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National, Confederal, Regional, Inter-local?¹

The Scale of Political Parties in the Canton of Glarus, Switzerland

Abstract

Swiss parties are said to be “vertically integrated” but with a generally high autonomy of the cantonal branches (Thorlakson 2009). But what scale of party authority in the cantons? Does intra-party federalism continue to spiral downwards toward “federal” or even “local decentralisation” (Duverger 1959, 53)? Or are parties truly “regional parties”, at the expense of local parties or sections? The paper proposes to answer these questions by looking at the case of political parties in the canton of Glarus, in Eastern Switzerland. The question of multilevel intra-party organisation (Deschouwer 2003) is analysed through data from party statutes and interviews with party leaders in Glarus. While parties are decentralised in parallel with intra-cantonal federalism, traditional ideologies (liberal, christian, socialist, Greens) filter that causal influence. The recent rescaling of electoral districts and a radical merging of local authorities have lead to an even greater division of tasks, but more parties competing for less seats has not led to a greater “cantonalisation” of parties. The paper concludes with deducing three ideal types of cantonal party-organisation: regional (SP and BDP), federal (Greens), and inter-local (CVP, FDP, and SVP).

Keywords

Switzerland, canton of Glarus, political parties, vertical integration, local autonomy

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1 Introduction

Glarus is one of 26 cantons constituting the Swiss federation. In general terms, cantons are the Swiss nation-state's regions.² Self-rule for education and police, shared rule for agriculture, health and traffic: the Swiss regions are largely self-financing, state-like entities. That the cantons are (somehow) "sovereign" is acknowledged by the Swiss constitution.³ Yet the Swiss cantons represent "pre-sovereign" polities insofar as their formation antedates the conceptualisation of sovereignty as both "jurisdictional integrity" (Skelcher 2005) and "geographical fixity" (Vollaard 2009), typically on the national level. A canton is, in its very own projection, a "democratic free-state" (*demokratischer Freistaat*) and a "sovereign part of the comity" (*souveränes Bundesglied*), an "autonomous" (*eigenständig*) and "democratic Republic" that has joined the Swiss Confederation.⁴ Hence a canton's suitability to political analysis on system-level.

Speaking of Switzerland means speaking of the Swiss cantons. The implication for contemporary scholars is that a canton cannot be neglected in any study of Swiss political institutions, be they related to legislative activity, financial capacity, or administrative discretion. But the vertical dimension of politics does not stop here. Switzerland consists of yet another layer of politics, which is that of the municipalities or "communes" (*Gemeinden, communes, comuni*). (Fleiner and Basta Fleiner 2000) Speaking of the cantons, then, means speaking of the Swiss communes. Communes implement both federal and cantonal tasks through their own staff; communes levy taxes and set their own tax rates; communes issue decisions which are collectively binding. Communes are the basis of Swiss citizenship (Basta Fleiner 2000, 80). Subsidiarity as "a general principle" (Bapst 2000) and the Swiss "preference for small-scale government" (Frenkel 1993, 61) refer to the same: Swiss politics is cantonal politics, and cantonal politics is local politics.

What does this mean for the study of political parties? The topic of this panel, **Where is the party?**, can be taken literally as to *exactly where* do we find Swiss parties: on the national level, or in the cantons, or even in the municipalities?⁵ In other words: how "nationalised" (Caramani 2004) have political parties become/remained? How "cantonalised", "localised" are they still?

The interaction between national/federal and regional/cantonal party levels has been analysed for example by Thorlakson (2009), who found Swiss federal parties to be "vertically integrated" but with a generally high autonomy of the cantonal branches. But what about the organisation of authority within (Swiss) *cantonal* parties? How are cantonal parties organised *internally*; where is the chief locus of candidate selection, what are the modes of party financing at this level? Multi-level electoral systems at this stage turn into organisational debates (Deschouwer 2003), but remain "multi-level".

Two explanations are usually offered to account for the vertical (non-)integration of parties: ideology and federalism. Liberal and catholic parties are expected to organise into more decentralised structure; and parties from all shades tend to mirror the institutional distribution of political power in their organisational structure. This paper tests these two theories through data on the Swiss canton of Glarus (GL). First, the general national-regional framework for the vertical dimension of intra-party analysis is being exposed. The paper then describes patterns of party organisation in the canton of Glarus and, in the main, discusses and tests how the multi-level framework can be repro-

2 Terminology: "national", "regional" and "local" are generic terms; "federal", "cantonal" and "communal" or "municipal" refer to the same, respectively, but are specifically Swiss notions.

3 "The Cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution." (Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, of 18 April 1999; status as of 27 September 2009)

4 Quotes are from Art 1.1. of the Constitution of the Canton of Zurich, of 27 February 2005; Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Canton of Obwalden, of 19 May 1968; Art. 1.1 of the Constitution of the Canton of Basle-Countryside, of 17 May 1984; Art. 1.2. of the Constitution of the Canton of Schaffhausen, of 17 June 2002; and Art. 1.1 of the Constitution of the Canton of Valais, of 8 March 1907.

5 The same question, devised independently of both the panel title and the author's application of it to Switzerland, has been put forth by Deschouwer (2003, 216): "The fundamental question is: exactly where is the party? Is it at the federal level or at the regional level?"

duced at this particular cantonal-communal interface. The paper concludes with three types or models of cantonal party-organisation.

2 The territorial dimension of political parties

The question of how political parties organise across multiple governmental layers merges the objects of two sub-disciplines of political science: party politics and territorial politics. (Thorlakson 2009) Depending on the perspective, party organisation is either treated as a dependent, or as an independent variable of the territorial organisation of political systems. That is, a party's organisation and ideology are regarded as either effect of, or cause for, federalism, regionalism, devolution and/or decentralisation.⁶ The causal relationship is however far from clear (Duchacek 1987, 329). As so often in social science, the two variables may both influence each other, or even be themselves influenced by yet a third.⁷

Trying to understand the linkage between party organisation and the organisation of a (for example federal) polity faces a number of challenges. The first is terminological. In principle, political parties relate to the political system as a more or less autonomous sub-system: the "party system". But the concept of system can also be reproduced for each individual party: the "party-as-a-system" (Sartori 1976 [2005], 39). On the other hand, the autonomy of a federal state's constituent entity can be as far reaching as to make this territorial sub-system a perfectly valid political system on its own, with its own parties. The choice is then between treating sub-national parties as forming a party system on their own; regarding them as extensions of the national parties and party system; and mixing (or not) these two perspectives for different parties and/or different regions. Add to this two-level conceptualisation a third, i.e., the local layer – and complexity could hardly be more challenging. (Deschouwer 2003)

In the interest of parsimony, let us make two initial choices. First, we are interested in party organisation, so this variable is our explanandum. We acknowledge that parties partake in shaping the institutional structure. But this process is not under review in this paper. Second, insofar as federalism is "a normative principle" arguing for "combining elements of shared-rule and regional self-rule" (Watts 2008, 8), federalism is a systemic attribute. It applies to both political systems and the party-as-a-system. Consequently, we may speak of *federal parties* as those political parties operating within a "federal political system" (ibid.), i.e., within a state or a region (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). *Party federalism*, in turn, denotes the application of federalism (as "ideology": King 1982) within the party. Both instances will be discussed in the following two sections.

Federal parties

Parties are essential to the workings of democracy (van Biezen 2003). They are thus indispensable for federations as "a classification of [...] the fully constitutional type" (Hughes 1963, 7) as well. But there is more to it, it appears. The idea that a party's strategy and behaviour are determined by federalism inheres with Thorlakson's (2007) *institutional approach to party organisation*. The realisation of a federal design in a state creates "multiple arenas of competition" (p. 73), each with different offices at stake and with distinct policies to make. Thorlakson argues that

[...] decentralization gives parties and voters both incentive and opportunity to mobilize and respond to locally defined issues, leading to the development of "unique" party systems at the state [regional] level, with fewer competitive linkages to the federal [national] arena. (p. 71)

Parties turn federal to the extent that the overarching polity embodies federalism. However, other authors reverse this causal connection. (Watts 2004) Approaching, in turn, the federal design of a

6 Despite their obvious differences, federalism, regionalism, legislative decentralisation and devolution have in common that, as systemic properties, they all create/maintain a sub-system level of political competition. As genus, each belongs to the species of "non-centralised" systems, to some extent (Elazar 1987, 34). This is not valid for mere administrative decentralisation ("deconcentration") and fully ("unitary") centralised systems. (Watts 2008, Swenden 2006)

7 This is the argument of Chandler (1987, 151: fig. 1): "patterns of party competition" and "federal institutions" influence each other, and both are influenced by and actively influence "federal societies", in turn.

state from the perspective of political parties, Riker (1964) saw in the territorial structure of a party system the only reliable indicator of how centralised or “peripheralized” a federal polity really was. His *party-political approach to federalism* reads as follows:

The federal relationship is centralized according to the degree to which the parties organized to operate the central [national] government control the parties organized to operate the constituent [regional] governments. [...] the proximate *cause* of variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of a federalism is the variation in degree of party centralization. (p. 129; emphasis added)

For Riker, a polity is federal to the extent that parties embody federalism. Both Riker’s and Thorlakson’s inferences may hold true; indeed, they may be read as complementary. Their emphasis on the relationship between party system and federal system is quite different. But both make valuable contributions toward understanding the importance of territory *as such* for politics. Any “non-centralised” system (Elazar 1987, 34) is then operated by parties, competing, at a minimum, on multiple levels, and exhibiting, at a maximum, two (or n , for n relevant levels) “cores” (Deschouwer 2003). If the formal (constitutional) divisions of authority across different territorial scales matches the real (actor-related) distribution of power, a polity is truly “multilevel” (Benz 2009, Bache and Flinders 2004). In his later writings on federalism, Riker (1969, 139) brings this assumption to the point:

[T]he essence of local autonomy has little to do with whether or not the central constitution grants particular rights to local officials but has very much to do with whether or not local officials are elected by or are in some other way responsive to local citizens.

In other words, if fiscal, administrative and/or legislative decentralisation (Watts 2008) is not accompanied by the creation (or maintenance) of respective electoral arenas, autonomy as the lung of federalism remains but symbolic. On the other hand, once a political system is moving in the direction of more decentralised decision-making structures, parties follow and adapt to “peripheral” (e.g., regional or local) issues at stake – ideologically as well as organisationally. Parties become themselves “multilevel organizations” (Deschouwer 2006). Thus, the “ideal federal party [...] exists at all levels – national, regional, and local – and fields candidates at all levels” (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004, 192). Indeed, parties in federations seem to have been “formed primarily to contest regional elections”, and not so much to stand in national contests (Epstein 1967, 32).

The territorial dimension of a political system and parties as political actors within that system are interdependent. The particular organisation of a party and the particular organisation of government are “parallel” (ibid.). We can therefore expect that if one changes, the other will follow. This was the case in Glarus, as will be shown below. Parties “both shape processes of decentralization and federalism and need to respond to political imperatives induced by the territorial structure of a state.” (Hopkin and van Houten 2009, 131) With regard to such “territorial or multi-level organization of political parties”, one descriptive and one analytical question arise. Description pertains to the mode or pattern of vertical organisation; analysis to the reasons for variation in organisation of parties in the same political system (ibid. 132). We review this descriptive aspect under the heading of party federalism; analysis will be applied to the case of Glarus further below.

Party federalism

The notion of “party federalism” captures how federalism, as an organisational principle for the distribution of political power based on territory, comes to play *within* a political party. Intra-party aspects of multi-levelness belong to the sphere of party organisation (Deschouwer 2003). However territory, as an “intervening variable” (Burgess 2006, 106), is largely absent from “classic” literature on political parties (cf. Hopkin and van Houten 2009, 131-132). Giovanni Sartori (2005 [1976]) does not take the territorial dimension of either parties or party systems into account in his “framework of analysis”. Maurice Duverger (1959) is equally concerned more with wider issues such as party alliances, types of party systems, and political regimes than party organisation. Yet a closer look turns this observation on its head. Speaking about “the party from within”, Sartori (2005 [1976], 67-68) cautioned that:

[...] it does make a wealth of difference whether, and to what degree, a party is made up of subunits that operate their own network of loyalties, hold their congresses, seek money for themselves (not for the party), have their press and their press spokesmen, and – all in all – relate to the party as quasi-sovereign groups.

Although speaking for “factions” more than for territorial within-party entities, his indicators can be “territorialised”. How a party is organised vertically⁸ can therefore be deduced from how “loyalties” are distributed across governmental levels; how actively local/regional branches and national/European umbrella organisation campaign for votes; and from the direction of intra-party money flows, e.g., from national to regional (“top down”) or from regional to national offices (“bottom-up”). Using the very term “quasi-sovereign”, Sartori at least implicitly associates party organisation with territory; the idea of sovereignty having become near-exclusively associated with territoriality (Larkins 2009). In the same vein Sartori's use of “confederation” (for the case of Uruguay; fn. 11 on p. 94) and “federation” (for Japanese and Italian parties; p. 80) to describe specific party types.

Duverger (1959, 20), on the other hand, did speak about the territorial dimension of parties. Territory appears in four instances. First, the distinction between “direct membership” (of individuals) and “indirect membership” (of corporate, social, and/or professional groups) is one that mirrors the distinction “between the unitary and the confederate state at the national level.” (p. 5). Particularly christian-democratic parties were founded upon a corporate membership. Second, for a party's “basic elements”, there is the opposition between caucus and branch (p. 17). The typical nineteenth-century liberal organisation of parties was one of “federations of caucuses”, itself an “archaic type of political party structure” (p. 20). The more recent “branch” of a party “denotes a basic element which is less decentralized than the caucus: a branch is only part of the whole, and its separate existence is inconceivable” (p. 23). A branch is a socialist invention, typical for the modern mass-party. Despite all differences, both branch and caucus are, *inter alia*, defined in relation to territory: a “large geographical area” for the caucus (p. 18), a “less extensive” one for the branch (p. 23). Third, speaking of how these “basic communities” (p. 40) of a party interconnect, Duverger claims exactly the kind of parallelism mentioned above:

In general, political articulation tends to model itself upon the articulation of administration in the state: the grouping of the “basic elements” assumes therefore the pattern of a hierarchical pyramid coinciding with the official territories. One level often seems preponderant in character, and generally corresponds to the basic administrative area. (ibid.)

This “basic administrative area” Duverger rightly identifies in the canton, for Switzerland (ibid.). Weak articulation, or a low degree of “institutionalisation” (Panebianco 1988, 49), correlates with the caucus system; and so does a strong articulation with the branch system (Duverger 1959, 47). The forth contribution Duverger makes to studying the territorial dimension of party organisation is a distinction between (de-)centralization and the arrangement of the basic elements:

Vertical links and horizontal links define ways of co-ordinating the basic elements of which the party is made up; centralization and decentralization define the way in which power is distributed amongst the different levels of leadership. (p. 52)

This distinction refers to “the direction of the system of articulation” (p. 47). However, of the four types of decentralisation, only two are territorial. One, “local decentralization” (or “parochialism”), means that “the local leaders of the party come from the bottom; they enjoy wide powers; the centre has little control over them; the fundamental decisions are taken by them.” (p. 53) The other, “federal decentralization”, associates most clearly with our notion of party federalism. So in Switzerland, where “the federal structure of the state is [...] reflected in that of the parties”; and so in Austro-Hungary before 1914, where it was the parties that injected “a certain element of federalism” into an otherwise unitary state. (p. 55)

⁸ The descriptive value of “vertical integration” will be discussed below. Attention can be drawn to its normative implication: if the opposite of integration is *fragmentation and conflict*, integration appears as a normative value. Only if the opposite of integration is *non-integration* (i.e., a party with two or more “cores”) can the concept be understood empirically.

Since Duverger and Sartori, more examples have emerged, making theory-building more fine-tuned. Especially demands for more regional autonomy in Europe since the 1970s have spurred the development of “territorial” parties. (Keating 1998, 58) We can now locate two extreme types of territorial organisation, in-between which a myriad of possibilities exist. Organisation may take place exclusively along *national*, or exclusively along *regional* lines. A party may be regionalised to an extent that there is not even a national formation at all; examples include the Catalan *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), the Bavarian Christian-Social Union (CSU), the Italian *Lega Nord*, or the Swiss *Lega dei Ticinesi*. These parties are “multilevel” only to the extent that they participate in national and regional elections. (Maddens and Swenden 2009, 9) Otherwise, such formations are regional parties – and, often, also “regionalist” in that they promote their region ideologically. (McDonnell 2006)

But how to measure the nature and degree of territoriality? Lori Thorlakson (2009), following Sartori’s signposts and partly applying Duverger’s conceptualization, assesses the territorial organisation of parties (in federal systems) via three variables:

Vertical integration refers to the extent and strength of formal and informal linkages between state [regional] and federal [national] parties. [...] *Influence* refers to the extent to which the state party organizations exercise control in the governance of the federal party, while *autonomy* tells us whether these integrative linkages result in control over another party level. (p. 160)

Influence of the regional parties (“branches”, for Duverger) and autonomy (“local/federal decentralization”) are two sides of the same coin. Influence refers to bottom-up, autonomy to (the absence of) top-down decision-making channels. The key concept however is vertical integration. Two situations are possible:

- Vertical integration comprises Duverger’s “strong articulation” and “direct membership” insofar as “formal organizational linkages such as a common party membership, shared finances and a common governance structure” (Thorlakson 2009, 161) presume a party at least partially acting upon individual members and possessing an elaborate structure of internal representation.
- A “non-integrated” political party, on the other hand, is one that “organizes and competes at both the state and federal levels but shares neither a common governance nor membership structure” (ibid.). Here, membership in the national party is “indirect” (i.e., through the regional party) and Duverger’s “general articulation” is weak in its vertical dimension. In Sartori’s terms, in a non-integrated party, loyalties are divided, with campaigns and financing run separately.

Apart from membership structures and financing, another important indicator of “the degree of autonomy of the regional branch” refers to recruitment (Deschouwer 2006, 294). Insofar as the ultimate goal of every democratic political party is to gain power through elections, the national-regional tensions boil down to candidate selection:

The party in recruiting candidates determines the personnel and, more symbolically, the groups to be represented among the decision-making elite. Through recruitment, the party indirectly influences the types of policy decisions to be enacted and the interests most likely to be heard. Candidate recruitment then represents one of the key linkages between the electorate and the policy-making process. (Crotty 1968, 260)

Again, we can imagine two extremes:

The slate of candidates competing in local [regional] elections might be chosen by central [national] government party officials. At the other end of a spectrum, state [regional] or local officials might play a key role in selecting candidates for central [national] government elections. (Rodden 2004, 488)

Theoretically, national candidates could even be selected exclusively by regional or even local officials. But local autonomy is a two-edged sword in that other localities have the same power, and then the national level is needed at least to coordinate different candidacies. Thus, one needs to assess the *relative* weight of influence on candidate selection that each tier of party officials/members has, if one is to establish “empirical types of multi-level” parties (Thorlakson 2009, 159).

Cantonal parties

Multi-level parties are typically found in federations. The debate is about regional (i.e., cantonal, *Länder*, provincial, State etc.) influence in, and autonomy from, the overarching national (i.e., federal) party. This article goes one step further in the vertical analysis of political parties in that the *regional-local* interplay is observed. But before proceeding at the sub-cantonal level, cantonal parties must be placed in the overall framework. Applied to Switzerland, Thorlakson (2009, 166) found that Swiss parties “are integrated, yet preserve a high degree of autonomy for state-level [regional/cantonal] parties.” Regional, that is cantonal autonomy within the federal party is not only tolerated, but desired and promoted:

Swiss parties, while integrated, stand out for the emphasis their party statutes place upon preserving the autonomy of the cantonal organization. This party design offers maximum flexibility for state-level [cantonal] parties to adopt divergent policy positions. (Ibid.)

Swiss parties, therefore, are little more than “franchise” enterprises. (Carty 2004) It is very common that cantonal parties – the term “branch” must appear derogatory in this context – adopt divergent views on the regularly held popular votes. In a semi-direct democracy as Switzerland, parties' official recommendations on how to vote are part of their interest-aggregating function. Membership in Swiss parties is clearly indirect/territorial. When the Swiss People's Party (SVP) wanted to expel the newly elected Federal Councillor Eveline Widmer Schlumpf for having accepted the office, they had to resort to expelling the whole regional party, the SVP Grisons.⁹ The autonomy of cantonal parties *from*, and the influence they wield *on* the federal party, make Swiss parties fit into Thorlakson's “confederal” type of multi-level parties. (Thorlakson 2009, 173) For this type, “the balance of party power lies in the state [regional/cantonal] organizations” (ibid. 162). But what exactly means the application of the notion of confederalism to political parties? The term is propped onto parties without a more thoroughgoing ponderation about the conceptual consequences.

“Confederalism”, to be sure, is neither an philosophical ideology nor a programmatic strategy. The (abstract) ideology behind is federalism, and the (specific) programme following it is centralisation of decision-making. (Hughes 1963, Forsyth 1981) Hueglin and Fenna (2006, 34) state that confederations – as empirical realisation of both programme and ideology – are, on the one hand, “more than alliances or leagues”, because at least some legislative, administrative and/or fiscal functions are “centralised”. On the other hand, since the “locus of sovereignty” remains with the member states, “confederal arrangements leave the central government dependent on the member states for revenue and with little scope for making domestic policy” (ibid.). They thus agree with Duchacek (1987, 160) that “[i]n a union of states a permanent common machinery is not endowed with any significant central coercive device and tax-collecting powers.” Members of a confederation do not “lose their identity as states” (Forsyth 1981, 1), as they “raise themselves by contract to the threshold of being one state” (p. 2), without however crossing that bar.

Applied to Swiss parties, this means that cantonal parties enter the national formation a) without losing their identity, or “sovereignty”, as parties; and b) centralise (“nationalise”) as little decision-making powers as possible. Hence our insistence on cantonal *parties*, and not branches. National parties, in that they are confederal, cannot enforce their party programmes directly. They have, other than outright expulsion, no means to coerce cantonal parties into certain behavioural patterns; the BDP-SVP case has shown this. National parties rely on cantonal finances and loyalties, manpower and support, candidates and often also issues.

But what about the (internal) organisation not of Swiss, but of *cantonal* parties? Is the confederal pattern reproduced at lower levels? Given the quite equilibrated structure of federalism in Switzer-

⁹ This has led to the (re-)creation of the BDP (*Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei*), in the cantons of Grisons, Glarus and Berne. These three cantonal parties in turn founded the BDP-Switzerland, on 1 November 2008, in the city of Glarus. (Cf. official press release at http://www.bdp.info/media/archive1/mm_d_081101.pdf, accessed 12 July 2010) The party's French acronym is PBD (*Parti bourgeois démocratique*); cantonal parties have been founded so far in ten cantons: in GR, GL, BE; and in ZH, SG, TG, AG, VS, SO, and SZ. (Cf. <http://www.bdp.info/kantonalparteien>, accessed 12 July 2010)

land over the three layers, cantonal parties are assumed to be under two constraints. One is from the top and represents a possible “nationalization” (Caramani 2004). The other constraint arises from the bottom: “local decentralization”, with Duverger. Only the latter is discussed here. Reproducing the national-regional concepts at the regional-local interplay should help us capture specifically “Swiss” (in fact, cantonal) realities. How vertically integrated are cantonal parties – in other words, and to paraphrase again the title of this panel: *Where exactly is the cantonal party?* The hypothesis for cantonal parties can be formulated as follows:

- H1: If a canton is decentralised/federal, then parties operating within that canton are organised in a decentralised/federal fashion **paralleling** the institutional system: membership is indirect (through communal branches), candidates for cantonal and local elections are selected by communal party organs, and financing is done communally (with bottom-up transfers).

But parties are expected to vary according to their ideological stance. Caucuses are a liberal, the branch a socialist, and corporate-indirect membership structures a christian-democratic invention (Duverger 1959, 25). An alternative explanation of vertical integration, therefore, is based on party ideology:

[...] we would expect liberal parties [...] to have high autonomy and a low degree of integration. In socialist parties [...] we would expect integration and a low degree of state party influence and autonomy. The centrality of the values of subsidiarity and democracy in Christian Democratic ideology [...] we would expect [...] to translate into an integrated structure that provides autonomy for the state parties. Finally, Green parties tend to have a highly decentralized grassroots structure, which is likely to produce autonomy. (Thorlakson 2009, 165)

If we reformulate this statement into one according to our indicators and notion of party federalism, the second hypothesis of this paper reads as follows:

- H2: The degree of party federalism/decentralisation is a function of a party's **ideology**: it is higher in liberal and christian-democratic parties than in Green parties, and comparatively lowest in socialist parties.

These two hypotheses will be tested in a qualitative discussion of parties in the canton of Glarus. A comparison of party statutes and a survey among party leaders provide the primary data. The time-frame covered for supporting electoral data is between 2002 and 2010; statutes are from 2008-2010, survey and follow-up interviews have been conducted in Summer 2010.

3 Territory and parties in Glarus

This chapter starts with a background note to situate Glarus, both contextually and conceptually. The second section lays out recent changes in the political landscape. The third section describes the rescaling of parties, or party federalism as we may also call it, by distilling the degree of vertical integration from party statutes and through interviews.¹⁰

Background

Glarus as a state-like polity, as an arena for political competition, is very small. However, this paper is based on the assumption that size does *not* matter for analyses on the system-level. The systemic principles of election, voting and competition remain the same. Otherwise they are neither systemic nor principles. Besides, it is far from clear exactly *how* size matters. Does a smaller polity enable a better mobilisation and guarantee more participation, as Jefferson thought? (Huntington 1959) Or do, with Hamilton and Madison, only “extended republics” provide the best safeguard against excessive participation, or “factionalism”?¹¹ Controlling for size, here, means ignoring this debate.

¹⁰ A list of party statutes analysed and interviews conducted is provided in Annex 1. Statutes were obtained from the websites of the respective parties, local sections and youth organisations (if applicable), all accessed on 20 July 2010. Interviewees were sent a four-page questionnaire and subsequent conversations took place based on their answers and the party statutes (if available). The author is happy to share the material with interested scholars; privacy protection may apply.

¹¹ “The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it [...] Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens [...]” The Federalist, no. 10)

Glarus is no doubt small both in terms of area and population: 40'000 people inhabit 685 km². Catholics and Protestants divide this German-speaking canton near-equally. (BFS 2010) Glarus is (over-)industrialised and a net-recipient from the national equalization fund. The cantonal competencies are the same as for every other Swiss canton: self-rule for education, internal order (police) and health; shared rule for taxes, transport, social care, immigration; implementation of civil law and agriculture; and no rule for defence (army), tariffs, and currency. Utilities (water, gas, electricity, oil/heat) have largely been privatised, but municipalities continue to spend up to half of all administrative costs in the canton. (BADAC 2010) The main conflict currently dominating cantonal politics can be described as “protection of the (cantonal) environment and pro-public transport (rail)” vs. “pro-infrastructure (street) and private transport (car)”. The national “cleavage” (“anti-naturalization/closed borders/conservative/pro-farmers” vs. “pro-EU/open borders/progressive/pro-employees”) leaves however its imprint on the party-political scene also on cantonal, if not even local level.¹²

Territory and political power are brought together and structured by the electoral system as an “opportunity structure”, in Sartori’s (1976 [2005]) words. The “rules of the game” (Schmidt 2004, 321) for elections to the cantonal legislative (*Landrat*) are that of the “free party list system” (Reynolds et al. 2005). It is particularly the possibility of *panachage* that allows cross- and/or anti-party voting, and introduces a personal-plurality element into otherwise party-proportional elections.¹³ But elections are one thing, direct democracy another. Glarus is one of the few cantons still practising the *Landsgemeinde*. As a consequence, party-political competition and the Landrat itself are of minor importance than in “pure” representative democracies. The Landsgemeinde, as a procedure, provides a synergy of obligatory and facultative, ordinary and extraordinary, constitutional and legal, administrative or financial referenda. (Cf. Trechsel and Serdült 1999) As an institution, it embodies cantonal autonomy to the fullest extent possible. Actual voting in the Landsgemeinde does not take place unless the requests of the Landrat as a the agenda-setting body are publicly disputed by at least one citizen. Parties (in the Landrat) thus retain at least some of their aggregating functions. (Cf. Müller 2007, 9)

Recent changes

Glarus has undergone some major changes in the last decade. Table 1 depicts an overview of the evolution of these changes, decided at person- and party-based elections and through issue-related decisions of the Landsgemeinde. They can be summarised into four dimensions:

1. *Party-political*: The entry of the BDP, in 2008, onto the scene of political competition transformed the cantonal party system from a five- into a six-party system;
2. *Territorial-administrative*: The communal merger, decided in 2006 and confirmed in 2007, has radically altered the political-administrative structure. More than 70 sub-national entities (school districts, welfare districts, political communes, and citizen’s communes) were merged into just three “unitary communes” (Cf. Müller 2008);
3. *Representational*: both the cantonal executive (*Regierungsrat*) and the cantonal parliament (Landrat) have been downsized, from seven to five and from 80 to 60 seats, respectively; and
4. *Territorial-electoral*: the previously 14 electoral districts have been reapportioned to fit the three new unitary communes; indeed the very notion of “electoral district” (*Wahlkreis*) has disappeared altogether.

12 See the extremely tight results in Glarus for the popular votes in 2009 on the extension of free movement to Bulgaria and Romania (51.00% no vs. 48.99% yes; CH: 40.4% vs. 59.6%) and on the agreement with the EU on biometric passports (50.03% no vs. 49.96% yes; CH: 49.9% vs. 50.1%). We find the city of Glarus and the communes of Ennenda, Rüti, Mollis and Braunwald in the affirmative (=pro-EU and progressive) camp on both issues. This made them losing the cantonal, but winning the – decisive – national vote. (Cf. <http://www.gl.ch> and <http://www.admin.ch>, both accessed 18 July 2010)

13 A description of the electoral system for parliamentary election in the canton of Glarus is provided in Annex 2.

Date	Event	Result/Decision	Dimension(s)
5 May 2002	Landsgemeinde	seats in the Regierungsrat from 7 down to 5 (per 2006)	representational & party-political
8 & 22 Feb 2004	Regierungsrat elections (substitution for 1 CVP)	1 CVP (R. Widmer)	party-political (cantonal)
12 Feb 2006	Regierungsrat elections (now 5 instead of 7 seats)	2 FDP, 1 SP, 1 CVP, 1 SVP	party-political (cantonal)
7 May 2006	Landsgemeinde	merge 70+ sub-cantonal entities into 3 “unitary communes”	territorial-administrative
21 May 2006	Landrat elections (80 seats)	26 SVP, 23 FDP, 12 SP, 12 CVP, 6 Greens; 1 other	party-political (cantonal)
6 May 2007	Landsgemeinde	cantonisation of social care	territorial-administrative
21 Oct 2007	NC elections	1 SP (W. Marti)	party-political (federal)
	SC elections	1 FDP (F. Schiesser), 1 SVP (Th. Jenny)	party-political (federal)
25 Nov 2007	special Landsgemeinde	confirms communal merger (cf. Landsgemeinde of 7 May 2006)	territorial-administrative
10 Feb 2008	SC elections (substitution for 1 FDP)	1 FDP (P. Freitag)	party-political (cantonal)
6 & 20 Apr 2008	Regierungsrat elections (substitution for 1 FDP)	1 FDP (A. Bettiga)	party-political/cantonal
4 May 2008	Landsgemeinde	seats in the Landrat from 80 down to 60 (per 2010)	representational & party-political
		electoral districts from 14 down to 3 (= new communes)	territorial-electoral
8 Feb 2009	NC elections (substitution for 1 SP)	1 BDP (M. Landolt)	party-political (federal)
3 May 2009	Landsgemeinde	various technical matters	territorial-administrative
13 & 27 Sept 2009	Communal elections: executives	12 FDP, 4 independent, 3 SP, 3 CVP, 3 Greens, 2 BDP, 1 SVP, 1 CSP	party-political (communal)
7 March 2010	Regierungsrat elections	2 FDP, 1 SP, 1 CVP, 1 BDP	party-political (cantonal)
	communal elections: legislative, in GL-north	8 SVP, 6 SP/JUSO, 6 CVP, 5 FDP, 4 BDP, 2 Greens, 2 CSP	party-political (communal)
2 May 2010	Landsgemeinde	various technical matters	territorial-administrative
30 May 2010	Landrat elections (60 seats)	17 SVP, 12 FDP, 10 BDP, 8 SP, 7 Greens, 6 CVP	party-political (cantonal)

Table 1: Territory and politics in Glarus, 2002–2010

Key: NC = National Council; SC = Council of States

These four changes have made the year 2010 a very special election year. 2010 was the first time that citizens voted in a) *bigger* electoral districts for candidates to b) a *smaller* Landrat among c) *more* parties. Specifically the BDP was under pressure to confirm its 10% of the legislative seats, which the party had “won” still under the SVP-label.¹⁴

How did the parties’ internal organisations respond to this rescaling? If we take the tightening of the race for less cantonal seats to be predominant, then parties will “cantonalise” (=centralise) their resources to better be able to fight – and win – the decisive elections. The canton of Glarus being a sub-national hybrid between a “constitutionally decentralised Union” (Watts 2008) and a “regionalised state” (Swenden 2006),¹⁵ cantonal seats are expected to count more. The presence of just three communes, which overlap with the cantonal constituencies, will make the occupying of communal offices (executive, in all three, and also legislative, in Glarus North) important, but not as much as being among the much more prestigious cantonal dignitaries, Regierungsrat and Landrat. We thus hypothesize that:

- H3: With competition having become more intense (less seats for more parties in bigger constituencies), parties “**cantonalise**”, that is centralise their organisation at the expense of the autonomy of local branches.

We can now proceed to discuss vertical integration in Glarus, testing the three hypotheses (parallelism, ideology, cantonalisation) through the empirical data collected.

Vertical Party Integration in Glarus

The six cantonal parties under review here are the Swiss People's Party of the Canton Glarus (SVP Glarus), the Christian-Democratic People's Party (CVP), the Social-Democratic Party (SP), the Free-Democratic Party, The Liberals (FDP), the Greens, and the BDP.¹⁶ We start by discussing the parties' general articulation, in Duverger's sense, as a prelude to the framework of vertical integration, in Thorlakson's sense. Then, the three indicators of party organisation (membership structures, financing, and candidate-selection) are assessed in turn.

General articulation

The BDP, to start with, has a very strong articulation on cantonal level, but not so much on local level. This reflects a deliberate choice of the party founders to have a “minimal”, i.e., a small and efficient structure (*1). The connection with “regional and local layers” takes place through regional representatives, which are however appointed by the cantonal party leadership (BDP/6, 12.4 and 17.1-j). There are no local sections as in all the other parties. On the other hand, a regional party assembly (*regionale Parteiversammlung*) may be called by either the cantonal party leadership or one tenth of the members in the respective region; a region, for that matter, corresponds to any of the three new municipalities (BDP/12.1). The powers of such a regional assembly include the issuing of recommendations for local elections and votes, including the communal assemblies (*Gemeindeversammlung*), and the proposing, to the attention of the cantonal “extended party leadership” (*erweiterte Parteileitung*), of candidates for Landrat elections (BDP/12.2).

The SVP Glarus, in turn, is itself “attached” (*angeschlossen*) to the Swiss SVP, and its local sections combined or “federated” (*zusammengeschlossen*) into the cantonal party (SVP/6). The powers and duties of local sections are accordingly quite extensive: electoral activities, recruitment of new members, propaganda are explicitly provided for in the statute. The political autonomy of local sections is based on “loyal cooperation” with the cantonal mother party (SVP/7). Internal democratic structures characterise the very down-to earth approach of all parties in Glarus. In general, this pat-

14 The BDP’s previous “votes” have all been obtained through “crossing the floor”: cantonal MPs elected on an SVP-list left their party and joined the BDP, between 2008 and 2010.

15 *Constitutional* because the communes are guaranteed “autonomy” (Selbständigkeit) in the Constitution of the canton of Glarus of 1 May 1988 (Art. 115.2); effectively *regionalised* because the constitutional entrenchment is equal to mere statutory guarantees, given the low threshold (Landsgemeinde, see above) to amend the constitution.

16 References in this section are to the party statutes, indicated with the name of the party and the article in its statute, and to the interviews, abbreviated by * and the number found in Annex 1.

tern of the SVP is reproduced for FDP, CVP, SP and Greens: cantonal assemblies vote the cantonal party leadership, and local assemblies vote the local party/sectional leadership. There is, however, one major difference between the SVP and FDP, on the one hand, and the Greens, SP, CVP and BDP, on the other. This difference relates to the composition of the highest organ on cantonal level.

On cantonal level, the highest organ of the SP is the "party congress" (*Parteitag*), of the BDP: the "party assembly" (*Parteiversammlung*), of the Greens and the CVP: the "members assembly" (*Mitgliederversammlung*) (SP/7, BDP/9.1, Greens/8, and CVP/10). The three notions all mean the same: a physical get-together of all the individual members of the party. This perfectly parallels the concept of *Landsgemeinde*, which is the open-air assembly of all cantonal citizens.

However, for SVP and FDP, it is the "delegates' assembly" (*Delegiertenversammlung*) that is the highest organ on cantonal level (SVP/10, FDP/9). While the difference, apparently, is more related to internal democracy than vertical integration, the following two provisions reveal the potential effects on a party's internal territoriality. In the SVP Glarus, the members of the delegates assembly are calculated per local section: one delegate per ten members of a local section, with each section at least three delegates. The other members of the cantonal assembly include the SVP Landrat group, cantonal judges, and members of the cantonal presidium (SVP/11). Similarly so for the FDP: the delegates' assembly consists in party executive, cantonal judges, MPs and government officials on federal and cantonal level, former cantonal party presidents, former federal MPs – as well as one delegate per ten members of a local section, each section with at least two delegates (FDP/9.1). In both instances, a mixture of personal and territorial representation is applied, which obviously cannot be reproduced for party assemblies, where the one-man-one-vote principle applies.

Lastly, the principle of territorial representation finds an additional way of expression at the sub-sectional (=sub-local) level. For the (local) FDP Glarus Centre, its local statute provides that in the local party leadership (*Vorstand*) at least one person must come from Netstal, one from Glarus or Riedern, and one from Ennenda (FDP Glarus Centre/12). And until the completion of the communal reform on 1 January 2011, even two persons per each pre-merger village were required (*ibid.*). Sub-local identity seems to be as strong as to lead to a guaranteed seat in the party executive. A similar provision is found only in one other local CVP statute: the CVP Glarus North prescribes "a balance of gender and regions" in the local party executive (CVP Glarus North/9.2).

Membership

Who are the members of political parties in Glarus; is it the individual citizen or a local section? Do parties mirror mirror the unitary or confederate state? From the statutes, it appears as if only the BDP as by far the youngest party knows an exclusively individual membership (BDP/4.1). The FDP does also admit individual members, but "only in exceptional cases" (FDP/3.1.2). These FDP members pay their annual membership fee directly to the cantonal party (FDP/6.1). As a rule, membership is through one of the now three local sections only (*ibid.*)

A dual model is explicitly provided for by the Greens. Membership is "through local sections" or "by individual adherence", the two principles being hierarchically equal (Greens/6.1). Moreover, while membership in a local section makes one automatically a member of the cantonal party (Greens/6.2), the opposite must not be true. Individual members can "opt-out" from becoming members also of the local section which, in theory, would be "responsible" for them (Greens/19.1)

On other hand, the CVP is structured exclusively upon indirect membership: one becomes a member "through entering the local party (*Ortspartei*)" or, alternatively, through entering the Young CVP (JCVP) – direct membership is possible "only if there is no local party" (CVP/5.2). Since the territorial restructuring, the CVP has fielded candidates in all constituencies, while before it did so only in most of them and only in a few of the municipalities (*2 and *3). The same counts for the SVP: membership is through "local sections" (*Ortssektionen*); individual members are only allowed in "areas (*Gegenden*) in which no local sections exists" (SVP/4).

The SP, lastly, mentions neither direct nor indirect membership. Members of the party are simply "assembled" (*zusammengeschlossen*) locally or regionally (SP/4.1). At the party congress (*Parteitag*)

ag) – which is the party's highest organ on cantonal level – „all members of the cantonal party (*Kantonalpartei*) have the right to vote” (SP/7). But insofar as local sections have no explicit right to even provide for membership, this latter is exclusively cantonal, as it is for the BDP.

Finances

The SP Glarus levies a direct membership contribution, “in addition to that on the national level” (SP/19.1). Local sections are not entitled to such membership fees, but receive an annual contribution from the cantonal party, in turn (SP/21). Top-down transfers take place according to the numerical strength of the local section (*11). Thus, finances are clearly cantonalised. This is valid not just for membership contributions, but for all other financial aspects as well. The cantonal party runs the shots, in respect both to the federal and local levels (*10 and *12). The same counts for the BDP, which has no local sections at all (BDP/21.1). The cantonal level exclusively controls the finances, which are mainly through membership fees and donations (*1). The “regional assemblies” are deliberately not termed sections; they do not have any financial sources on their own (ibid.).

FDP, SVP and CVP, in turn, provide for local contributions of their members, with the sections then having to transfer some funds to the cantonal level. These transfers take place bottom-up. The SVP provides for “yearly contributions by the local sections, proportional to the number of members and fixed by delegates' assembly (*Delegiertenversammlung*)” (SVP/23.1). But contributions by individuals and office-holders remain an option (SVP/23.2), as do donations (23.3). In this regard it is interesting to note that not just members of the Landrat and cantonal judges pay contributions, but also the (one) member of the federal parliament (*13). While in a general view the SVP has its finances mainly run by the cantonal level (ibid.), the CVP sees itself dominated by the local level (*2), and the FDP balanced (*5) or local (*4).

And while the Greens are mainly funded cantonally (*7 and *8), local sections do have the capacity to levy their own membership fees (*9). The statute even provides for a “common membership fee” (Greens/19.2). Finances, at least in terms of membership fees, appear equilibrated between cantonal and local level. And according to the party, this is the main source of funding.

Candidate-selection

The cantonal parties in Glarus are involved in three kinds of candidate selection: Regierungsrat, cantonal judges, Landrat. All parties but one chose the candidates for the Regierungsrat and the cantonal courts – elected at the polls through a majority vote, the first, and elected by the *Landsgemeinde*, the second – on the cantonal level only. Only the CVP, faithful even in wording to the principle of “subsidiarity” (CVP/2.2-a), allows some local input into the selection process. The “local parties can propose”, to the attention of the cantonal members assembly (*Mitgliederversammlung*), “candidates for federal and cantonal elections” (CVP/17). That this is valid for both parliamentary (Landrat) and governmental (Regierungsrat) elections is confirmed in the interviews (*1 and *2).

For the SVP, the (cantonal) delegates' assembly – although with some territorial, i.e., local representation – “approves” the candidates for the federal parliament and both cantonal executive and judiciary (SVP/10.6). Exactly the same holds for FDP (FDP/9.2.11) and BDP, whereby for the latter it is the cantonal “party assembly” (*Parteiversammlung*) that decides (*1). And while the SP party congress ultimately decides, a special finding commission is usually installed, but under cantonal guidance (*10 and *12). The Greens have their candidates for Regierungsrat elections decided by the party leadership (*Vorstand*; *7 and *9), however with some input from the cantonal parliamentary group (*Fraktion*; *8).

Parties vary more widely as to how they select candidacies for the Landrat elections. Overall, an opposite trend can be observed. For FDP, SP, SVP and CVP the local sections clearly decide on the party lists in their electoral districts (*2, *5, *10, and *13), which now perfectly overlap both with their territory and that of the municipalities. For the BDP, the “regional assemblies” (*Regionalversammlungen*) propose the lists of candidates, but the extended party leadership eventually decides (BDP/14-b). The Greens, finally, have again a different model. For Landrat elections, a special “electoral committee” (*Arbeitsgruppe Wahlen*) under the guidance of the cantonal party leadership

is created; however, in terms of electoral strategy the sections are given as much freedom as possible (*9).

In this regard we may briefly note the self-estimated effect of the reforms on the party's success. For the Greens, local sections have become more important (*7). Before the reforms, the party could not afford to be present in all 25 municipalities and field candidates in all 14 constituencies. Now, with three municipalities corresponding to the constituencies, campaigning and mobilisation is much easier (*9). The CVP, on the other hand, found its local network diluted – reflected in the results of the 30 May 2010 Landrat elections, at which the party came in last. SP, FDP, and SVP (*13) simply reorganised into three branches, which made party life simpler (*10). No major centralisation or decentralisation was caused by this reorganisation. The BDP, on the other hand, has not been present in the pre-reform stage. At its creation, it opted for a centralised form of organisation (*1), with considerable success so far: it came in second in its first ever Landrat elections, and could hold onto its one seat in the Regierungsrat. (Cf. Table 1)

4 Conclusion

Where exactly is the party, in the state-like canton of Glarus? The literature both on territorial politics (e.g., Riker's party-political approach to federalism: “federal parties”) and party politics (e.g., Thorlakson's institutional approach to party organisation: “party federalism”) has guided our enquiry. We have advanced two explanations for territory as an intervening variable in party organisation. The first, institutional parallelism, has been opposed to a second, a party's ideology. Duverger's historically inspired classification of basic elements has proven useful in this regard. We found that, overall, both hypotheses hold true. They reinforce each other as regards the multi-level parties of Glarus. From our empirical data – 14 party statutes and 14 interviews with party officials – three types of territorial party organisation have emerged. In a continuum – and we are reminded by Sartori (2005 [1976]) that “universe is a continuum – these types exhibit cantonal predominance, for the “regional party”, local predominance, for the “inter-local party”, and balanced cantonal and local influence and autonomy, for the “federal party”. After reviewing the results of our empirical assessment (cf. Table 2), we will be able to more clearly define these types.

First, parties are internally decentralised. The dimension of candidate-selection in cantonal parties must be split according to the scope of the constituency: candidacies for parliamentary elections (III) vs. those for executive and judicial offices (IV). All parties make this distinction; variation in terms of vertical balance is rather small, though present. This confirms the idea of parties choosing the candidates on the level of the respective constituency (Deschouwer 2003, 218). But it does not answer Duverger's idea of “basic administrative area”: no party selects cantonal executive and judicial candidates on the local level; and no party selects Landrat candidates on the local level only. This reflects the fact that for the Landrat, cantonal territory is split into three areas of contestation, while the Regierungsrat is elected in a two-round system (majority, then plurality), with the whole canton as just one constituency. The cantonal judges are directly elected by the people at the Landsgemeinde: insofar as we can speak of a constituency – “arena” would literally be more appropriate –, for judges it is cantonal. Party organisation not just mirrors the territorial organisation of the political, but rather of the electoral system; H1 is confirmed and narrowed down.

Second, inter-party variation exists. Membership (I) is direct only for the BDP, and local sections receive top-down transfers (II). But then again the party has special regional representatives, which for example can propose candidates for the Landrat elections. The BDP also fields candidates in communal elections, as do all other parties – and these are chosen by local members. On the other hand, even the apparently “federated” SVP, the sub-communal FDP (in Glarus Centre), and the CVP with its explicit emphasis on “subsidiarity” and sub-local representation (in Glarus North) have parts of their structures centralised at cantonal level. To be sure, FDP, CVP and SVP all rely on their local sections to a very great extent: membership (I) is through the local section, and bottom-up transfers (II) dominate. Yet, the extra contributions of party members in cantonal (and federal, for FDP and SVP) public offices go directly to the cantonal level, thus bypassing the local level.

Also, it is the cantonal party that may receive (sporadic) support from the federal “franchise” for campaigning toward important votes. Thus, while all six parties reviewed here confirm our hypothesis of institutional parallelism, variation can only be explained through the second hypothesis. Party federalism is highest in the “traditional” liberal (FDP) and christian-democratic (CVP) and parties, middle for the Greens, and lowest for the socialists (SP). The BDP is too new to be classified according to Duverger's scheme; H2 is confirmed as far as the traditional parties are concerned.

Indicator	Vertical balance		
	Local domain	Local and cantonal	Cantonal domain
<i>I. Membership</i>	FDP, SVP, CVP (all indirect/local sections)	Greens (dual model)	SP (implicitly); BDP (no sections as such)
<i>II. Finances</i>	FDP, SVP, CVP (all bottom-up transfers)	Greens (separated finances)	SP and BDP (both top-down transfers)
<i>III. Landrat candidacies</i>	FDP, SP, SVP; CVP (cantonal coordination)	BDP (cantonal decision on local proposals); Greens (special group)	-
<i>IV. Regierungsrat (and judicial) candidacies</i>	-	CVP (cantonal decision on local proposals); SVP and FDP (both <i>also</i> by local delegates to cantonal level)	SP and BDP (both party assembly); Greens (party assembly with <i>Fraktion</i>)
Overall articulation	FDP, CVP, SVP	Greens	SP and BDP

Table 2: Summary of empirical findings

Third, we have assumed that the four major changes in the institutional set-up of the canton had an effect on party organisation. The changes concerned the seats in the Landrat; the merging of over 70 sub-cantonal entities into just three communes; redistricting of constituencies to match these new communes; and the entering of the BDP on the stage. The results of the elections saw the SVP emerge as the strongest party (17 seats out of 60; or 28%), followed by FDP (12; 20%), BDP (10; 17%), SP (8; 13%), Greens (7; 12%) and CVP (6; 10%) (cf. Table 1). It appears that there was no correlation of success with vertical party organisation: SVP and FDP, the two winners, are very decentralised. But so is the CVP, who came out last. The Greens are of a mixed type, and did quite well, but so did the BDP, who is, with the SP, the most cantonalised party. The rescaling of electoral districts, radical communal mergers, and more parties competing for less seats – both in the Landrat and the Regierungsrat – have not lead to major changes in the vertical distribution of power. At best, the change is bi-directional. Parties have easily adapted in the sense that they now have just three local sections – except the BDP, which has no local sections at all. But competition has become more intense on *both* levels. Federalism as an ideology of power sharing based on territory within parties remains dominant:

- *Membership* is either indirect, i.e. through entering the local section one becomes a cantonal members (FDP, SVP, CVP) or dual (Greens), and even BDP and SP have regional assemblies/sections “regrouping” its members at grassroots level;
- *Candidacies* for Regierungsrat and Landrat are decided together (CVP); together for Regierungsrat but locally for Landrat (SVP and FDP); cantonally for Regierungsrat but locally for Landrat (SP); or cantonally for Regierungsrat and together for the Landrat (Greens and BDP); and
- *Finances* are either primarily local, but with extensive bottom-up transfers (FDP, SVP, CVP), primarily cantonal, but with extensive top-down transfers (SP and BDP), or separated from the very beginning (Greens).

Therefore, H3 is not confirmed, or only partly so. More intense competition in the overall arena has not lead to a tightening of the central grip on peripheral interests, because at the same time, the peri-

phery has regrouped into bigger, stronger, local sections. H1 (parallelism) and H2 (ideology) interact, with H3 (cantonalisation) having played differently: the institutional changes have not produced a centralisation, but rather a re-definition of tasks with a clear separation of cantonal and local domains. Three types of parties can be deduced from this interplay of institutional constraints and party ideology with cantonal-local integration.

The first type is the **regional party** and applies to BDP and SP. If “nationalisation” means homogenisation at the national level of a political system (Caramani 2004), then parties can be said to “cantonalise” to the extent that they homogenise at the cantonal level. To the extent that cantons are, in generic terms, like regions, a cantonal party then emerges as a regional party. A regional party is conceptually equivalent to the national party, but empirically at regional level. However, for the BDP it may be too early to draw conclusions, as the party is barely two years old. But political engineering toward a “minimal” structure was present. The SP, on the other hand, has completely delegated Landrat candidacies to the local level, and in that respect resembles more the federal party.

Such a **federal party** is our second type. A federal party at cantonal level is conceptually *and* empirically the same as the federal party at federal level – relations are vertically symmetric in this model. The federal party organises and campaigns at both cantonal and local level; cantonal and local success depend on each other; but electoral strategies, timeframes, and resources are largely uncoupled. (Cf. the seven criteria of Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004, 192) Loyalties are divided, and membership in the cantonal party is both direct (individual) and indirect (local sections). The federal party is best exemplified by the Greens: membership is explicitly dual, with an opting-out clause for individual members from “their” local section. And the special arrangement for selecting candidates for Landrat elections is heavily influenced by the idea of compromise – or “balance”, to use that typically federal term.

The third type is the **inter-local party** and associated with FDP, CVP, and SVP. These cantonal parties are themselves confederations of local parties. Inter-local parties are conceptually equivalent to the (e.g., Swiss) confederal party as inter-cantonal formation, but empirically at regional level. They replicate the “party as franchise” at the cantonal level. Membership is indirect, finances bottom-up, and candidates mainly locally selected. Sub-local identities are protected. But again, the matching is imperfect, because the party's elected office-holders pay certain sums directly to the cantonal party. Also, the final decision on candidates for the Regierungsrat is taken at cantonal level, if however with more or less local influence (local delegates for FDP and SVP, a local right to initiative for CVP).

We have started this paper with the question of *where exactly* the political party is. For cantonal parties in Glarus, the answer is: it depends. For some, the party *is* more at local, for others, more at cantonal level. Systemic institutional constraints and party ideology both matter, but the first more than the latter. On the other hand, both are filtered through technical constraints, as the influence of the territorial-administrative (less municipalities) and territorial-electoral (less electoral districts) changes in Glarus have shown. More parties competing for less seats has had no influence on party organisation, or at least not yet. The culture of dividing power based on territory is too strong to be overruled. But the BDP may well have shown the way also in intra-party, multi-level organisational matters...

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Annex 1: List of Statutes and Interviews

Status of cantonal parties	Statutes of local sections and/or youth parties
BDP, of 28 August 2008	-
CVP Glarus, of 13 May 2008	CVP Glarus Centre, of 30 Sept 2008
	CVP Glarus North, of 30 Sept 2008
	CVP Glarus South, of 17 Sept 2008
FDP.The Liberals Glarus, of 13 January 2009	FDP Glarus Centre, of 12 March 2009
Greens Glarus, of 26 April 2000	n/a
SP Glarus, of 2 April 2008	n/a
SVP Glarua, of 26 February 2003	SVP Glarus Centre, of 29 October 2008
	SVP Glarus North, of 20 November 2008, modified on 30 April 2009
	SVP Glarus South, of 23 October 2008
	Young SVP (JSVP), of 4 January 2008

Table 3: Party Statutes of cantonal, local, and youth parties

no.	Party	Party office(s)	Public office(s)
1	BDP	Cantonal president	National councillor (2009–) and Landrat (1998–)
2	CVP	Cantonal president	former Landrat (2002–2010)
3	CVP (JCVP)	president Young CVP (JCVP) and member of the cantonal CVP presidium	member of the local parliament (Glarus North, 2010–)
4	FDP	Cantonal press officer	-
5	FDP	President of the Landrat fraction	Landrat (2001–) and local president (Glarus Centre, 2010–)
6	FDP	Cantonal treasurer	former Landrat (2009–2010)
7	Greens	Cantonal vice-president	Landrat (2002–2006, 2010–)
8	Greens	-	former Landrat (2002–2010)
9	Greens	member of the cantonal leadership (<i>Vorstand</i>) and cantonal secretary	local councillor (Glarus South, 2010–)
10	SP	member of the cantonal executive leadership (<i>Geschäftsleitung</i>)	Regierungsrat (2010–); former Landrat (1998–2010)
11	SP	member of the local executive leadership (<i>Geschäftsleitung</i> , Glarus South)	Landrat (2002–); former local president (during 4 years)
12	SP	Local president (Glarus North)	Landrat (2005–)
13	SVP	Cantonal president	Landrat (2003–)
14	SVP (JSVP)	president Young SVP (JSVP; 2008–) and member of the cantonal SVP leadership (<i>Vorstand</i>)	Landrat (2006–)

Table 4: Survey among and interviews with party officials in Glarus

Key to Tables 4 and 5:

n/a not applicable

- none

? no information

years in brackets indicate the duration of the mandate, if applicable

Annex 2: The electoral system for parliamentary elections in the canton of Glarus

Cantonal voters receive as many party-lists as there are parties taking part in the election, plus one empty list. They then face three choices:

1. Voters may choose whether to vote at all. Voting is not compulsory and turnout usually reaches some 30-35%.
2. If citizens do decide to vote, they can either
 - a) vote the party-list in an *unchanged* form,
 - b) fill in candidates of their liking on an *empty* list, or
 - c) *modify* a party-list.
 Whether filling in their own list or modifying a party-list, candidates must be drawn from any of the official (i.e., printed) party lists. Any candidates, also from different parties (*pan-achage*), may be voted for in this way. On a previously empty list, voters may add a party-label to indicate that places left empty should go to that particular party as list-votes.
3. Whenever voters add someone to an empty list, or substitute a candidate on a (printed) party-list, they may write the name of the same candidate up to two times, giving that particular person two votes – an act know as *kumulieren*.

The distribution of seats, once the elections are over, takes place in five steps:

1. The votes for an individual candidate in his electoral district (constituency) are added up, i.e., how many times has this person's name been actively written down, duplicated, and/or left imprinted on the party-list? These votes count as *Kandidatenstimmen*.
2. Second, all the empty spots (erased from the party-list and not substituted for, or left blank on the empty list) are awarded to the party whose label is printed – or has been added – on top of the list. These votes count as *Reststimmen*.
3. Third, all the votes for candidates from the same party (1) and the list-votes (2) are added up to the final figure of party-votes, or *Parteistimmen*.
4. Fourth, seats in the electoral district are distributed proportionally to parties based on the number of party-votes (3).
5. Fifth, within the party, the allocated seats are attributed to the candidates with the most personal votes (1), until all the party-seats in the constituency are filled with a candidate from that party in that constituency.