrete steps have been taken by the EU to support Africa’s needs in infrastructural development without (any longer rhetorically) masking the pursuit of its strategic interests. Nevertheless, the EU, more often than not, continues to take Africa for granted and treat it as an afterthought, rather than regarding it as a true partner and actively listening to its voice - though internal clashes between the AU and the OACPS have weakened Africa's international agency.
Same Same but Different: Informal Groupings in EU Response to the 2014 Conflict and the 2022 War in Ukraine
Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, Monika Sus
Abstract
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war has put security cooperation in Europe under strain. Among other institutional reactions within the EU, such pressure triggered the occurrence of member states’ differentiated engagement to integrated efforts through the establishment of informal groupings. By conceptualizing informal groupings as types of differentiated cooperation, the article assesses the influence of informal groups on EU foreign policy, unravels their interaction with EU institutions and the formal EU foreign policy-making procedures, and evaluates their implications for EU security governance. To do so, it carries out a comparative study of the occurrence of informal groupings in EU response to two major events occurring in EU’s Eastern Neighborhood: the 2014 conflict and Russa’s subsequent destabilization of Ukraine; and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Russia-Ukraine war. The article relies on a triangulation of data gathered from official documents and original interviews with relevant EU and member states’ policy makers.
The European Parliament as a Foreign Policy Actor: the Case of China-EU Economic Relations
Francesco Giovanni Lizzi
Abstract
Throughout the 2019-2024 EU institutional cycle, the European Parliament has managed to make its voice heard on an increasing number of issues at the crossroads between the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and trade and investment domains. This was especially true in the case of China-EU economic relations, in which the Parliament halted the ratification process of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment in early 2021, thus setting the tone for a tougher European approach towards China. How did the European Parliament develop and put into action its powers and influence in this domain? This paper aims to answer this question by relying on a historical institutionalist framework, taking into account the main critical junctures that led to a greater role of the European Parliament in China-EU relations. This paper aims to contribute to the vibrant field of EU actors’ foreign policy practices and the evolution of European strategic autonomy in a contested international arena by employing a qualitative research design involving in-depth interviews and analysis of European Parliamentary debates.
Whither contestation? The effects of far-right parties on the EU’s CFSP/CSDP
Raffaele Mastrorocco
Abstract
In the last EU institutional cycle, the EU came up with an impressive array of foreign and security policy instruments and responses to threats. Some argue that this is due to the changing security environment, while others claim that the agency slack of institutional actors explains this. However, EU integration in security and defence happened at a moment of increased political contestation mobilized by challenger parties inside the EU. This is puzzling because the literature on such parties, populist, far-right, or extreme, would suggest that they are protective of their national sovereignty and do not easily give it up to international bureaucrats or to face common security threats. What these accounts have not considered is that these parties make use of their membership strategically. The paper explores the consequences of such strategies - and the role of institutional actors - for the EU’s CFSP/CSDP to explain the effects of far-right parties on this policy area. It does so by analysing the influence of the Fratelli d’Italia government in Italy led by Meloni on the CFSP/CSDP during the mandate of President von der Leyen. It then compares it to a previous instance of far-right party in government in Italy, the League in the 5SM-League coalition, during the mandate of President Juncker to explain variance in these parties’ influences. The paper draws from interviews with Italian politicians and diplomats in Rome and national representatives and EU officials in Brussels, together with data from party manifestos, news coverage, autobiographies, political speeches, and texts. The paper contributes to taking stock about the EU’s foreign policy considering the increased pressures exerted by Eurosceptic forces.
Analyzing Crisisification Impact on the Operationalization of Values in the CSDP. The Case of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022
Marcello Ciola
Abstract
The phenomenon of crisisification is a change in the nature of the processes by which collective decisions are made. In our theoretical framework, crisisification is a step beyond securitization. A situation where decision makers are not only requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure, but they are at the same time facing the “existential threat” (the identified “source of crisis”) with no or poor political strategy. According to the discourse of the EU institutions, past and, above all, future crises play an essential role in the construction of the Strategic Compass and the “next CSDP”: this could mean that crisisificaiton could, potentially, “prevail” or change on the traditional method of decision-making – i.e., based on long consultations with stakeholders, a long process of mediation and balance between positions of a consistent number of actors to achieve solutions based on consensus and long-term policies. Crisisification processes can have an impact on the operationalization of values into policies, lacking the time to be able to discuss and decide together with partner – and informal groups could play an important role in this dynamic. This intervention aims to question the extent of the impact of crisisification processes on the operationalization of values, under the pressure of urgency and existential threat, analyzing, in particular, the EU’s resilience-building politics in the two Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and 2022. Methodology: analysis of official documents and semi-directive interviews with civilian and military personnel from the EU (institutions and member states) and Ukraine.
 

Panel 11.3 EU Foreign Policy in a Contested International Arena: Taking Stock of the 2019-2024 EU Institutional Cycle (II)


In 2019 the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, declared its ambitions to lead a 'geopolitical Commission', and hence to turn the EU into a ‘geopolitical’ actor. Against the backdrop of growing tensions between the United States and China, such an ambition has been at the centre of the European debates in the last five years. Indeed, the von der Leyen’ allegedly geopolitical EU has been put to test by multiple and diverse crises. Among these, there are the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war against Ukraine, the Israeli war against Hamans and the ensuing tensions in the Middle East. As the European Parliament's elections are taking place in spring 2024 and a new Commission is expected to take over, the panel aims to take stock of EU foreign policy during the 2019-2024 EU institutional cycle.
In this context, we welcome contributions examining the role of EU actors and their practices in foreign policy not only within the EU institutional context but also in EU interactions with other international actors. At the same time, we welcome contributions looking at the evolution of EU foreign policy from the perspective of non-European actors.

Chairs: Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré

Discussants: Sonia Lucarelli

The EU’s Geopolitical Turn in External Energy Policy and its Pitfalls
Marco Siddi
Abstract
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has been promoting the concept of a “geopolitical Commission” since her appointment in late 2019. Since then, successive crises—the Covid-19 pandemic, the ever-worsening climate crisis, and the war in Ukraine—have tested the Commission’s intention to turn the concept into practice. This is particularly evident in the field of energy politics following Russia’s attack on Ukraine. When the war started, Russia was the EU’s largest energy supplier. The EU’s desire to end its energy dependency on Russia called for “geopolitical actorness,” notably swift political and diplomatic initiatives to find alternative suppliers considering the rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances. To what extent and how did this occur? Did the Commission achieve its goal of becoming a geopolitical actor in the field of energy politics? What does geopolitical actorness imply for the EU’s energy policy and low-carbon transition? The paper addresses these questions through an analysis of policy documents published by the von der Leyen Commission between 2019–2023, including the communications on the European Green Deal and Critical Raw Materials Resilience, the EU Hydrogen Strategy, the Global Gateway, the REPowerEU Plan, the External Energy Strategy, the Solar Energy Strategy, and the Green Deal Industrial Plan. The article argues that EU policy priorities progressively shifted from a focus on broad multilateral cooperation and open strategic autonomy to more narrowly defined strategic partnerships with “like-minded” Western and neighbouring countries. The 2022 war in Ukraine was a strong catalyst for this shift.
The Defence Policy of a “geopolitical” commission: a first-blush assessment of the defence initiatives launched by the von der Leyen commission
Andrea Locatelli, Davide Fiammenghi
Abstract
In its five-years mandate, the von der Leyen commission has launched a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening military cooperation among EU member states. Quite interestingly, while some were spurred by external events, like the war in Ukraine, others are part of longer-term projects. The end result, we argue, is an articulated web of efforts that span from institutional reform, weapons procurement, and doctrinal change. The aim of the paper, then, is to appraise the potential and limitations of these efforts and design policy prescriptions aimed at improving defence integration in the EU. In this view, the paper will first provide a systematic review of the above-mentioned initiatives; it will proceed by contextualizing these initiatives within the broader debate on EU strategic autonomy and discuss the limits of the European ambitions. The closing paragraph will finally present our policy recommendations.
Overcoming the Limits of the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of Hybrid Threats
Donatella Casaburo
Abstract
Nowadays, conflicts are not only fought by using weapons on a battlefield. Sometimes conflicts are not fought at all. Rather, authoritarian regimes and non-state actors prefer destabilising democracies through combined and synchronised subversive means, including massive disinformation campaigns and propaganda, cyberattacks against critical infrastructures, or economic pressure. The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) label these attacks to its internal space as ‘hybrid threats’. As happened in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, hybrid threats can escalate to military coercion. However, more often, as in the case of China, hybrid threats remain below the threshold of formally declared warfare. Nonetheless, over the past decade, the concept of hybrid threats has gained significant prominence, due to the advancement of novel and emerging technologies, which constitute both an effective tool for hostile actors and a source of vulnerability for EU and NATO Member States. As a result, today, due to their massive growth in frequency and impact and their possible cascading effects, both NATO and the EU consider hybrid threats as “serious and acute threats” to their security environments. In 2016, the European Commission adopted the ‘Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats’, a non-binding communication jointly addressed to the European Parliament and the Council. There, the Commission recalled that EU Member States have the competence and responsibility to formulate and conduct their own security and defence policies to respond to hybrid threats, since hybrid operations need to be considered as a national security matter. At the same time, the EU can intervene by stimulating convergence between Member States’ actions, by exercising the competences assigned within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the exercise of these competences is “subject to specific rules and procedures”. As a general rule, the EU cannot adopt any binding legislative acts having direct effects on Member States’ security and defence policies: not only the EU Treaties provisions on the CFSP do not establish any legal basis for the adoption of regulations or directives, they also explicitly exclude this possibility. However, as noted by the Commission in the same 2016 Joint Framework, “many EU Member States face common threats, which can also target cross-border networks or infrastructures”. Hybrid threats are not confined within geographical borders and do not exploit the vulnerabilities of single EU Member States: on the contrary, the vulnerabilities of an unprepared Member State become the vulnerabilities of the EU as a whole. Therefore, in the words of the Commission, “[s]uch threats can be addressed more effectively with a coordinated response at EU level by using EU policies and instruments”. Since 2016, EU institutions have cooperated to “build resilience” against hybrid threats, both at a supranational and a national level. In particular, in its communication on the 2020 EU Security Union Strategy, the Commission stated its intention of mainstreaming hybrid considerations into policy making: all the potentially relevant initiatives will need to be assessed through “hybrid lenses”, to ensure that these initiatives can contribute to the EU holistic response to hybrid operations. The Commissions’ hybrid lenses have recently permeated the legislation field. The fact that many of the domains targeted by subversive hybrid threats fall within non-CFSP shared and supporting competences allows EU institutions to overcome the limits of the CFSP itself, which forbids the adoption of legislative acts. In other words, while the EU does not have the competences to regulate hybrid threats per se, it can nonetheless tackle the matter by relying on legislative measures already adopted and by adopting new legislative measures in the domains targeted by hybrid threats. This ‘repurposing process’ of non-CFSP legislative measures to the aim of countering hybrid threats is, however, not as straightforward as it may seem. The mere existence of domain-specific legislative measures does not necessarily imply that they can counter hybrid threats as the repurposing may be hindered by the potential inapplicability of the laws to hybrid threats and their unfitness for the new purpose. The first part of the presentation aims to delve into the ‘repurposing process’, to highlight its main strengths and weaknesses in relation to foreign policy matters, such as hybrid threats. The second part of the presentation focuses on a case study: the relationship between the Digital Services Act (2022/2065/EU) and hybrid disinformation campaigns. As the Digital Services Act was adopted by relying on the legal basis established by Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it does not specifically aim to counter hybrid threats but, rather, aims to promote the proper functioning of the internal market for intermediary services and to facilitate innovation and consumer protection. Thus, the repurposing of the Digital Services Act presents limitations both in terms of applicability and fitness for the purpose of countering hybrid disinformation campaigns. Finally, the presentation paves the way forward for future research in relation to EU foreign policy, CFSP and non-CFSP legislative measures.
Redefining EU Security: Strategic Autonomy on the Example of the EU Nuclear Deterrence Debate
Agata Bidas
Abstract
The concept of strategic autonomy has become a fundamental objective of the European Union's foreign policy objectives, particularly under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, who has advocated for a more assertive EU on the global stage. This paper critically examines the feasibility of achieving strategic autonomy, emphasising the need to reform the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and enhance unity among EU member states. Since the formulation of the 2016 Global Strategy, the international landscape has undergone significant transformation. This has been characterised by intensifying US-China tensions, unpredictable US foreign policy, and major security threats, including the Russian war against Ukraine and the Israeli conflict with Hamas. These shifts serve to illustrate the misalignment of the strategy with the prevailing circumstances, thereby underscoring the necessity for a revised approach. A key aspect of this analysis is the necessity for a unified EU stance on relations with major global actors, particularly China. Additionally, in light of potential shifts in the U.S. administration, such as the possible return of a Donald Trump presidency, the EU must assume greater responsibility for its own security. This includes bolstering collective defense mechanisms and reconsidering the role of European nuclear weapons as a critical example of the broader need for strategic autonomy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted critical issues regarding the EU's preparedness for potential military conflicts within Europe and its reliance on the United States for defence, including nuclear deterrence. This situation has prompted discussions within the EU about developing its own nuclear deterrent to enhance strategic autonomy. However, the EU's position on nuclear deterrence is not uniform, posing significant contention among member states. While some EU countries, such as Austria, Malta, and Ireland, support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), others, like France, oppose it, reflecting alignment with NATO's deterrence policy. The paper uses the debate on European nuclear weapons as a case study to explore the broader implications and feasibility of such a shift in EU defence policy. This case study serves also to illustrate the significance of strategic autonomy for the EU’s foreign and defence policies and its position in the world. It also considers potential challenges, such as maintaining the EU’s unity. Through a detailed case study of the EU nuclear deterrence discussion and comprehensive policy analysis, this paper provides insights into the obstacles and opportunities for advancing EU strategic autonomy. It examines key aspects of CFSP reform, including the development of a more integrated defense policy, enhanced decision-making processes, and increased investment in defense capabilities.It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at achieving a more unified and effective EU foreign policy, capable of responding to global challenges with a coherent and independent voice. In conclusion, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the viability of EU strategic autonomy, offering a detailed assessment of the reforms needed to transform it from a rhetorical aspiration into a concrete reality.
 

Panel 11.5 Evolving Migration Governance in the Mediterranean: Actors, Institutions, and Practices


Between 2022 and early 2024, the Mediterranean region has experienced a new increase in irregular mobility to Italy and the European Union (EU) at large. The bilateral agreements drafted by Italy with Libya and Albania, as well as the EU-wide agreements with Turkey, Tunisia and most recently Egypt suggest that the externalization of border enforcement has become the cornerstone of EU migration governance across the Mediterranean. The content, effectiveness, and implications of these externalization strategies, however, vary considerably. The European Council and Parliament’s recent agreement on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum after years of negotiation is also set to reshape the governance of mobility, calling for a reappraisal of existing institutional frameworks and policy arrangements.
This panel will analyse change and continuity in European migration governance, focusing on the interplay between European internal dynamics and geopolitical factors like growing regional and global instability. By utilizing interdisciplinary approaches and concepts including (but not limited to) ethnography, visual content analysis, infrapolitics, and policy diffusion, our panel aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of border enforcement across the Mediterranean.
To that end, we welcome papers examining the constellations of actors, institutions, practices, and norms underpinning European migration governance. Key themes to be addressed encompass the discourses and practices underlying the securitization of migration, policy diffusion, issue-linkages, and reverse conditionality in negotiations within the EU as well as between the EU and third parties. Relatedly, the panel discussion will examine the implications of current migration governance strategies like externalization agreements for human rights and regional stability, as well as potential avenues for enhancing cooperation and addressing gaps in the frameworks protecting the fundamental rights of people on the move

Chairs: Eugenio Cusumano

Discussants: Marcello Carammia

Externalization as EUropean migration governance: border enforcement and externalization protocols dilemmas
Diego Caballero Vélez, Eugenio Cusumano
Abstract
In November 2023, Italy and Albania signed an agreement allowing Italy to use Albanian territory to set up two camps hosting asylum seekers who reached Italian territory irregularly. Few days after, the UK Supreme Court disavowed the deal enabling the British government to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda. The two previous decades had already seen the proliferation of agreements enabling the externalization of European border enforcement to Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia, and Libya. This paper leverages discursive institutionalism to conceptualized externalized detention and externalized border enforcement protocols as a form of isomorphic convergence enabled by processes of emulation and normative diffusion. These protocols may or may not align with international and European law, prompting political, legal, and ethical dilemmas. To unravel the origins and implications of these agreements, this paper conducts a content analysis of the texts of these protocols and traces the processes underlying their development and implementation. By doing so, the paper sheds new light on the mobility of human mobility governance and the institutional arrangements, practices, and discourses underlying them.
Liberal Regionalism, Illiberal Borders: Navigating Contradictions in South America's Migration Governance
Leiza Brumat, Marcus Nicolson
Abstract
South America has been labelled as the region with one of the most liberal and progressive migration policies and discourses in the world. South American states have established a liberal intra-regional migration regime that delinked South American migrants’ labor situation from their right to residence, increased access to rights for regional migrants, and facilitated border crossings. However, at the same time, scholars have highlighted the ‘gap’ between this liberal approach to migration and more restrictive implementation practices, particularly since the COVID-19 pandemic, to which several states in the region responded with increased border militarization, and restrictions on movement. Are bordering practices in the region coherent with South America’s liberal migration approach? And what do these bordering practices tell us about South America’s role as a liberal actor in regional migration governance? To answer these questions, this paper will analyse bordering practices across the region in the post-COVID period, characterized by several ‘waves’ of militarization of borders. Based on newspaper reporting on borders, political speeches, official documents, and legislation, we will first identify such waves. Second, we will identify the national-level narratives used to justify the militarization of borders. Third, we will contrast these findings with the regional macro-narrative of migration governance in South America. We will unpack the contradictions between the macro and meso-level narratives to shed light on the factors that enable the coexistence of liberal and illiberal policies and discourses in South American migration governance. Theoretically, our approach draws on ontological security theory, and dissects the narratives that are used to justify increased border securitisation in so-called crisis moments. The theory is useful for illustrating how political actors attempt to provide security, while drawing on perceived outside threats, including increased numbers of migrants. Migration and bordering practices are one of the main policy areas that illustrate the ambivalent relationship between regionalism and liberalism in South America. By looking at bordering practices and narratives, this paper will unpack the dynamics behind apparent contradictions on a topic that sits at the centre of the tensions underpinning the Liberal International Order.
The external dimension of Italian migration policy in the wider Mediterranean
Matilde Rosina, Iole Fontana
Abstract
This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of the external dimension of Italy’s migration policy (EXMIPO) in the broader Mediterranean, over the past three decades. Building on an original dataset spanning over 30 years and 125 instruments, it investigates how and to what extent Italy cooperated with countries of origin and transit in the management of migration flows. The paper argues that the external dimension of Italy’s migration policy is far richer than initially expected. From the immediate neighbourhood, Italy’s EXMIPO has gradually extended well beyond its geographical borders. If initially, it relied on a strategy of issue-linkage between quotas and return agreements, this gradually faded away in favour of more informal tools. While governments’ political ideology did not play a key role in defining the direction of Italy’s EXMIPO tools, we find that the evolving dynamics of migratory flows, and the pursuit of flexible tools to promptly address rising numbers, were crucial aspects behind the country’s external migration policy.
 

Round table

Panel 11.6 Round table: New balances in the Union? The political and institutional implications of the European elections


The round table aims to analyse the new political and institutional balances in the European Union following the elections for the European Parliament, held between 6 and 9 June 2024. The tenth European Parliament elected by the citizens of the Union plays a key role as co-legislator, in the approval of the EU budget and in the process of forming the new European Commission. The Roundtable seeks to provide a first assessment of the impact of the elections on the new political cycle in the EU. Who are the winners and losers of these European elections? What role did the Europarties play? What will be the impact of the new balances of power on the political agenda of the European Commission for the next five years? Did the turbulent geopolitical environment affect the outcome of the elections? Experts in European Union politics will try to provide answers and food for thought on the results of the elections for the European Parliament and their implications for the EU and its Member States, also starting from some recent publications on the subject.

Participants:
Thomas Christiansen (LUISS, Rome)
Nicoletta Pirozzi (IAI)
Simona Piattoni (University of Trento)
Edoardo Bressanelli (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa)

Chairs: Edoardo Bressanelli

 

Panel 11.7 The 2024 European elections between rising Euroscepticism and solidaristic policies: European (dis)integration and the future of Europe


The upcoming European elections in June 2024 represent yet another electoral cycle, following those of 2009, 2014, and 2019, occurring within the historical phase of the European integration process that began with the global economic crisis, which many scholars have dubbed the "polycrisis." The Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, the protracted departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU), the Covid-19 pandemic, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine with the ensuing energy and cost of living crisis have posed serious threats to the very existence of the EU polity. However, unlike previous European elections, those of 2024 come after an electoral cycle (2019-2024) in which the Commission, under Von der Leyen's presidency, responded to the pandemic crisis, climate change, and energy crisis with policies involving novel forms of risk-sharing and solidarity, such as Next Generation EU (NGEU), the Green New Deal, and joint procurement of vaccines against the Covid-19 pandemic. Arguably, these policies can be considered a departure from the strict conditionality and austerity policies implemented during the Eurozone crisis and the general lack of coordination among European political leaders to address massive inflows of migrants towards Europe during the refugee crisis of 2015. Nevertheless, in spite of these solidaristic political responses to recent crises, the electoral consent for Eurosceptic parties has been growing not only in Northern Europe, such as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, but also in Southern European countries, like Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which are among the main recipients of the intra-EU solidarity mechanisms recently implemented. To date, hard Euroscepticism has remained rather marginal and confined across the extreme right and extreme left but forecast and the current political success of extreme right and illiberal democratic leaders across EU member states provide an original case study towards 2024.The upcoming electoral round offer an opportunity for testing the main theories explaining voter choices in European elections and understanding whether these are still perceived as "second-order elections" or if instead, citizens' electoral behaviour is also motivated by the proximity between their positions and those of parties on European issues. The 2024 European elections also allow studying how recent political choices made by EU institutions have been judged by voters and whether these have played a role in influencing their voting preferences. The analysis of the electoral campaign and the issues that will emerge as salient in different countries, as well as the consequences of the election results on party alliances both nationally and at the European level, are certainly other aspects of considerable interest. We are keen to receive papers focusing on Euroscepticism at the party, public or civil society levels, the role of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament and the changing EP and also Pro-EU movements, parties and/or campaigns. We are seeking papers that analyse both the demand and supply sides of the electoral competition, as well as the combination of both. We are particularly interested in comparative studies but will also consider works that focus on single countries.

Chairs: Simona Guerra, Ioana Elena Oana, Alessandro Pellegata, Fabio Serricchio

Discussants: Alessandro Pellegata

EU issue voting at the 2024 EP elections in Italy: Is the sleeping giant awake?
Matteo Giardiello, Nicolò Conti , Luca Carrieri
Abstract
The recent past has been one of intense EU politicisation with rumblings against the legitimacy of the EU opposed by echoes of pro-EU resilience. In this context, Italy is a particularly interesting case as here anti-EU sentiment and political entrepreneurship have reached unprecedented levels and may have contributed to the electoral success of parties. However, there are also doubts about the overall impact of party-level polarisation on the EU in this country. Euroscepticism has often appeared a phoney stance of opposition parties aimed at attracting support in view of elections more than as a committed agenda of parties with a view to govern. Thus, the relevance of the EU for Italian voters remains uncertain as the impact of the EU on voting could prove ephemeral. In the paper we address the following questions. Does the EU motivate the vote choice of Italians? Are citizens more likely to vote for a party when they are positioned closer to each other on the EU? In a context of heightened polarisation on the EU, are parties with a more extreme (yet more distinguishable) position on the EU more likely to attract voters? Are the effects of EU-issue voting stronger for the pro- or the anti-EU half of the spectrum? Using a combination of original data from a mass survey conducted on the occasion of the 2024 EP elections and of expert survey data from CHES, we examine the positional distance between voters and parties on the EU and we relate it to vote choices. Our analysis allows to explore the pattern of EU issue voting in Italy in 2024, more specifically if citizens voted given their positional closeness with parties on the EU; furthermore, it allows to explore if citizens rewarded to a greater extent parties with more pronounced pro- or anti- EU stances. Finally, our findings may have implications for the study of the EU conflict that is expected to produce mobilising effects on parties and voters and, more in general, for knowledge about the dynamics of vote choice and party competition.
Turnout and salience at concurrently held second-order elections: Evidence from five EU member states
Daniel Kovarek, Alexandru Moise
Abstract
European elections are usually considered second-order, with their outcome being determined by domestic politics. However, the many crises that the EU has experiences since 2009 has steadily increased the salience of the EU issues in EU elections. Local elections are also considered second-order, as their lower salience drives lower turnout. Drawing on original survey data in five countries (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Hungary and Romania), we advance the literature by studying how satisfaction with national and local governments, as well as place attachment alters the way municipal and European Parliamentary elections influence each other when these second-order elections are held at the same time. The evidence we present leverages a two-wave panel survey fielded one month before (6–12 May), and immediately after (10–16 May) the 2024 EP elections in countries where local and EP elections were held concurrently. To investigate the effects of satisfaction with mayors, national and EU-level decision makers on turnout and party choice, we employ a rich dataset with information on vote intention, party identification, as well as regional, national and European identities. We furthermore study whether holding local and EP elections together incentivize higher (or lower) turnout among particular respondent subgroups, notably populist, Euroskeptic and Europhile voters. Our results speak to the existing research on policy congruence, voter turnout, the role of territorial vs. functional cleavages in EU-level politics, as well as spillover effects of solidaristic crisis responses into other electoral arenas of multi-level, compound polities.
EU integration, parties and voters: An integrative empirical test of the U-Curve over time and political space
Giorgos Charalambous, Luca Carrieri, Davide Angelucci
Abstract
On the EU dimension of politics in Europe, it has been shown by scholarly work that party stances take a U-shape across the left-right spectrum. In other words, while parties and voters of the extreme tend to take more Eurosceptic positions, mainstream parties and voters are consistently pro-EU. The U curve is an established schema characterizing party competition over European integration, however, several socio-economic and political events in the past two decades or so should lead us to question its fit to reality over time. The employment of anti-EU ideas and rhetoric by populist and radical right parties has also increased, generating electoral openings to challenger actors. Moreover, most of the literature on the U curve focuses on party positioning and repositioning, yet the U curve argument has an electoral, individual level component, which is an integral part of democratic representational processes. Ideally then, any claim about the structure of political competition over the EU must be tested through a combination of party and voter data and linked to the effects of party cues on voters. One cueing, tactical device that parties own in electoral competition is the shifting of their positions. Incorporating the effects of such shifts into the analysis one achieves an integrative investigation into the distribution of EU preferences across the party system, by factoring in both their supply and demand side. Acknowledging material changes, indications of ideological realignments from secondary sources and methodological complexity, opens a series of research questions that motivate this study. We interrogate changes in the U-curve pattern, asking if there has been a realignment of Euroscepticism on the left-right dimension through searching for a symbiosis of electoral demand and supply and testing hypotheses about potential patterns and changes. We theorise how distinct left-right locations in the party system would reveal different temporal effects due to the particularities of evolution and inertia in terms of their ideological configurations. Using longitudinal data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Manifesto Project, we proceed in two empirical steps. First, we disentangle party positions shifts over time: How have different political spaces been developing their positions on the EU over successive phases of European integration and its socio-political environment? Second, we test the effects of these party positional shifts on voting choice: Are these changes consequential in terms of individual choices and in what ways across time and political space?
“Don’t know, don’t care?” Does knowledge and institutional reform impact voting for the European Parliament? Evidence from an experiment during the 2024 EP elections
Alexandru Moise
Abstract
European elections are considered second order, reflecting domestic politics and generally having lower turnout (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). While the many crises that the EU has experiences since 2009 has steadily increased the salience of the EU issues in EU elections (Maier et al., 2021), and turnout has also increased (Gattermann et al., 2021), voters still turn out less to vote for the EP. Two types of explanations have been proposed for this lower turnout. The first is the “don’t know” explanation: European citizens are not adequately informed about what the EU does, what the role of European Parliament is, and what impact their vote can have. Giving voters more information about European integration has been shown to increase their propensity to vote (Hobolt & Wittrock, 2011). The second type of explanation is the “don’t care” type: voters don’t care about European elections because they might think that EU policies don’t affect them or because they might think that they cannot impact EU policies. Perceptions of the European Parliament itself shape the decision to vote (Clark, 2014). This study adds to this literature by exploring how the two mechanisms work together. It employs a survey experiment one month before the 2024 European elections in order to see whether giving voters more information about what the European Parliament does and presenting respondents with hypothetical increases in the powers of the European Parliament, affects their propensity to vote, as well as their views of the European Parliament. On the informational side, this study contributes to the literature by exposing voters to information regarding the democratic and policy roles of the EP. Respondents are exposed to three informational primes. The first is a “representation” prime describing the EP as the only EU institution directly elected by voters. The second is a “policy” prime, describing several important policies that the next EP will influence. The final, “identity”, prime goes beyond information and taps into civic identity, describing voting for the EP as an affirmation of European identity. The study further contributed by exploring whether the limited powers of the EP make them consider their vote less important. It proposes two realistic increases in the powers of the EP. In the “increased legislative powers” scenario, respondents are asked to imagine an EP that initiates and passes legislation by itself. In the “increased oversight powers” scenario, respondents are asked to imagine a scenario where the EP has more oversight over the commission. Previous work, looking not at voting but at preferences for institutional design, has shown that EU citizens prefer to keep the co-decision of the Council and Parliament but would prefer that the Parliament can also initiate legislation (Hahm et al., 2020). To date, there have been no experimental studies to directly test whether the empowerment of the EP would increase the likelihood of voting in EP elections.
 

Panel 11.8 EU decision-making in healthcare policies: exploring power shifts in a multi-level governance system


Historically, the European Union (EU) jurisdiction in healthcare has always been very limited. The article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is indeed clear about the fact that healthcare remains under the responsibility of member states, while EU action may at best 'complement' their legislation. Notwithstanding, years of research on EU policy-making in healthcare has provided much more contrasted insights : the EU's and member states' competences have become far more entangled than expected by the treaties (Natali 2004; Greer 2011; Maino and Neri 2011; Giulio de Belvis et al. 2012).
Most of the time, the EU influence on healthcare policies in rather indirect, as it is linked to the implementation of the Single Market: harmonization of legislation and procedures for medicines and medical devices, regulation of products with a high impact on healthcare (tobacco, alcohol), budget harmonization through the European semester (Mäkelä and Osterberg 2009; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2018; Perna 2018; Greer and Brooks 2021). In addition, the EU has developed numerous soft guidelines and initiatives on many topics related to healthcare: rare diseases, health and environment, healthy ageing, cancer prevention, digital health… (Greer 2011; Nalin et al. 2019; Tuzii 2017). More recently, the COVID-19 crisis highlighted the need for a deeper cooperation at the EU level in case of pandemics, as citizens realized the extent to which EU direct intervention possibilities were limited (Brooks and Geyer 2020). In the aftermath of this crisis, the European Commission wrote a proposal for the creation of a European Health Data Space, a major piece of legislation which is currently negotiated between the EU Parliament and the Council.
In light of these recent developments, this panel aims to gather papers that conceptualize power in healthcare as a complex phenomenon responding to strong domestic imperatives, but also European ones. As it becomes increasingly difficult to consider healthcare as the sole prerogative of member states, political scientists need to develop new conceptual tools to describe EU influence on such a politicized sector. In this view, this panel will welcome papers that address the following topics:
• The mechanisms by which the EU has become an influent actor of health policies at the domestic level (Europeanization). In particular, we would like to receive papers that compare Europeanization mechanisms between healthcare and other sectors, and try to renew the classic conceptualization of Europeanization (Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Risse 2003; Graziano et al. 2011)
• Papers exploring power shifts dynamics between the EU and member states in healthcare. As healthcare policies belong to the traditional set of core state powers, papers that address the relation between the EU’s ever-increasing powers in health and issues of sovereignty are particularly welcome.
• The effects of the COVID-19 crisis on EU health-related policies and the way this crisis created changes in power relations between member states and the EU. In particular, we would like papers to address the question of the magnitude of change related to the COVID-19 crisis (Natali et al. 2023).
• The adoption of the regulation on the European Health Data Space constitutes a major step forward for EU integration in healthcare. Through digitalization, the EU managed to strengthen its political influence far beyond the limits imposed by the treaties. We therefore invite participants to submit papers about the link between digitalization (Amoretti and Musella 2011), healthcare, and the European Union.

Bibliography

Amoretti, Francesco, and Fortunato Musella (2011). ‘Toward the European administrative space: the role of e-government policy’, European Political Science Review, 3:1, 35–51.
Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse (2003). ‘Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe’, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57–80.
Brooks, Eleanor, and Robert Geyer (2020). ‘The development of EU health policy and the Covid-19 pandemic: trends and implications’, Journal of European Integration, 42:8, 1057–1076.
Giulio de Belvis, Antonio et al. (2012). ‘The financial crisis in Italy: Implications for the healthcare sector’, Health Policy, 106:1, 10–16.
Graziano, Paolo R., Sophie Jacquot, and Bruno Palier, eds. (2011). The EU and the Domestic Politics of Welfare State Reforms: Europa, Europae. 1st ed. Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire?; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Greer, Scott L. (2011). ‘The weakness of strong policies and the strength of weak policies: Law, experimentalist governance, and supporting coalitions in European Union health care policy’, Regulation & Governance, 5:2, 187–203.
Greer, Scott L., and Eleanor Brooks (2021). ‘Termites of Solidarity in the House of Austerity: Undermining Fiscal Governance in the European Union’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 46:1, 71–92.
Maino, Franca, and Stefano Neri (2011). ‘Explaining Welfare Reforms in Italy between Economy and Politics: External Constraints and Endogenous Dynamics*’, Social Policy & Administration, 45:4, 445–464.
Mäkelä, Pia, and Esa Osterberg (2009). ‘Weakening of one more alcohol control pillar: a review of the effects of the alcohol tax cuts in Finland in 2004’, Addiction, 104:4, 554–563.
Nalin, Marco et al. (2019). ‘The European cross-border health data exchange roadmap: Case study in the Italian setting’, Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 94, 103183.
Natali, David (2004). ‘Europeanization, policy arenas, and creative opportunism: the politics of welfare state reforms in Italy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11:6, 1077–1095.
Natali, David, Emmanuele Pavolini, and Andrea Terlizzi (2023). ‘Multi?Level Governance Feedback and Health Care in Italy in the Aftermath of Covid?19’, Politics and Governance, 11:4, 365–377.
Perna, Roberta (2018). ‘Re-bounding EU citizenship from below: practices of healthcare for “(Il)legitimate EU Migrants” in Italy’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44:5, 829–848.
Radaelli, Claudio M. (2003). ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 27–56.
Tuzii, Jennifer (2017). ‘Healthcare information technology in Italy, critiques and suggestions for European digitalization’, Pharmaceuticals Policy and Law, 19:3–4, 161–176.
Zeitlin, Jonathan, and Bart Vanhercke (2018). ‘Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordination in crisis and beyond’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25:2, 149–174.

Chairs: Chloé Berut, Stéphanie Novak

 

Panel 11.9 European integration, collective actors and citizens: studying the multifaceted nature of “visions of Europe”.


The European Union finds itself navigating tumultuous waters characterized by multifaceted crises whose nature and potential consequences have fueled the rise of opposing voices across the continent.
Such voices cross-cut different social sectors and involve political parties, civil society associations, social movements, and the public at large. Moreover, if it is on the one hand true that radical right voices are significantly growing since the past few years, on the other hand, also left wing radicalism should not be excluded from the equation (see the recent creation of the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht party in Germany).
The study of these multifaceted opposing voices entails the analysis of their “visions of Europe”, the way in which they see and perceive the EU or how the EU should look like. There are two main reasons stressing the cruciality of such research agenda: firstly and in view of the European Parliament elections 2024, it allows to shed some light on how citizens, civil society associations, social movements and political parties perceive the European union alongside its integration process(es). Secondly, while the rise of opposing voices is nowadays a consolidated reality, the impact of such visions on the future EU alongside its democratic architecture is still unclear.
This panel asks for contributions able to grasp, empirically analyze, and compare such “visions on Europe” (Caiani Weißkircher 2020) seeking to explain which their nature, interconnections and orientations are. More precisely the panel will include contributions that:
• Shed light on Europeanization of both civil society associations, social movements and political parties promoting both a bottom-up and a top-down analytical perspective.
• Focus on the “narratives on Europe” formulated and used by extreme right and left wing actors (e.g.: social movements and political parties) while promoting their visions of Europe.
• Propose a strong comparative perspective while seeking to reach generalizable conclusions over the Europeanization processes.
• Rely on different analytical and methodological tools and data: from survey analysis to text analysis or frame analysis. In other words, the panel seeks and promotes the use of a mixed method approach relying on multiple data sources (e.g.: survey data, textual data and so on) and mixing both quantitative and qualitative perspectives.
• Investigate the causes and the triggering factors of opposition to the European Union relying on a strongly dynamic and processual approach.
• Present an innovative and interdisciplinary approach in terms of both the proposed theoretical framework and the included disciplines.

Chairs: Manuela Caiani, Benedetta Carlotti

Discussants: Benedetta Carlotti

Brothers of Italy, but not brothers of Europe? Assessing Fratelli d’Italia’s ambivalent vision of the European Union.
Eugenio Salvati
Abstract
The astonishing growth of Fratelli d’Italia (Borthers of Italy, FdI) has represented the last big earthquake in Italian politics. The success in the Italian general elections in 2022 has allowed the party leader, Giorgia Meloni, to become prime minister. The first Prime Minister of an important EU member state to be the expression of a radical right party While various studies are now being conducted on the profile of Fratelli d’Italia’s leadership, the party's policy priorities, and the characteristics of its electors, much less is known about the evolution of the party's stances on the EU, its vision of the integration process, and its conception of what the relationship between the national and supranational arenas should be. Generally speaking, we know that in the ideological background of radical right parties, harsh euroscepticism plays a prominent role (Vasilopoulou 2018). Nevertheless, in the case of FdI, other studies assess a more mixed picture (Bressanelli and De Candia 2023), where both radical right positions and more conservative tendencies coexist. The purpose of this research is to provide the first comprehensive analysis of Fratelli d'Italia's EU positions by studying the party's parliamentary speeches at both the national and supranational levels. Through this analysis, we aim to assess if FdI presents the traditional Eurosceptic positions of radical right parties or if it is more oriented towards a pragmatic Eurorealist approach, proper of conservative parties (Steven 2020). Furthermore, given the complicated relationship that radical right parties have with the EU as they transition from opposition to government, we hope to determine whether this turning point represents a critical juncture in FdI’s orientations, signalling a shift to a more pragmatic dialectic with EU institutions. In this regard, it will be critical to evaluate the evolution or stability of FdI's positions on both polity and policy dimensions at various points in time during the 2019–2024 period. In order to assess these elements, the concept of sovereignty will be used as the main lens through which understand FdI’s complex vision of the EU, its role, its competences, and the way in which it should relate to member states. Moreover, we expect that further complexity is represented by the arena in which the party positions are expressed. If the national parliament represents the perfect forum in which to articulate harsh stances towards the EU due to its proximity to electors, the European Parliament seems to be a more insulated arena where pragmatism may be more convenient than radicalism. We can reasonably suppose that the interaction between different arenas in different time frames will produce a complex and nuanced picture of FdI’s positions about the EU and the process of European integration and contribute to shedding light on the party’s “supranational identity.”.
From a research institute to a governance hub? The evolution of the concept of ‘European University’
Marina Cino Pagliarello, Giliberto Capano
Abstract
The concept of the European University has evolved significantly since its inception in 1972 as the “European University Institute,” a research and study body primarily focused on providing PhDs. This paper explores the ambiguous and polysemantic nature of the concept of ‘European University,’ tracing its transformation into an institutionalized initiative characterized by complex governance structures, diverse mechanisms, and various instruments, including the recent European Universities Initiative (EUI) Alliances. Through an analysis of historical documents, existing literature, and new empirical data about the EUI, the paper examines the implications of this evolution. In doing so, it contributes to the panel by considering the varied "visions” in the idea of ‘European University’ held by different European and transnational actor, reflecting the broader debates on the EU's integration future. Furthermore, it presents a provocative discussion on the outcomes and future agendas of European higher education, considering current EU education policies and initiatives (e.g., the Higher Education Package). This thought-provoking examination aims to address the "so what" of future agendas in higher education, providing a comprehensive understanding of the European University's past, present, and potential future roles.
Strategy behind Euroscepticism? The adaptable EU positions of radical Eurosceptic parties
Matteo Giardiello
Abstract
After the economic and social crises starting in 2008, an increasing number of RRPs and RRLs are no longer on the fringes of the European party system but are strongly integrated into their respective national political contexts. Academic and scientific research on radicalism has grown exponentially in recent years and has largely focused on analyzing the causes of this success. However, not enough attention has been devoted to the changes and developments that occur when radical parties reach governmental positions, especially regarding their positions on European issues. This paper addresses the following questions: Do RRPs and RLPs positions on Europe evolve when they enter government? Does their stance on Europe become more mainstreamed, do they silence it, or does their stance remain the same? What are the motivations behind their possible shifts in EU position when in government? How are their Eurosceptic narratives affected by government responsibility? The analysis uses a mixed method approach. The quantitative analysis uses the data of the CHES expert survey, which provides the assessment of the EU party positions; the qualitative analysis highlights the evolution of the public discourses of leaders of radical Eurosceptic parties, from opposition to a government status. The results show that radical parties that have built their consensus also on Euroscepticism weaken (or moderate) their opposition to the EU when they reach government status.
‘There Is No Future of Europe Without Africa’. Shaping the Vision of Europe Through the Prism of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Italy's Perspective
Małgorzata Maria Fijał
Abstract
The concept of a united and prosperous Europe has been a guiding vision for the European Union (EU) and its members since its inception. An important step towards this idea was the initiation by the European Commission of a strategic instrument of EU foreign policy in the form of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003. This framework was created to support stability, security, and prosperity in the countries surrounding the EU. The ENP seeks to create a ring of well-governed countries to the east and south of the EU, enhancing political, economic, and social ties with its neighbours. This policy is instrumental in addressing challenges such as migration, security threats, economic disparities, and political instability, which are crucial for the realization of a stable and cohesive European continent. The main stakeholders are not only EU institutions but also its member states. Nonetheless, these actors are experiencing increasing disagreements over the EU’s aims, content, and geographic preferences. Italy, for instance, given its strategic geographic location and historical connections — described as its 'natural vocation: a bridge between Africa and Europe' (Meloni 2024) — supports the peace process and stability in the eastern part of Europe and its enlargement but shows greater interest in the countries of the Mediterranean area than in those belonging to the Eastern Partnership. It takes the position that Europe's eyes should turn to the Global South, especially Africa. This perspective is deeply influenced by the country’s national interests, which include ensuring regional security, managing migration flows, fostering economic development, and leveraging cultural ties. These interests align with the broader goals of the ENP and contribute significantly to the evolving concept of Europe. This paper examines how Italy's engagement with the ENP reflects and shapes the future vision of Europe. Empirically, the analysis covers Italy's strategic actions, economic initiatives, and cultural diplomacy within the ENP framework, with particular emphasis on the Mediterranean area. Understanding Italy's perspective provides valuable insights into the complexities and dynamics of the ENP, shedding light on how individual member states contribute to the collective European vision. This research is part of the Horizon Europe project SHAPEDEM-EU (Rethinking and Reshaping the EU’s democracy support in its Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood).
 

Panel 11.10 From austerity to socialization: Adaptations of European economic governance to crisis policymaking (I)


A series of independent, but mutually reinforcing crises (from the sovereign debt crisis, to immigration, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy and inflation crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate emergency) have tested in multiple ways the European approach to emergency policymaking.

Among EU member states, after the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis, initial policy responses have focused on the need to increase supranational monitoring of member states. This has materialized in the increased coordination, and increased Commission involvement, in national budgetary policies (e.g., with the European Semester). Financial assistance to countries was mainly seen in the light of rigid conditionality, which can be seen in the bailouts of Ireland, Portugal, and most notably Greece. The creation of a permanent instruments to manage loans to countries in financial difficulties (the ESM) followed the same logic. The European banking union is another example of this increased centralization of EU financial surveillance.

Starting from 2012, a new phase has begun, marked by a more active and anti-cyclical intervention of the European Central Bank (ECB), which has adopted a more accommodating monetary policy, both towards states and businesses: the so-called “quantitative easing” (a massive programme of public and private bond purchases) has helped reduce the cost of financing for both states and businesses throughout Europe, leading to a relative calm on financial markets as well. In the meantime, the Commission reduced its demands of fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has elicited even more radical responses: i) an upgrading of the ECB quantitative easing (the Pandemic emergency purchase programme, PEPP); ii) the suspension and, later, substantial redrafting of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); iii) the adoption of the Next Generation EU relief package. The latter led member states to formulate ambitious National Recovery and Resilience Plans, whose implementation is ongoing.

Finally, the Russo-Ukrainian war has led to a quick and unexpected increase in energy prices that, together with bottlenecks due to the post-pandemic recovery, yielded a rapid rise in inflation rates throughout the continent. The risk of two-digit inflation has prompted a strong U-turn in ECB monetary policy, with the phasing-out of bond purchase programmes and quick rises in interest rates that still need to fall in light of easing pressures on prices.

This panel encourages papers that explore any aspect related to the changes in European governance and European policymaking related to the challenges above, and in particular:
• investigating the European Semester and its policy cycle, and its change within Next Generation EU;
• investigating the path-dependent and path-departing elements of NGEU;
• investigating and explaining the structure and adoption of the NRRPs;
• looking at the relationship between the “technocratic” bodies established to implement the NRRPs and the “political” bodies at the national and EU levels;
• analysing the genesis of the main institutional innovations of the previous years (which motivations have pushed member states to pursue integration? who has benefitted or lost more from the new setup?);
• focusing on the responsiveness of the EU political environment to demands arising from the European public opinion or from national public opinions;
• investigating the institutional and socioeconomic impacts of the Ukrainian crisis on the EMU and related instruments.

The panel is open to contributions based on different methodologies (quantitative analyses, case studies, analytic narratives, process tracing, comparative qualitative studies). Comparisons between European cases and cases from outside Europe are welcome. The panel is also open to studies from different disciplines: from political science to sociology, from economics to law.

Chairs: Igor Guardiancich, Mattia Guidi

Discussants: Enrico Borghetto

From the Green to the Just Transition: How did the EU adapted climate policies during and after the neoliberal era?
Gianmarco Fifi, Xinchuchu Gao
Abstract
We investigate the adaptation of the EU climate stances between the early 2000s until today, arguing that the dichotomy prevalent within the literature between market vs. public solutions to climate change misses the nuance of different interpretation and justifications of private and public interventions. Employing content analysis of policy papers, declarations to the press and meetings’ summaries, the paper argues that during different critical junctures the EU changed interpretation of the public-private nexus as well as of trade-offs between the green transition and social protection. Climate policy has become less market-liberal, while also acknowledging the redistributive distortions that could originate from public intervention. We identify four main periods: 1. In the early 2000s, market solutions and competitiveness between private actors were described as the dominant strategy in climate policies. 2. After the Stern Report (2006), the EU started interpreting climate change as a ‘market failure’. On the other hand, EU interventionism was not meant to enhance social protection, still conceptualised as a cascade effect of international competitiveness. 3. After the Eurozone crisis, competitiveness was increasingly seen as depending on sustainable energy (not viceversa). Differently from previous periods, the EU thought it should ‘change the price’ of clean energy (a distortion of competition that was previously openly criticised). 4. More recently, the EU has started emphasising the need to compensate disadvantaged groups and member states that are affected by the green transition. This has inspired a more interventionist approach of the EU across different policy-realms under the label ‘Just Transition’.
A Next Generation of Administrative Reforms? The Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan and the European approach to administrative reforms
Tommaso Sacconi
Abstract
The Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) has placed administrative reforms at the center of its efforts, aiming to achieve two overarching goals: firstly, enable the Italian public administration to fulfil the milestones and targets outlined in the plan, and secondly, to tackle the longstanding issues of poor administrative capacity in Italy. These reforms revolve around four central pillars: Access, Simplification, Skills, and Digitalization. For years, Country-Specific Recommendation within the European semester have highlighted persistent problems within Italy's public administration, often linked to perceived failures of other European policies such as cohesion policy. The Covid-19 crisis, coupled with the introduction of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) program, has provided a fundamental window of opportunity for reforming the Italian public administration, allowing for a rethinking and restructuring of administrative realm to meet both national and European expectations. In the aftermath of the Covid crisis, how have the priorities of national policymakers shifted in this regard? What role has the European Union played in framing these administrative challenges and providing the necessary policy instruments? Specifically, what has been the influence of the European Commission, and particularly the relatively newly established Directorate-General for Structural Reform Support (DG REFORM), in this domestic policy process? These questions are central to understanding the transformation underway in Italy's public administration. This study, part of a broader doctoral project on administrative reforms in Italy, aims to contribute to the scholarly debate in two ways. On the analytical side, the research will integrate the literature on Europeanisation with the advocacy coalition framework to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for studying the EU's role in administrative reforms in Italy. The mechanisms through which the EU influences domestic reforms will be closely examined and discussed, merging conditionality and learning processes. In terms of empirical contribution, the paper will undertake a comprehensive review of the literature on the European Union's role in administrative policy, highlighting recent developments, particularly within the framework of the European Semester. The empirical analysis will involve extensive document analysis to reconstruct the landscape of Italian administrative reforms, with a specific emphasis on Human Resource Management (Access and Skills). By assessing the policy design of these reforms in comparison to the latest policy documents on administrative reforms provided by DG REFORM, the study aims to offer an initial empirical assessment of the influence of a "European model in the making" on the policy content in Italy. Additionally, the study will examine whether and how Country-Specific Recommendations and European policy tools, such as the Technical Support Instrument, have impacted the formulation and implementation of Italian reforms. This research wants to shed light on the intricate dynamics between European and domestic factors shaping administrative reforms in Italy. By providing both analytical and empirical contributions, this study aims to enhance our understanding of the processes of Europeanisation and the ways in which EU-level initiatives can drive substantial administrative reforms at the national level.
Healthcare policy-making through the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility: A Policy Design Approach
David Natali, Emmanuele Pavolini, Andrea Terlizzi
Abstract
The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) (key part of the Next generation EU recovery programme of 2020) has been a big innovation in the EU and represented an opportunity to prioritize – among other policies- healthcare investments and reforms. While much has been written about the EU after the pandemic, in terms of the possibility for changing the economic paradigm and for triggering massive policy changes in the Member States, the present article sheds light on the RRF through a policy design approach. The latter allows to set up a mid-range analytical framework to assess the effectiveness of RRF in the context of the typical multi-level governance of healthcare. A policy design approach helps combining the study of the congruence of the EU policy strategy at the top, and the study of the national and regional capacities and implementation programs at the bottom. Through the study of the Italian case, we shed light on opportunities and limits of both the RRF and the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). The limited effectiveness of the strategy for reforms and investment is assessed to be the consequence of both EU-level incongruence and national- and regional-level political and institutional incapacities.
Gender equality and fiscal policy-making: gender mainstreaming in the EU pandemic recovery
Matilde Ceron
Abstract
While the EU has a longstanding formal commitment to gender mainstreaming, gender equality has traditionally remained a blind spot of EU economic governance and crises responses. The paper investigates if and under which conditions the EU response to the pandemic promoted gender-sensitive recovery policies. Next Generation EU entails common funding and priorities, including gender mainstreaming. Yet, the plans are designed at the national level. While the RRF represents unprecedented progress in including a gender mainstreaming mandate, its efficacy in delivering gender-sensitive recovery plans appears limited and heterogeneous across countries. The analysis assesses whether and under which conditions the gender mainstreaming mandate of the RRF is effective. In doing so it considers whether the mandate is sufficient in engendering prioritization of gender equality within the plans. Document analysis and elite interviews indicate conditionality through the gender mainstreaming mandate is weak, especially against others such as spending allocation targets and CSRs implementation. Gender equality was not a salient priority in the negotiations over the NRRPs and its scope was narrowly understood as related to its growth-enhancing potential. The analysis provides a gendered assessment of the flagship EU response to the pandemic and more broadly questions the effectiveness of (weak) gender mainstreaming conditionality, a cornerstone of the EU gender equality strategy.
The determinants of unemployment benefits generosity in the EU member states (2000–19)
Michele Piccinetti
Abstract
This quantitative research examines cross-national and cross-temporal differences in unemployment benefits expenditure across European countries. The study aims to evaluate the impact of three theoretical frameworks on the expenditure and generosity of unemployment benefits. Using a dataset comprising 27 EU countries from 2000 to 2019, the analysis primarily investigates the Power Resource Theory (PRT) and the Insider-Outsider Theory (IOT). The study tests these theories against two dependent variables: the level of unemployment benefits expenditure and a generosity index specifically calculated for this research. The Power Resource Theory posits that the strength of unions and the political affiliation of governing parties (partisanship) significantly influence welfare policies, including unemployment benefits. In contrast, the Insider-Outsider Theory suggests that labor market insiders, typically those with secure employment, benefit more from social policies than outsiders, who are often marginalized in policy considerations. To operationalize the Insider-Outsider Theory, additional variables were used, including the number of outsiders (part-time workers and those on temporary contracts) and an employment protection index. This index was calculated using factor analysis on variables derived from the "CBR Labour Regulation Index" dataset from Cambridge. The analysis, which employs mixed effect regression models, supports the Power Resource Theory, demonstrating a significant correlation between union strength, left-wing partisanship, and higher unemployment benefits expenditure and generosity. This highlights the role of political and social power in shaping welfare policies across the EU. A second step of the analysis focuses on the period 2011-2019 to examine the impact of Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) issued by supranational entities, such as the European Commission, on national unemployment benefits policies. The CSRs are coded and analyzed to understand their influence on the dependent variables. Initially, the analysis revealed that CSRs had no significant impact on either the expenditure or the generosity of unemployment benefits. However, subsequent analysis using the first difference in unemployment benefits expenditure as the dependent variable indicated that CSRs significantly influenced changes in expenditure, although they did non affect the generosity of the benefits . Further, the restricted dataset analysis from 2011 to 2019 reaffirms the diminishing influence of partisanship on unemployment benefits policies, which aligns with the Insider-Outsider Theory. This suggests that even within the constrained time frame, labor market insiders continue to receive preferential treatment in welfare policies, overshadowing partisan considerations. These findings contribute valuable insights into the dynamics of employment policy-making in Europe. They underscore the limited effectiveness of supranational recommendations in shaping welfare policies but reveal their potential to drive changes in expenditure patterns. This research is particularly relevant in the context of potential European Unemployment Benefit Schemes (EUBS), offering a nuanced understanding of the factors driving national preferences in welfare design. Understanding these determinants is crucial for policymakers aiming to develop equitable and effective unemployment benefits systems that can be harmonized at the European level. By highlighting the persistent role of national power structures and the complex impact of top-down recommendations, this study provides a critical perspective on the challenges and opportunities in reforming European unemployment benefits policies. Keywords: unemployment benefits, Power Resource Theory, Insider-Outsider Theory, European Union, welfare policy, Country-Specific Recommendations, partisanship, union strength, social policy, European Unemployment Benefit Schemes (EUBS), employment protection, labor market dynamics.
 

Panel 11.10 From austerity to socialization: Adaptations of European economic governance to crisis policymaking (II)


A series of independent, but mutually reinforcing crises (from the sovereign debt crisis, to immigration, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy and inflation crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate emergency) have tested in multiple ways the European approach to emergency policymaking.

Among EU member states, after the outburst of the sovereign debt crisis, initial policy responses have focused on the need to increase supranational monitoring of member states. This has materialized in the increased coordination, and increased Commission involvement, in national budgetary policies (e.g., with the European Semester). Financial assistance to countries was mainly seen in the light of rigid conditionality, which can be seen in the bailouts of Ireland, Portugal, and most notably Greece. The creation of a permanent instruments to manage loans to countries in financial difficulties (the ESM) followed the same logic. The European banking union is another example of this increased centralization of EU financial surveillance.

Starting from 2012, a new phase has begun, marked by a more active and anti-cyclical intervention of the European Central Bank (ECB), which has adopted a more accommodating monetary policy, both towards states and businesses: the so-called “quantitative easing” (a massive programme of public and private bond purchases) has helped reduce the cost of financing for both states and businesses throughout Europe, leading to a relative calm on financial markets as well. In the meantime, the Commission reduced its demands of fiscal consolidation and internal devaluation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has elicited even more radical responses: i) an upgrading of the ECB quantitative easing (the Pandemic emergency purchase programme, PEPP); ii) the suspension and, later, substantial redrafting of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP); iii) the adoption of the Next Generation EU relief package. The latter led member states to formulate ambitious National Recovery and Resilience Plans, whose implementation is ongoing.

Finally, the Russo-Ukrainian war has led to a quick and unexpected increase in energy prices that, together with bottlenecks due to the post-pandemic recovery, yielded a rapid rise in inflation rates throughout the continent. The risk of two-digit inflation has prompted a strong U-turn in ECB monetary policy, with the phasing-out of bond purchase programmes and quick rises in interest rates that still need to fall in light of easing pressures on prices.

This panel encourages papers that explore any aspect related to the changes in European governance and European policymaking related to the challenges above, and in particular:
• investigating the European Semester and its policy cycle, and its change within Next Generation EU;
• investigating the path-dependent and path-departing elements of NGEU;
• investigating and explaining the structure and adoption of the NRRPs;
• looking at the relationship between the “technocratic” bodies established to implement the NRRPs and the “political” bodies at the national and EU levels;
• analysing the genesis of the main institutional innovations of the previous years (which motivations have pushed member states to pursue integration? who has benefitted or lost more from the new setup?);
• focusing on the responsiveness of the EU political environment to demands arising from the European public opinion or from national public opinions;
• investigating the institutional and socioeconomic impacts of the Ukrainian crisis on the EMU and related instruments.

The panel is open to contributions based on different methodologies (quantitative analyses, case studies, analytic narratives, process tracing, comparative qualitative studies). Comparisons between European cases and cases from outside Europe are welcome. The panel is also open to studies from different disciplines: from political science to sociology, from economics to law.

Chairs: Igor Guardiancich, Mattia Guidi

Discussants: Matilde Ceron

Political Dissensus and EU Economic Governance: The European Semester between Technocratic Rule and Politicisation
Andrea Capati, Thomas Christiansen
Abstract
This article examines legitimacy and political dissensus in the area of EU economic governance, with a specific focus on the operation of the European Semester and the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). It asks how different types of legitimacy – democratic, technocratic and procedural – play out in EU economic policymaking, under which conditions political dissensus occurs, and what impact this has on implementing the facility. In doing so, the paper investigates the role of relevant EU and national actors in the process of coordination, adoption and implementation of the specific provisions of the RRF in the context of the European Semester. The paper then zooms in on Italy’s implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) to test the connection between legitimacy and political dissensus. Italy is a critical case in this regard, given that a) it is the recipient of the lion’s share of RRF funds, b) a government crisis unfolded between the design and the implementation of the NRRP, and c) domestic contestation about EU macro-economic management is long-standing. These factors combine to make Italy the most likely site of any potential dissensus about EU economic governance. The paper shows that the emergence of a “legitimacy disequilibrium”, based on strong technocratic but weak democratic legitimacy, has the potential to lead to political dissensus at both the EU and the national level through politicisation dynamics. It then concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications for the sustainability of the EU’s macro-economic governance framework.
Stronger Conditionality for Stronger Compliance? Analyzing NGEU's Effect on EU Policy Implementation
Igor Guardiancich, Mattia Guidi, Enrico Borghetto, Lucia Quaglia
Abstract
Much of the debate on the EU’s capacity to affect policy change across member states has centred on compliance research, particularly on whether stronger conditionality enhances compliance compared to more flexible regulatory schemes. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) program, established in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, introduced a robust conditionality framework compared to the laxer one under the several existing coordination processes. Leveraging data from the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSR) database and related evaluations, this research aims to determine if the NGEU represents a structural break in the implementation and effectiveness of the European Semester. The study employs segmented regression analysis to examine the impact of the NGEU on the trajectory of reform implementation. By analyzing the evaluations of the implementation of CSRs issued before and after the pandemic, we assess variations in the scope, nature, and compliance with the recommendations. Segmented regression allows us to detect structural breaks and measure the extent to which the NGEU has influenced policy changes across the EU, while hinging on the reliance - on behalf of the Commission - on established policy designs and conditionality mechanisms, allowing national governments significant leeway in defining their strategies.
Reforming fiscal regulation: a new paradigm of EU economic governance?
Tiziano Zgaga
Abstract
On 23 December 2023, European Union (EU) member states agreed on the politically contested reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the cornerstone of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The SGP consists of the set of rules that regulate the deficit and debt ratio that member states can have and the sanctions in case of non-compliance. Through a thematic analysis of the relevant regulations and directives, this paper first conceptualizes the new fiscal regulation that emerges from the SGP reform: are we facing a paradigmatic change as advocated by many, or just an incremental one? The paper then adopts process tracing, complemented by semi-structured interviews, to explain the negotiation that led governments with very different fiscal preferences to agree on the reform of the SGP. Hence, it sheds light on the nature of and the reasons behind the changes in the fiscal regulatory integration paradigm of EMU.
A comparative analysis of the formulation of National Recovery and Resilience Plans: domestic agency and strategic usages of Europe
Enrico Borghetto, Lucia Quaglia, Igor Guardiancich
Abstract
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic fallout, the European Union (EU) adopted the ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU) funding programme, the centrepiece of which was the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to support reforms and investments in EU countries. In order to access this funding, EU member states had to submit National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) prepared in consultation with the European Commission. This paper examines the domestic factors that have affected the formulation of the NRRPs by focusing on their reform agenda. The paper engages in a structured focused comparison of four country studies – Germany, France, Italy and Spain - as well as a longitudinal comparison and within-case process tracing of the Italian case. It draws attention to the ‘agency’ of national executives, their partisan profile and their strategic usages of Europe domestically. Unlike its predecessor, the technocratic core executive in Italy used its NRRP as an ‘external constraint’ to seek to bring about far-reaching controversial domestic reforms. The leftist executive in Spain did so to a lesser extent, avoiding reforms that were not attuned to its political views. The French executive proposed fewer reforms, which were in line with its partisan profile. The outgoing German grand coalition, facing imminent national elections, sought to avoid EU constraints, committing itself to minimal reforms.
Why sharing? Discursive strategies in major treaty negotiations leading to EU solidarity and conditionality
Niccolò Donati
Abstract
In recent years, a growing literature on EU solidarity has investigated public opinion attitudes towards cross-national redistribution and EU social policy. However, elite behaviors regarding EU solidarity have received less attention. Why, during some critical junctures, are decision-makers in the Council able to overcome 'national egoisms' and value conflicts to create solidaristic instruments? We know how structural factors and public discourse may contribute to a solidaristic outcome, especially in relation to the recent NGEU negotiations (Ferrera et al. 2021; De La Porte and Jensen 2021), but individual agency and discursive capacity during the negotiations are less investigated. Based on the polity approach (Ferrera, Kriesi, and Schelkle 2024), this study proposes a new explanation of how political actors within the Council interact with structural-level polity constraints and opportunities to broker the creation of EU solidarity instruments, and why the outcome is sometimes conditional solidarity. The research will focus on the two intergovernmental conferences (ICGs) that crucially established the structure of today's EU budget and most of the instruments that operate cross-national redistribution: the 1985 ICG leading to the Single Market and the 1991 ICG(s) leading to the Maastricht Treaty and the EMU. The inquiry will be based on a content analysis of the recently disclosed ICG documents of the Secrétariat Général du Conseil de l'UE, which contain the verbatim debates of the two ICGs. The analysis will also include epistemic reports made by supranational actors such as the Commission and by national actors close to national governments. The focus will be on both the state-level interest constellation and the discursive strategies used to overcome material and ideal interest contrasts. Apart from highlighting which discursive strategies worked, our findings show two different paths towards solidarity: solidarity is more likely to emerge when uncertainty about the outcome creates a context conducive to mutual assistance; when the winners and losers constellation is more evident, existing asymmetries in interests and values tend to lead to conditional solidarity.