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SISP Conference 2023

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Section 8 - Parties, Public Opinion, Elections

Managers: Silvia Bolgherini, Fulvio Venturino

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Panel 8.1 The 2022 Italian General Election: Analyses and Interpretations (I)

Chairs: Lorenzo De Sio

Discussants: Alessandro Chiaramonte

Fratelli d’Italia. Radici e dinamiche di un successo annunciato
Gianfranco Baldini, Sorina Soare
Abstract

L'offerta politica 2022 tra liste e coalizioni
Matteo Boldrini, Marco Improta, Aldo Paparo
Abstract

Opinione pubblica e issue nelle elezioni del 2022
Lorenzo De Sio, Nicola Maggini, Elisabetta Mannoni
Abstract

Politiche 2022: partecipazione elettorale e impatto dei divari socioeconomici
Davide Angelucci, Federico Trastulli, Dario Tuorto
Abstract

Risultati, flussi di voto e issue voting nelle elezioni politiche italiane del 2022
Lorenzo De Sio, Davide Angelucci, Aldo Paparo
Abstract

Panel 8.1 The 2022 Italian General Election: Analyses and Interpretations (II)

Chairs: Alessandro Chiaramonte

Discussants: Lorenzo De Sio

Territorio e voto in Italia alle elezioni politiche del 2022
Nicola Maggini, Vincenzo Emanuele, Matteo Cataldi
Abstract

Il sistema partitico italiano dopo le elezioni del 2022: il processo di deistituzionalizzazione continua
Vincenzo Emanuele, Alessandro Chiaramonte, Elisa Volpi
Abstract

Una campagna poco decisiva? Le priorità dei cittadini e le strategie dei partiti
Luca Carrieri, Cristian Vaccari
Abstract

La rivincita della politica? Il ceto parlamentare alla prova della riduzione dei seggi
Luca Verzichelli, Bruno Marino, Filippo Tronconi
Abstract

Il paper descrive e interpreta le caratteristiche del ceto parlamentare eletto nel 2022. Il focus si concentra sulla principale novità istituzionale, la riduzione del numero dei parlamentari, in combinazione con l’evoluzione del sistema partitico che ha visto l’indebolimento delle due forze politiche (Lega e Movimento Cinque Stelle) vincitrici nel 2018. L’ipotesi di partenza è che questo mix di fattori abbia contribuito a ridimensionare le innovazioni del ceto parlamentare osservate nelle precedenti elezioni (in primis quelle portate dal Movimento Cinque Stelle) e restituito centralità al ruolo dei partiti e dei loro gruppi dirigenti. In breve, un ritorno, sia pure relativo, delle logiche del professionismo politico e del controllo partitico sulla formazione delle élite. La riduzione del numero di parlamentari ha reso più pressanti le abituali preoccupazioni di sopravvivenza dei parlamentari. Sono rimasti immutati, invece, altri vincoli del sistema elettorale: doppio canale uninominale-plurinominale, liste bloccate, obbligo di alternanza fra i generi nelle candidature, possibilità di formalizzare alleanze pre-elettorali. Partendo da questi presupposti, analizziamo le tradizionali caratteristiche socio-demografiche e politiche del ceto parlamentare (tasso di ricandidatura e di rielezione, genere, età media e profilo socio-occupazionale, precedenti esperienze politiche e istituzionali, tipo di expertise). Questi cambiamenti potrebbero avere piegato in modo innovativo i profili di reclutamento emersi nel recente passato, e che avevano fatto intravedere l’emergere di una “classe politica populista”, caratterizzata da inesperienza politica e istituzionale e profili socio-demografici eccentrici. Dopoi l 2018 era stato però sottolineato come tali peculiarità fossero difficilmente sostenibili nel lungo periodo. Sarà questa l’occasione per verificare se tali congetture erano corrette e quanto sopravviva dell’esperienza di quella stagione politica inaugurata nel 2013 e proseguita nel 2018. Infatti, i vincoli supplementari introdotti dalla riduzione dei parlamentari potrebbero avere indotto i partiti a virare verso modalità diverse di reclutamento. In particolare, la tecnica del “paracadutismo” di candidati estranei al territorio che dovrebbero rappresentare, e l’esclusione di candidati “laterali” e non adeguati ad una fase rinnovata di disciplina partitica. Inoltre, i nuovi vincoli potrebbero aver inciso sulla possibilità di uso strategico del canale uninominale o di quello plurinominale, più che nella precedente tornata elettorale, per assicurare ai parlamentari di lungo quelle posizioni “blindate” oramai ridotte. In breve, la classe parlamentare uscita dalle elezioni del 2022 potrebbe evidenziare il ritorno di alcuni caratteri tradizionali di controllo centralistico e nel contempo il consolidamento di figure neo-notabilari, a dispetto di una ancora elevata volatilità elettorale e dell’incertezza che si lega alla vittoria di un partito fino a ieri marginale nel panorama politico. Tuttavia, proprio la vittoria di un partito “nuovo” – eppure legato ad una lontana tradizione dell’istituzione legislativa italiana – potrebbe essere la chiave per capire come discontinuità e innovazioni potranno combinarsi nel ceto politico futuro.

Maggioritario di risulta. Il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano alla sua seconda prova
Alessandro Chiaramonte, Aldo Paparo, Roberto D'Alimonte
Abstract

Panel 8.2 Social Status, Social norms, Public Opinion and Political Behaviour (I)

Chairs: Francesco Colombo

Discussants: Daniel Bischof

Delayed Maturation and Conservative Voting
Laura Serra
Abstract

Exploring material and ideological correlates of perceived victimhood
Moreno Mancosu, Federico Vegetti, Antonella Seddone, Giuliano Bobba
Abstract

The concept of victimhood in politics is gaining increasing interest in both public and academic debate, especially when referring to practices and attitudes that emerge both at the elite and mass levels (Amaly and Enders, 2021; Boussalis et al., 2022). This paper aims at investigating perceptions of victimhood at the public opinion level, arguing that material and ideological elements might correlate with the levels of this attitude. The literature dealing with perceived victimhood mainly aims at finding ideological correlates of this psychological construct, focusing on whether left-right placement, voting behavior, and other socio-demographic variables are likely to explain levels of perceived victimhood. We aim at extending the present literature, by combining the victimhood studies with the economic grievance literature (Kriesi et al., 2006; Kurer et al., 2019). Consistent with the literature on economic grievance, we argue that economic aspects might affect the perception that one has of being a victim. Several studies posit that specific groups, especially those experiencing economic distress following the process of tertiarization and globalization of Western societies, might experience resentment toward the system (Kriesi et al., 2006). We argue that levels of perceived victimhood might be affected, in addition to cultural/ideological factors, also by material/economic factors (that can be measured, for instance, by income levels). If perceived victimhood is correlated with both material and ideological factors, it is also interesting to assess whether (and how) the two variables interact. Previous literature has shown an association between being in economic distress and voting for right-wing populist parties, which, according to the literature, tend to present themselves as avengers of a wounded heartland (Taggart and Kaltwasser, 2016). What we ask, thus, is whether a combination of conservatism and economic hardship can increase the level of perceived victimhood among the population. The hypothesis testing will be performed in Italy, a multi-party context characterized by strong anecdotal evidence of practices of victimhood enacted by politicians. By employing two surveys administered on convenience and quota samples of Italian citizens, we aim at answering several questions: 1) the literature shows that perceived victimhood can be separated into two related facets, one stressing the systemic nature of one victimhood (“I am a victim of the system” - systemic victimhood) and one focusing on a more existential aspect (“Nothing ever works out for me” - egocentric victimhood). We test the egocentric/systemic dimensions of perceived victimhood battery in a non-US context; 2) we analyze socio-economic and ideological correlated of perceived victimhood; 3) we test the interaction of the two, to assess whether the correlation of high-low levels of these two correlates leads to a multiplicative effect on egocentric/systemic victimhood. First, by performing a confirmatory factor analysis, we show that the separation between egocentric and systemic victimhood holds also in the Italian context. Results answering the second set of questions are consistent with what we derived from the theory: the higher the subjective levels of economic distress, the higher the levels of perceived victimhood. Also, the relationship between conservatism is positive and significant in both studies. We also show that higher levels of conservatism/economic distress do not provide higher levels of victimhood when they are present together in an individual. Rather, they lead to a counter-intuitive pattern, in which, on the one hand, right-wing citizens score high in (egocentric) victimhood irrespective of their material conditions. On the other hand, we see a significant difference between wealthy and low-income left-wing citizens. We argue that, among left-wing voters, the only mechanism at work is that of material conditions - better objective economic conditions lead to a significant reduction of perceived victimhood. Right-wing voters do not see any difference in perceived victimhood: if, as stressed above, right-wing populist parties are more likely to signal victimhood as an ideological/communication element of their strategy, the absence of income differences among right-wing citizens might suggest some form of party/elite cueing, which is mainly located in the right-wing part of the political spectrum (Zaller, 1992). References Armaly, M. T., & Enders, A. M. (2021). ‘Why Me?’The Role of Perceived Victimhood in American Politics. Political Behavior, 1-27. Boussalis, C., Craig, C., & Rudkin, A. (2022). Collective Victimhood Narratives in Far-right Communities on Telegram. Working paper. Available from https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/bgk96/ Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. European Journal of Political Research, 45(6), 921-956. Kurer, T., Häusermann, S., Wüest, B., & Enggist, M. (2019). Economic grievances and political protest. European Journal of Political Research, 58(3), 866-892. Taggart, P., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2016). Dealing with populists in government: some comparative conclusions. Democratization, 23(2), 345-365. Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge university press.

How Economic Shocks Fuel Far Right Support: The Xylella Outbreak in Italy
Simone Cremaschi, Nicola Bariletto, Catherine De Vries
Abstract

It Takes a Village: Economic Decay, Rootedness, and Voting
Giuseppe Ciccolini
Abstract

Much research is devoted to the diverse success of the far right throughout the Western world. Leading demand-side explanations point to the role of local economic opportunities in peripheral areas in comparison to economic and political centers. Yet the very mechanism driving this geographic heterogeneity remains unclear, as individual-level studies do not corroborate the argument that voters’ worsening economic conditions spur far-right voting. Among the possible contextual factors shaping voters’ reactions to local economic decline, ethnographic research from the US has emphasized the importance of place-based community rootedness. Rootedness shares features of both social capital and place attachment – two factors that have received greater attention in this literature – while being more encompassing than them. Unfortunately, evidence using quantitative methods and considering the European context is scant. To address this shortcoming, the present paper investigates how rootedness moderates the impact of regional economic decline on far-right electoral success. I select the case of Italy and specifically the 2018 general election. This choice is justified by the country’s experience with deindustrialization, the abundance of research and data on social capital and place attachment, and the presence of a successful far-right option within a rich party system (notably, including a populist non-far-right party). I focus on one major source of economic decay: decadal exposure to international trade with China. I do so by measuring local exposure to changes in Chinese trade imports in Italy since the early 2000s, based on area-specific historical sectoral specialization, and instrument it using Chinese imports to other OECD countries (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). To measure rootedness, I construct a composite indicator, based on the weakest-link method. To this end, I first conduct a factor analysis exploiting a variety of variables (associational density, volunteering rate, homeownership rate, surname diversity, among others) extracted from census data and phone directories. The results of the present analysis demonstrate that the electoral success of the far right due to Chinese imports doubles in areas featuring fairly high levels of rootedness, compared to the standard. Hence, in localities where dwellers are particularly attached to their place and community, the social consequences of regional economic decline are amplified. This effect is specific to the populist radical right, and does not extend to other populist parties or the rest of the right-wing family. Also, this phenomenon is of most concern to the left and the center-right – and equally so. Additional inquiry reveals this is not the result of a decrease in electoral turnout. On the contrary, the far right also mobilizes voters that, in absence of rootedness, would have otherwise acquiesced to economic decay. In conclusion, this study advances scholarly understanding of the relevance of place to the cultural conflict in politics. While claims of the revival of the center-periphery cleavage might be overstated, since regionalism is marginal to the ideology of the far right, this political family does benefit from regional inequality. Economic decline threatens local communities, which retreat into themselves, come into conflict with out-groups, and become sensitive to rhetoric on identity and pride. This finding thus calls for further research on the importance of the place dimension in politics (Rickard 2020; Gieryn 2000; Agnew 1987). On the one hand, this requires putting further effort into situating individuals in their proximate social context. The fact that political action does not happen in a social vacuum should be taken more seriously both in theory and methods. On the other, it means considering changes in local conditions from a longitudinal and dynamic perspective – by contrast to the cross-sectional approach that is adopted in the present analysis and most other literature on the topic. This could be achieved, for instance, by comparing deindustrializing areas that are successful in their post-industrial transition and those that are not and are destined to decline, similar to Sch¨oll and Kurer (2023). The findings of this study should also inspire reflections on the social and political responses to regional economic divergence. Classic economic theory posits that labor markets readjust to asymmetric shocks through people’s movement to more productive areas (Blanchard et al. 1992). This is most critical in the case of Europe, as the free movement of workers is the basis of the EU project. Yet though there may be some truth in this (Gathmann, Helm, and Sch¨onberg 2020; but see Saks and Wozniak 2011; Monras 2015), the extent to which such movement occurs in reality needs further attention (Amior and Manning 2018). Citizens in certain areas may not be willing or able to move – which further deteriorates their condition (Bound and Holzer 2000). The present study puts forward one notable case of this dynamic. While integration in the local community may be beneficial in many respects, it also augments the social and economic cost of migration. When “exit” is no option, citizens express their reactions at the polls. This calls for further investigation into the importance of “steadiness” for electoral politics.

Panel 8.2 Social Status, Social norms, Public Opinion and Political Behaviour (II)

Chairs: Francesco Colombo

Discussants: Fred Paxton

The Precariat: Unveiling Policy Preferences and Mobilization Potential
Elisabetta Girardi
Abstract

Then and Now: Comparing early and later experiences of Deprivation on Civic Behaviour
Franco Bonomi Bezzo, Laura Silva, Anne-Marie Jeannet
Abstract

Community deprivation puts an economic and social strain on civic life when individuals are denied conditions ordinary to that society. Deprived communities are characterized by a persistent scarcity of material resources but also a lack of vital social resources. In a deprived community, a person’s own material lack is compounded by their neighbourhood context. It is well established that a community’s material deprivation can influence the ways that residents interact with one another (Jahoda et al., 1933; Wilson, 2011). Qualitative evidence finds that individuals living in deprived areas feel isolated and disenfranchised as they come to view the society around them as ’forbidding’ (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2004). The social context where individuals live can determine how much they actively engage in politics (Dacombe and Parvin, 2021) as well as the extent to which individuals participate in local associations (Huckfeldt, 1979). Some qualitative studies have documented the lower participation in voluntary associations in impoverished areas (Small, 2002; Wilson, 2011) but little is still known about the mechanisms through which this works. Small (2002)’s ethnographic study of deprived areas reveals the complexity of participation in community associations and that poverty imposes structural constraints on participation. This evidence of structural constraints would indicate that low participation in deprived areas is not simply due to a concentration of individuals who lack sufficient resources or education to form social organizations. Instead, there is reason to see the concentration of deprivation as reinforcing group-level scarcity in social life. The purpose of this study is to reappraise what has been found in qualitative case studies through a quantitative analysis and to investigate the mechanisms linking experiences of collective material deprivation and associational membership. Taking a Durkheimian view, we claim that a person’s decision to engage politically not only depends on individual willingness but also a) on the community where the individuals have grown up and b) on the community where individuals currently live. Drawing on existing research on political socialization, we postulate that not only the contextual, but also the exposure to deprivation during childhood has long-lasting effects on civic and political engagement in adulthood. For this reason, we investigate the differential relevance of community deprivation across the life-course of people born either in 1958 or in 1970. To better understand these patterns, we test different competing mechanisms through which neighbourhood deprivation can be related to civic participation. To be clear, in this article we go beyond considering a person’s current neighbourhood, looking also at the effect of experiences of collective deprivation in early life. We use data about the UK from two birth cohort studies, the NCDS for people born in 1958 and BCS for people born in 1970. To harmonize the two cohorts, we measure the neihgbourhood of origin at age 16 and our outcome at age 42. The neighbourhood is defined at the level of Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). Each LSOA contains between 1,000 and 3,000 people. As a measure of neighbourhood deprivation, we use the Townsend Index (Townsend et al.,1988). The Townsend Index is a composite measure deriving from four Census variables: unemployment (as a percentage of those aged 16 and over who are economically active), non-car ownership (as a percentage of all households), non-home ownership (as a percentage of all households) and household overcrowding (as a percentage of all households). Our main outcomes of interest are whether individuals have voted or not in the most recent general election, whether individuals actively participate in local associations, and the level of trust and social cohesion toward the community they belong to. Our findings show that, while exposure to deprivation at any life stage has always a negative effect on the probability of participating in local associations, experiencing deprivation during childhood and adulthood have opposite effects on the probability of voting. In fact, while being exposed to deprivation during childhood has a negative effect on the probability of voting, the same experience during adulthood has a positive effect on the probability of voting. This is important because it demonstrates that neighbourhood deprivation simultaneously exerts competing forces on the participation of its residents. One possible explanation for this heterogeneous pattern is that while growing up in a more disadvantaged context create a form of apathy and lack of interest towards political participation, the very same experience of deprivation during adulthood creates a sense of struggle and willingness to be heard. Finally, a second interesting result from our analysis is that the effect of the neighbourhood where individuals have grown up is opposite for the two cohorts of people when we consider trust and social cohesion. In fact, growing up in a more deprived neighbourhood has a positive effect on social cohesion for those born in 1958 while it has a negative effect for those born in 1970. We theorize that this can be due also to the different socio-cultural environment and associated values that where predominant in the two periods. While, indeed, in 1974 (when the 1958 cohort was 16) the UK came from a period of Welfare State expansion, characterised by more egalitarian and progressive values, in 1986 (when the 1970 cohort was 16) it was the peak of the neo-liberal reign of Margaret Thatcher with a more individualistic and business-oriented society.

Panel 8.3 “Navigating the storm”: an ideological re-alignment of European Far-Right and Conservative parties at the time of the Russia-Ukraine war?

Chairs: Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Alessio Scopelliti

Discussants: Alessio Scopelliti

Fratelli d'Italia, the ECR party and the 2024 European Parliament election
Valerio Alfonso Bruno
Abstract

Fratelli d’Italia in the EU: A radical party in disguise?
Edoardo Bressanelli, Margherita De Candia
Abstract

Established in 2012, Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) has had a remarkable political journey, going from a 2 percent result in the 2013 general Italian election, to becoming Italy’s largest party in 2022. This extraordinary electoral climb has spurred a soaring interest in the party and led to speculations about its ‘true’ nature: Is FdI a post-fascist, a radical right, or a conservative party? Using a mixed-method approach and a wide range of data, this paper seeks to contribute to this debate by studying the behaviour of FdI inside the European Parliament (EP), where the party sits with the soft Eurosceptic group of the European Conservatives and Reformists. More specifically, with the aim of producing both a bird's-eye view and a fine-grained picture of FdI’s behaviour in the EP, we first assess, based on all final votes in EP-9, the political fit of FdI – in terms of voting agreement - with its political group, and compare it with the party’s alignment with the other (centre-)right groups in the EP, the group of the European People's Party and the Identity and Democracy group. Next, we examine in depth the party’s position on crucial legislative and non-legislative ‘crisis’ acts: from the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the financial instrument introduced by the EU in February 2021 to alleviate the economic and social repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic across the member states; to the REPowerEU Chapters, introduced in February 2023 to address the energy needs arising from the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Our analysis sheds new light on FdI’s behaviour and identity by showing the party’s broad alignment – both in words and in deeds – with conservative principles and positions, albeit with some remarkable exceptions (mainly on socio-liberal issues) where its position is more radical. Moreover, the study indicates that the party has shown a more moderate behaviour in the EP following its transition from opposition to government benches in Italy.

Normalisation of Radical Right-Centre Right Coalitions: The Case of Italy and The Role of Russia’s Intervention to Ukraine in Upcoming European Elections 2024
Selcen Oner
Abstract

After facing with economic, migration crises, Brexit and the pandemic, Europe has focused on its own internal problems. With the effect of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the EU has focused on its foreign, security and defense policy. Various visions of Europe are still competing in the EU. The populist radical right parties after Brexit process started to focus on ‘Europe of nations’ which may be defined as ‘Parochial Europe’ vision (Öner, 2020). Lega’s leader Salvini was the main representative of this vision in the 2019 European elections. For the upcoming European elections, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni after forming the biggest radical right-center right coalition, she may play a pioneer role in the formation of a radical right-center right collaboration at European level. After the recent changes in the retirement age in France, there had been long demonstrations. If these socio-economic problems cannot be solved, there is a risk of further rise of National Rally in the upcoming European elections. In the last snap general elections in Italy in September 2022 the populist radical right Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FDI), Matteo Salvini’s Lega, and populist centre right Forza Italia and Noi Moderati collaborated with each other and won the elections (%43.8) and formed a coalition. For the first time in Western Europe a radical right party became a bigger coalition partner. One of the biggest common denominator among European populist radical right parties is their anti-immigrant, anti-refugee policies especially towards non-European and Muslim irregular immigrants. We have seen that they have shifted their rhetoric and policies after Russia’s intervention to Ukraine towards Ukrainian asylum seekers. One of the main dividing line between European radical right parties is their way of looking to Russia and their relations with Putin. While some political figures like Salvini and Le Pen had close ties with Putin, some are against. Meloni has a more Atlanticist approach in foreign policy and in favour of supporting Ukraine. Even those radical right parties who had close ties with Putin had tried to put a distance. Marine Le Pen had to order destruction of 1.2 million election leaflets in which she had a photo with Putin while shaking hands in Kremlin. Thus, we have seen further normalisation of radical right, meanwhile radicalisation of center right. We have also seen normalisation of radical right-centre right coalitions as well which has been together increasingly perceived and reflected by many media representatives as just right wing parties. These political tendencies at national level may have implications at European level which may be reflected in the upcoming European elections. In the last European elections in 2019, the radical right parties get totally around 10%. The negative socio economic impacts of Russia-Ukraine war on Europe, particularly rising inflation rates, energy, housing and food prices may influence the result of the upcoming European elections as well. If these problems cannot be solved or at least decreased by the mainstream parties in power, populist radical right parties may benefit from this atmosphere. For the upcoming European elections, we may see closer collaboration and even coalition between radical right and centre right groups as well. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) which define themselves as ‘Eurorealits’ instead of ‘anti-European’. Identity and Democracy (ID) group has MEPs mostly from National Rally the League and the AfD. They emphasise “the Greek-Roman and Christian heritage as the pillars of European civilisation” . They are in favour of “cooperation between sovereign European nations, and reject any further evolution toward a European superstate.” Their main difference is that they mostly have close ties to Putin and critical towards NATO. On the other hand, the EPP is the biggest party family at the EP. One of the common characteristics of these three parties is their cultural perception of European identity, while EPP is different because they are in favour further European integration and they are not nativist. Italian Prime Minister Meloni has become one of the pioneer actors of ‘Parochial Europe’ vision and after forming a coalition with conservatives, she tries to promote this cooperation at European level as well before the upcoming European elections. After the Qatargate scandal that negatively influenced the leftist group, Meloni tries to overcome the predominant influence of centre-right and centre-left parties at the EP. The EP’s President Roberta Metsola in January 2022 was elected with the support of the ECR as well. During the summer of 2022, Manfred Weber who is the leader of the EPP, campaigned for the rightist coalition led by Meloni ahead of the Italian elections . During a visit to Rome, Weber endorsed Berlusconi’s party for its campaign before Italian elections. Berlusconi, who is a former MEP at the EPP group, has been also trying to contribute to this cooperation as well. After Russia-Ukraine war, Finland became a member of NATO and the radical right Finns Party decided to leave ID group and move to ECR. In the party statement it was stated that “radical change in Finland’s security policy” caused by the Russia’s war on Ukraine led the party to “reexamine international cooperation networks”. Thus, one of the main issues that affect this collaboration between radical right and conservatives will be the role of Russia-Ukraine war. In this paper the normalisation of radical right-center right coalitions in European politics is analysed by focusing on the recent elections and the new coalition in Italy. The implications of this coalition in collaboration between radical right and center right groups at the EP and the role of Russia-Ukraine war in this process will be discussed by focusing on the meetings of the representatives from these parties and their speeches.

Panel 8.5 The comparative study of political parties: advances, continuity and change

Chairs: Giorgia Bulli, Enrico Calossi, Eugenio Pizzimenti

Discussants: Giorgia Bulli

How party reputations influence public opinion. Evidence from a referendum campaign
Davide Morisi, Rune Slothuus
Abstract

The Five Star Movement in government: A rebel at the wheel?
Anna Grazia Napoletano
Abstract

Always the same story? Party organizational change and variance (1970-2019)
Beniamino Masi
Abstract

Testing May's Law in Italy. An empirical investigation of the Democratic Party
Bruno Marino, Antonella Seddone, Marco Valbruzzi
Abstract

Since the publication of the seminal contribution by John May in the 1970s, the differentiated ideological congruence within political parties has been widely investigated. On the one hand, many pieces of research have focused on the ideological differences among different strata of political parties (party voters, party members, party activists, and party MPs and leaders) coming from several Western European countries. Empirical results have not always found evidence of the presence of the so-called ‘curvilinear disparity’ proposed by May. On the other hand, the original ‘May’s law’ has been subsequently modified and amended, to account for the importance of intra-party or structural factors in affecting the degree of parties’ internal congruence. Against this backdrop, the Partito Democratico (PD) represents an interesting case study to empirically explore the validity of May’s law more than 50 years after its inception. The usefulness of recurring to the study of the PD stems from different considerations: first, it is the most important Italian centre-left party and was part of government coalitions for many years; second, it is a party which has been extensively studied from many viewpoints (leadership, MPs, members, sympathizers, and voters); third, it has undergone different profound leadership and (possibly) ideological changes from its birth onwards; fourth, it has quite inclusive leader selection rules, allowing not only members but also sympathizers to have the final say in the selection of the party leader, thus giving considerable influence to people outside the party. In this paper, we explore the ideological congruence within different layers of the PD (leadership, members, sympathizers, and voters) in the last years, thanks to data coming from different sources (e,g,the Comparative Manifesto Project, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Candidate and Leader Selection, the Italian National Election Study). The Research Questions we will address are as follows: is there any evidence of the presence of curvilinear disparity’ within the PD? Has this disparity changed over the years - and to what extent? The paper - and the answers to the Research Questions - can be of interest for scholars interested in party politics, party membership, and Italian politics.

The 2022 Italian General Elections Campaign: parties, leaders and strategies on Facebook ADS
Daniela Piccio, Antonella Seddone
Abstract

With the growing digitalization of contemporary society political parties have been growingly relying on the internet for campaigning. The movement ‘from the fringe to the mainstream’ of digital campaigning predicted by Gibson and Ward (1998) did indeed take place, with social media platforms becoming a major tool for political advertising. While scholars in the Anglo-Saxon region – and more recently across Western continental Europe – have been devoting growing attention to this phenomenon, research is particularly scant in Italy despite the significant presence by political parties on digital platforms. We know little of the Italian parties and the candidates’ advertising strategies on social media platforms and we have a limited understanding of how this tool is being used, especially when it comes to money spent. The paper provides an empirical analysis of the political ADS published on Facebook by the six major political parties in Italy (Azione, Forza Italia, Fratelli d’Italia, Movimento 5 Stelle, Lega, Partito Democratico) and by their respective leaders, during the campaigning period for the Italian general elections of 25 September 2022. Based on the over 800 political acts collected using the Meta Ad Library, we analyse the volume and the timing of ads published; the amount of money spent on Facebook ads; the main topics covered by the political ads, their target audience and reach, comparing across the different political parties and candidates. Moreover, we argue that a close examination of this topic is necessary not only if we want to have a clearer understanding of what the Italian political parties are doing online (and which parties are doing most), but also to engage in the long-debated ‘normalization’ versus ‘equalization’ hypotheses concerning the impact of online activity on the ability of political actors to compete on equal grounds. As we shall see, this debate particularly applies for the case for Italy, where the online arena is not subject to any restriction and the private sources of income have become largely predominant, following the 2014 political finance reform repealing any direct forms of party funding. Is it the case that established and more resourceful actors benefit from the online political sphere more than their peripheral counterparts?

Panel 8.7 Populist Competition: Exploring Demand- and Supply-Side (I)

Chairs: Gianluca Piccolino

Discussants: Sofia Marini

The Populist Radical Right: the ‘Outer Mainstream’ of Contemporary European Politics
Mirko Crulli, Daniele Albertazzi
Abstract

Differential Impact of Populist Attitudes in the Vote in First- and Second-Order Elections: The Case of Portugal
José Santana Pereira
Abstract

Affective polarization and supply-side populism in Spain: The impact of affective polarization on the intention to vote for populist parties
Danilo Serani
Abstract

Mobilization, demobilization and remobilizations of populist voters in longitudinal perspective. The case of Germany
Davide Vittori, Davide Angelucci
Abstract

Political scientists have long debated about the role of populism in liberal democracies: in particular, scholars have wondered whether this populist wave represents a threat or a corrective for democracy. On the one hand, populism insists on an anti-elitist, people-centric and anti-pluralist conception of democracy, which might be threatening for the core values of liberal democracies; on the other, populism is also perceived as a political phenomenon capable of mobilizing politically marginalized and alienated social groups, canalizing their rejection of the system into a more pro-systemic protest, thus indirectly strengthening the representativeness of the political system as whole. Recent contributions on the effect of populist parties’ presence for the election turnout have provided mixed results. Most of the literature on the rise of populist political parties (on the left and on the right) have so far focused on both of the demand and offer sides: in a nutshell, the drivers that lead to vote for populist parties, the political attitudes of the populist voters and what populist parties “offer” in term of policy proposals. Nonetheless, one often-neglected aspect in the literature is whether populist voters are a mobilized “social” group or whether they are disenfranchised and thus prefer to stay out of the system. It is often assumed that populists express their protest through the ballot box, yet we do not know whether all voters with populist attitudes do indeed mobilize or, rather, they prefer abstention. And, equally important, those who stay out of the system in what way are (more or less) alienated and “populist” compared to the electorate of populist parties? The analysis of the abstainers and the comparison of this group with other group of voters is still underdeveloped, not only in the study of populism. In a demobilized environment, such as those of in Western Europe, where participation has reached its lowest peak in the last decade, these questions are even more pressing. In this paper, we inquire whether and how populist attitudes as measured at the individual level are able to correct existing participatory unbalances. We do so by using the GLES dataset on the German case: GLES offers a unique panel and a longitudinal dataset that allows to look at the pattern of populist voters and abstainers before, during and after the entrance of a successful radical-right populist party, as AFD. Our paper proceed as follow, we explore the effect of individuals' populist attitudes on their intention to go to the polls and cast a vote in the next federal election; second, we investigate whether and to what extent populist attitudes are able to mitigate the widely documented adverse effects on political participation of social and political marginality; finally, focusing on vote flows between the 2013, 2017 and 2021 federal elections, we estimate the remobilisation/demobilisation potential of individual holding (or acquiring) populist attitudes. The paper thus intends to contribute to a larger body of literature on the effects of populism on participatory democracy.

‘European integration, radical parties and their voters: Who cues whom?’
Luca Carrieri, Davide Angelucci, Giorgos Charalambous
Abstract

Panel 8.7 Populist Competition: Exploring Demand- and Supply-Side (II)

Chairs: Gianluca Piccolino

Discussants: Sorina Soare

Radical Right, Populist or What? Exploring the political culture of Fratelli d’Italia with a novel middle-level elite survey
Gianfranco Baldini, Filippo Tronconi
Abstract

“Don’t mind me; it’s the elite!” How parties’ anti-elitism salience explains issue blurring.
Paride Carrara
Abstract

Political parties are often accused of beclouding their true preferences in a fog of ambiguity in order to avoid detrimental issues and appeal to a larger audience. The literature that focuses on understanding why parties decide to present a more ambiguous position highlights how in a multidimensional context, parties decide which strategy to pursue depending on their attachment to the specific dimension. Indeed, more extreme parties both tend to emphasize and clarify their stance on the issues they champion while de-emphasizing and blurring on dimensions that are of secondary importance to them. While the present paper agrees with this view, it also shows how the focus on positional issues neglects the potential role of non-positional issues in shedding light on the conditions that determine the strategic use of ambiguity. In particular, the paper focus on the employment of anti-elitism rhetoric defined as a "quasi-valence" issue that has the potential to appeal to voters across the ideological spectrum and can be employed by any party regardless of their type or status. Therefore, by strategically deciding to compete using anti-elitism, which might be considered appreciated by a large group of voters, we expect parties to increase their ambiguity on positional dimensions. The reason for this expectation resides in the fact that positional issues are divisive by nature and have the intrinsic risk of alienating part of the electorate. Therefore, parties that stress anti-elitism have the incentive to blur their stances on the positional dimensions as this allows them to maintain their broad not-ideological appeal. The argument is tested using data from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (2010, 2014, 2019), electoral manifestos (MARPOR), and the V-Party dataset. The analysis is conducted on a dataset that covers more than 400 cases in 28 European countries and focuses on the parties' strategies concerning the economic and socio-cultural dimensions. The results show how parties that heavily rely on the "quasi-valence" issue of anti-elitism also tend to blur their stances on crucial positional dimensions, such as the economic and the socio-cultural, while controlling for other conditions that might impact position blurring, such as the relative party's attachment to the dimension and internal disagreement. The value of the present study lies in the attempt to bring together the literature on ambiguity and valence competition, as the strategic choice of parties to blur their position might be better understood while considering their strategic choices on non-positional issues.

Anti-establishment challengers in Italy and the Czech Republic. An Analysis of party organisation and leadership strategies of FI, Lega, FdI, ANO and SPD.
Tomas Cirhan , Mattia Collini
Abstract

Our paper explores the organisational and leadership strategies of new anti-establishment parties in Czechia and Italy. The electorally volatile and unstable party systems in the countries of central-eastern and southern Europe are associated with the constant emergence of new parties. The Czech party system is a great contemporary example of this phenomenon. A similar level of instability is associated with the Italian party system, and for some time. Whilst many newcomers make electoral breakthroughs, only some outlive their initial electoral success. Organisational survival and the role of party leaders are the factors that often precede the parliamentary survival of these new parties. In this paper, we compare the organisational settings and leadership strategies of four parties, two from Italy and two from the Czech Republic. Our case studies include Forward Italy (Forza Italia, FI), Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce Nespokojených Občanů, ANO), Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia, FdI) and Freedom and Direct Democracy/Svoboda a přímá demokracie (SPD). Although all four parties share the fact that they started running on the anti-establishment ticket, they differ from each other in some respects. In addition to being formed as anti-establishment challengers, the former two parties are considered the pioneers of entrepreneurial parties in the context of Italian and Czech party systems. The latter two, on the other hand, represent the most successful far-right parties in their respective countries. Based on the analysis of statutes and organisational affairs of the concerned parties, we analyse the decision-making within the organisational structure, as well as the position of party leaders. Multiple factors, such as the leader's decision-making capacity, interventions to the autonomy of territorial party structures, and parties´ policy towards membership, form the basis of our comparative analysis. Such analyses allow us to determine what these case studies have in common in regards to the studied variables, and what it tells us about the role party structures and leadership play in the persistence of these new political actors. We have a hunch that centralised hierarchy combined with a strong position of party leaders props the organisational endurance of these parties. The similarity between the studied cases provides us with the opportunity to empirically test these expectations.

So far, so close? Explaining the different trajectories of Lega and Fratelli d’Italia
Gianluca Piccolino, Leonardo Puleo
Abstract

Do educational agenda help explain populist policy platforms? The case of the (Northern) League.
Giorgia Bulli, Paola Mattei
Abstract

Does Economic Insecurity Drive the Electorate toward the Populist Radical Right? Evidence from the 2022 Italian Elections
Fabio Bordignon, Luigino Ceccarini, Giacomo Salvarani
Abstract

The 2022 Italian general elections witnessed the emergence of the radical right populist party Fratelli d'Italia (FdI), led by Giorgia Meloni, as the clear winner of the electoral competition. This occurred amidst an unprecedented increase in electoral abstention and long-standing sentiments of political discontent. Furthermore, prolonged economic stagnation, high unemployment rates, and bleak economic prospects have fostered economic insecurity over the past two decades in Italy. These sentiments favoured the rise of populist parties, which reached its climax in the 2018 General Election. During the 18th legislature, they were further fuelled by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. This article examines the relationship between citizens’ perceptions of the economy – both sociotropic and egotropic – and the 2022 national elections, and their interaction with other sources of insecurity. Existing scholarship has highlighted the role of economic insecurity, job insecurity, and socio-economic inequalities as drivers of populist (radical right) electoral success worldwide. In 2018 Italian general election, the success of the Five-star Movement (M5s) and the League was interpreted in the light of global dynamics and their economic and cultural consequences. In particular, the rise of the M5s and the ‘southernisation’ of the geographical distribution of its support have been linked to its ambitious plan to tackle difficult economic conditions through its ‘citizenship income’ project. Drawing on the literature exploring the impact of the economy on political behaviour, which has recently questioned the positive link between the populist radical right's electoral success and economic insecurity, we hypothesize that: 1) in terms of party choice, the M5s was once again the main catalyst for expressions economic and job insecurity in 2022; 2) economic insecurity primarily deterred voters from casting their ballots. Moreover, we explore the interplay between pre-existing feelings of (economic and cultural) insecurity and attitudes regarding responses to the pandemic and the war in Ukraine in affecting the voting choice (and the choice to abstain). To test our hypotheses, we conduct a statistical analysis using post-electoral survey data collected by the Electoral Observatory LaPolis – University of Urbino Carlo Bo. Our objective is to contribute to the existing literature on Italian elections and on populist voting, as well as to the scholarship dealing with the factors influencing political (dis)engagement from the perspective of the economy.

Panel 8.8 Party Reform and Causal Complexity: Disentangling the Process of Programmatic-, Personnel- and Organizational reforms

Chairs: Sacha Rangoni

Discussants: Thomas Legein

An account of the ideological change in Turkey’s Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), 2010-2020: ideas, coalitions, external factors
Carlo Sanna
Abstract

The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) in Turkey is the second biggest party in Turkey for membership dimension and vote share, and the main opposition party since 2002. Despite the relevant role it covers in the Turkish party system, the CHP remains understudied. There is a rich literature produced in the period that goes from its reopening in 1992 to the first decade of the 2000s (Güneş-Ayata 2002; Turan 2006; Ayata and Güneş-Ayata 2007; Keyman and Öniş 2007; Coşar and Özman 2008; Ciddi 2008, 2009). However, the academic interest decreased in the following decade (2010-20), despite this started with the election of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the new chairman of the party, and the beginning of a new phase for the CHP. Some studies have been carried out to analyze the substance of intra-party change brought by the new leadership, but they were conducted too close to the leadership change to be possible for them to frame the complete picture (Tosun 2010; Kömürcü 2011; Kiriş 2013; Ciddi 2014). Thus, they mostly end up with an open question, asking whether this change was just “new wine in an old cellar” (Gülmez 2013). Because of this, scholars of Turkish politics had to resort mostly on the pre-2010 conceptualizations to carry out new research and produce new knowledge on the CHP and on the Turkish party system (Aydogan and Slapin 2015; Akgönül and Oran 2019; Oran and Akkoyunlu 2019). This proposal aims to contribute in filling this void by enquiring on the ideological evolution of the CHP during the first decade of Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership (2010-20), and on the complexity of the factors and mechanisms that caused reform and change in the party. The main object of analysis is the ideology of the party: I will focus on the CHP’s understanding of secularism and its positioning on the left-right political spectrum, as they are among the topics, I argue, for which pre-2010 conclusions need to be updated the most. The above mentioned literature widely addresses these two topics in an interrelated way. It shows that in the 90s and early 2000s the CHP adopted a staunch, intransigent, “assertive” (Kuru 2007) approach to secularism. It then uses (also) this argument to theorize an “ideological inconsistency”: a non-coherence between the leftist, social-democratic outlook it claims on-paper (CHP 1992, 2008) and the positions it takes in-action. I argue that, during the decade took as the object of this proposal, the party re-positioned itself and developed a new discourse and a new ideological outlook that made it possible to be perceived as a “coherent” force of the center(left) of the political spectrum by other right-wing and conservative political actors. I also aim to provide an explanation of this processes of ideological change as a consequence of intra-party power dynamics, which are prompted by both internal and external factors. In doing this, I build on the theory of “ideas as coalition magnets” initially developed by Beland and Cox (2015) to explain power relations in coalition building, and apply it to the formation of intra-party coalitions. Another theoretical pillar will be drawn from the literature on party change and on the functioning of political parties as organizations (Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992; Harmel and Janda 1994; Adams et al. 2004, 2009; Schumacher et al. 2013). I explain ideological change (over the positions of the party on secularism) as the resultant of the clash, prompted by environmental shocks, between intra-party competing élites that used ideas as “coalition magnets”. To do this, I will resort to different kinds of primary and secondary sources: from data collected personally through semi-structured interviews conducted with selected former and current party elites (MPs, delegates, members of the governing bodies) and through research in the archives of the CHP and of the National Library in Ankara, to data extracted from the database of the Party Manifesto Project – MARPOR (Lehmann, et al. 2022). The paper will be structured as follows. I will begin with a review of the literature, to frame the main flaws in the conceptualization of the ideological positioning of the CHP. Taking account of these conclusions, I will explain my research question and my main argument, as anticipated above. To prove it, I will first resort to the data extracted from the MARPOR database, which will be used to support the consistency of my claim that there is a need to re-discuss the conclusions on the ideological positioning of the CHP. Then, resorting to the theories on intra-party change and on the functioning of political parties as organizations (Lynton 1973; Janda 1990; Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992; Harmel and Janda 1994; Adams et al. 2004, 2009; Schumacher et al. 2013), and through the methodology of process tracing, I will analyze the data collected during my research periods in Turkey between 2022 and 2023, discuss it and formulate my conclusions.

Left Conservatism or Social Democracy? Determinants of Communist Successor Parties’ Identity Formation and Change
Gianmarco Bucci
Abstract

In the decade after the fall of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, scholars of party politics have particularly been interested in the process of identity formation of communist successor parties, the heirs of the old communist parties. Studies have focused on their survival and adaptation strategies, their impact on the democratic process and organizational features, contributing to a vivid debate both on the parties them-selves, but also on the factors that have contributed to shape their diverging ideologies. This resulted in a theoretical discussion clustered around “externalist” and “internalist” approaches: the externalist approach highlighted the importance of external elements in the process of party identity formation (such as legacies of the past, electoral competition, expanding electoral base, transnational factors and the resulting incentives produced by these changes); the internalists considered internal distribution of power and institutional culture within political parties to set parties’ identity. Decades after the transition – considering the critical role still played by these actors – assumptions upon their ideological and programmatic change shall be updated, with particular attention on the one side to the modified structural conditions within which communist successor parties act, and on the other side on the new thematical and ideological divides around which renovated party factions position them-selves. The present paper wants to propose a new approach through which assessing communist successor parties’ identity formation and ideological change, responding to the call of integrating internalist and externalist approaches (along the repeated efforts to synthetize historical and rational choice institutionalisms). It will draw its conclusions upon an empirical observation of two cases in which communist successor parties have first moderated their nationalist and authoritarian stances, only to restore their cultural-conservative programs a decade or so later: the Romanian Social Democratic Party and the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

Mobilization vs. Organization: patterns of grassroot participation in Corbyn's Labour Party (2015-2020)
Robin Piazzo, Domenico Cerabona
Abstract

This paper aims at proposing a general assesment of the patterns of grassroot participation in support of the cause of the Labour left under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. Distinguishing between mobilizing and organizing approaches (Han, 2010), I will argue that, in this specific case, the former has both attracted more investment by the leadership and has produced better pay offs. I will further my argument by analysing two key domains of participation populated by left-leaning activists and supporters: Momentum as an intra-party organization of the left and local sections of the Labour Party as sites for involvement and contestation. The first thing that must be noted is that the participation of the base has been the most relevant resource wielded by the corbynists. Lacking any form of entrenched power within both the party and the media, the utterly marginal faction of New Left veterans obtained the leadership in 2015 thanks to an extraordinary mobilazion fuelled by the supporters of the anti-austerity movements and the unions. From then on, the leadership has repeatedly survived threats from both within and without wielding the capacity to mobilize a very reactive base. This approach has been internalized by Momentum, the intra-party organization officially tasked with protecting the leadership and furthering the project of the left within the party. Momentum has followed a digital-based mobilizing approach both in action and organization building, promoting digital tools facilitating connective action in electoral campaigns and developing a light, stratarchised structure along the “distributed centralization” model of digital parties. The whole participatory infrastructure of the organization revolves around the resonant features of digital tools tasked with amplyifing participation at critical junctures, without however allowing a significant structuration of local groups and intermediary structures. This organizational model is a consequence of the need to mobilize large portions of the base in specific moments but with few resources and preventing risks of take-over by hostile groups. As for participation in local sections of the party, we observe a pattern of repeated activation and deactivation of the left, often with discontinuities in personnel. The rythm of these patterns has been set by highly emotional events at the national level, such as threats to the leadership from within the party and general elections. Often left-wing activists have exploited these exogenous waves of participation to get control of local party structures, but have since struggled to keep their base sufficiently active. At the local level the most significant cause of these patterns is once again Momentum’s organized neglect of local organizing which results in a lack of redistribution of resources and of the structuration of official positions: therefore the left could only count on high levels of participation when enthusiasm and stakes have been high, given the lack of incentives to participation other than purposive ones; alongside with this aspects there are two other elements explaining the predominance of mobilizing: the aversion of “movementist” members against party rotines and bureucracy and the “trench warfare” launched by right wing activists at the local level.

Local patterns of change in Salvini’s League
Ghita Bordieri
Abstract

Panel 8.9 Electoral competition, electoral space, issues and the vote function in 2022 Italian elections. A public opinion perspective.

Chairs: Franca Roncarolo, Cristiano Vezzoni

Discussants: Linda Basile

Unraveling the Links between Ethnic Concentration and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties: An Examination of the 2022 Italian National Elections
Giulia Sarcone, Moreno Mancosu
Abstract

In the past decade, Italy has witnessed significant growth in support for right-wing radical parties, even in its major urban centers. Ethnic concentration is posited as one potential explanation for this surge, a pattern also evident in the electoral communication of radical right-wing parties, not just in Italy. Academic research in political geography has been dedicated to assessing whether ethnic concentration is a significant determinant of support for the populist radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Savelkoul et al., 2017; Schneider, 2008; Stockemer, 2016; Valdez, 2014; Coffe et al., 2007). Empirically, the presence of ethnic minorities in a specific area has been shown to have either positive or negative association with support levels for right-wing parties, according to the context considered (De Blok & Van der Meer, 2018). These inconsistent results have prompted further exploration, particularly around the "halo effect" theory, which posits that support for radical right-wing populist parties is higher when the concentration of ethnic minorities is greater in areas surrounding, rather than within, the native voters’ area of residence (Eatwell, 2003; Martig & Bernauer, 2018; Rydgren & Ruth, 2013). As a result, the hypothesized mechanisms in the “halo effect” theory depend on the location and distribution of the ethnic concentration. If the latter is higher in the voters’ immediate area of residence, contact theory is expected to apply, creating a negative correlation with the support for radical right-wing parties. If ethnic concentration is stronger in neighboring areas, we expect that voters, observing minorities from a distance without direct contact, may perceive them as a potential threat, thereby increasing support for right-wing populist parties (Martig & Bernauer, 2018; Rydgren & Ruth, 2013). This study tests the halo effect hypothesis in the Italian urban context, using data from the 2022 Italian national elections, where a landslide victory was secured by the right-wing coalition led by the radical right-wing party, Fratelli d'Italia (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021). The analysis combines georeferenced data from the electoral sections of the 2022 elections and census section data, focusing on eight major Italian cities: Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Palermo, Rome, and Turin (for total of 8709 ecological units). Contrary to previous research that mainly focuses on municipal-level analysis, this study examines the lowest aggregate level – electoral/census sections – offering a more detailed understanding of neighborhood-level variations. Preliminary investigations using 2021 local election data in Bologna, Milan, Rome, and Turin have already indicated the presence of the halo effect in these cities, exhibiting a negative correlation between support for right-wing populist parties and ethnic concentration in the area of residence, and a positive correlation when considering neighboring areas. By dissecting the spatial dynamics and impacts of ethnic concentration on right-wing populist voting behavior, this study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the conditions that foster right-wing populism, thereby helping shape strategies to mitigate political polarization and promote social cohesion.

"Ideological" consistency of issue attitudes
Nicola Maggini, Lorenzo De Sio, Elisabetta Mannoni
Abstract

Affective Polarization and Negative Voting in Italian Elections
Diego Garzia
Abstract

The Italian right and Euroscepticism in the 2022 general elections
Fabio Serricchio, Gianluca Passarelli
Abstract

Voters' perception of governing populist parties: Fratelli d'Italia after the 2022 election
Sofia Marini
Abstract

The 2022 election in Italy saw the rise of the radical right-wing party Fratelli d’Italia, that has become the largest one in terms of electoral support. Its success culminated in the premiership of its leader, Giorgia Meloni, heading a government coalition consisting of more experienced right-wing coalition partners. Fratelli d’Italia instead, although not a complete outsider in Italian politics, had never held office before. This paper aims to assess how the public perception of the party has changed once it reached government. Participating in government is a crucial step in the institutionalization of all political parties, increasing their power, resources and visibility. But it should be an important signal particularly for populist and radical actors, to be perceived as part of the political establishment. Indeed, the inclusion in a government coalition would legitimize them and boost their image as institutional actors. Some research has also argued that engaging in electoral competition gradually reduces the ideological extremeness of radical actors. This may be especially true for governing parties, whose agenda is restrained either by the need to compromise with coalition partners or by external constraints such as supra-national guidelines or extraordinary events. This paper aims to understand if the position of Fratelli d’Italia, once in government, is perceived differently by voters. Previous research suggests that citizens assess the position of parties by relying on informational cues, for instance coalition choices. We know that coalition partners are seen as closer to each other, with a greater influence of larger and more centrist actors, but we do not know whether these findings hold for populist actors, as well. Indeed, I argue that populists in government face a trade-off between legitimation and differentiation. In fact, ideological moderation might help them present themselves as reliable institutional partners. However, becoming part of the mainstream might risk alienating voters that support the party precisely due to its anti-establishment character. Therefore, the question of how the party is perceived becomes even more pressing. I hypothesise that, all else being equal, Fratelli d’Italia is perceived as more moderate after the election. I plan to test this hypothesis by leveraging on the panel dimension of the ITANES questionnaire, by comparing how the estimated position on the Left-right scale of Fratelli d’Italia has changed, for each respondent, between the pre- and post-election surveys. Accordingly, I will estimate statistical models that allow me to disentangle to what extent the announcement that Fratelli d’Italia would be the main governing party has affected its perceived position among voters.

Panel 8.10 The mixed electoral systems - hopes and traps (I)

Chairs: Jaroslaw Flis

Discussants: Jeremiasz Salamon

Coordinating candidacies: Payoff Allocation in Pre-Electoral Coalitions
Gianni Del Panta, Mattia Guidi, Tristan Klingelhöfer
Abstract

Three decades experience of the Hungarian mixed electoral systems
Fanni Tanács-Mandák
Abstract

At the time of the Hungarian democratic transition, a new, mixed electoral system was introduced, which was one of the most complicated and complex electoral systems in Europe. The introduced three-channel mixed system was intended to answer to a variety of needs and political concepts, and enabled coalition government at the newly established multi-party system. In addition to the fear of the possibility of the formation of a new non-democratic system, this decision was also motivated by the fact that the newly formed parties could not have assessed their chances, so they sought guarantees in case of their defeat. Proportional rules were applied at two levels of the 3-channel system: at the regional (152 mandates) and at the national (58 mandates) party list channel. The mandates of the national party list channel - forming a very specific solution in international comparison – were distributed on the basis of the surplus votes obtained both at the regional party list channel and at the single member constituencies. The third channel included single member constituencies (176 mandates) based on an absolute majority system. The majority of Hungarian parliamentary mandates were therefore allocated by proportional system between 1990 and 2010. The right wing government coalition that won the elections of 2010 transformed the electoral system causing widespread and solid debates both at international public and at political science and constitutional literature. The comprehensive reform that affected both the composition of the parliament and the electoral system, adopted in 2011, significantly reduced the number of parliamentary mandates (from 386 to 199) and, while maintaining the mixed system, transformed the previous system in such a way that, most of the mandates (106) are allocated by simple majority system. The former compensation instrument remained, but was significantly modified, reducing its true compensatory character. The main goal of the two mixed electoral systems was to create government stability and efficiency. The two electoral systems undoubtedly created governmental stability, Hungary is the only country in the Central-Eastern European region where not a single early election was held in the last 30 years. In the examined period, two prime ministers did not complete their full mandate, but in both cases the reason was a personal scandal and the government majority was able to nominate and elect a new head of government. In addition to a detailed comparison of the elements of the two mixed electoral systems, the purpose of the paper is to describe their (not always positive) impact on parliamentary representation, the party system and the entire political system.

Mixed electoral system - the best or the worst for Poland?
Bartłomiej Michalak
Abstract

Territorial and ideological representation in the MMP system
Jaroslaw Flis, Marek Kaminski, Katarzyna Lorenc
Abstract

Panel 8.10 The mixed electoral systems - hopes and traps (II)

Chairs: Jaroslaw Flis

Discussants: Jeremiasz Salamon

The problem of surplus seats in mixed member proportional systems and its consequences in regard to the size of parliament. Evidence from Germany
Joachim Behnke
Abstract

The Dark side of simultaneous elections? The case of Sicily in 2022 Italian national elections.
Danilo Di Mauro, Marco Valerio Livio La Bella
Abstract

Pre-reform party competition and contamination of single-member districts in mixed-member systems: Path-dependant or not?
Dušan Vučićević
Abstract

Three decades ago, there was a surge in the popularity of mixed-member (MM) electoral systems throughout the world, with dozens of countries implementing the MM system. Thirty years later, initial predictions that they would provide the best of both worlds (two-bloc party systems without reducing minor parties to insignificance; local accountability and nationally oriented party systems) have mostly been hampered. One of the main explanations for the unintended and unexpected consequences of MM system implementation is the contamination of electoral competition in SMDs (single-member districts). As parties are incentivized to run candidates even when and where they are not viable, party competition in MM SMDs differs from what we can expect in FPTP (first-past-the-post) or TRS (two-round system). Additionally, strategic incentives to run everywhere vary between subtypes of MM systems. In one-vote MM systems, parties have to run candidates in as many SMDs as possible to be successful. In MM systems with seat linkage, the party configuration of parliaments is decided by list votes, with a smaller value of SMD votes and consequently less incentive to nominate candidates in every district. Parallel systems lie somewhere between one-vote and seat-linkage MM systems. However, initial findings do not confirm those expectations because competition in one-vote MM systems is not as fragmented as we should anticipate. Therefore, we are interested in alternative explanations for different levels of SMD contamination. As electoral systems do not emerge in a vacuum, pre-reform party competition can decisively impact the strategic considerations of political actors after the institutionalization of MM systems. Our main research question is: In what ways does pre-reform party competition (one-party systems, dominant-party systems, two-party systems, moderate pluralism, and polarized pluralism) impact contamination of SMD competition in MM systems? We expect that pre-reform party configuration will be mostly preserved even after the implementation of mixed electoral rules, except in the case of a critical juncture (one-party system breakdown). Our empirical analysis is based on results from over 24,000 SMDs in over 125 elections in 24 countries over the course of seven decades. The main dependent variables are the effective number of candidates in SMDs, SF ratio, TF ratio, and vote share of third- and lower-placed candidates. Besides different subtypes of MM systems and patterns of pre-reform party competition, we are testing the influence of other important electoral factors (i.e., effective threshold, the share of list mandates), institutional factors (i.e., federalism, direct presidential elections), and contextual factors (i.e., margin of victory, number of elections under MM systems, population/country size).

Lights and shadows of a two-vote system. A case of split-ticket voting in mixed electoral systems
Jeremiasz Salamon
Abstract

One of the ten criteria formulated by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System for the new electoral system for the New Zealand House of Representatives concerned effective voter participation. According to this criterion, if individual citizens are to play a full and active part in the electoral process, the voting system should provide them with mechanisms and procedures which they can readily understand. At the same time, the power to make and unmake governments should be in hands of people at an election and the votes of all electors should be of equal weight in influencing election results. The experience of nine New Zealand mixed parliamentary elections provides a basis for assessing whether, and if so, to what extent, the electoral system applied in this country meets the above-mentioned criterion. This applies in particular to the two-vote system functioning within the New Zealand MMP electoral system, through which New Zealanders can express their preferences both concerning party lists and individual candidates. The system based on two categorical votes allows voters to split their votes between a candidate and a list registered by two different political parties. According to the data of the New Zealand Electoral Commission, on average, every third voter expresses their political preferences by splitting votes. Therefore, the question arises whether this pattern of expressing political preferences is a consequence of effective voter participation or the result of the efforts made by political parties. Who benefits from the split-ticket voting: the voters, who thus express their complex political preferences more fully, or the political parties, who maximize their electoral outcome thank votes splitting? The paper will present analyses concerning i.a. the intensity of the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in the elections to the House of Representatives of New Zealand, directions of vote flow and territorial differences in the occurrence of split-ticket voting. In addition, an attempt will be made to identify the reasons for this pattern of voting and to indicate its political beneficiaries. The results of the research will be confronted with the experience of other countries using the mixed system, which will allow us to answer the question of whether the two-vote system applied in the vast majority of mixed electoral systems ensures effective voter participation, or whether a more optimal solution, i.e. more fully implementing the "best of both worlds" postulate, is the single-vote system (applied until recently in elections to the Landtag of Baden-Württemberg).

Panel 8.11 Party competition and the restructuring of European party systems between old and new conflicts (I)

Chairs: Vincenzo Emanuele

Discussants: Bruno Marino

Electoral competition, public issue salience and far-right success in Western and Eastern Europe
Sofia Vasilopoulou, Roi Zur
Abstract

Euroscepticism in context. Perceptions of communal loss and parties’ electoral fortunes in the European elections
Francesco Visconti
Abstract

Parties’ fluctuation on the transitional divide: Structural change or Strategic Competition? Evidence from Euromanifestos (1979-2019).
Giuseppe Carteny, Leonardo Puleo
Abstract

Whom do you serve? A comparative analysis of ideological congruence between voters, economic elites, and representatives in Southern European political systems (2007 - 2016)
Michele Scotto Di Vettimo, Paolo Marzi
Abstract

Ideological congruence between voters and elected politicians has been an asset of representative democracy (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999). Yet, in the last decades, changes in attitudes and salience towards both existing and emerging topics within the political spheres in Europe, deeply impacted the alignment between voters and representatives on a whole plethora of issues. In this sense, the existing literature on unequal representation shows how representatives’ preferences could in fact be regarded as closer to the preferences of specific social groups rather than the parties’ median supporter or to the electorate at-large (Rohrschneider 2015). Unequal representation does constitute a major issue for contemporary democracies, as it hinders the principle of political equality and hampers the representation of the median voter in favour of specific and/or privileged societal groups. Whilst the role of socio-economic status has been explored mostly in the United States (Achen & Bartels 2016), in Europe the research largely opted to focus on specific differences in either electoral behaviour or geographical location (Rohrschneider 2015), with a few exceptions along the socio-economic dimension (Donnelly & Lefkofridi 2014). Given these premises, we aim to contribute to the literature on unequal representation by exploring the ideological congruence between representatives, voters and economic elites in a group of Southern European countries across different time periods. By emphasising the importance of economic factors within the political sphere of different national political systems, we intend to confirm or refute the notion that elected officials at the (supra)national level are closer to economic elites when compared to the public, and how these trends changed over time. The existing literature has so far provided only mixed evidence on both the aforementioned topic and the effective existence of this misalignment. Indeed, while several scholars have proven the enduring presence of a gap between a pro-EU elite and a significantly more sceptical public (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999), others managed to provide either partially or completely conflicting evidence with respect to the above assumption (Pareschi et al. 2022). Furthermore, though the crisis has been characterised as a critical juncture concerning the attitudes towards European integration of many national elites (Conti et al. 2018), the role that it played with regard to the relationship between representatives, voters and economic elites has yet to be properly charted. Indeed, although the crisis did not affect the congruence between voters and representatives on EU integration, literature has not addressed the attitudes of economic elites yet. Therefore, we intend to explore this strand of the topic by exploring this triangular relationship on a number of policy issues and assessing how it varies over time and across countries. Our approach introduces a few novelties, as it explicitly addresses the issue of economic elites, adopts a properly comparative perspective, analyses both national and supranational representatives, and covers five different points in time. In terms of research hypotheses, we are interested in the differences in ideological congruence between representatives and voters, on the one side, and representatives and economic elites, on the other. We posit that economic elites experience a higher congruence than voters when it comes to the level of closeness to elected officials. By comparing the pre- and post-crisis years, we are also able to track the evolution of these trends over time. Moreover, we hypothesise that different parties (e.g., challenger vs. government parties, populist vs. non-populist parties) exhibit different trends in ideological congruence before and after the crisis, with some political formations progressively reducing their gap with the public and/or the economic elite and vice versa. To test our hypotheses, we rely on data from three mass-elite survey projects (IntUne, ENEc, and EUENGAGE) covering various European countries in five different time periods (2007, 2009, 2014, 2016, and 2017). We set our focus on the Southern European countries that are consistently included in the selected surveys – Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – so as to focus on the part of the Eurozone that was most hit by the crisis. The surveys include questions concerning different political issues that allows us to assess the overall mass-elite congruence on topics like EU integration, economic policy, migration policy, and so on. As recent studies of congruence indicate that findings are very sensitive to the methodology employed for the purposes of the research (Pareschi et al. 2022), we aim to employ different established measures to capture ideological congruence to ensure the robustness of our results. Finally, we intend to analyse congruence by also relying on an innovative measure – Earth Mover’s Distance – that has been deemed as beneficial in addressing some of the criticisms that have been moved to existing methodologies (Lupu et al. 2017). Our findings shed light on the closeness of political and economic elites when compared to voters, and the role that the crisis played in widening the gap between voters and representatives’ preferences. Additionally, our analysis informs us about variations in ideological congruence between populist and non-populist parties, with the former performing better in terms of mass-elite congruence and the latter in terms of political-economic-elite congruence. Finally, we explore how the levels of ideological congruence between political and economic elites are influenced by the presence of given parties in government.

Panel 8.11 Party competition and the restructuring of European party systems between old and new conflicts (II)

Chairs: Bruno Marino

Discussants: Vincenzo Emanuele

Party System Types and Party Non-systems in Western Europe
Alessandro Chiaramonte, Vincenzo Emanuele, Marco Improta
Abstract

The EU conflict and patterns of EU issue voting, between a rally of the pro-European voter and a Eurosceptic backdraft.
Nicolò Conti, Carrieri Luca, Matthew Loveless
Abstract

The return of post-materialism. Exogenous constraints, electoral conflicts and voting preferences in Europe
Luca Carrieri, Silvia Bolgherini
Abstract

Contemporary politics in Europe has shown several novelties with respect to the previous decades. De-alignment of party systems, the rise of right-wing populism, and the steady decline of voter turnout are among the main phenomena witnessing these moving grounds. The political mobilization on climate issues, the differentiated reactions to the immigration crises, as well as the multifaceted attitude towards civil rights and liberties have gained momentum, potentially modifying the voting patterns of past decades. This change in attitudes and consequently in voting preferences have considerable consequences, especially in the current political, economic, and social context of multiple co-occurring crises. Are voters' priorities changed over time? Have the traditional issues, e.g., those based on the economic elements, lost their predictive capacity, while others have risen as voting determinants? In other words, to what extent have political conflict structures shifted in our societies? Have voters' preferences changed towards more post-materialistic (environment, civil rights) issues? Starting from the assumption that contemporary partisan and electoral conflict is, more often than not, circumscribed to a limited range of issues due to growing and binding external constraints (EU treaties, economic international agreements, etc.), we address the impact of “new” issues on the party support. By using European Election Studies (EES) and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), we aim at assessing the changing effects of three “new” determinants (immigration, environment, civil rights) over time (2009-2019) on the voting preferences for parties in 25 European countries. We seek to capture the partisan/positional divides on these issue dimensions by looking at the electoral patterns of the different party families in these countries. This will allow for understanding if the positional differences on these issues have explained the fluctuations in the voting preferences or not.

Conflict over EU integration and citizens’ political awareness: assessing the relationship in politicized party systems.
Danilo Di Mauro, Vincenzo Memoli
Abstract

Round table

Panel 8.13 The 2022 Italian elections: one year later

A un anno da una tornata di elezioni politiche che ha permesso (per la prima volta dal 2008) la formazione relativamente rapida di una maggioranza di governo diretta espressione del risultato elettorale, la tavola rotonda mette a confronto i responsabili di diversi gruppi di ricerca che hanno dato vita a volumi interamente dedicati a queste elezioni. L'obiettivo è un confronto/discussione sull'interpretazione più "ampia" di queste elezioni, a un anno di distanza, e quindi con la possibilità di leggerne i diversi aspetti (le strategie di competizione e l'offerta politica; la campagna elettorale; gli allineamenti di voto territoriali e dei gruppi sociali; gli scenari per il sistema partitico) fuori dall'urgenza dei commenti a caldo, e con possibili scenari di interpretazione del futuro del sistema politico italiano.

Speakers:
Luigino Ceccarini - Università di Urbino Carlo Bo (LaPolis)
Lorenzo De Sio - Università LUISS Guido Carli (CISE)
Franca Roncarolo - Università di Torino (Itanes)
Salvatore Vassallo - Università di Bologna (Istituto Cattaneo)

Chairs: Silvia Bolgherini, Fulvio Venturino