SISP Conference 2022

Le sanzioni economiche rappresentano importanti strumenti di politica estera che si frappongono tra simboliche azioni politico-diplomatiche (come il ritiro degli ambasciatori e delle delegazioni nazionali) e strumenti molto coercitivi, come il conflitto armato. La valutazione degli obiettivi delle sanzioni economiche evidenzia la forte interconnessione tra l’analisi economica – tradizionalmente più interessata all’efficacia economica della sanzione, ma con meno enfasi sull’obiettivo politico – e l’analisi politica – interessata unicamente all’obiettivo politico finale della sanzione, ma senza interessarsi alla valutazione del passo intermedio dell’efficacia economica delle misure. Dal punto di vista empirico la costruzione di recenti datasets sembra già aver integrato le categorie economiche e politiche. In questo lavoro ci riferiremo al database più recente, il Global Sanctions Database (Felbermayr et a., 2020) e presenteremo elaborazioni econometriche per giudicare l’efficacia di diverse tipologie di sanzioni rispetto a specifici obiettivi politici finali. Si concentrerà l’attenzione sulle principali tipologie di sanzioni recentemente decise contro la Russia. Riferimento bibliografico Felbermayr, Gabriel & Kirilakha, Aleksandra & Syropoulos, Constantinos & Yalcin, Erdal & Yotov, Yoto V., (2020),"The global sanctions data base," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

Mentre durante i primi anni Duemila la Russia e la Cina confluirono nel cosiddetto “asse di convenienza” (Lo, 2008) per contrastare l’influenza occidentale in Asia Centrale, in anni più recenti – soprattutto a partire dall’inaugurazione da parte di Pechino nel 2013 dell’iniziativa della “Nuova Via della Seta” – la Cina sembra voler ottenere un’egemonia regionale e incrementare la rivalità con la Russia. Iniziato nel 2001, dopo l’intervento statunitense in Afghanistan, l’“asse di convenienza” sino-russo si è concluso ufficialmente nel 2014, con il ritiro delle truppe statunitensi dalle basi militari dell’Asia Centrale. Infatti, per facilitare le operazioni militari contro il regime afghano dei talebani, gli Stati Uniti avevano bisogno del supporto logistico locale, utilizzando, ad esempio, la base aerea uzbeka di Karši-Khanabad (K2) dal 2001 al 2005 e la base aerea kirghisa di Manas dal 2001 al 2014. Il Cremlino ha percepito l’uso delle basi militari dell’Asia Centrale come un tentativo di Washington di accerchiare e contenere la Russia (Kazanstev, 2008, p. 1082). A partire dalla Rivoluzione delle rose in Georgia (2003), dalla Rivoluzione arancione in Ucraina (2004) e dalla Rivoluzione dei tulipani in Kirghizistan (2005), Russia e Cina hanno temuto che l’Occidente avrebbe sostenuto attivamente le riforme politiche nello spazio post-sovietico contro i propri interessi. Allo stesso tempo, la paura delle “rivoluzioni colorate” ha rafforzato i legami tra Mosca e le élite politiche locali, che – modellate nel contesto dell’Unione Sovietica – si opponevano volentieri alle iniziative liberal-progressiste occidentali. L’intervento di Mosca al fianco del Presidente kazako Tokayev, nella repressione dei tumulti esplosi nel gennaio 2022, ma soprattutto l’invasione dell’Ucraina scatenata dall’Armata russa un mese e mezzo dopo, sono da considerare conseguenza dell’approccio imperiale di Mosca a tutta l’area ex sovietica e quindi ex imperiale russa.

The Ukraine War became a turning point in European energy security. The crisis raised immediate concerns about Europe’s energy security and overdependence on Russia, demanding a crucial respond from the EU. At the same time, this crisis did not come as a surprise. It illuminated the fundamental point that the relationship between the European Union and Russia had been deteriorating for some time. The Ukraine War merely crystallized the increasing tension and long-term divisive issues between Russia and the European Union. It particularly reflected very clearly the difference in understanding European security between Russia and the EU. In this sense, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent European-Russian differences over it followed years of growing mistrust, resentment, and frustration on both sides. The Ukraine War is the most severe crisis in EU-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. This watershed event has significantly altered the nature and dominant discourse of EU-Russia relations. It also brought European energy security back into the spotlight. Previous hopes that energy interdependence would help to stabilize and improve EU-Russian relations have been proven wrong. The war also revived the problem of diversification of energy imports and the question of alternative energy supplies, especially natural gas sources. Dependence on Russian gas makes it necessary to implement a series of projects that guarantee security of supply through the diversification of sources and routes of supply. In this proposed paper, my purpose is to analyze the validity of viewing the Caspian Sea region as an alternative source of natural gas for Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. One of the projects that could mitigate the EU's dependence on Russia ,is the Southern Gas Corridor. An important inter-regional energy project, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), has been finalized in December 2020. In its initial stage, the SGC was set to deliver about 10 bcm to Europe. However, the project has also been built with potential expansion capacity, which could be increased to 31 bcm in the South Caucasus Pipeline Expansion Project and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, and up to 20 bcm in the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, thereby doubling the corridor’s capacity. Azerbaijan has the potential to increase gas deliveries to Europe by using its gas reserves in the Caspian Sea as well as accessing natural gas sources from Turkmenistan and Iran. Just in November 2021, Baku, Tehran, and Ashgabat have reached an agreement on a natural gas swap deal for up to 2 billion cubic meters per year. Under the deal, Iran acquired natural gas from Turkmenistan and transferred an equivalent amount to Azerbaijan. Gas swap operations began in late December 2021. Turkmenistan will sell 5-6 million cubic meters of gas per day to Azerbaijan under the trilateral agreement. This number could be increased, which could, in turn, also increase natural gas exports to Europe from Azerbaijan. However, to achieve all this, the EU needs to invest on the energy infrastructure of the region. Partly the EU could help by optimizing the losses of gas domestically in these countries. Partly, the EU could help by investing in green energy (solar and wind) in the Caspian region, which will help the regional countries, especially Azerbaijan, to reduce its own domestic gas consumption and redirect released gas resources to Europe, and partly the EU could help by investing in new production capacities. Production from new fields in Azerbaijan will already start in 2023. Azerbaijan expects to have 1,5 billion cubic meters gas from Absheron field, for instance. Apart from production capacities, increasing the capacity of the pipelines is also important. The Southern Gas Corridor is an integrated pipeline system, which means that TANAP, for example, has one diameter and TAP has a different diameter. TANAP can transport more than 30 bcm of gas, while TAP can transport only 10 bcm. At the time, to construct the pipeline that way made financial sense. Azerbaijan was supposed to sell to Italy only 8 bcm gas. And for that purpose, the shareholders of the pipeline designed the pipeline volume so that not to have additional expenses. At the same time, it still possible to expand the capacity of the TAP pipeline. By adding pump stations, it can be expanded up to 20 billion cubic meters. In other words, Italy can get twice as much as they get today. To sum up, the proposed paper argues that although the Caspian Sea region cannot replace Russia as the main source of natural gas to Europe, there are still a number of ways where the energy supplies from the Caspian Sea region can significantly mitigate the negative consequences that the EU will inevitably face in the process of weaning itself off the Russian gas. However, to achieve this, the EU needs to actively engage with the regional countries.