Coordinators: Luca Germano (firstname.lastname@example.org), Orazio Lanza (email@example.com)
Chairs: Enrico Calossi, Eugenio Pizzimenti
Discussants: Eugenio Pizzimenti
Theorizing party change. A model to explain party positioning towards the European Union and Immigration.
Stella Gianfreda (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract In political science, the concept of Europeanization has been employed to a large extent as a synonym of European integration, to explain the development of supranational institutions and common policies. Scholars have largely explored the impact of the European Union (EU) decision-making style and mode of governance on those actors and institutions directly susceptible to its legislative outputs (as, e.g., national governments, legal systems and interest groups). Comparatively less attention has been devoted to European integration as an explanatory factor of domestic political representation and party politics. Moreover, in the last decade the novelty of a Europeanization approach has been largely eclipsed by the politicization literature. Many scholars have identified the emergence of a new transnational cleavage, transcending the traditional left-right dimension of party competition in favor of a pro-anti EU divide. This paper argues that Europeanization as an analytical framework is still relevant to explain the new set of circumstances - a politicised EU - in terms of impact on domestic politics change or continuity. Therefore, three branches of the literature - Europeanization of party politics, politicization of the European Union, and political party change – are bridged to come up with a comprehensive analytical framework for assessing the impact of the EU on party programmatic changes.
In or out? Social linkage and the regulation of political participation across party organizations
giulia sandri (email@example.com), Felix von Nostitz (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Over the past decade many parties have created new possibilities to affiliate and to involve citizens, often rivalling the classic conception of party membership. Several parties integrate nowadays citizens and supporters in their activities, without any formal tie to the party organization. So far, the existing literature has mainly focused on classifying these new and different types of affiliates and supporters, but little attention has been paid to what these imply in terms of formal rights and obligations and how these compare to those of full members. This paper addresses this gap based on an original database anayzing non-members involvement in 72 parties in 14 established democracies. We not only map the current landscape of rules underlying different membership types but also explore potential factors- party family and size- underlying the variation across parties. We find a strong association between party family and the degree of non-members’ involvement and that smaller parties tend to involve more non-full-members. Our findings and new database provide a first step for future research to study the regulation of membership types, what determines it, and how it affects the traditional concept of party membership and societal linkage.
Private Political Money and Political Parties in Italy: The Changing Connective Capability of Political Actors in the last 30 Years
chiara fiorelli (email@example.com)
Abstract Despite the dramatic evidence of their decline (in terms of membership, trust, and ideological perspective), political parties still represent the most important collective actor in a democratic political system. Their role in representing pluralism and their electoral centrality is not undermined, even if strongly questioned. As organization, parties have to face areas of uncertainty that request suitable answers and efficient organizational choices. Taking the challenge as representative actors, in this paper I will focus on the capacity of parties to mobilize resources: financial resources in particular. Through the analysis of private financial donations to political parties in Italy –in determinant election years as 1987, 1994, and 2013- I will try to assess their connective capability with specific interests representatives in order to provide evidence of their changing representational role. According to the literature on the cartel party model, I should find fairly distant relations and cross-party donors, and this evidence should be stronger in recent years. The focus on the private political money allow us to take into consideration the neglected role of external donors in a society characterized by a strong public financing. The evidence provided suggests that a change in the representational dynamics of parties should be understood also through the variation of their financial roots.
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF PARTIES: THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF FACTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1965-2016)
Bruno Marino (firstname.lastname@example.org), Vincenzo Emanuele (email@example.com), Nicola Martocchia Diodati (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Notwithstanding the attention devoted to the study of political parties in Western Europe and beyond, a crucial area of research is still underdeveloped: the comparative study of party factions. Since Sartori’ seminal work, the study of party factions has become an important strand of research for political scientists; nonetheless, most works focus on purely qualitative accounts or on case studies (usually, country-related ones or party-related ones), thus lacking a comprehensive understanding of party factionalisation and its variation in Western Europe. In this paper, we put forward two innovations to fill this gap. First, through a collection of a large amount of data on party factions in 11 Western European countries from 1965 until 2016, for a total number of more than 850 party cases, we show evidence of the cross-country, cross-time and cross-family variation of party factionalisation. Second, we present a new measure of factionalisation at the systemic level, the Effective Number of Factions (ENF), inspired by the analogous Laakso and Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties (ENP). This new measure of the party factionalisation allows us to go beyond the traditional study of factions with an exclusively party-level organisational scope and to explore the so-far neglected influence that party factionalisation may have at the systemic level and, more specifically, on the party system fractionalisation.
The strange non-death of mainstream political parties
Francesca Feo (email@example.com)
Abstract “The age of party democracy has passed”, runs the first line of Ruling the Void, Peter Mair’s posthumously published book. The claim raised by the author builds on the assumption that political parties, cartel parties in particular, have lost the capacity and willingness to be representative, instead stressing their capacity as good governors or, in other words, as responsible administrators of the polity. This interpretation casts a rather pessimistic light on the behaviour of political party organizations, one that helps us understand why new political actors are succeeding in electoral competitions and institutionalizing within European party systems. However, it does not explain why mainstream parties persist, even if weakened and transformed. In this paper, I will try to identify factors explaining this persistence of mainstream political parties in Western European party systems. The paper sketches three possible lines of explanation for mainstream party persistence, drawing on sociological, institutional and organizational theory. In particular, I argue that the idea that political parties have abandoned their representational function needs to be reconsidered, in order to analyse patterns of organizational adaptation that might explain mainstream parties’ persistence.
Chairs: Enrico Calossi, Eugenio Pizzimenti
Discussants: Enrico Calossi
Il fazionismo nelle organizzazioni partitiche: dalla cooperazione al conflitto? Il caso dei partiti della sinistra radicale nel Sud Europa
Valeria Tarditi (firstname.lastname@example.org), Davide Vittori (email@example.com)
Abstract I partiti sono organizzazioni complesse, entità collettive caratterizzate da diversi livelli di coesione e omogeneità interna, al cui interno possono svilupparsi dinamiche competitive che spesso determinano l’emergere di fazioni. Queste ultime costituiscono sottogruppi più o meno organizzati, caratterizzati da identità comuni e in grado di agire collettivamente per raggiungere vari obiettivi, concernenti questioni di “principio” o di “interesse” (Hume 1877; Sartori 1976). La letteratura sul fazionismo partitico non è molto sviluppata e i principali studi si sono concentrati sull’analisi dei partiti elettoralmente rilevanti (la DC in Italia, i partiti Conservatore e Laburista in UK, l’SPD in Germania). Minore attenzione, invece, è stata data a una delle famiglie partitiche che storicamente è stata particolarmente soggetta al fenomeno del fazionismo e che attualmente, in tempi di crisi economica e sociale, sembra aver riconquistato un rinnovato protagonismo in alcune democrazie contemporanee: la sinistra radicale. Oggetto di studio del paper è quindi l’analisi del fazionismo all’interno di quattro partiti della sinistra radicale: Rifondazione Comunista e i suoi eredi in Italia, Syriza in Grecia, Podemos e Izquierda Unida in Spagna. Tali casi comprendono partiti che hanno origini lontane e che hanno rivestito posizioni rilevanti in passato o che, al contrario, sono di recente formazione e hanno registrato improvvisi successi elettorali. Adottando l’approccio teorico e metodologico proposto da Boucek (2009), obiettivo di questo paper è quello di analizzare il fenomeno del fazionismo nei quattro partiti attraverso una prospettiva dinamica, considerandolo come processo di “partizione in sottogruppi”, piuttosto che come fenomeno statico. Attraverso un’analisi diacronica, quindi, si spiegherà il passaggio dal fazionismo cooperativo/competitivo a quello degenerativo nei quattro partiti, considerando tre variabili indipendenti: incentivi/vincoli istituzionali (legge elettorale e partecipazione in coalizioni di governo), sfide esterne o competitive (sconfitte/successi elettorali e emergere di nuovi sfidanti), politicizzazione di nuove issues. Il paper dimostra che le variabili istituzionali e l’andamento elettorale costituiscono i principali fattori nel favorire la trasformazione del fazionismo nei partiti della sinistra radicale.
Popolo vs élite? Partiti anti-establishment e nuove prospettive di cleavage politics in Europa.
Lorenzo Viviani (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract I sistemi politici europei sono al centro di un lungo processo di trasformazione degli attori della cleavage politics tradizionale, dal punto di vista delle identità, delle funzioni svolte e del tipo di organizzazione. L’indebolirsi della capacità dei partiti mainstream di rappresentare le domande che provengono dalla società ha progressivamente favorito l’accrescersi di un sentimento di opposizione alla classe politica e ai partiti tradizionali, che può assumere la forma dell’apatia, con l’astensione elettorale, e della protesta, con la nascita di partiti anti-establishment. All’interno di questo contesto il paper affronta la relazione fra la crisi della democrazia rappresentativa così come strutturatasi nei sistemi politici europei nel Novecento e la politicizzazione del crescente sentimento anti-politico e anti-partitico. Sarà quindi tematizzata la prospettiva di una nuova cleavage politics sulla base dei processi sociali ed economici internazionali che investono le società europee, e il tipo di orientamento ideologico dei partiti della nuova destra populista e della nuova sinistra populista. Per comprendere la natura e lo sviluppo dei partiti anti-establishment è necessario indagare quanto questi siano portatori di una sfida alla democrazia in sé, o quanto invece rappresentino la spia della mancata ridefinizione dei contenuti e delle forme della rappresentanza politica nelle democrazie europee. Nel primo caso i partiti anti-establishment sarebbero, infatti, riconducibili ai tradizionali partiti anti-sistema, nel secondo esprimerebbero invece una reiezione selettiva nei confronti degli attori della politica tradizionale, ponendosi alla “periferia” e non “all’esterno” della democrazia rappresentativa.
Populist Parties and Party Systems in the Fourth Wave: Exploring Patterns of Negative Integration and Non-Integration
Mattia Zulianello (email@example.com)
Abstract The increasing electoral success of populist parties raises the question of their integration into national political systems. This is relevant in particular because populist parties would by default be considered as anti-system following the classical Sartorian approach (Mudde 2014), yet the progressive integration of such parties in national party systems remains intangible following existing conceptualizations (Sartori 1976; Capoccia 2002). This paper provides the analytical tools to operate a major distinction among populist parties by complementing the ideational perspective with an assessment of their functional role in the national party systems. Such a bi-dimensional perspective allows to distinguish between the parties that can be considered as anti-system parties following a revisited conceptualization of the term and those that qualify as halfway house parties – that is, formations that, while ideologically challenging crucial features of the status quo, are visibly, although negatively, integrated in the party system (Zulianello 2017). In particular, the paper sheds light on the populist phenomenon by adopting a party-system perspective, which allows to identify three main mechanisms: non-integration, negative integration, and radical disembedding. Such novel concepts are then applied to the analysis of three populist radical right parties, namely the French Front National, the Danish People's Party, and the Dutch Party for Freedom. Significantly, such an exercise allows to undertake important steps towards the ‘paradigmatic shift’ advocated by Mudde (2016: 16) in the study of populist parties, which ‘are no longer seen as new outsider-challenger parties, but also as institutionalized and integrated members of the political system’. Furthermore, this paper innovates the literature on party systems which, despite its great tradition in comparative politics, has experienced a noticeable stasis over the last decades.
The organisational face of the radical left: An examination of patterns in the internal democracy of radical left parties
Giorgos Charalambous (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Recent scholarship has debated intensely the relationship between radical left parties and democracy. Some students of party politics call attention to left-wing populism as an illiberal democratic force with a personalistic appeal embodied by a charismatic and powerful leadership voicing demagogic discourse. Others emphasize the pluralism and internal democracy in some radical left parties and argue that this boils down to their often special relationship with social and protest movements and their radical democratic ideology. This study offers an organizational perspective of the European radical left in order to map out and elaborate patterns of democratic practice. Using the internal party democracy (IPD) index developed by Rahat and Shapira (2017), the article compares ten European radical left parties from several ideological traditions – in Cyprus, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Germany, France and the Netherlands – across the dimensions of participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and transparency. It investigates the extent of variation in IPD within the party family juxtaposing it against established typologies of radical left parties as well as different party models; considers how democratic the radical left party family is on average and in relation to existing knowledge about other party families; and examines potential differences in IPD across its distinct dimensions, inquiring whether the radical left prioritizes some democratic principles over others.
Chairs: Marcelo Camerlo, Antonino Castaldo
Expertise and specialism in Spanish ministerial elite 1977-2017
Juan Rodriguez (email@example.com), José Real Dato (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract This paper focuses on the appointment of experts and specialist ministers in Spain, which is a major example of one-party cabinet with highly personalization of executive powers and increasing cabinet dominance over the party. We provide empirical evidence of the fluctuation of minister partisanship and expertise over time. Very few cabinets have been formed only by party ministers while others cabinets have had a majority of non-partisan ministers. This is largely contrary to what literature has traditionally argued for parliamentary executives, by opposition to presidential and semi-presidential systems. The aim of the paper is to explain this variation at both cabinet and ministerial levels of analysis. We will pay particular attention to the role played by the party leaders and the prime minister, and whether their strategic preferences and political positions influence the ministerial recruitment process in terms of partisanship. To test this leadership effect, our analysis will control by ministers’ individual features as well as by the specific political and parliamentary context.
Continuity and Change in a Small Island State. Government Formation and Minister Profile in Malta (1921-2017)
Marcello Carammia (email@example.com), Roderick Pace (firstname.lastname@example.org), George Vital Zammit (email@example.com)
Abstract This paper presents the first empirical analysis of government formation and minister profile in Malta. Malta is a perfect case of a two party system, where no third party gained access to parliament since the first post-independence elections in 1966. It is also a textbook case of a majoritarian democracy, with power centralised (vertically and horizontally) in the hands of government. Finally, Malta is a clear case of party government, in which ministers can only be appointed from among the ranks of parliament. The combination of these features result in a remarkable stability of the political system. Therefore, we expect change in patterns of government formation to happen primarily as a result of dynamics exogenous to the political system, such the social and economic contexts or pressures coming from the international environment. The paper is structured as follows. We first map the evolution of minister profiles over time. We then explore possible determinants of appointment to ministerial positions, looking at professional background, seniority in parliament, number of elections competed and electoral performance. We then analyse the degree of continuity and change in government formation and minister profile, focusing on the effect of such critical junctures as independence from the UK and access to the EU.
Ministers’ Profiles: An Open Typology
Marcelo Camerlo (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract This paper proposes a flexible and open typology of ministers’ profiles. The typology integrates preceding achievements into a systematic framework to address shortcomings, such as the inconsistency between copious but dispersed data and parsimonious but rigid dichotomous categorisations. Relying on the set theory approach, the proposed typology provides criteria and tools for cooperative data gathering and analysis.
Chairs: Maria Elisabetta Lanzone, Angelo Scotto
Discussants: Valeria Ottonelli
The German AfD and the Lega Nord: obsessed by Islamism and islamistic terrorism
Markus Grimm (email@example.com)
Abstract Since 2015, the new party Alternative for Germany (AfD) gained a noticeable success in Germany, which is expected to lead the AfD up to 10 % in the forthcoming national elections in September 2017. This success of a young right-populist party (according to Muddes categories) is remarkable on at least two reasons: the concentration on an anti-Islamic and xenophobic rhetoric / theme and the constant struggles in between the leading group of the party. These struggles did not stop the party until now and they are not expected to stop the triumphant success leading to the Bundestag. However, the AfD presents itself as a single issue-party, which seems not capable to conquer other topics besides the xenophobic and anti-european issues. The current program shows an obsession of anti-islam topics, which covers all mentioned topics within. This analysis will compare the development of the relatively young German party to the longer lasting success story of the Italian Lega Nord. To this, it will compare the programs of both the parties, the development of the leading group within the parties and the electoral success and setbacks on regional level. It will concentrate on the xenophobic and anti-Islamic phrases of the programmatic documents and will compare the effect on the respective electorate of both the parties. Currently, the AfD seems to be isolated from the existing parties and there will be rather no possibility for them to participate in the next government. However, the rising of these parties influence the moderate parties within the system as well. Therefore, it may demonstrate the effects on other parties programs and positions. The presentation may be hold in Italian and/or English.
Italian parties and the migration challenge: populism or an anti-immigration stand?
Mattia Zulianello (firstname.lastname@example.org), Giorgia Bulli (email@example.com), Sorina Soare (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Italy has only recently become an immigration country. The country has registered a positive migration balance only since the beginning of the 1970’s The growing importance of the migration issue in Italy –in terms of figures and political influence- has not been accompanied by the development of a systematic political understanding and management of the phenomenon. Moreover, the unstable composition of the Italian governments over the past three decades has made it impossible to develop an organic and shared migration policy. Starting from the late 1980’s, with the emergence of the populist party of the northern league (Lega Nord), migration has become a very “lucrative” political issue. The initial opposition of the party to internal immigration from the south to the northern regions of the country soon turned into open hostility towards the so-called “extra-communitarian” migrants. This transformation was the consequence of a sudden and unexpected increase of migration fluxes from eastern European and north Africa in the early 1990’s. Since then, the anti-immigration stances of the Italian parties have overlapped with a populist call to the people’s will. The conflict on this issue has increasingly become a party based–contraposition, which is now perceived as a “new cleavage”. In order to shed light on the relationship between the growing relevance of the immigration issue and the strategic adaptation of Italian political parties, this paper will address three main questions: 1) How does the Italian migration history affect parties’ positions and their policy making? 2) What are the different frames adopted by the main Italian parties on immigration? 3) What are the implications of anti-immigration stances for the Italian party politics?
A Theoretical Scheme for studying “Anti-Immigration Parties”: a first proposal
Maria Elisabetta Lanzone (email@example.com), Angelo Scotto (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract The main aim of the paper is to propose a theoretical scheme in order to better understand analogies and differences between European right-wing parties able to put migration problems at the heart of their political agenda. In particular, the paper proposes a typology designed to evaluate the relationship between electoral attitudes towards migration and public policies suggested (and/or implemented) by the same parties. Nowadays, almost all Countries in the European Union are interested by these phenomena: anti-immigration parties – in a broad sense – established themselves getting a constant presence in their respective party systems, in Western Countries (France, Italy, Austria, Belgium and Scandinavian Countries) and in new member-states, too (Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). In order to analyses different attitudes of these parties we propose three variables: 1) approaches towards immigration – political discourse. This first aspect ranging from a complete closure to selectiveness towards different categories of migrants, in the field of entries; as regards integration, it is possible to identify three different attitudes (complete segregation/subjugation/absorption). In general this first approach is able to range from ideology (identity position) to “pragmatism” (security approach/defence of national workers). This first approach is analysable also across the time. 2) Impact on public policies. In this second case the question is related to the role of the party. It is able to have a direct influence to policies? It retains a governmental role or the party represents the opposition? In general is able to influence policies, also with an indirect role? For example, other parties – in order to preserve the electoral appeal – decide to mediate their policies? 3) Difference discourse/practice. This third variable element is aimed to evaluate the relationship between electoral proposals and “real politics”. Often these parties propose an overpromising discourse not really able to become a practical position after elections. What are, in particular, the differences between representatives with different roles (government/opposition)? The typology proposed in this paper is finalized to create a first model of different ‘anti-immigration parties’ in order to better analyse their attitudes towards migration problems.
Chairs: Ton Notermans, Simona Piattoni, Luca Verzichelli
Discussants: Simona Piattoni, Luca Verzichelli
Competitiveness imbalances, Eurozone’s “core”-“periphery” divide, and the euro’s difficult future
Luigi Bonatti (email@example.com), Andrea Fracasso (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Competitiveness imbalances among countries and regions tend to be wide and persistent. As a result, the spatial distribution of high and medium value-added activities is not uniform and collides with the worldwide tendency towards an equalization of the workers’ education levels and aspirations. In the Eurozone (EZ), this is determining a sharp divide between those areas predominantly located in Northern and Central Europe displaying relatively high per-capita income and low unemployment and those low-competitive areas of the Southern periphery with high structural unemployment. Such divide creates growing tensions among member countries and fuels hostility towards European Union institutions. Moreover, the weak governments of these peripheral countries do not appear to have the political capital needed to tackle these weaknesses. Thus, they seek some relief in the prolongation of the Quantitative Easing (QE) currently implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB), in the possibility of increasing their budget deficit beyond the limits dictated by the European rules, and in some form of debt mutualization (or—in the case of Greece—of debt forgiveness). In the meantime, populist parties capitalize on the discontent, particularly widespread in the periphery among the young cohorts, that are disproportionally suffering from the shortage of decent job opportunities. In contrast, EZ “core” countries like Germany have a tight labor market and their recent growth performance has not been disappointing considering that their workforce is shrinking as population ages. In a global scenario where deflationary impulses appear to be subdued and inflation—together with interest rates—is expected to gradually pick up, the EZ core will probably be less tolerant towards periphery’s excessive deficits and oppose the extension of the ECB’s QE after December 2017. Also their resistance towards more cross-border fiscal transfers (and debt mutualization or relief) in favor of the periphery is not likely to soften, especially if the nationalistic parties recently emerged in the EZ core will strengthen. It is apparent that the divide outlined above may put at risk the existence itself of the euro. In this paper, we shall discuss the deep causes of this divide and their implications for the future of the relationship between Germany and Italy.
Growth, prosperity, distribution and discontent. The question of economic equality and social justice in the run-up of federal elections in Germany.
Jan Labitzke (email@example.com)
Abstract For outside observers the economic situation in Germany seems to be splendid, especially in comparison to other European countries that have not yet overcome the financial crisis and its consequences as quick as Germany did: Germany is the strongest economy in the EU, the GDP grows constantly, the unemployment rate decreased from 11.7% in 2005 to 6.1 % in 2016 (with even lower rates and de facto full employment in the Southern regions). The tax revenues of all state levels grow every year and the state reduces its debt without cutting expenditure (Statistisches Bundesamt). However, alongside of this growing prosperity surveys show a huge discontent within the German population. In a survey of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in spring 2016 49% of the interviewed “fully agree” and another 33% “tend to agree” that social injustice in Germany is too high (FES 2016). Even if survey results differ, they show that a high share sees problems in the distribution of wealth, income and in the question of social justice. In an inquiry of the pollster Forsa, published in December 2016, 29% consider the societal conditions in Germany “unjust”, further 11% consider them “completely unjust”. Only 24% think that they are “fair all in all” (Stern, 07.12.2016). The proposed paper shall discuss these – at the first glance – contradictory and inconsistent observations, present approaches that can explain this huge discontent in a generally blooming economic situation, give a comparison to the situation and the developments in Italy, and discuss the impact of these findings on the federal elections in Germany at the end of September.
Exhaustion of Integration Narratives? Germany and Italy: from Reflex Europeanism to Responsible Nationalism?
Ton Notermans (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Though interpretations of the causes of and potential solutions to the Eurocrisis diverge widely, they share the conclusion that political support for a sustainable solution is lacking such that Europe is doomed to stalemate. Completing the monetary union a gouvernement économique falters on the resistance of Germany and its North European allies. The mercantilist policies of Germany that are seen to have driven the southern periphery (ref) into a competitiveness and balance of payments crisis, form the cornerstone of Germany’s post-war social model, which neither governments nor business and labour have any incentives to dismantle. Similarly, the South European model with it reliance on clientelistic forms of redistribution and its concomitantly larger role for the state appears as an equilibrium solution for societies marked by deep cleavages and low levels of trust. Yet, one of the most notable changes wrought by the Eurocrisis is a far-reaching upset of the party systems. Virtually all Eurozone countries have seen the meteoric rise of new (populist) challengers; the most spectacular of those, no doubt being the Italian M5S. Germany for a while seed immune, but since its foundation in 2013 the AfD in each successive state election has managed to increase its votes and now is represented in the parliaments of the majority of state and expected to enter the national parliament in the September 2017 elections. This paper explores to what extent the rise of new challenger parties may affect the Eurostalemate as well as the mutual relations between Italy and Germany in the European Union. As the established parties have excluded the challengers as potential coalition partners, the latter cannot expect to hold government office in the foreseeable future except for the highly unlikely event of them polling an absolute majority. Nevertheless, their ability to draw voters from actress the entire spectrum creates strong incentives for programmatic adjustment by the established parties. The effects of such adjustments, however currently seem contradictory. On the one hand, their EU-critical attitude would make a move towards a gouvernement economique less likely. On the other hand, these parties reflect a deep-seated discontent with growing socioeconomic inequalities such that they may exert both direct and indirect pressures for the resolution fo eth euro stalemate either through a dissolution of the Euro or a more coordinated expansionary strategy within Germany
Il processo di Bologna in Italia e in Germania
Giovanna Pugno Vanoni (email@example.com)
Abstract Una prima valutazione del processo di Bologna a partire dagli studi e dalle analisi prodotti, nell’arco di tempo fra il 1999 e il 2014. Una ricognizione della letteratura. Il paper si propone di delineare un disegno di una ricerca da condurre per individuare i fattori e e le dinamiche, da un lato, e per misurare eventuali effetti ed esiti dello stesso processo. 29 maggio 2017 Giovanna Pugno Vanoni E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Veto players in Environmental policy in Germany and Italy
Markus Grimm (email@example.com)
Abstract The German Green party is rooted in divergent ideological and cultural traditions, such as the Christian idea of the integrity of the creation or the international peace movement. In Italy the Green parties were never that successful than in Germany, but in both countries the environmental movements grow in the era of the anti-nuclear plant-protests and due to the effects of the report of The Club of Rome in the 1970s . Nonetheless, there do exist numerous NGOs in the field of ecology and climate policy, which gain a certain success in influencing Italian politics. Therefore, this project will research on the ideological and organizational roots of the Italian environmental movements, and especially on the Christian roots of these movements. Since the 1960s in Germany, the protestant and catholic idea of the “integrity of the creation” bore some important movements and founding documents of the green movement. In addition, just some papal documents, like the encyclical letters Octogesima adveniens (1971) and Laudato Sì (2015) showed a certain influence on the environmental debate in Germany and in other mainly catholic countries. In Italy, the environmental movement is embossed by Legambiente, a movement with political left root, which opened to a broader support during the last years. However, the religious influence on the Italian environmental debate seems not that obvious than in Germany. This study will concentrate on parallels between the development of the green movements and ideas in both the countries and it will do research on linkages between the ecologist groups and documents and the reception of Christian theories inside the ecologist movements. The presentation may be hold in Italian and/or English.
Chairs: Roberto De Rosa, Dario Quattromani
La Turchia di Erdogan
Domenico Fracchiolla (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Dopo gli eventi dell’ultimo anno la Turchia, un Giano bifronte della politica internazionale si rivolge sempre più verso il mondo islamico. La prospettiva accarezzata per quasi una generazione della Turchia come ponte di civiltà tra Oriente ed Occidente sembra essere compromessa in modo significativo. Fedele ad una strategia di ampio respiro Erdogan utilizza il coinvolgimento internazionale per portare avanti una personale agenda politica il cui fine è quello del consolidamento del suo potere politico all’interno della Turchia e la proiezione internazionale di una potenza regionale forte, con una maggiore autonomia rispetto ai suoi partner tradizionali. Si registra un trade off tra concessioni più o meno implicite alla deriva autoritaria che ha assunto il processo di riforma del sistema politico interno della Turchia, in cambio di garanzie sugli impegni internazionali assunti con l’Occidente nella direzione della stabilità, della guerra in Siria e della lotta all’Isis e della gestione della crisi dei rifugiati per l’UE. La relazione con l’UE rappresenta l’esempio più evidente della strumentalizzazione di Erdogan del processo d’integrazione europeo, utilizzato per costruire e consolidare la sua ascesa al potere, nella difficile opera di indebolire le strutture repubblicane della Turchia di Ataturk e di ridimensionare e rendere inoffensivi i militari, attori da centrali nel sistema politico turco fin dalla fondazione dello Stato. Il Presidente Erdogan ha utilizzato il processo d’integrazione europea per indebolire i suoi avversari politici considerati non democratici, salvo svuotare le conquiste liberali e registrare gravissime e continue violazioni dei diritti umani che hanno affossato, per il momento, ogni prospettiva di allargamento della Turchia e aggravato la stessa crisi dell’UE. In questo clima, ancora una volta, Erdogan ha sfruttato le debolezze dell’UE siglando un accordo per la gestione della crisi dei rifugiati che trasferisce ingenti finanziamenti alla Turchia e diventa un importante argomento negoziale della Turchia nei suoi rapporti con l’UE, da utilizzare nei momenti di maggiore difficoltà. Le chiavi della politica estera della Turchia risiedono nell’evoluzione della sua politica interna e quindi nel consolidamento del sistema di potere di Erdogan e del suo partito, l’AKP, che ha assunto i caratteri della presidenzializzazione del sistema politico con derive autoritarie e riacceso i timori della perdita della Turchia per l’Occidente.
Populism, blame shifting and the crisis: communication strategies in Portuguese political parties
Enrico Borghetto (email@example.com), Marco Lisi (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract Riding the wave of the economic crisis and the refugee emergency, populist parties have been gaining ground in European political systems. Their claims are not simply anti-elitist or people-centred: these parties defy the tenets of democratic liberalism by presenting themselves as the only "true" representatives of the "true" people. Southern Europe is no exception. Five-stars movement, Podemos and Syriza have all hit the headlines in recent years with their unique kind of rhetoric. Against this background, Portugal stands out as the only southern European country where traditional mainstream parties have not had to face the strong rise of populist challengers. Yet, this does not imply that the political rhetoric has not been affected by the populist zeitgeist. This paper starts from the premise that it is more meaningful to talk of degrees of populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and that elements of the populist rhetoric can be systematically detected in the political discourse (Hawkins 2009, Rooduijn 2011). We use a quantitative content analysis approach to identify the presence of a populist discourse in party manifestos and political leaders' speeches during the last three political campaigns (2009, 2011 and 2015). The coding protocol we adopt allows us also examining the use of blame-shifting argument, a rhetoric device extremely important in a country that faced the intervention of external actors in national politics during the bailout (2011-2014). Portugal is also an interesting case study given the resilience of mainstream parties and the continuities in terms of party systems characteristics. Therefore, the implications of this study provide a better understanding not only of the use of distinct rhetoric tools, but also on inter-party dynamics and party competition. Finally, this case study enlarges the scope of extant research by considering how populist discourse is used in distinct party types, both in terms of ideological orientations and organisational characteristics.
Are Slovenian United Left and Croatian Human Blockade populist on Facebook? A comparative analysis of their electoral campaigns.
Alessandro Albertini (email@example.com)
Abstract Populism is currently widely discussed and analyzed as a political communication style, particularly in terms of new political parties that emerged in Europe in the last several years. Do the new parties in European new democracies also follow the trend and adopt the populist communication style? This paper aims to analyze the extent in which new political parties in Croatia and Slovenia use populist political communication style in social media. This paper focuses on two new parties that didn't exist during the previous parliamentary elections and that entered the parliament in the last elections. In Croatia the party is Živi zid (Human Blockade) while in Slovenia Združena levica (United Left). The paper will analyze their political communication on Facebook. The main questions guiding the analysis are 1) to what extent are new parties in Croatia and Slovenia populist in their political communication on Facebook?; and 2) What kind of populism do these parties express on Facebook? The method used in the paper will be content analysis with a Facebook post as a unit of analysis. Content analysis will be performed on posts published in the timespan of two weeks before the general election (electoral campaign).
Trump & co: when populist billionaires enter politics
Marco Morini (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract This research moves from the shocking Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 American presidential elections and it offers an analysis of the growing phenomenon of billionaires who enter politics. The focus in on five billionaires who were able to achieve government responsibilities in their countries: Berlusconi in Italy, Blocher in Switzerland, Macri in Argentina, Piñera in Chile and Thaksin in Thailand. Throughout a comparative analysis, this research investigates their political and pre-political characteristics, highlighting the five cases’ differences and analogies. It compares the billionaires’ personal stories, the process of building their political careers, the election campaigns, their favourite political issues, the populist rhetoric and their styles of communication and government. We argue that the cases’ similarities are copious, both at biographical and political level. However, due to the different social, political and historical backgrounds, the conditions that favoured the billionaires’ success have to be found not only in their communication strategies but also in the process of disillusionment and de-politicization of voters.
Chairs: Roberto De Rosa, Dario Quattromani
Podemos e “Movimento 5 Stelle”: quale populismo?
francesco campolongo (email@example.com)
Abstract La crisi organica Europea (economica, democratica e sociale) ha prodotto una modifica della “struttura delle opportunità politiche” favorevole all'affermazione di alcuni partiti outsider come Podemos e il “Movimento 5 Stelle”. Poiché entrambi sono definiti, dalla pubblicistica e dalla letteratura scientifica, partiti “populisti” si potrebbe/dovrebbe pensare che siano realtà politiche sostanzialmente simili. In realtà, l'ipertrofia mediatica del concetto “populista” nella sfera pubblica, declinato come categoria “cath all” per partiti molto diversi tra loro, e lo stato della discussione accademica, caratterizzata dall'assenza di una definizione “condivisa” di populismo e da una pluralità di tendenze interpretative prevalenti (ideologia, strategia, stile), ci spingono ad approfondire se, come, in quale misura e sotto quali aspetti soggetti diversi come Podemos e il M5s possano essere definiti 'populisti'. A tal fine userò come punto di partenza della mia analisi la definizione operativa e multidimensionale di “populismo” fornita da Hanspeter Kriesi (2015), per cui le manifestazioni fenomeniche del concetto populista possono assumere la forma non reciprocamente escludente di “ideologia sottile”, di strategia comunicativa e di strategia di conquista/conservazione personalistica del potere. Lungo queste tre dimensioni verrà sviluppata un'analisi in chiave comparata di Podemos e del “Movimento 5 Stelle”. L'obiettivo della ricerca è quello di verificare se i due partiti possano essere definiti populisti e secondo quale/quali dimensioni al fine di contribuire ad un maggiore articolazione interna e ad una riconcettualizzazione dello stesso concetto di “populismo”, in termini di “concetto radiale” o di family resemblance. A tal fine si procederà ad una comparazione organizzativa, simbolica e strategica dei due partiti attraverso l'analisi della declinazione dei significanti costitutivi dell'ideologia populista (il popolo e le élite evocati sono certamente molto diversi), della comunicazione e dell'organizzazione, cioè di tre elementi chiave che paiono essere molto diversi nei due casi oggetto di indagine. L'ipotesi alla base del lavoro è che Podemos e il “Movimento 5 Stelle”, nonostante rilevanti differenze, possano essere definiti entrambi partiti “populisti” in relazione a tutte e tre le dimensioni del concetto individuate da Kriesi.
Regeneration or Disfiguration? The populist challenge to representative democracy in Italy and Venezuela.
Goffredo Adinolfi (firstname.lastname@example.org), Mayra Goulart (email@example.com)
Abstract This paper is about populism as a phenomenon that highlights the legitimacy crisis that characterizes liberal democracy in contemporary societies, since, from a pragmatic point of view, it exhibits a kind of representative dynamic less mediated by institutions for collective action, exposing the downfall of traditional social subjects as parties and unions. However, from a moral and philosophical perspective, the concept of populism, as it has been commonly presented, lacks a normative approach that could be useful to detect and emphasize the risks involved in this type of representation, less open to intermediate bodies and reflexive processes of consensus-building. So, in order to test this initial hypothesis, two case study will be presented – concealing the Bolivarian Movement, in Venezuela, and the Five Star Movement, in Italy – in which we will contrast different theoretical approaches in the analysis of political phenomena that can be understood as populist, namely: the laclaunian definition of populism and Nadia Urbinati’s model of democratic representation. In the first case study, we expect to demonstrate the adequacy of laclaunian concept in the description of the kind of representative bond established between Hugo Chávez and his constituencies. Especially this analytical tool seems useful to reveal the elements of rupture and continuity introduced by Chavez, considering a political tradition characterized by personalism, centralism, clientelism and the fragility of liberal institutions. Nevertheless, despite its descriptive skills, the concept does not demonstrate the same utility to support normative developments. This is the thesis that will be presented through the second case study, dedicated to the analysis of Five Star Movement (M5S), whose main idea is that the people have to rule by itself without been tutored by any kind of political elite or collective actor. In common, populist parties support the idea that to overcome the legitimation crisis of the liberal democracy is necessary to improve forms of direct participation, i. e. favouring direct participation through social networks. Is the bottom up "revolution against the intermediate bodies", as explained by Nadia Urbinati, a completely disfiguration of the liberal representative democracy or it can be a way to regenerate this failed system, as assumed by Laclau?
Five Star Movement: Grassroot Movement or an Institutionalized Party?
Martin Mejstrik (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Abstract The proposed paper is a qualitative interpretative case study whose aim is to analyse the development and structural changes in the Italian populist Five Star Movement (M5S) in the period after the European Parliament Elections in 2014. The main goal is to analyse a shift in the party organization from original grassroots movement towards more institutionalized political actor with office-seeking behaviour using the theoretical framework of Kenneth Janda and his theory of institutionalization. The structural factors which caused this shift (role of the media, new electoral system, style of politics of Matteo Renzi, “going mainstream” in order to get more votes) will be examined. Question of direct and arbitrary control exercised by the movement's indisputable leader Beppe Grillo with regard to possible successors and internal fractions will be also discussed. The paper will work with the hypothesis that the Five Star Movement in order to maintain office-seeking behaviour and with an ambition to win the next election became closer to political establishment and that this appeal to moderate electorate is possible only by going through the process of institutionalization. In short terms the M5S became a serious player in a contest for the Italian government and to maintain that position, the Movement has to adopt a structure of a classical political party. The question of cohesion and compactness of the movement will be also discussed.