

XXIV Convegno SISP
IUAV
Venezia 16-18 Settembre 2010



**Discord and Collaboration in the Pacific Alliance. US-Japan
relations between new threats and old controversies.**

Matteo Dian.

PhD Candidate in Political Science.
Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane.
Firenze.

matteo.dian@sumitalia.it

Draft version. Comments are welcomed.

The US-Japan security alliance (together with US military presence in Japan) constitutes a central pillar of East Asian peace and stability. During the Cold War, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone defined Japan as a “US Unsinkable Aircraft carrier” pointing to the importance of the alliance and the US military presence in Japan (roughly 47,000 troops) for US and Japanese regional (and global) foreign and security strategies. In recent years, however, the alliance has been undergoing a qualitative transformation generated and accelerated by amongst others a changing East Asian security environment, China’s political, economic and military rise as well as what is being referred to as “normalization” of the Japanese foreign and security policies.

The recent developments and trends of US-Japan security relations offer relevant aspects for IR theory-centered discussion in general and alliance theory in particular: a military threat-driven realist theory approach competes with a constructivist explanation based on identity and norms to explain the recent changes and developments in the framework of the US-Japan security alliance.

In this context I argue that the economic and military rise of China is not the main driver of these trends and changes as the balance of threat theory predicts. Moreover, the current evolution of the Japanese foreign policy is inspired to a gradual overcoming of the Yoshida Doctrine, contrarily to the prediction of the constructivist perspective. In this paper, I argue that in order to provide an effective assessment of the evolving dynamic of the Pacific Alliance a more nuanced perspective is needed, rooted mainly on the concept of “alliance security dilemma”.

*“The day for rearmament will naturally come. But let the Americans handle our security until then.
It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good fortune that the Constitution bans arms.
If the Americans complain, it gives us the perfect justification. Politicians who want to amend it are fools.”*

Yoshida Shigeru¹

Introduction.

Since the end of the Second World War, the US-Japan security alliance (together with US military presence in Japan) has been considered a central pillar of East Asian peace and stability. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent remodeling of the global geopolitical exchequer triggered a series of changes in the Japanese security strategy traditionally inspired to a minimalist approach. Particularly after the 9-11, American policy makers applauded Japan for “showing the flag,” providing material assistance and political support. The former US Under Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage went so far to predict that Japan could become the Great Britain of the Far East.² Especially during the mandate of Junichiro Koizumi, Japan undertook some relevant steps in order to become an active partner in what the Bush Administration defined the Global War on Terrorism.

More recently however, the alliance has been experiencing a considerable period of uncertainty and malaise. The government elected in 2009 led by Yukio Hatoyama and backed by the Democratic Party of Japan opposed some of the most relevant policies concerning the alliance as the relocation of bases in Okinawa and the renewal of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force mission in the Indian Ocean, related to the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. Moreover, Hatoyama after his bilateral summit with President of China Hu Jintao in September 2009, called for a more symmetrical relationship with the US and suggested the creation of a new “East Asian community” that would implicitly exclude the United States. Finally, the Hatoyama government bet all his political capital on the revision of the agreement regarding Okinawa and was forced to resign after the US refusal.

¹ Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*. London: Heinemann, 1961.

² Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye Jr. “The United States and Japan: advancing toward a mature partnership”, *INSS Special Report* Washington, DC: National Defense University. 2000

Both the transformation of the alliance and the recent drift in the US-Japan relationship have been a favorable ground for debate between international relations theory paradigms, particularly between ideational-constructivist approach and realist explanations. In this paper I will present different competing explanations IR literature offers on the issue and then I will test them against the empirical-historical record. Firstly, however, I will highlight the conceptual and empirical difference between symmetric and asymmetric alliances, which is indeed very relevant in order to describe the behavior of allies and their political preferences related to the case I will focus on.

Concepts, definitions and operationalisations. On asymmetric alliances.

The empirical research requires a preliminary phase in which we define and operationalise the main concepts in order to avoid what Giovanni Sartori labeled as three very common pitfalls of the empirical comparative research: concept mis-formation, conceptual stretching and “the indiscriminate fishing for data”.³

In the IR literature we can find many definitions of the concept of “alliance”. Among them we can signal the one proposed by Bruce Russett who defines alliance as “a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force.”⁴ Osgood defines the concept of alliance as: “A formal agreement that commits a number of states to cooperate militarily in the use of their resources against another state, or some other states, that usually bind the involved states to use force, or to consider the use of force in determinate circumstances”⁵ Generally, all this definitions highlight a certain degree of formalization, cooperation in the military and security realms, a given degree of commitment and the existence of a set of gains for all the involved actors.

The other relevant concept it will be necessary need to further define and operationalise is the one of “asymmetry and asymmetric alliance”. In the article that opened the field of the economic theory of alliances, Olson and Zeckhauser refer to the notion of asymmetry in alliances.⁶ These attributes, however, are not particularly defined or operationalised. They simply state that the NATO was, in a certain degree asymmetric because the US shared a major part of the burden related to military budgeted, or because the US were richer and military more powerful *vis à vis* other allies.

A first noteworthy attempt to define explicitly this concept has been proposed by James Morrow. He dismissed the capability aggregation model and tried to put forward an alternative one based on the balance between security and autonomy. His definition of asymmetry derives from this model. According to Morrow, states form alliances in order to gain some benefit in terms of security and autonomy.⁷ An alliance decreasing the autonomy for a state enhances its security or viceversa. Consequently it will exist a trade-off between the two. States seek an optimal combination. They also have convex preferences, similar to a microeconomic function of utility for a rational consumer. According to Morrow: “Alliance agreements increase a nation's autonomy by providing it with assistance from the ally that allows the first nation to adopt actions that pursue desired changes. At the

³ Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics”. *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Dec., 1970), pp. 1033-1053.

⁴ Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances” *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 262-289.

⁵ Robert Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. John’s Hopkins University Press 1968.

⁶ Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser. “An Economic Theory of Alliances” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Aug., 1966), pp. 266-279.

⁷ James D. Morrow, “Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security” *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

same time, its security decreases both because its new position may provoke new challenges from other nations and because the nation will take actions to defend its ally's security interests that it would not defend without the alliance"⁸. An extended commitment to defend an ally behind the existence of a shared threat can involve a net loss in terms of security.

A certain degree of control over an ally can generate benefits in terms of autonomy allowing some desired change in the status quo or the fulfillment of some strategic interests, or the reduction of the cost for the fulfillment of these interests. In the perspective proposed by Morrow, "the Pact of Steel between the Nazi Germany and Italy diminished the net level of security for both partners, but increased their autonomy, defined as "capacity to change the status quo according to their preferences." Even the creation of alliances as the NATO or the alliance between US and Japan, from this point of view, decreased the level of US security, enhancing the risk of involvement in overseas conflict, but improved the US autonomy. This greater degree of autonomy derives from the increased control over allies and from the concessions allowed by the junior partners as the establishment of permanent bases that amplify the power projection capability and allows a certain degree of control over ally's domestic political life.

Figure 1. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Minor Powers





Figure 2. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Major Powers



Therefore, according to Morrow, the real threshold to define the symmetry or the asymmetry of an alliance is not the bilateral relationship between the amount of material capabilities, but the kind of benefit a state derives from the alliance. Therefore, an alliance is symmetrical if all the members get the same type of benefit. This benefit will be security in the case of a defensive alliance, or autonomy in the case of an offensive alliance.⁹ The alliance will be asymmetric when different states get different kind of benefits from cooperation. In a bilateral model, the first increases the level of security, the latter the level of autonomy and *viceversa*. The definition proposed by Morrow is relevant because he put forward a model alternative to the capability aggregation one, analyzing the impact of power differences on state's preferences and objectives. Morrow's most significant insight concerns the potential difference about objectives inside asymmetrical alliances.

⁸ *ibidem*

⁹ On offensive alliances: Jack Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25:581-613. 1981. Randall Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997). Randall Schweller and David Priess. "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996). Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning For Profit: Bringing The Revisionist State Back in". *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1. Summer 1994.

The other way to conceptualize the asymmetry in the alliances is the one proposed by Filippo Andreatta that puts forward a definition that goes behind the simple dichotomy between major and minor member on the ground of capabilities, rooting his definition on criterions of necessity and sufficiency. The relation of (a)symmetry is no longer defined in the bilateral relationship between allies but in the triangular context between allies and adversaries. Therefore, during the Cold War, “the presence of the USSR generated a kind of asymmetric alliance not only because the US were the most powerful part of the alliance, but because they were the only member able to contain the Soviet threat. They were the only necessary member of the alliance.”¹⁰ Formalizing this kind of reasoning in a model, we can assume the existence of a universe constituted by three states (A, B, C); C represents a threat for the security of A and B. A and B will ally in order to face the threat constituted by C. If C owns greater capabilities in comparison to the others ($C > A > B$ or $C > B > A$) the case is an alignment of necessity. In this case an interaction similar to the assurance game will take place (the stug hunt model), in which the actors are interested in cooperating even if they fear the defection of the others (preferences schema $CC > DC > DD > CD$). This case doesn't fall in the category of asymmetric alliances because both states are necessary but none is sufficient to contain the threat. The alliance can be defined asymmetric when A owns the necessary amount of capabilities to face C even without the cooperation of B, while B is to able to face C alone. ($A > C > B$). The alliance is asymmetrical when a state is necessary and sufficient to face the external threat alone, while the other(s) are neither necessary nor sufficient. This condition of asymmetry generates a different set of preferences, similarly to a “suasion game” (CC, CD, DC, DD) for the major ally and similar to the “prisoner dilemma” (DC, CC, DD, CD) for junior partners.¹¹ Finally this kind of conceptualization of the asymmetry for alliances identifies the presence of a necessary and sufficient ally, able to face the external threat, while the other members are neither necessary nor sufficient.

Visions of the Alliance.

The issue of alliances has been a favorable ground for debate between international relations theory paradigms. Various scholarly traditions have stressed different rationales for alliance origin and persistence. I will here consider different clusters of explanations based on several independent variables: two of them belong to the neo-realist paradigm, the other to the constructivist research camp.

I will start from the latter perspective, based on ideational and normative factors. The constructivist scholarship in the considered case is not focused on the existence of a security communities sustained by shared values and mutual trust, like in the case of the NATO. On the contrary, more attention is dedicated to the peculiar features of the Japanese state. Constructivist scholars claim that the “culture of antimilitarism” that developed in Japan after the World War II led it to adopt a highly restrained security policy and to avoid the development of offensive military forces. Japan's postwar behavior,

¹⁰ Filippo Andreatta, “Istituzioni e Politiche di Sicurezza dopo l'11 Settembre. L'intervento in Afghanistan e la lotta al terrorismo.” *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*. Gennaio 2002.

¹¹ On game theory applied to IR theory and on bargaining models. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*. Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press, 1976. *Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays*. Harvard University Press. Cambridge 2006. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under Security Dilemma” *World Politics*. Issue 2 Volume 30. Jan 1978. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation”, *World Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Apr., 1988), pp. 317-349 . Kenneth Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1986. Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics.” *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 25-57.

these scholars argue, demonstrates the influence of norms and culture on a state's security policy.¹² They claim that Japan's devastating defeat of the World War II originated antimilitarist norms that affected the Japanese foreign and security policy beyond or notwithstanding systemic constraints. Peter Katzenstein claimed indeed that "there exists no observable relation between Japan's relative position and its security policy," and that "Japan's security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international balance of power."¹³ Sun-Ki Chai stated that "the incompleteness of systemic explanations suggests that domestic factors are essential to explaining the anomalous nature of Japanese defense policy."¹⁴ Thomas Berger argued that because of Japanese antimilitarism, "in each instance efforts to significantly expand Japanese defense establishments and international roles foundered on the shoals of domestic opposition."¹⁵ Therefore, according to constructivist scholars, the most relevant variable to take into account in order to understand the management of the Japan-US alliance is the Japanese security identity and the Japanese exceptionalism rather than material and systemic variables.

The neorealist paradigm, contrarily, emphasizes mainly the role of capabilities and the possibility of balancing and bandwagoning. The view expressed by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer on the US led alliances in the post Cold War environment reflects entirely this point of view. These alliances are considered as useful instrument in the Cold War environment, but are destined, soon or later, to expire as a consequence of end of the bipolar system.¹⁶ The Waltzian theory identifies in the distribution of the capabilities in the system the crucial variable for the origin and the collapse of alliances. According to Waltz alliances are a byproduct of structural factors.¹⁷ Nevertheless alliances have a considerable role in the waltzian theory, because they represent one of the main strategies available for a state to face a systemic imbalance: the first one is an "internal balancing", namely a military buildup. The second is external balancing through the formation of alignments or alliances. This theory suggests that states tend to ally with the weaker coalition in order to balance the momentarily power imbalance in the system. The systemic incentive to keep the system in balance is determined by the ideal typical aim postulated by Waltz, power maximization. According to Waltz, a change of the distribution of capabilities in the international system generate an inevitable tendency towards a balancing behavior that leads preexisting alliances to break up.¹⁸

Stephen Walt elaborated the balance of threat theory as an integration to the waltzian theory. Walt argues that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. The power of other states can therefore be a

¹² Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198–233; Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan*. London: Routledge, 1996.

¹³ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996; Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 Spring 1993, pp. 84–118; Richard H. Friman, Peter J. Katzenstein, David Leheny, and Nobuo Okawara, "Immovable Object? Japan's Security Policy in East Asia," in *Beyond Japan: The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism*, eds. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraiishi (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 85–107.

¹⁴ Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 Summer 1997, pp. 389–412.

¹⁵ Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 Spring 1993, pp. 119–150; Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

¹⁶ Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Autumn 1993.

¹⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Trad. It. *Teoria della Politica Internazionale*. Il Mulino Bologna 1987.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do and how it is used.¹⁹ A central question is how states respond to threats – by balancing (allying with others against the prevailing threat) or bandwagoning (alignment with the source of danger). Walt asserts that, “for states that matter, balancing is the rule.”²⁰ States facing an external threat will align with others to oppose the origin of the threat. The greater the threatening state’s aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive intentions the greater will be the tendency for others to align against it. Being the balancing behavior the dominant tendency in the system, the presence of a threat leads inevitably other states to align against it. In this kind of assessment credibility and reliability of allies is not a major problem, because every threatened nation share an interest in the defense of allies as well as itself.²¹ Therefore, the internal cohesion of an alliance will be proportional to the level of threat. It is necessary to highlight that Walt’s emphasis on perceptions and intentions is quite at odd with the purely material and structural horizon of waltzian neo-realism. Another weak point of this theory concerns credibility. Cooperation and credibility are postulated and assumed as consequences of the to balancing tendency²². According to this assumption the presence of a threat fosters the alliance cohesion. The vanishing of the threat leads to the unavoidable decay of the alliance cooperation.

Some classic of the pre-waltzian realism provide many interesting insights for the analysis of asymmetric alliances. Robert Osgood in his *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* argued that “the most prominent function of alliances is to restrain and control allies, particularly to safeguard one ally against actions of another that might endanger its security of another or otherwise jeopardize its interests”²³. George Liska in *Nation in Alliances* claimed that “[alliances are aimed] to restrain the enemy and if it’s possible to restrain each other and the scope of a conflict.”²⁴ The historian Paul Schroeder explicitly described alliances as multi-purpose instruments: both *Weapons of Power* and *Tools of Management*.²⁵

¹⁹ Stephen Walt, *Origin of Alliances*. Cornell University Press. Ithaca 1987. Stephen Walt “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse”. *Survival* Volume 39, Issue 1 Spring 1997.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Recently some quantitative studies stressed how credibility and reliability are the central problems for alliances, particularly for alliances between democracies. Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeremy S. Vogel, Michaela Mattes, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, Pp. 461–476. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties”. *International Organization* 57: 801-827. Nora Bensahel, “International Alliances and Military Effectiveness. Fighting Alongside Allies and Partners.” RAND Organization Report For External Publication. EP-20070016. 2007. On democracies as less reliable allies, Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4, October 2004, Pp. 775–795. On democracies as reliable partners, Charles Lipson, *Reliable Patners. How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace*. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 2003.

²² The prevalence of balancing over bandwagoning has been widely debated in the literature. Some scholar analyzed the presence of these kind of behavior in history with quantitative and statistical technique, claiming the prevalence of one on the other. Richard Rosencrance, Chih Cheng Lo “Balancing, Stability and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic System”, In *International Studies Quarterly* XL, 4, 1996. Rosencrance e Lo, Jack Levy “Alliance Formation and War Behaviour. An Analysis of Great Powers, 1495-1975”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* XXV 1981. Brooke McDonald e Richard Rosencrance “Alliance and Structural Balance in the International System: A Reinterpretation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* XXIX 1985. Daniel Jones, “Balancing and Bandwagoning in Militarized Interstate Disputes”, in F.W. Wayman e P.H. Diehl, *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Michigan University Press. Ann Arbour 1994. Paul Schroeder neglected the possibility to establish the prevalence of one of the two using statistical assessments. Paul Schroeder “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer, 1994), pp. 108-148.

²³ Robert Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*. John’s Hopkins University Press. 1968.

²⁴ George Liska, *Nations in alliance: the limits of interdependence*. John’s Hopkins University Press. 1962.

²⁵ Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 230–31

The neorealist theory has always stressed the capability aggregation function of military alliances. The latter function, on the contrary, has been largely neglected. According to Schroeder, the aim to control and restrain allies is absolutely relevant even when a clear external threat is absent. Moreover, an alliance generated by a process of capability aggregation to face an external threat can keep on living, strengthening its function as *tool of management*. Schroeder defines an alliance as a *pactum de contrahendo* (pact of restraint), conceived as an instrument aimed to restrain unilateral actions of its members. The message of Paul Schroeder could be synthesized as follows: alliances are a complex phenomenon, partially competitive and partially cooperative, hard to describe with unidimensional categories. They can have multiple aims, often implicit. While most neorealist scholars have focused on their external dimension, Schroeder has looked inside alliances, emphasizing the complex and nuanced nature of intra-allied relationships. This perspective is coherent with the realist tradition and considerably enriches it.

Another scholar focusing his attention on the management phase of alliances is Glenn Snyder. He integrates the “tool of management”’s dimension and the potential internal conflict between allies in the theoretical *corpus* of the neorealist research program. The merit of Snyder’s theory is to define a sort of intermediate space between structure and units, defined as the “situational context of behavior”²⁶. This is described as “the meso-level” in which process variables characterizing alliances can be conceptualized²⁷. According to Snyder, “alliances cannot be separated from the context, constituted by the international system”²⁸. Unlike Waltz, according to Snyder alliances are not an epiphenomenal feature of the system but depend on process variables. This kind of variables are situated at an intermediate level between the agents and the structure²⁹. They can be identified as interests, capabilities and interdependence.

Snyder distinguishes between strategic, reputational and intrinsic interests³⁰ and between general and particular ones. A common interest could be determinant for the creation of an alliance but, likewise, an existing alliance can create new interests or modify old ones. According to Snyder, process variables are fundamental to understand the management of an alliance. States, while keeping the survival of the alliance as their overall objective, try to maximize their individual security, their independence and their control over partners. The management of an alliance is then, implicitly or explicitly, a bargaining process. Members of an alliance are involved in the “security dilemma of the alliance”³¹. On one hand, states try to avoid entrapment (being involved in costly and unwanted initiatives, like wars in which they have no interests); on the other hand, they fear to be abandoned the very moment they have to face an external threat.

²⁶ Glenn Snyder, “Process variables in neorealist theory.” *Security Studies*, Volume 5, Issue 3 Spring 1996, pages 167 – 192.

²⁷ *Ibidem*

²⁸ Glenn Snyder, Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ 1977.

²⁹ David Dessler, “What’s at the Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” *International Organization* Vol. 43 No 3 1989. Alexander Wendt “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 1987), pp. 335-370.

³⁰ Intrinsic interests are considered as foreign policy aims *per se*, as prestige and economic development; strategic interests are considered instrumental, correlated to other state’s behaviour or interest. Some examples are the control of a certain geographic area or access to raw materials. Strategic interests are directly connected to the structure of the international system. Reputational interests involve the credibility of commitment towards other states. The fulfilment of intrinsic interests entails absolute gains, while the fulfilment of strategic interest entails relative gains. Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. Op cit.

³¹ The original formulation of the security dilemma of the alliance is due to Michael Mandelbaum. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima*. New York. Cambridge University Press. 1981. Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”. *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Jul., 1984), pp. 461-495.

Definition of the Dependent Variable. What we are looking for and why it matters.

Once we have defined the conceptual border in which we have to move, it will be necessary to define the dependent variable. Generally the literature on security alliances employs a binary conceptualization of the dependent variable. The explanandum of this kind of researches is usually based on the presence or on the absence of the observed phenomenon (the persistence of the alliance in time, the reliability of allies). As Paul Schroeder and Glenn Snyder highlighted, there are three analytically distinct phases in an alliance's life: the origin, the management and the eventual collapse.³² A binary definition of the explanandum can be functional to a research aimed to analyze the origin and the collapse of alliances. An example of this kind of reasoning is the classical work by Stephen Walt that focus the attention on "the forces that bring states together and drive them apart"³³, underscoring how his research embodies this kind of dichotomist approach. This kind of formalisation is also shared by the majority of quantitative researches³⁴, ranging from the one by Holsti published in 1973 to more recent ones based on Correlate of War (CoW) e Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP)³⁵ datasets.

In this case we are not asking ourselves why alliance endure or collapse but what are the variable influencing the management phase or which is the expected output deriving from the present or the absence of different independent variables. In order to do so it is necessary to reach an alternative formalization and operationalization of the dependent variable.

The main contribution to take into account is the one by Glenn Snyder. In his *Alliance Politics* he suggested to analyze "the management phase" and particularly "interactions". According to Snyder, "Interaction is any behavior that impinges on or it is influenced by some other party. It is therefore the principal dependent variable of our theoretical scheme, ultimately what we are trying to explain"... "Interaction is the process by which alignments, capabilities, interests are translated into outcomes. Of course it can take a myriad of forms."³⁶ The Snyderian approach goes beyond the dichotomist reasoning and formalizes a more nuanced explanandum apt to describe the management phase. Interactions are defined by a complex game constituted by two main games: the *adversary game* e *alliance game*. The former

³² Glenn Snyder defines the *management* phase as "the joint or unilateral process by which alliance members try to keep the alliance alive and advance their own interest within it. During the formation phase the members bargain over the alliance terms: the scope of their commitment, the amount of forces to contribute in what contingencies and a like. In the management phase they may bargain over levels of preparedness, war planes, or the amount of support to be provided in crisis confrontation, or entirely renegotiate the original contract." Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. Op. cit.

³³ Stephen Walt, *Origin of Alliances*. Op. cit. The dichotomist horizon of the Waltian enquiry is even more evident in "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse" *Survival* Vol. 38 No. 1 Spring 1997.

³⁴ Scott Bennett. "Testing models of alliance duration, 1816–1984." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41: 846–78 1997. Michael Altfeld. "The decision to ally". *Western Political Quarterly*. 37:523 1984. Thomas J. Christensen. "Perceptions and alliances in Europe, 1865–1940." *International Organization* . 51:65 1998. Richard Rosencrance e Chin Chen Lo, Jack Levy "Alliance Formation and War Behavior. An Analysis of Great Powers, 1495-1975". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* XXV 1981. Jack Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495–1975," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 4. December 1981. Douglas Gibler and John A. Vasquez. "Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980." *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 785-807 1998. Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan. 1973. *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Singer, J. David and Melvin Small. 1966. Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description. *Journal of Peace Research* 3: 1-32. Smith, Alastair. 1995. Alliance Formation and War. *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (4): 405-425. Gibler, Douglas M. 1999. "An Extension of the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Data Set, 1648-1815." *International Interactions* 25: 1-28. Gibler, Douglas M. and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set, 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41: 211-222

³⁵ Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944" *International Interactions* 28: 237-260. <http://atop.rice.edu/data>

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

involves interaction between adversaries, the latter concerns intra allied relationships. The alliance game is constituted by three “arenas of action”: preparedness, diplomacy and action (war). Here we will focus on the latter.

The Alliance Game

	Preparedness	Diplomacy	Action
Cooperation	<i>Hug</i> (<i>more integration</i>)	support	<i>War Cooperation</i>
Defection	<i>Move away</i> (<i>less integration</i>)	defection	<i>Restraint</i>

This kind of analysis allows to open the black box of the alliance game and to focus on a wide range of behaviors. This process of disentanglement into three dimensions or arena of action is fundamental to analyze the alliance game and the possible inhomogeneous impact of our independent variables on these dimensions. Therefore we can define the arena of preparedness as the structural changes of alliance terms, through the renegotiation of the scope, the degree of commitment, the specific condition of intervention, the *causus foederis*. These major changes could be formal, through treaties either formal documents or marked by informal but relevant changes. Generally, these changes involve directly the degree of militarily integration and cooperation.³⁷ These dimension can be defined with a dynamic continuum constituted by two main movements, “get close” or “move away”.

The arena of diplomacy is defined by political cooperation not involving structural change in the alliance terms and not concerning use of force. The third arena of action is defined by militarily cooperation and the use of force. In this case we face a broad range of behavior from the alliance restraint (the attempt to hinder the employ the use of force by part of an ally)³⁸ to the non cooperation, to the logistical support and the formation of military coalitions.

Hypotheses

Each of the abovementioned approach entails, implicitly or explicitly, one or more hypothesis about alliance cohesion and behavior of actors involved in a military alliance both in periods marked by stability and in time of systemic restructuring. Therefore it would be useful to make a synthesis and derive some testable hypothesis from the theoretical background I have just examined.

Hp 1 (*Domestic Norms and Pacifist Culture*) Pacifist norms and domestic constraints contribute to keep the Japanese contribution to the alliance disproportionately low, independently from the systemic constraints, the varying level of external threat and the US pressures.

³⁷ An example can be the revision of the security treaty between US and Japan in the 60's. An example for the second can be the Strategic concept of the NATO in 1991. For the third the Nye Report on Japan in 1995.

³⁸ Jeremy Pressman, *Leashes or Lemmings? Alliances as Restraining Devices*. Op. cit. Jeremy Pressmann, *Warring Friends. Alliances Restraint in International Politics*. Op cit..

Hp 2: (*balance of threat*). Alliance cohesion is directly proportional to the level of external threat (capability + geographic proximity and offensive intentions). If the unifying threat fades the alliance will lose its founding rationale. The internal cohesion diminishes and the process of disaggregation starts.

Hp 3 The definition of this hypothesis derives from the alliance security dilemma, formulated by Glenn H. Snyder. States seek to avoid both entrapment (involvement in unwanted conflicts) and abandonment (uncertainty of allies support in the moment of need). Therefore intra-allied relations are marked by a permanent bargaining with a target state (directly threatened or more interested) and a supporter. Alliance cohesion and, ultimately, the level of cooperation is a function of the coercive potential of the target and of its ability to extract a cooperative behavior from the partners. According to this schema, cooperation happens if the target has a higher bargaining power. Contrarily, if the supporter prevails there will be no cooperation. The bargaining power depends on interests, dependence and commitment. Disentangling the variables:

- ✓ Hp 3a *Ceteris paribus*, the less interested dependent prevails.
- ✓ Hp 3b *Ceteris paribus*, the most interested actor prevails.
- ✓ Hp 3c *Ceteris paribus*, the less committed actor prevails.

Overcoming Yoshida. Japan as a normal(izing) country.³⁹


The first hypothesis to “test” looking at the “Pacific Alliance” is the one rooted on the constructivist approach. It suggests that the Japanese strategy is mostly rooted on its identity of pacifist state and determined by the self restraint imposed by domestic arrangements and shared values of non violence and pacific resolution of international disputes. In this case, it is important to stress that is impossible to deny that these norms and values have any impact at all, ignoring very significant historical legacies and a relevant role of the domestic debate in shaping the country’s strategy and security policy⁴⁰. However, recognizing the impact of these variables does not imply a stronger assumption, similar to the one put forward by scholars such as Peter Katzenstein, Thomas Berger and Yoshihide Soeya. They argue that the Japanese security strategy and the relationship *via à vis* the US is determined by domestic norms and pacifist culture *rather than* systemic factors and threat perceptions. This approach foresees a number of prescriptions related to the three arenas of action constituting our dependent variable. Firstly, a permanent and low level of military integration concerning the arena of preparedness: the pacifist culture and antimilitary laws should impede any form integration different from the defensive defense in

³⁹ The reference to the Japanese normalisation and Japan “normal country” (*jutsu no kuni*) started with publication of the Blueprint for a New Japan by Ozawa Ichiro in 1993. He argued “Japan must do things normally, in the same way as everyone else”. Ozawa called for the “end of Japanese exceptionalism and the abandonment of traditional low posture security strategy, defining it a mark of the Yoshida prevarication, of the Japanese selfishness and money grubbing.” Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan*. Tokyo Kodansha 1994.

⁴⁰ Jennifer Lind, “Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics” PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science MIT. Cambridge MA. 2004. Lind, Jennifer. “Memory, Apology, and International Reconciliation.” *Asia-Pacific Journal* 47, 7: 6. 2008 John Torpey, ed. *Politics and the Past*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 2003 Melissa Nobles. *The Politics of Official Apologies*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008 Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War*. Ann Arbor. University of Michigan Press 2008. Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German- Polish Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2009.

case of direct attack and a low level of interoperability of forces; secondly, a low and stable level of contribution related to US war efforts (arena of action) and, finally, a high and constant level of diplomatic cooperation due to mutual trust and friendship ties. This approach highlights the elements of continuity in the bilateral relationship and in the Japanese strategy, underestimating a number of deep changes that involved the Japanese role in the East Asian area, a substantial redefinition of its security posture and a significant rethinking of its domestic restraints.

The first step necessary to provide an effective assessment of the trend of the alliance concerns the actual Japanese military power and therefore the potential contribution of Japan to the alliance. Japan has been often portrayed as an economic giant and a military pigmy. A number of scholars contributed to foster this image. Peter Katzenstein argued that “by any conventional measure of military strength Japan ranks far behind its major industrial competitors.”⁴¹ Yoshihide Soeya wrote, “No responsible decision maker in postwar Japan has ever attempted to convert accumulated economic wealth into military might.”⁴²



Data provided by the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database⁴³

This misleading interpretation probably is conditioned by the statistics on the defense spending as a percentage of GDP.⁴⁴ However, looking at the data on aggregate military spending, Japan could be easily considered a first class military power (much more than China during the Nineties and more than Russia throughout the post Cold War period). Even respecting the self imposed fiscal limit, until 2004, the Japanese military spending ranked fourth in the world following the US, the UK and France. Only in 2004, China surpassed Japan in the military spending. Moreover, the actual Japanese spending exceeded the official 1% cap through the use of the *Kakushi yosan* (the hidden military budget) particularly through the build-up of a particularly powerful and effective Naval Coast Guard with substantial paramilitary and military tasks.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, Op. cit. pp. 194–195.

⁴² Soeya, “Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives,” Op. cit. p. 226.

⁴³ <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput>

⁴⁴ Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki in 1976 committed his government and its follower to respect a fiscal limit of 1% of the GDP for the defense budget.

⁴⁵ Richard J. Samuels “New Fighting Power!” Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security” *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 84–112.

Year	USA	RUSSIA	CHINA	UK	JAPAN
1988	483,987	218,402	12,276	62,982	37,136
1989	479,053	202,512	13,147	62,028	38,397
1990	457,641	171,322	13,691	60,696	39,515
1991	401,943	100	16,534	62,348	40,411
1992	424,699	42,521	15,331	58,56	41,391
1993	402,369	37,563	14,607	56,394	41,85
1994	377,861	36,608	14,987	54,579	42,052
1995	357,376	21,68	16,606	50,818	42,472
1996	337,941	19,145	16,799	50,554	43,329
1997	336,179	21,242	19,263	48,276	43,522
1998	328,605	13,555	21,626	47,691	43,406
1999	336,179	14,042	23,767	47,542	43,484
2000	329,416	19,138	28,515	47,778	43,803
2001	342,167	21,242	33,436	49,417	44,276
2002	387,297	23,601	36,405	52,423	44,725
2003	440,806	25,107	40,631	55,347	44,818
2004	480,444	26,12	44,911	55,112	44,476
2005	503,353	28,488	52,199	55,152	44,165
2006	511,171	31,176	57,861	55,043	43,666
2007	524,591	33,821	63,643	55,746	43,46
2008	548,531	38,238		57,392	42,751

Data provided by the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Surely a statistical account of a country's capabilities and military expenses could be a valid indicator of its potential military power, particularly to dismiss the "military pigmy theory", but it cannot be the only variable to take into account to explain the trajectories of evolution of its security strategy, above all in the case of Japan. In the case of the Japanese security policy it will be necessary to pay attention to historical legacies and institutional and normative backgrounds. During the Cold War, the Japanese foreign and security policy was based on the "Yoshida Doctrine" elaborated during the '50s by the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The term 'Yoshida doctrine' refers to the policy of seeking protection under the US military umbrella and focusing on Japan's national energy and resources on economic regeneration, and wealth creation⁴⁶. After the Second World War, Yoshida realized that in a system marked by the bipolar rivalry, the most convenient security strategy for Japan was to act as a junior partner of the United States and to base its economic reconstruction on the open international economic system that the United States were building.⁴⁷ Yoshida was persuaded of the necessity of the

⁴⁶ On the Yoshida Doctrine: Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*. London: Heinemann, 1961. Hiroshi Nara. *Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 2007. Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. Kenneth Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* AEI Press, 1996. Go Ito, "Leadership in Bandwagon: A Historical Sketch of Japan's Security Policy." *Policy and Society* Vol. 23, no. 1 (2004). Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. Pg. 183.

⁴⁷ G. John Ikenberry, "American hegemony and East Asian order" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 2004. G. John Ikenberry, "Power and liberal order: America's Postwar world order in transition" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 5* (2005). Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, "Empire, hierarchy, and hegemony:

alliance with the United States to protect Japan from the Soviet threat and to enhance the domestic political stability. Within the security framework provided by the San Francisco Treaty, Japan could concentrate its resources on economic reconstruction and development, avoiding to dissipate part of its resources on the military.⁴⁸ This doctrine has been “entrenched” in the Japanese institutions through the Article in the Constitution 9⁴⁹, which bans the use of force and the maintenance of a “war potential”, through self-imposed fiscal limits and through the submission of the military to a strict control by the Government.⁵⁰

This strategy has been the intellectual and political basis for Japanese policy makers during the Cold War. However, since the early nineties the Yoshida Doctrine has been subject to a so called “*salami slicing*”,⁵¹ namely a gradual erosion of its principles and its dictates and a process of “normalization” of the Japanese foreign policy.⁵² In particular, the Japan has been abolishing or at least putting in serious doubt, what Kenneth Pyle has called the “eight self-binding restrictions”: no dispatch of SDF abroad, no collective defense arrangements, no power projection capability, no more than 1% GDP for defense, no nuclear arms, no sharing of military technology, no exporting of arms and no military use of space.⁵³ The most evident indicator of the overcoming of the Yoshida doctrine is the removal of some of these domestic institutional constraints and the progressive erosion to previous self binding restrictions that impeded a more assertive security strategy.⁵⁴ The first noticeable step was the Peace Keeping Operation Law in 1992 that marked the first revision of the ban on overseas dispatch. In 1997 Japan opened the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which integrated various intelligence structures. Other major legislative reforms were the amendment of the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” to include regional contingencies and the “Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan”, approved in august 1999, which was basically a revised and updated version of the PKO Law geared

American grand strategy and the construction of order in the Asia-Pacific”. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 5 (2005).

⁴⁸ Richard J. Samuels, *Strong Nation, Strong Army. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. Cornell University Press Ithaca 1994. Richard J. Samuels, Eric Heingbotham, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy”. *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 171-203. About reconstruction and the development of the Japanese model of capitalism: Chalmer Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press 1982. David Fiedman, *The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan*. Ithaca Cornell University Press 1988. Kent E. Calder *Strategic Capitalism: Private Business and Public Response in Japanese Industrial Finance*. Princeton. Princeton University Press 1993. Daniel Okimoto, *Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology*. Stanford University Press 1993. Richard Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective* Ithaca Cornell University Press.

⁴⁹ The article Nine statue that “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” The *de facto* power to interpret Article Nine lay in the hands of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The whole debate is focused on the definition of “war potential” (*senryoku*). On the Article Nine and the debate on possible constitutional revisions: J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan” *East West Center Policy Studies* 19. 2005.

⁵⁰ Sun-Ki Chai, “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine”. Op. Cit.

⁵¹ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press 2007.

⁵² Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: the resurgence of Japanese power and purpose*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. On this point also, Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Reemergence as a Normal Military Power*. Adelphi Paper 368–69. London: Institute for International Strategic Studies. 2004.

⁵³ Pyle. Op. cit. At the moment only the production of nuclear arms is still respected. However, Japan stationed US nuclear arms in Okinawa violating the principle of no possession, no production and no transition of nuclear weapons in Japanese territories during the Vietnam War.

⁵⁴ Richard Samuels. *Securing Japan*. Op. cit.

specifically towards the U.S.-Japan security alliance. It allowed for the deployment of the SDF in U.S. operations not mandated by the UN.⁵⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the 9-11, Prime Minister Koizumi delivered an *ad hoc* package in order to cope with the challenge posed both by the new terrorist threat and the renewed US activism. The new legislation allowed the Self-Defense Forces to supply noncombat support to the U.S. coalition and to defend U.S. facilities. Afterwards Japan's Diet then passed a Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (July 2003), which has enabled Self Defense Force to provide logistical support for US and coalition forces in Iraq and in the surrounding Persian Gulf states.⁵⁶

A more recent step is represented by the elevation of the JDA (Japanese Defense Agency) to the ministry level in 2007. The creation of an autonomous Ministry of Defense is not only a matter of symbolism and rhetoric⁵⁷. Domestically, it means that the MoD enjoys bureaucratic equal status to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which effectively reinforces its position vis-à-vis the MOFA and it guarantees a leading role in security policymaking. Moreover, ministerial status allows the MoD to take control of critical administrative procedures, such as submitting its own legislative proposals to the Diet or negotiating a budget with the Ministry of Finances. Beyond the symbolic change from agency to ministry, the law included "international peace cooperation activities" a fundamental mission of the JSDF, which implies that for the first time in its history the JSDF's core purpose necessarily involves missions outside of Japan. This signifies that the Self Defense Force shift from a static defense to an active force fit for overseas deployments.⁵⁸

A part from these relevant and completed "salami slices", it is necessary to mention another policy option that has been present in the Japanese discourse until recently: the proposals for the revision of the Article Nine. During November 2005, the LDP released its draft revision of the Article Nine. The House of Representatives and House of Councillors of the Japanese National Diet conducted research committees on the matter since 2000, releasing separate reports in 2005; the LDP and the DPJ, after attempts to reach a joint proposal, submitted individual Diet bills to put in place the necessary national referendum procedures to enable the constitutional revision in May 2006. The presence of a number of different proposals testifies that both LDP and DPJ agreed on the possibility to put seriously in question the Article Nine and, more generally, to overcome the constitutional limits restricting the Japanese military activity to "self defense" and forbidding to develop any form of "war potential".⁵⁹

The salami slicing did not involve only domestic constraints and institutions but also the level of actual security contributions in terms of troops deployed. After the widely criticized "checkbook diplomacy" during the first Gulf War, the Japanese SDF started to dispatch its personnel abroad under the

⁵⁵ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Reemergence as a Normal Military Power*. Adelphi Paper 368–69. London: Institute for International Strategic Studies. 2004. Christopher W Hughes, and Ellis S. Krauss, "Japan's New Security Agenda", *Survival*, 49:2, 157 — 176. 2007. Linus Hagström, "Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy" *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. No. 7 2008.

⁵⁶ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the 'war on terror': incrementalism confirmed or radical leap?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 427–445, December 2004.

⁵⁷ In the post war Japan all reference to power politics, war and the use of force were banned from the public rhetoric. Japan had no army but a self defense force and no ministry of defense but a self defense agency. Even the term alliance (*domei*) was a taboo in Japan and was used only in the early 1980s. Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Op. cit. Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* Op.cit.

⁵⁸ Linus Hagström, "Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy" *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. No. 7 2008.

⁵⁹ J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels "Nine Lives" Op. cit. On the Japanese debate and on different positions about the "Peace Clause": Richard Samuels, "Securing Japan: The Current Discourse" *The Journal of Japanese Studies* Volume 33, Number 1, Winter 2007, pp. 125-152.

framework of the PKO Law of the 1992. The first peace keeping missions were delivered in Cambodia and Timor East in 1992 and 1993 respectively. Successively, Japan has participated in PKO and relief operations in Mozambique (1993–95), Rwanda (1994) and the Golan Heights (since 1996). During the Nineties these kind operation were carried out only under the UN umbrella. Since 1999-2000 Japan started to cooperate with the US even in without a full UN mandate. The most relevant contributions to the US war effort were made during the Koizumi Era, with refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to contribute to the logistic operation related to the war in Afghanistan and the dispatch on the SDF in Samawah in southern Iraq.⁶⁰ According to Christopher Hughes, Japan’s effort to limit the type of capabilities and missions prescribed for the JSDF dispatch in non-combat zone operations, should be considered as one indication of its persistent caution about committing military forces to overseas operations. However, “Japan’s recent actions represent a major incremental leap in its security policy that could take it to the point-of-no-return in terms of breaking with its past traditions”. Moreover, “they have established *de facto* precedents of cooperation with the US and other states which means that Japan will be obliged eventually to apply the same levels of cooperation to bilateral security cooperation with the US in other regional and global crises”⁶¹.

The evolutionary change that brought the progressive fading of the “eight self binding restrictions” testifies the inadequateness of the explications based on the primate of the “Second Image”⁶². This evidence questions directly the position proposed by Katzenstein according to whom the “Japanese security strategy will continue to be shaped by domestic rather than international factors”⁶³. A more robust assessment of the evolving dynamic of the security alliance between Japan and US should be based on other variables related to the evolving security scenario in the area as threats, military interdependence and evolving interests.

Threats, spirals and hugs.

The second hypothesis to test is the one deriving from the balance of threat theory. As we have seen before, it argues that the alliance cohesion is a byproduct of the level of external threat. External threats are constituted by capabilities, intentions and geographic proximity. This theory considers as dependent variable the origin and the lasting or the collapse of alliances. Therefore it does not consider a dependent variable disentangled in different arenas of action. Nevertheless, we can apply the balance of threat theory to our theoretical schema as follows:

	Hug
High or rising threat	Diplomatic cooperation
	Wartime Cooperation
	Move Away
Low or diminishing threat	Defection
	Free Riding or Restraint

⁶⁰ The Ground Defense Force was not allowed to “use force” according to the Cabinet Legislative Bureau interpretation of the article 9.

⁶¹ Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s Security Policy and the War on Terror: Steady Incrementalism or Radical Leap?” CSGR Working Paper 104/02. Warwick 2002 University of Warwick, CSGR.

⁶² Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press. 1959.

⁶³ Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*. Op. Cit.

Japan clearly lives in an unstable regional scenario marked by different sources of security threats. The post Cold War regional system has been influenced by two major threatening factors: the rise of China and the aggressive strategy of the DROK. We have to consider them separately.

As far as capabilities are concerned, China constitutes the greatest challenge for Japanese security over the longer term. Former Prime Minister Taro Aso during a press conference in December 2005⁶⁴ said he viewed China as a threat, listing China's defense buildup and possession of growing nuclear arsenal as evidence: "A neighboring country...has a population of 1 billion and an atomic bomb and its military spending has been increasing at a double-digit rate for 17 consecutive years. What else can be considered a threat?"⁶⁵

As previous tables testify, the level of Chinese military expenditure has been growing considerably since the early Nineties, it highly accelerated in early 2000's and ultimately surpassed the Japanese level in 2004. From this point of view, Japanese concerns do not involve only present levels of expenditures but primarily the capacity of the Chinese economic and political system to generate a permanent military expansion. From a purely materialistic and systemic perspective this is a scenario that could easily lead to external balancing. Nevertheless, other scholars argue more prudently that "even if China tops virtually everyone's list of threats, it is not clear why a risen China *must* threaten Japan".⁶⁶ The balance of threat theory indeed negates that states balance against capabilities alone. According to Walt, balancing acts and subsequently enhancement of alliances cohesion are due to the presence of offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions. Therefore, it will be necessary to look at variables as the military posture, the presence of offensive capabilities, the general capacity to project power abroad.

Japan has been alarmed by the Chinese program of modernization of its forces since the early 1990s.⁶⁷ There are three main trends of the Chinese modernization that contribute to a gloomier threats assessment by the Japanese side: the growth of China's ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, the ongoing development of a blue water Chinese Navy and the technological development of the PLA Air Force.⁶⁸

On the nuclear and ballistic ground, the expansion of Chinese forces has been constant during the last decade. Nowadays, the PRC reached "a full spectrum of offensive missile forces as well as a *bona fide* second-strike nuclear deterrent"⁶⁹. Particularly the recent development of SLBMs with a range of around 2,000 kilometers is specially threatening for the Japanese security.

The modernization of the Air Force is the less successful area of development. In the early Nineties the Chinese Air force was essentially based on a improved version of Soviet 1950s technology. Since middle 90's PRC started to produce more advanced aircrafts, as the JH-7 fighter. Currently it is able to produce

⁶⁴ At the time Taro Aso was Foreign Minister.

⁶⁵ The Cabinet, however, quickly modified Aso's position by stating in a written answer to a member of the House of Representatives. Taro Aso, at a press conference after the cabinet meeting, 22, December 2005. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaikan/gaisho/g_0512.html#5

⁶⁶ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan*. Op. cit. pg 136.

⁶⁷ Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* New York: Palgrave, 2001, especially p. 93; Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: the Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* Op. cit. . Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japanese Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 4. Spring 1999, pp. 49-80; Kent Calder, "China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March-April 2005): pp. 1-11; Denny Roy, "The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Ties," *Survival*, vol. 47, no. 2, Summer 2005. Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan's Shifting Strategy toward the Rise of China," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 August. Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*. New York: Oxford Press, 2007.

⁶⁸ David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's military: progress, problems, and prospects*. University of California Press. Los Angeles. 2002. Nevertheless China miss a part of the strategic nuclear triad, owing ICBMs, SLBMs and lacking strategic bomber similar to American B-2 or B-52. On this point also, Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2005.

⁶⁹ *ibidem*

a completely indigenous bomber modeled on the Russian Su-27. The PLA Air Force lays decidedly behind the US and the Japanese Air Force in technological terms. However, the Japanese government looks with apprehension at the general improvement of its air defense and offence capabilities and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) programs and an anti-satellite systems.⁷⁰

The enhancement of the naval sector has probably been the highest priority service for modernization in recent years. This has been the case for two main reasons: the military demands related with a possible Taiwan contingency and the desire to eventually establish a blue water presence throughout the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Even if a limited share of vessels can be considered blue-water capable and the majority constitute a coastal force that operates in brown and green water, this development is the most influential on regional security equilibria, because it increases the Chinese power projection and potentially endangers Japanese SLOCs.

According to David Shambaugh, this trend of transformation and modernization could be considered natural for a rising continental power as China and it does not necessarily reflect any offensive posture. However, the acquirement of a significant power projection capability could destabilize the area originating a security dilemma and an unintended competition even without explicit offensive intentions.⁷¹ According to Christopher Hughes, indeed, the development of this multiplicity of capabilities implies that China is not simply undertaking a process of military modernization *per se*, “but that it has a new appetite to project military power outside its own territory to secure its national interests, and thus it may be able to threaten Japan’s interests in the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyutai islands, interrupt Japan’s vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and even to attack Japan’s southern islands and Okinawa in an attempt to stop the US deploying from its bases in Japan in the event of a Taiwan Strait contingency.”⁷²

The third element of the threat assessment is the perception of offensive intentions. It is not easy to assess objectively the intention of a great power, particularly in the case of China, which officially adopts a non aggressive posture and declares its commitment to a “peaceful rise”.⁷³ China considers the acquisition of power projection capability, the modernization of the army and the navy, together with a nuclear arsenal able to achieve an extended deterrence as natural attributes of a great power, without linking this military expansion with an explicitly offensive posture .⁷⁴

However, Tokyo may perceive (and it did in the recent past) malevolent intentions into China’s military build-up even if they do not exist. Beijing can see a form of containment in Japan’s military modernization, originating a spiral of insecurity.⁷⁵ The interaction between mutual fear and capability-acquisition can trigger a competition in security and foster hostility even in absence of clear offensive

⁷⁰ Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, William Overholt, *Modernizing China Military. Opportunities and Constraints*. RAND Organisation. RAND Air Force Program UA835.M63 2009.

⁷¹ David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's military: progress, problems, and prospects*. Op. cit. Also on this point, Denny Roy, “Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions,” *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 196–205.

⁷² Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection”, *Asia-Pacific Review*,16:1, 2009.

⁷³ Zheng Bijian, “China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status” *Foreign Affairs*. September-October 2005. Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia” *International Security*. Summer 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1, Pages 81-126. Barry Buzan , “Sino-Japanese and Sino-US Relations in China’s Peaceful Rise”. *World Economics and Politics*. May 2007. Rosemary Foot, “Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging” *International Affairs* Volume 82 Issue 1.

⁷⁴ Avery Goldstein , “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence.” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 1743-937X, Volume 30, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 639 – 682.

⁷⁵ Christopher I. Pehrson “String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral”. *Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy*. US Army College. June 2006. Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki , “The Rise of China Threat Arguments” PhD Dissertation. 2006 Department of Political Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

intentions⁷⁶. Moreover, the political use of a historical legacies constituted by animosity and unsettled disputes concerning the past can make a peaceful resolution of controversies more difficult and it can further inspire mutual distrust ⁷⁷. A good indicator of this kind of spiral are the China's Ministry of National Defense white papers (published a every two years) and Japan's Ministry of Defense Diplomatic Blue Books⁷⁸(Self-Defense Agency until 2007).

YEAR	China National Defense	Defense of Japan Blue Book
1998	Relatively positive stance. Critics against the US hegemonism, cold-war mentality, military alliances, and the tendency to engage in armed intervention. US and Japan interference into Taiwan issue (considered strictly domestic)	Increase in China's Taiwan related exercises, reinforced presence in the South China Sea, and expanding maritime interests. Attention to PLA modernization.
2000	Highlighted stronger U.S.-Japan alliance, advocacy of theater missile defense, Japanese Diet's passage of the revised defense guidelines.	Missile units near Taiwan, construction of facilities in the South China Sea, and maritime activities near Japan.
2002	Japan "enhancing military deployment and strengthening military alliances";	Speculated on motivations behind China's military modernization; dwelt on PRC actions to prepare for a war against Taiwan; statement about "the objective of the modernization exceeds the scope necessary for Chinese defense" and "China may aim at building the so-called 'blue water' Navy in the future."
2004	"complicated security factors" criticized U.S. for reinforcing its presence, strengthening its alliances, and deploying Theater Missile Defense. Criticized Japan for "adjusting its military and security policies," Disapproval for Koizumi visit to Yakasuni Shrine. ⁷⁹	"Serious problems arose that infringed on Japan's security and rights, including its right of sovereignty." dispute over energy resources in the East China Sea and Chinese ships conducting research of the sea floor. Incident in November 2004 where a PLA Navy submarine went through a strait in the Ryukyu Island chain. General uncertainty about ends of PLA military modernization.
2006	U.S. and Japan were strengthening the alliance, "in pursuit of operational integration"; Japan was seeking to revise the constitution and exercise collective self-defense and was shifting to a more externally oriented military posture. Referred to	Chinese defense budget exceed Japan's; China advancing in the development of cruise missiles; the PLA air force has increased reconnaissance flights against Japan; Araki Report (2005) recognize China explicitly "China as a potential security threat"

⁷⁶ On security spirals and security dilemmas. John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma" *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Jan., 1950), pp. 157-180. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton University Press, 1997. Jennipher Lind, Thomas Christensen, "Spirals, Security, and Stability in East Asia" *International Security*, Spring 2000, Vol. 24, No. 4, Pages 190-200.

⁷⁷ Victor D. Cha, "Hate, Power, and Identity in Japan-Korea Security: Towards a Synthetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000. Jennipher Lind, *Sorry States*. Op. Cit. Richard C. Bush, "China Japan Tensions" Foreign Policy Paper. Brookings Institution. June 2009. No. 16. He Yinan, "History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict," *Journal of Contemporary China* 16, no. 50 (February 2007): 1-24.

⁷⁸ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html

⁷⁹ On Yakasuni Shrine: Daiki Shibuichi, "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics of Identity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?" *Asian Survey* 45, no. 2 (2005): 197-215. Wakamiya, Yoshibumi, and Tsuneo Watanabe. "Yasukuni, War Responsibility, and Japan's Diplomacy." *Japan Echo* 33 (April 2006): 10-15.

	“complex and sensitive historical and current issues in China’s surrounding areas [that] still affect its security environment.”	
2008		China’s defense industrial base improving. Further intensification of maritime activities. Increasing emphasis of SLOCs protection. China active promotion of “RMAs with Chinese characteristics.”

This table briefly summarizes the content of the official documents concerning mutual threat perceptions of China and Japan. The relationship between the two countries is not marked by a fully fledged security spiral. Nevertheless, as Mike Mochizuchi recently stated “They are more symptoms of an adjustment from the “friendship diplomacy” era to one characterized by a more realistic and frank interaction that involves a mix of “cooperation and coexistence” on the one hand and “competition and friction” on the other”⁸⁰.

The second major threat for the Japanese security concerns North Korea. Even if the DROK cannot challenge Japan in terms of capabilities and military budget, the nuclear and ballistic program and the offensive posture of the North-Korean regimes represent the most immediate security issue faced by Japan. According to the 2009 Blue Book on Defense “North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of non proliferation of WMD”⁸¹.

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons presents a serious and extremely complicated problem, with implications that could drastically affect Asian security.⁸² In the early 1990s, North Korea started to develop two missile programs labeled Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2. During August 1998, North Korea launched a medium range ballistic missile Taepo Dong 1 that flew over Japan and crashed in the Pacific. The launching was the first occasion in the postwar period in which Japanese people really felt their country was being directly threatened by an hostile power. Despite two decades of intensive efforts to stop or to freeze North Korea from “crossing the nuclear Rubicon”, Pyongyang tested a nuclear device on October 2006. Furthermore, the DROK tested also the long range ballistic missile Taepo Dong 2 in 2006 and in 2009.⁸³ The Korean nuclear crises represented a sort of catalytic shock that contributed to the acceptance of the new security agenda and major turning point in the Japanese security strategy. The first Taepo Dong together with other missiles’ and nuclear tests had a particularly intense shock on Japanese public opinion.⁸⁴ However, as Richard Samuels stressed, the

⁸⁰ Mike Mochizuki, “Japan Between Alliance and Autonomy” *Strategic Asia* No 3 2004-05. Terms cooperation and friction and cooperation and coexistence are quoted from the The Prime Minister’s Task Force on “Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy,” November 2002.

⁸¹ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Blue Book 2009”.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/2009/chapter1.pdf>

⁸² Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” *International Security* 21, no. 3 Winter 1996/1997: 57; Mitchell B. Reiss, “Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” in *Strategic Asia* 2005–06. Victor D. Cha, “Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, and Stability: A Case for Sober ‘Optimism,’” in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 464. Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59–88.

⁸³ International Institute for Strategic Studies. “North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme, A Net Assessment” January 2010.

⁸⁴ Richard P. Cronin, “The North Korean Security Threat and the US-Japan Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches, and Prospects,” in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29: 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 58-60. Paul Midford, Japanese “Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy”, *East-*

Korean threat represents also a sort of “catch-all proxy threat to justify changes in security policy that are simultaneously driven by the greater long-term, but diplomatically unacceptable to articulate, threat from China”.⁸⁵

The increasing level of external threat triggered the evolution of the Japanese security strategy but also it promoted two distinct moments of change in the alliance toward a “hug closer” movement in the arena of preparedness. These two moment of redefinition of the alliance took place between 1995 and 1997 and between 2004 and 2005.

The mid-90’s evolution involved different phases and the adoption of several documents: in February 1995, the US Department of Defense published the “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region”, (referred as the ‘Nye Report’); in November 1995 Japan adopted the new National Defense Program Outline⁸⁶; in April 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, which was an agreement to conduct a review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation in order to update the alliance and enhance bilateral defense cooperation. Finally, in September 1997 the Review of the Defense Guidelines in U.S.-Japan relations and regional security was released .⁸⁷

This first phase of enhancement of the alliance was determined to close an era of uncertainty that marked the early Nineties. Even if today it sounds as a completely unrealistic scenario, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War Japan was portrayed as a potential threat for the US primacy. Coherently with the opinion that foresaw “geoeconomics” and not geopolitics as primary driver of the evolving dynamic in the international system, many pundits argued that Japan was the most threatening competitor for the US.⁸⁸ Some observers went so far as to predict a “coming war with Japan.”⁸⁹ However, the image of Japan as threat last only few years. In 1992 the Japanese economic bubble burst and Japan entered in its “lost decade”⁹⁰. At the same time, the US and Japan started to deal with the evolving security threats we mentioned before.

West Center Policy Studies 27 (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2006). , Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni. “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options” *Congressional Research Service CRS Report RL33709*, 2009.

⁸⁵ Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan*. Op. cit. pg 137. On this point also Hitoshi Tanaka, “Japan's Policy for East Asia” *Asia-Pacific Review*. *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2007.

⁸⁶Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/6a.html>

⁸⁷ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security- Alliance for 21th Century.” 4-17-1996. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation New York, New York.” 9-23-1997 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html>

⁸⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Endangered American Dream: How to Stop the United States from Becoming a Third World Country and How to Win the Geo-Economic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy*. Simon & Schuster . New York 1993. Some often quoted examples of the American fear towards the Japanese economic challenge were In 1989, the acquisition of the the Rockefeller Center by the Mitsubishi Estate the purchase of Columbia Pictures by the Sony. James Fallows. A prominent American journalist, published his extremely influential series of articles, "Containing Japan," in the Atlantic Monthly that year. Many Japanese around this time began gradually to take a critical view of the "high-handed" American policies. The publication of “The Japan That Can Say No” by Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita bore testimony to such Japanese sentiment.

⁸⁹ George Friedman, Meredith LeBard, *The Coming War with Japan*. New York: St Martin’s Press. 1991.

⁹⁰ Fumio Hayashi and Edward C. Prescott, “The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade” *Review of Economic Dynamics* Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 206-235. T.J Pempertl, *Regime Shift Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy*. Cornell University Press 1999.

The Nye report can be considered as one of the most central documents concerning the shift in priority within the United States' approach toward Japan. The new security strategy report outlined the necessity to maintain a US military presence in Japan and to reinforce the bilateral security relationship ultimately isolating possible economic frictions from the military alliance.⁹¹ Moreover, the report called for a more active role of the JSDF in the area.

The substance of this report was then included into a new National Defense Program Outline (the document that sets out Japan's military doctrine alongside the necessary force structure) that was released in 1995, which included "situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on peace and security of Japan" as integral part of the Japanese role in the East Asian theatre and in the alliance.⁹² The 1995 NDPO stresses the presence of significant changes in the international system and the increasing expectation towards the SDF role. It called for defense forces capable of effectively dealing with diverse contingencies with appropriate flexibility and apt to make a "smooth response to an unexpected development of the situation by enhancing necessary functions and seeking for qualitative improvement"⁹³. The 1995 NDPO emphasizes the necessity to look for a more proactive use of SDF capabilities in various missions not limited to a (narrowly defined) national defense.⁹⁴

In 1997 the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were revised to reflect Japan's renewed commitment to a larger security role. However, the revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation stressed that the activation of the guidelines is predicated upon the concept of "situational need" rather than strict geographical demarcations, which introduces an element of strategic ambiguity.

The most recent redefinition of the alliance in 2004-05 was also primarily defined by the adoption of several different documents: the report of the Prime Minister's Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (better known as the Araki Commission Report)⁹⁵, the NDPG⁹⁶ and the Mid-term Defense Buildup Plan .

The Araki Commission Report identifies two main security goals: preventing a direct threat from reaching Japan and reducing the chances of threats arising in parts of the world that could reach Japan or harm Japanese interests. It highlights the necessity of a more flexible and outward looking "integrated security strategy" compared to the defensive defense approach that marked the Cold War era. It calls for "bolstering the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance" and it exhorts to continue to rely on extended deterrence provided by the U.S. This would compel Japan to establish an effective ballistic missile defense systems in cooperation with the U.S. Moreover, Japan would have to "continually upgrade arrangements for cooperation to deal with these types of situations".⁹⁷

The publication of the "National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and After" provides some additional clarity to the prescription of the Araki Reports. This document is very significant because

⁹¹ Funabashi, Yoichi. *Alliance Adrift*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.

⁹² Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996" <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/security/defense96/index.html>

⁹³ *ibidem*

⁹⁴ *ibidem*

⁹⁵ The Araki Commission was a private advisory panel that reported to the prime minister very influenced by the LDP Defense Policy Studies Subcommittee.

⁹⁶ National Defense Program Outline was renamed NDPG National Defense Program Guidelines.

⁹⁷ Emma Chanlett-Avery, Weston S. Konishi, "The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests". Report for International Affairs Sub Committee. *Congress Congressional Research Service*. June 2009.

Japan revised its defense guidelines very rarely (previously only in 1978 and 1995).⁹⁸ The NDPG does in fact introduce new elements. Firstly, it defines the basic principles of Japanese security policy for the first time, namely deterring direct threats against Japan and minimizing the possibility of being threatened by improving the international security environment.⁹⁹ Secondly, this document explicitly identifies regional threats for the first time: China's military and nuclear modernization program and North Korea. The NDGP appears to confirm the shift toward a regional and international emphasis and endorses the multifunctional, flexible approach envisaged in the Araki report. It notes that Japan will "proactively engage in a strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries, the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives."¹⁰⁰ Moreover, "Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as intelligence exchange, operational cooperation, including in situations in areas surrounding Japan, cooperation on ballistic missile defense, equipment and technology exchange."¹⁰¹

The 2005 NDPG also went beyond the 1995 NDPO in its new emphasis upon global security interests. The report stated that "the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical for Japan," mapping Japan's own security interests onto those of the United States along the "arc of instability."¹⁰² Nevertheless, the document states that "Japan will continue to uphold the basic principles of Japanese defense policy, including *senshu boei* (exclusively defense-oriented posture), the three non-nuclear principles and maintenance of civilian control."¹⁰³

Finally, we can argue that balance of threat theory explains the two "hug close" movements in the realm of preparedness. However, this is only part of the picture. In the post Cold War Era, the transformation of the alliance has been far from unidirectional and linear. On the contrary it showed contrasts, differences of interests and discord both on short terms policies and on strategic visions. Moreover the dimension of diplomacy has been marked by noteworthy frictions and disagreements particularly during the period successive to the mandate of Junichiro Koizumi.

The evolution of the alliance indeed cannot be described simply as a enhancement of the internal cohesion due to an increasing external threat. The alliance game has been characterized by a far more complex dynamic that can be analyzed and understood looking at the interaction between external environment and the bargaining relation between the allies.

Hedging strategies and the security dilemmas of the Alliance.

The Waltian theory describes balancing acts and the enhancement of alliances' cohesion as natural behaviors. A new or a rising external threat blurs all the divergences of interests between the allies. This approach cannot grasp the internal dynamic of the alliance determined by elements other than security threats. This pitfall is particularly relevant when we analyze an asymmetric alliance marked by different

⁹⁸ David Fouse, "Japan's FY 2005 National Defense Program 2005 Outline: New Concepts, Old Compromises" Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Volume 4 - Number 3, volume 4 - Number 3, March 2005.

⁹⁹ Yuki Tatsumi, "National Defense Program Outline: A New Security Policy Guideline or a Mere Wish List?" *Japan Watch* 20 December 2004. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

¹⁰⁰Quoted in the Defense Annual White Paper. 2005 Ministry of Defense.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2005/2.pdf

¹⁰¹ *ibidem*

¹⁰² Hughes, About the concept of arc of instability Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostategic Imperatives*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997.

¹⁰³ Yuki Tatsumi. Op. cit.

set of preferences, with a coordination game (CC, CD, DC, DD) for the major ally and a “prisoner dilemma” (DC, CC, DD, CD) for the junior partners. These preference ranks reflect the Japanese predilection for buck passing (DC) and the US permanent incitement for cooperation and burden sharing (CC).¹⁰⁴

The dynamic of evolution of the alliance between US and Japan therefore can be grasped more accurately by a theory based on what Glenn Snyder defined process variables¹⁰⁵ (capabilities but also interests and commitment) able to describe the complex interaction between allies and external environment rather than postulating a general tendency towards balancing and a direct relation between threat perception and internal cohesion. A theoretical framework based on this kind of variables contributes to evaluate the dilemma of the alliance between entrapment and abandonment that affected the Japanese strategy and the interaction between the US and Japan.

The Cold War was marked both by the catalytic threat of the Soviet Union and the permanent commitment of the US to protect the Japanese archipelago with the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces. This kind of commitment permitted a minimalist strategy by the Japanese side. Contrarily, the period between the demise of the USSR and the 1997, year in which the revised Guidelines of the alliance were signed, was marked by fear of abandonment by the Japanese side and widespread discussion over possible alternatives for the US engagement in the Pacific, including a sharp reduction of the US presence.¹⁰⁶ During the Nineties, the North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Straits crisis demonstrated the “emptiness” of the alliance due to the lack of preparedness and interoperability in responding to regional contingencies. However, as I mentioned before, the late nineties were characterized by a hug close movement that diminished sharply Japan’s abandonment fears. Particularly after the completion of the middle nineties “get closer” movement with US-Japan Guidelines for Defense, the alliance showed a permanent strategic ambiguity, that Samuels and Heginbotham labeled “dual hedge” or generally hedging strategy¹⁰⁷: a tightening and loosening of alliance ties in order to face fear of entrapment. Christopher Hughes defined these kind of behaviors as “evade and temporise”, “acquiesce and stand aside”; “emphasize domestic political and constitutional restraints”; “obfuscate and delimit” and “intimate non-cooperation”¹⁰⁸. This hedging behavior marked both the period following the two “hug close” movements in the realm of preparedness, after the 1997 and during the post Koizumi era. During these periods the evidence highlights how Japan managed to avoid potential entrapments and bargained with the ally to avoid any kind of “tying hands”¹⁰⁹ commitments in the most dangerous scenarios in East Asia. This multiplicity of hedging tactics affected, in different degrees, all the three arenas of action and regarded mainly the base politics (preparedness and diplomacy), the ballistic defense systems (preparedness), the Japanese contribution in war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq (Action) and the Six Parties Talks (diplomacy).

¹⁰⁴ Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy.” *International Security* 29 (2004) (1): 92–121.

¹⁰⁵ Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory”. Op. cit.

¹⁰⁶ Joseph S. Nye, “The ‘Nye Report’: six years later?”. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Volume 1 (2001) 95–103.

¹⁰⁷ Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge” *Foreign Affairs*. September-October 2002. Evelyn Goh, “Understanding “hedging” in Asia-Pacific security” *PacNet* 43, August 31, 2006. Daniel Twining, “America’s Grand Design in Asia” *The Washington Quarterly*. No 30-3. 2007. On the hedging strategy: Patricia A. Weitsman, “Alliance Cohesion and Coalition Warfare: The Central Powers and Triple Entente” *Security Studies*, Volume 12, Issue 3 March 2007, pages 79 – 113. Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous alliances: proponents of peace, weapons of war*. Stanford University Press. Stanford CA. 2004. Daniel Baltrusaitis, “Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing And The War In Iraq” PhD Dissertation at Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University. 2008.

¹⁰⁸ Christopher W. Hughes, “Ballistic Missile Defence and US-Japan and US-UK Alliances Compared” GARNET Working Paper: No 11/06 December 2006.

¹⁰⁹ James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1): 68–90. 1997.

The cooperation on the field of ballistic defense is one of the most controversial aspect of the US-Japan security relationship both for military and for political reasons.¹¹⁰ The Ballistic Missile Defense system originates a number of potential situation of entrapment by the Japanese side. Such a system, once fully operational, would freeze a considerable part of the possibility to adopt hedging strategies. The integration of the Japanese archipelago in the system would create the kind of “tying hands” commitment that Japan tried to avoid since the Shigeiru Yoshida was in office. Moreover, this would give a more relevant role to commanders in the field, contrarily to one of the most essential principles of the post-war Japanese foreign policy, the absolute subordination of the military to civil political power.¹¹¹

For technical reasons, the establishment of a BDM system means that policy-makers and military commanders would have to respond nearly instantaneously to missile attacks and consequently it could lead to the participation in an unwanted conflict regarding contingencies outside the Japanese defense perimeter or Japanese interests. In this way Japan could be involved in conflicts related to Taiwan and North Korea without a direct attack on its soil.¹¹² Moreover, Japan’s participation in BMD could destabilize the fragile equilibrium between Japan and China, fostering a latent security dilemma. China fears the involvement of Japan in possible Taiwan contingencies and it is concerned by the possibility for Japan to obtain protection from SLBMs and tactical missiles. Therefore, a joint BMD system is likely to trigger a missile build up and the development of MIRVed type technology by the Chinese side in order to compensate in terms of deterrence. The Japanese possession of fully integrated BMD capabilities can turn Japan into a forward base for US ballistic defense. This implies a *de facto* evolution of the traditional *defensive defense* approach into a form of *collective defense* that at the moment is explicitly forbidden by the present interpretation of the Article 9 by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau.

On December 2003, Japanese Cabinet decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC-3). At that time, the Cabinet adopted a policy decision “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures,” arguing that a robust missile defense system capability was a top priority and that it is a purely defensive system which “presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect regional stability”. The Japanese Cabinet claimed moreover, following a typical “acquiesce and stand aside” tactic that “the BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan’s own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan’s own information systems” trying to negate that the new shield could

¹¹⁰ Ronald O'Rourke, “Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense. Background and Issues for Congress” *CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of US Congress*. July 10, 2010. Richard P. Cronin “Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects.” *CRS Report* RL31337, March 19, 2002. See also, Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress” *CRS Report* RL33436. Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, ‘Statement By the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan: On the Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures’, 19 December 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html. Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, ‘Statement By the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan: On the National Defence Program Guidelines, 10 December 2004, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2004/1210statement_e.html. David Fouse, ‘Japan gets serious about missile defence’, *Asia-Pacific Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, June 2003. Umemoto Tetsuya, ‘Ballistic Missile Defence and the US-Japan alliance’, in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.) *Reinventing the Alliance; US Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

¹¹¹ Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: the resurgence of Japanese power and purpose*. Op. cit. Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. On civil military relations: Peter D. Feaver, *Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations*. Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 2003. Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control”. *Armed Forces & Society* 1996; 23; 149. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. A Theory of Civil Military Relations*. 1981. Cambridge MA. Harvard University Press. 1957.

¹¹² Japan never recognized the issue of Taiwan as a national security priority. The only statement about this issue was issued in 1969 when Prime Minister Sato relied a communiqué to President Nixon arguing that Taiwan and ROK were “important” for Japanese security.

transform the traditional defensive defense into an implicit collective defense.¹¹³ In 2007, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formed the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security in order to provide recommendations on the right of collective self-defense and to establish "whether it is appropriate for Japan to use its missile defense to intercept ballistic missiles targeting the United States"¹¹⁴. After different political controversies (Abe resigned and his successor Fukuda froze the process), the resolution was approved in 2009. The final report stated that even if "the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit on self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible"¹¹⁵[...] "the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense must be allowed for protection of US vessels in the high sea and in case of interception of ballistic missiles that could head for the United States".¹¹⁶

The recent domestic change in Tokyo due to the LDP defeat and to the DPJ affirmation did not change substantially the commitment on the BMD. Hatoyama was generally favorable to the defensive system and also the recently constituted Kan government probably will not change position dramatically. Nevertheless, in December 2009 the Cabinet led by Hatoyama excluded the additional financial resources for the BMD system for the 2010-11 fiscal year budget, particularly for the PAC-3 System. This decision reflects what Hughes defines "evade and temporize" or "acquiesce and stand aside". This decision could delay the deployment of the PAC-3 (scheduled for the end of 2011) for three to five years.¹¹⁷ Therefore, from one hand this interpretation opens for a sort of collective defense transcending the previous strict limitation to the Japanese sole and area surrounding Japan. By the other hand excludes the Japanese intervention in contingencies linked to Taiwan and South Korea preserving the traditional situational and non binding commitment. As Kenneth Pyle argued recently "The decision to cooperate fully in missile defense is particularly important in its long-range implications for the growing tightness of the relationship. It will entail enhanced coordination, exchange of informations, and sharing of technology. Japan will now become an engaged ally."¹¹⁸

Another major issue with a considerable political impact on the alliance is the general revision of the US military posture. This issue is twofold: firstly it involves the direct impact on the US base politics in Japan¹¹⁹; secondly, the global revision of the US posture affects directly the relative bargaining position of the Japanese Government in its relationship *vis à vis* the US.

¹¹³ However the "National Defense Program Guideline FY 2005" endorsed the development of missile defense systems, and implied that the "Three Principles on Arms Export" could be further modified as necessary for the deployment of BMD. The Three Principles prohibited the Japanese government from jointly developing and producing weapons, as well as transferring weapons parts to any foreign countries. "National Defense Program Guideline, FY2005," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet website http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html . Also, "Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee," May 1, 2007, U.S. Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/may/84084.htm>.

¹¹⁴ Masako Toki, "Missile defense in Japan" *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* January 2009.

¹¹⁵ Japanese Ministry of Defense White Paper 2009
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/18Part2_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf

¹¹⁶ Japanese Ministry of Defense White Paper 2009
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/PartII_Colum_Chap1.pdf

¹¹⁷ Japanese Ministry of Defense, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview".
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/bmd2009.pdf

¹¹⁸ Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan's Historic Change of Course" *Current History*. September 2006.

¹¹⁹ For an analysis of the base problem in East Asia: Sheila Smith, "Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia". *East-West Center*, March 2006. For a more theoretical perspective, Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons. Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*. Princeton University Press. Princeton 2008. Robert E. Harkavy, *Bases Abroad. The Global Foreign Military Presence*. Oxford. Oxford University Press 1989. Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000. Strategy and History*. Routledge 2007. Christopher T Sandars, *America's Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2000. Joseph Gerson, Joseph and Bruce Birchard, *The Sun Never*

Recently, pundits and media highlighted the role of the “Okinawa affair” as the central issue of the Japan-US alliance. Indeed, the current tension over the relocation of the Marines Corps Air Station in Futenma, Okinawa, has worsened the political atmosphere that surrounds the alliance. In May 2006, the U.S. and Japanese governments reached an agreement over the relocation of the Futenma Air Base facilities and personnel partly to an alternative site in Okinawa and partly to Guam. Both governments signed a bilateral agreement on how to proceed with the relocation of marines to Guam in February 2009¹²⁰.

However, soon after Hatoyama came into office in September 2009, he made the revision of the Futenma base the top priority of his government and decided that he wanted to pursue the relocation of base Futenma to an alternative site outside Okinawa, throwing out the bilateral agreement. Finally, in June 2010, he was forced to resign because he failed to achieve a new compromise on Okinawa. Certainly, as the resignation of Hatoyama testifies, the issue of Okinawa is very relevant *per se* because is widely politicized in Japan and because it became the focal point of a more vast political resentment against the US presence in Japan. Okinawa hosts two thirds of the US personnel in Japan¹²¹. Moreover, a number of significant episode in the Japanese post war history involved Okinawa in some way or another, as the Okinawa reversion in 1972.

Sets : Confronting the network of Foreign U.S. military bases. Boston: South End Press. 1991. Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the US Military Overseas.* Ithaca. Cornell University Press 2008. For a critical point of view: Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic.* New York: Metropolitan Books 2004.

¹²⁰ “United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” Japan Ministry of Defense, May 1, 2006 u http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp13.html. “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, February 17, 2009 u <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/agree0902.pdf>.

¹²¹ Under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, about 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities throughout the archipelago. Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major US forward logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region.



However, domestic variables, though very relevant, cannot fully explain this kind of issue. It is necessary to put the “Okinawan problem” in a broader perspective. First of all, the US-Japan “base politics” does not involve only Okinawa and only the base of Futenma but the whole US presence in the sovereign territory of Japan and the use that US is allowed to make of these bases. An excessive focus on Okinawa and Futenma can make sound the worried statement of the recent month exaggerated.¹²² As Joseph Nye stated recently from the columns of the *New York Times* “The Alliance is larger than one issue”.¹²³ Therefore, it will necessary to consider it as a consequence of the process of global redeployment of US forces in the Asian theatre.

This process, envisaged yet in documents as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 194 (1997), started the operational phase after the elaboration of the Quadrennial Defense Review¹²⁴ in 2001 and, above all, after the Global Posture Review¹²⁵ of the 2004. According to Robert Harkavy, the latter

¹²² Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “A 12-Step Recovery Plan for the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Japan Chair Platform. Center for Strategic International Studies. May 2010.

¹²³ Joseph Nye, “The Alliance is Larger Than One Issue” *New York Times*. January 6, 2010.

¹²⁴ Department of Defense, *Quadriennial Defense Report 2001*, Washington D.C.,

¹²⁵ Department of Defense 2004, Strengthen U.S. Global Defense Posture - Report to Congress, Washington D.C. http://www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf The documents defines the Global Posture Review as “The deliberate apportionment and global positioning of forward-based and forward-deployed forces, and the development of supporting global attack, global mobility and logistics, forcible entry, global command, control, communications and intelligence forces, and supporting security relationships and legal agreements, in order to facilitate the rapid concentration of forces in time and space cross transoceanic distances, to

originated “the most relevant global posture review since the NSC-68”¹²⁶. These documents were inspired by a shift from the “threat based” deployment of the Cold War to a “capability based approach” more suitable to the present strategic and operative needs. Therefore according to the QDR and the Global Posture Review, the post Cold War challenges would require greater flexibility in the existing basing system. Forces would need to be closer to what the US recognized as the “arc of instability” from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia. The US would focus on mobility and power projection in distant theaters rather than on the fixed bases designed to ward off, or respond to, conventional attacks from well identified adversaries.¹²⁷

The key aspect of these design is the creation of the “hubs and lily pads system”: main hubs in host nation as Japan with main bases able to project force in distant theatres along with lily pads “holding pre-positioned equipment to which rapidly deployable forces can ‘leap to and from’ in response to contingencies in a wide variety of geographical locations.”¹²⁸ The Global Posture Review foresees relevant changes for the US military presence in Japan. The first change is the creation of a combined air and missile defense operations and coordination center, by consolidating all elements of Japan’s Air Defense Command at Yokota Air Base, where the US Fifth Air Force is based. The second one is to base US Patriot missile defense units at exclusive and shared bases in mainland Japan and in Okinawa. The third one is the US transfer of the US Army 1st Corps, previously stationed in Fort Lewis, Washington, to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture near Tokyo. This kind of transfer would emphasize and increase the Japanese role in the US global military strategy and it would deepen the ties between the US Japanese military structures. According to T.J. Pempel, since the sphere of action of the Army 1st Corp reaches the Middle East, “the relocation of headquarters from Fort Lewis to Camp Zama would expand considerably the geographic scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty taking it well beyond its current focus on the Far East”¹²⁹. The latter change is the reduction of the burden graving on the Okinawan people in order to alleviate the domestic resentment related to the massive US presence on the island and consequently to reduce the friction that it produces on the alliance.

The current U.S. Global Defense Posture Review promotes relevant evolution in deployments and command structures capable to enhance interoperability and further induce Japan to assume an expanded role in U.S.-led military operations in the East Asian theatre and beyond. Moreover, the US presence will be functionally expanded, with Navy and Air components, and a reconfigured Ground force headquarters presence in Zama and the Marine Corps repositioned in Okinawa. Japan will be the major Main Operation Base for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, becoming the main hub for power projection in the Pacific.¹³⁰

Another relevant point of discord within the alliance involved the negotiation with the DROK in the framework of the Six Party Talks. The SPT framework has been established in 2003 in order to reach a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. As Robert Kelly argued, a multilateral framework as the Six Party Talks can be described as a *n*-player coordination game, similar to the Stag

support and sustain US military presence and operations in distant theater, and to establish a favorable global strategic balance.”

¹²⁶ Robert E. Harkavy, *Thinking about basing in Reposturing the Force – U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century*, Naval War College Newport Papers n. 26, Carnes Lord Editor, Newport. 2006

¹²⁷ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., “Politics and Diplomacy of the Global Defense Posture Review,” in *Reposturing the Force: US Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century*, Carnes Lord, editor (Newport, RI: Naval War College Newport Paper 26, February 2006), p. 53. Robert O. Work, *Sea Basing: All Ahead, Slow* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2006).

¹²⁸ Department of Defense 2004. Op. cit.

¹²⁹ T.J. Pempel, “Japan Rethinks Its Security. The US, Asian Regionalism or some kind of mix?” *Kyoto Journal of Law and Politics*. 3 (1).

¹³⁰ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Op cit.

Hunt game. In order to achieve the expected results (to capture the Stag, namely stop the North Korean nuclear program) all players have to cooperate. Alternatively, they can defect, pursuing their own interests – catching only a rabbit (their particular interests other than a nuclear free Korean Peninsula).¹³¹ The history of the Six Party Talks and more broadly of the diplomatic triangle between the DROK, Japan and the US is a clear example of “every hunter catches his own rabbit” approach. Among scholars and analysts there is no consensus about the intentionality of different actors in pursuing this defection strategy. Some argue that Japan intentionally pursued a divergent diplomatic track, others stress the presence of external as well as domestic constraints. However, what appears certain is that the Six Party Talks have been a divisive factor on the alliance. The first relevant divergence on North Korean policy dates back on 2002. On September 2002 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met the “Dear Leader” Kim Yong Il for a summit in Pyongyang.¹³² This summit brought to the adoption of the “Pyongyang Declaration” that started the normalization process between Japan and the DROK and achieved a moratorium for missile test by the North Korean side. Prime Minister Koizumi offered official apologies for Japanese war crimes and colonial exploitation during the 30’s and the 40’s. Japan promised also to provide compensations for war damages. Kim in return admitted that North Korea kidnapped several Japanese citizens during the 70’s and the 80’s. This attempt to achieve a bilateral *détente* diverged sharply with the policy the US were pursuing at the time. President Bush had just declared the Kim regime as part of the “Axil of Evil” and was adopting a far more muscular position.

The success of the Koizumi-Kim summit was short lived. Soon after the 2002, “the abduction issue” became very controversial in the Japanese public debate. Conservatives media and politicians started to pressure the Government to act in order to bring the abductees back home.¹³³ As a consequence, Prime Minister urged Kim to provide informations about them. In 2003 Kim allowed them to go “on holiday” in Japan for a limited period of time, without their relatives maintained as hostages in Pyongyang. The public outcry induced the government to not sending them back.¹³⁴ Since then, for Japan, the abduction issue became inextricably linked to the Six Party Talks. The abductees became the Rabbit of the Stag Hunt model and Japan was forced by its public opinion, fomented by conservatives politicians, to look for the Rabbit first. The linkage between Six Party Talks and the abduction issue forced Japan to assume a non cooperative stance in the negotiation and to adopt recurrently a position divergent from the other countries at the table (China, Russia, Republic of Korea). Refusing to separate the two issue, Japan substantially hampered the negotiation in different circumstances. As the Council of Foreign Relation Task Force on Korea recently argued “To the extent that Japanese politicians and the Japanese public continue to make the abduction issue Japan’s foremost priority, Japan is unlikely to contribute effectively to diplomatic efforts focused on denuclearization through the Six Party Talks.”¹³⁵ Japan continuously refused to cooperate in energy and humanitarian assistance to which the parties

¹³¹ Robert E. Kelly, “Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic ‘Stag-Hunt’ ” *Asian Security* April 2010.

¹³² Japanese MOFA, “Opening Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Press Conference on the Outcome of his visit to North Korea (September 17, 2002) http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/press.html

¹³³ Particularly the future Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, then chief negotiator for SPT was one of the most intransigent on this point. Through his tough position on the abduction issue he gained the public support necessary to be nominated LPD leader and then Prime Minister after the Koizumi resignation. James L. Schoff, “Abduction Diplomacy and the Six-Party Talks” *Pacific Forum CSIS* April 2006.

¹³⁴ Official Japanese position on abduction issue on MOFA “Pamphlet on Abduction Cases of Japanese Nationals by North Korea (2010)” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/pdfs/abductions_en.pdf

¹³⁵ Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr. and Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” *Council of Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report* No. 64. June 2010.

committed in February 2007. Moreover Japan opposed some US attempt to restart the negotiations like the removal of North Korea from the UN list of “state sponsors of terrorism”.¹³⁶

Some scholar claimed that Japan intentionally took an obstructionist stance in order to promote its interests. According to this interpretation, Japan has the interest to inflate the North Korean threat in order to promote a policy of military modernization and expansion aimed to face the military rise of China. At the moment, admitting to pursue a balancing against China is politically impossible, both domestically and internationally. Therefore a persistent threat from North Korea contributes to avoid international criticism and Chinese direct opposition.¹³⁷

Moreover this non cooperative stance represented for Japan a way to maximize its leverage in the negotiation and a way to oppose solution different from the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.¹³⁸ This interpretation is based on the assumption that the actual North Korean potential to inflict serious military damage to Japan is substantially very low. North Korean capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, suffer for a dramatic technological obsolescence and therefore it would be not able to hit seriously the Japanese soil. These scholars stress the fact that the DROK does not own the technological expertise to build an effective nuclear missile device, a decade of efforts notwithstanding¹³⁹.

Another relevant point, from the Japanese perspective is the intention to avoid a great diplomatic success for China. The achievement of a success in the SPT negotiation could probably legitimize China as the geopolitical leader in the region. As far as the DROK and Six Party Talks are concerned, China has a far greater leverage than Japan. The Kim’s regime is extremely dependent economically form China. Beijing serves as Pyongyang's long-standing ally and main trade partner and has used its influence on the Kim’s regime to bring North Korea to the Six-Party Talk negotiating table.¹⁴⁰ Japan contrarily finds itself in a very uncomfortable position in the negotiation, particularly after the US softened their position in 2007 (the so called “Bush Shock”¹⁴¹). Moreover, historical controversies made the bilateral relationship very difficult to manage. Therefore, a positive result of the SPT would be a major success for Chinese diplomacy and a recognition that China is going to exercise a role of leadership that once belonged to Japan.

¹³⁶ On this point: Axel Berkofsky, “Japan-North Korea Relations: (Sad) State of Play and (Sad) Prospects” *Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) Asie Vision* 17. June 2009. Axel Berkofsky, “Japan-North Korea Relations. Bad and Not Getting Better” *ISPI Policy Brief*. N 191 July 2010. Linus Hagström, “Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear Talks?” *Asian Survey* September/October 2009, Vol. 49, No. 5. Linus Hagström, “Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy” *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. No. 7 2008. Yun Duk-Min “Japan Dual Approach toward North Korea: Past, Present and Future”. *SSRC Working Paper* June 2005.

¹³⁷ Maaïke Okano-Heijmans, “Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea” *JapanFocus* October 21, 2008. Christopher W. Hughes, “Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat Japan’s Evolving Military Posture and North Korea” *Asian Survey*. March April 2009.

¹³⁸ As Okano-Heijmans argued Japan considers the a “completely nuclear free Korean peninsula” the only way to succeed in the negotiations. The US, due to different and less imminent threat perception, are more prone to accept other solutions.

¹³⁹ The DROK carried out sub terrain explosions and missile launch exercises. However the most complicate stage of the process is the miniaturization of the explosive nuclear device in order to be fired to a missile. On this point both Berkofsky “Japan-North Korea Relations: (Sad) State of Play and (Sad) Prospects” and Maaïke Okano-Heijmans.

¹⁴⁰ Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr. and Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula”. Op. Cit. On this point also Henry A. Kissinger, “Reining on Pyongyang” *Washington Post* June 8th, 2009. Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy” *CRS Report for Congress* May 27, 2009.

¹⁴¹ In 2007 the Bush Administration removed the DROK from the list of state sponsoring terrorism. This was considered offensive towards Japan. Analysts and pundits defined it Bush Shock similarly to the Nixon Shocks after the Guam Doctrine speech and the end of the gold standard system.

In the longer term, Japan is frightened by the possibility of a Korean Reunification and primarily by how a unified Korea could look like. A prospective unified Korea could be detrimental for Japanese interests and security and this could represent a further motive of caution.¹⁴²

The last relevant element of discord in the alliance regards the low level of actual Japanese contribution in the effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. Japan, especially during the Koizumi period, expressed diplomatic solidarity and sympathy towards US policies. As we mentioned before, Japan was able to make some very relevant breakthrough approving important pieces of legislature allowing a more active role and a real contribution in the war effort. Nevertheless, the real contribution in terms of “boots on the ground” has been very small compared to the NATO partners and other members of the “coalition of the willing”. The “War” dimension of the alliance game was the most prone to a number hedging strategies, such as “acquiesce and stand aside” and “intimate non cooperation”. The US pressure for a more active role brought the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to contribute to the logistic operation related to the war in Afghanistan and to the dispatch of the SDF in Samawah in southern Iraq (with non combat roles and in the safest zone possible).

As data demonstrate, however, Japan managed to keep the number of deployed troops very low. As far as Iraq was concerned, the maximum number of troops deployed by Japanese SDF was 600, far less than others country. The data are even more clear when we consider the size of military contribution in proportion to some indicators of national power and military might as population, GDP and the size of the armed force.

	Troops Deployed in Iraq (max)	Total Size of the Armed Force	% Total size of the Armed Force	Population (millions)	Number of Troops / Population (millions)	Troops deployed (max)/GDP (Billion USD)
Japan	600	239,430	0,25 %	127,380	4,7	0,14
UK	46000	197,770	23,25 %	62,041	741	21,5
Italy	3200	104,000	3,07 %	60,340	53,4	1,83
Spain	1300	86,000	1,5 %	46,951	28,4	0,95
Denmark	550	10,500	5,2 %	5,540	100	2,6
Poland	200	100,272	1,94 %	38,167	5,2	0,3
Ukraine	1650	125,00	13,2 %	45,871	36	4,9
Australia	2000	28,000	7,14 %	22,396	90,2	2,35
Georgia	2000	36,553	5,4 %	4,436	500	95,23
South Korea	3600	522,000	0,68%	48,758	73.83	2,63

As Glen Snyder argued, “the management involves pursuing both commons and competitive interests thus is a bargaining process. Their primary competitive interest is to control or influence the ally in order to minimize one’s own costs and risks. The primary common interest is to maintain the alliance and its related benefits”. Moreover, “the relative power bargain is a resultant of asymmetries in interests, commitment or dependence (or all three)”.¹⁴³ We can explain the output in the abovementioned issue areas as a result of a bargain between allies.

Japan managed to prevail the bargaining process, advancing its own interest, on occasion of the Six Party Talks and on the burden sharing or the “war” dimension. Generally, as a junior partner, Japan prevails when it is able to keep the cost at the minimum preserving its interest and simultaneously

¹⁴² *Ibidem*.

¹⁴³ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. Op. cit pg 165-174.

avoiding excessive friction in the alliance. This is the case of the substantial defection in the war contribution, that was the lowest among relevant allies. This is due to the low level of commitment (Japan's commitment in the surrounding area is situational and there is not binding commitment similar to NATO article 5), the low level of dependence (US war effort was not undermined by Japanese defection) and the high interests in maintaining the pacifist façade. By the US side there was no interest to strain the alliance in order to obtain an increased Japanese military presence, very costly domestically for Japan but with a reductive impact militarily. This kind of bargain resulted in a substantial defection: Japan “showed the flag” but did not put “boots on the ground” (at least in comparison with other allies' effort).

The case of SPT can be considered logically similar. Japan pursued its own independent policy, often divergent from the US effort, managing to preserve its own interest, biased by the abduction issue, determined by the will to avoid compromises and by the desire to avoid a major Chinese diplomatic success. This was due to the low level of dependence that allowed a substantial room of maneuver for Japan and to the low level of commitment deriving from the fact that SPT framework is an ad hoc diplomatic structure, substantially independent from the alliance provisions.

The latter cases are more complex to classify along the dyad defection-cooperation. While cases of SPT and contribution on war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan can be classified as cases of divergence of interest and protracted Japanese “cheap ride”, the issues of bases and BMD are more nuanced. These issues affect the realm of preparedness, namely how allies will deal with future threats and opportunities therefore are the most relevant factors of evolution for the alliance. Both affect directly the US commitment on the defense of Japan. Therefore the bargain process results highly asymmetric. Japan could not defect completely in these two cases (that would bring a loosening of the alliance ties). In both cases the response was marked by a series of hedging strategies aimed to avoid possible entanglements into unwanted conflicts.

Both for technical and political reasons, the issue related to the missile shield is likely to end with a “tilt toward the US”. As Christopher Hughes highlighted, once fully operational the system involves a series of binding commitments that could definitively undermine Japan's hedging strategies. The asymmetric dependence on the realm of nuclear deterrence and the lack of available alternatives to deter North Korea and China, make future cooperation more likely. Moreover, a complex (and very costly) system as the BMD creates a political commitment for future cooperation in possible contingencies beyond the traditional “situational commitment in areas surrounding Japan”.

At the moment, the bargaining concerning the Okinawa relocation plan is still open. The Kan government decided to pursue an Okinawan policy similar to the one proposed by Hatoyama, namely trying to achieve a complete revision of the 2006 agreement and possibly to move the Futenma MCAS station into Guam. Making a prevision on the resolution of the Okinawa issue is not the aim of this paper. However, it is necessary to stress the most relevant features of this quarrel related to our theoretical schema: the reduction of the “base burden” has become a very relevant political objective for the Japanese government, above all for the DPJ that assumed a tougher position compared to previous governments led by the LPD. Until 2009, Japan managed to exploit the Global Posture Review process to push for the relocation of US bases to alleviate the burden on local communities, especially in Okinawa. Japan and the US engaged in hard bargaining until the relocation agreement of May 2006. Japan succeeded in securing the scaling-down of US Marine forces in Okinawa, while the US and Japan also appeared to converge on the future global agenda of the alliance. Japan accepted hosting the US Army I Corps, thus marking a *de facto* breach of the interpretations of the scope of the US–Japan security treaty and US bases as covering only Japan and the Far East. Hatoyama government managed to throw the agreement away to reach a more favorable accord and, at the same time, to decrease the Japanese contribution in other sectors (as war cooperation and financial freezing of the BMD).

Consequently, we can advance three considerations. Japanese governments led by the LDP based their strategy, explicitly or implicitly, on a kind of *do ut des*. The relocation of Okinawa was the counterpart for a more active role of Japan in the alliance. On the contrary, the DPJ is trying to redefine the Japanese role reducing its commitments in the area and globally and, at the same time, is trying to renegotiate on the issue of bases. This implies a general state of tension in the bilateral relationship and few results for Japan, at least at the moment. Secondly, the recent transformation of the Japanese security strategy and the “normalization process” gave Japan an increased bargaining power *vis à vis* the US. Thirdly, the success of DPJ in 2009 marked the end of the 1955 party system dominated by the LPD¹⁴⁴. The rising bipolar dynamic could boost the competition on delicate issues like the base policies. This kind of domestic dynamic could led Japan to assume tougher positions on different kind of issue affecting the alliance. As we saw on the case of SPT and abductions, the Japanese government could be compelled to assume harder stances by its public opinion. In the same way, the increasing bipolar competition leads to an intense politicization of issue areas in which previously Japan was able to make concessions without pay relevant political costs. In our schema this corresponds to an increasing interest from the Japanese side and to a Japanese will face possible strains in the alliance to achieve its interests if these are heavily politicized domestically.

Conclusion.

The alliance between US and Japan has been undergoing a qualitative change since the end of the Cold War. It cannot be described or understood uniquely in systemic terms, emphasizing the role of the demise of the Soviet Union or the role of the rise of China. Neither the recent and current evolution of the alliance cannot be grasped focusing on changing level of threat perception alone.

The changing role of Japan in the East Asian (and global) geopolitical environment can be considered the primary driver that determined the evolution of the alliance. During the Cold War the paramount objective of the US grand strategy was to make sure that no aggregate of industrial-military power in Asia and Europe could mobilize against the US (independently as in WW2 or by an external power as in the Cold War). The strategy of containment was the logical consequence of this priority.¹⁴⁵ As Yoshida and his followers fully understood this overall strategy left room for a minimalist strategy for Japan. It could give priority to recovery, pursuing a developmental economic model and to adopt a minimalist foreign and security strategy inspired to the Yoshida Doctrine and to the concept of “mercantile realism”¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴⁴ On the 1955 system, Gerald R. Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Tetsuya Kataoka, *Creating single-party democracy : Japan's postwar political system*. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1992. Robert E. Ward, *Japan's political system*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J : Prentice-Hall, 1978.

¹⁴⁵ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*. New York : Columbia University Press, 1972. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment . A Critical Appraisal of American Postwar National Security Policy*. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1982. George F. Kennan, “Japanese Security and American Policy” *Foreign Affairs*, October 1964. George F Kennan, *Memoirs 1950-1963 [of] George F. Kennan*. London : Hutchinson, 1973. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation. My Years at the State Department*. New York : Norton, 1969.

¹⁴⁶ Richard J. Samuels, Eric Heingbotham, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy”. *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 171-203. About reconstruction and the development of the Japanese model of capitalism: Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford University Press 1982. Kent E. Calder *Strategic Capitalism: Private Business and Public Response in Japanese Industrial Finance*. Princeton. Princeton University Press 1993.

Therefore the end of the Cold War did not mean simply the end of the “big overreaching threat that blurred all the divergence of interests”¹⁴⁷. It meant much more. The Japanese pawn radically changed its value in the global exchequer. It no longer is an amount of industrial potential that could be mobilized once again against the US by an external power. As far as security is concerned it became “the cornerstone of the US engagement in an increasing dynamic and potentially unstable area”.¹⁴⁸

This brought to three main consequences. The first one was the end of the possibility to play against the rules economically. Japan had to adapt to a sort of economic and financial fair play and to give up its model of “catch up developmentalism”.¹⁴⁹ Secondly, it was substantially the end of security free ride. Since the end of the Cold War Japan started its trajectory of normalization. It brought to the progressive erosion of all the eight self restraint principals that characterized the Yoshida Doctrine. Even maintaining formally all the symbols of postwar anti-militarism, as the article Nine of the constitution and the fiscal cap on military spending, all the main tenets of the postwar strategy are gone.¹⁵⁰

These two points are the most recurrent in the recent literature. However, a third point is very relevant and it concerns the post Cold War role of the “American Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier”. Ironically, the definition of the former Prime Minister Nakasone is becoming more and more realistic and accurate. In the East Asian theatre Japan’s strategic values depend both on its own actions and contributions and on its role of hub for the US power projection. In the eyes of US strategists Japan must not be backed and supported in every circumstances independently from its behavior (as in the Cold War) but must be encouraged to play its role as “military hub nation” and active junior partner in the area integrated in the US-led military apparatus. As a consequence, issues like the integration of Japan in the Ballistic Missile Defense System and the relocation of US bases in Japan assume a crucial importance. The strategic relevance of Japan after the Global Posture Review has increased (particularly for Okinawa and for the Yokota Integrated Air Command).

These considerations allow us to describe the recent evolution of the alliance as a far more complex dynamic than a series of balancing acts against the North Korean (or Chinese) threat. The evolution described was constituted by two distinct “hug close” movements but also by relevant diplomatic divergences and a protracted Japanese free ride in terms of “boots on the ground” (as Richard Armitage used to refer). For Japan this new and evolving scenario represented a renewed form of *gaiatsu*¹⁵¹, as they used to refer to the external pressure that historically forced the Japanese state to adapt in order to survive or to maintain autonomy from external forces. The Japanese response to the post Cold War and post 9-11 external pressure has been a mix of active contribution, voluntary and proactive change, acts of mere political sympathy, economic diplomacy and hedging strategies. The latter one has been the most significant feature of the Japanese strategy against the peril of being embroiled in military adventures.

¹⁴⁷ Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan*. Pg 125. Op. cit.

¹⁴⁸ Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, “The US-Japan Alliance. Getting Asia Right through 2020” *CSIS Report* February 2007.

¹⁴⁹ Pyle, *Japan Rising*. Op. cit. pg 285-290. As far as economic policy is concerned the post Cold War period begins with the Plaza Accord in 1985 that promoted the revaluation of the yen and marked the end of the Post War export led Japanese developmental model.

¹⁵⁰ Oros, *Normalizing Japan*. Op. cit.

¹⁵¹ On the concept of *gaiatsu*, T. J. Pempel, “Structural Gaiatsu: International Finance and Political Change in Japan” *Comparative Political Studies*, 32; 907. 1999. Leonard J. Schoppa, “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but not Others” *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), p. 353-386. John P. Tuman and Jonathan R. Strand. “The role of mercantilism, humanitarianism, and *gaiatsu* in Japan’s ODA programme” in *Asia International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2006 6(1):61-80; Akitoshi Miyashita, “Gaiatsu and Japan’s Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 4 Dec., 1999, pp. 695-731.

Until recently, Japan managed to avoid entrapment, keeping the numbers of troops abroad with combat duties near zero and avoiding direct military confrontations. However, the progressive integration in the US military apparatus and the enhanced interoperability with US forces can close or reduce drastically the hedging options, above as far as BMD and some relevant “hub bases” are concerned. Together with domestic political factors, namely the role of the DPJ, part of the discord the alliance recently experienced is due to the erosion of the possibility to hedge against entrapment that marked the current Japanese security strategy.

Bibliography.

Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998

Filippo Andreatta, “The Politics of Symmetry. European Integration and Trans Atlantic Relations”. *NATO Fellowship Report*. 1997.

Richard Armitage, and Joseph Nye, “The United States and Japan: advancing toward a mature partnership”, *INSS Special Report*, 11 October 2000.

Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119–150;

Axel Berkofsky, “Japan-North Korea Relations: (Sad) State of Play and (Sad) Prospects” *Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) Asie Vision* 17. June 2009.

Axel Berfkosky, “Japan-North Korea Relations. Bad and Not Getting Better” *ISPI Policy Brief*. N 191 July 2010

J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan” *East West Center Policy Studies* 19. 2005

Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997.

Richard C. Bush, “China Japan Tensions” Foreign Policy Paper. Brooking Institution. June 2009. No. 16

Kent E. Calder, “China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry,” *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March-April 2005).

Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons. Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*. Princeton University Press. Princeton 2008.

Kent E. Calder, *The Pacific Alliance. Reviving US-Japan Relations*. Yale University Press. New Heaven. 2009.

Victor D. Cha, "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 261-291.

Victor D. Cha, "Hate, Power, and Identity in Japan–Korea Security: Towards a Synthetic Material-Ideational Analytical Framework" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2000.

Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring, 1999), pp. 49-80.

Thomas J. Christiansen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks, Predicting Alliances Patterns in Multipolarity", in *International Organization* Vol 44 No. 2 1990.

Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389–412;

Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, William Overholt, *Modernizing China Military. Opportunities and Constraints*. RAND Organization. RAND Air Force Program UA835.M63 2005.

Richard P. Cronin, "The North Korean Security Threat and the US-Japan Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches, and Prospects," in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 29: 1 (Winter 2005),

James Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (1): 68–90. 1997

Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control". *Armed Forces & Society* 1996; 23

David Fouse, "Japan's FY 2005 National Defense Program 2005 Outline: New Concepts, Old Compromises" Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Volume 4 - Number 3, volume 4 - Number 3, March 2005.

Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge" *Foreign Affairs*. September October 2002.

Linus Hagström, "Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism: Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy" *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. No. 7 2008.

Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Reemergence as a Normal Military Power*. Adelphi Paper 368–69. London: Institute for International Strategic Studies. 2004.

Christopher W. Hughes "Japan's Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection", *Asia-Pacific Review*, 16:1, 84 — 99. 2009

Christopher W. Hughes, "Super-Sizing the DPRK Threat Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea" *Asian Survey*. March April 2009.

Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the 'war on terror': incrementalism confirmed or radical leap?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 427–445, December 2004.

Christopher W. Hughes, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan". *Asia Policy Number* No. 3 2007.

Christopher W. Hughes, "Not quite the 'Great Britain of the Far East': Japan's security, the US-Japan alliance and the 'war on terror' in East Asia", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20:2, 325 — 338.

G. John Ikenberry, "American hegemony and East Asian order" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 2004.

G. John Ikenberry, "Power and liberal order: America's postwar world order in transition" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume* 5 (2005).

Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, "Japan's emerging role as a 'global ordinary power'" *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume* 6 (2006) 1–21.

Go Ito, "Leadership in Bandwagon: A Historical Sketch of Japan's Security Policy." *Policy and Society* Vol. 23, no. 1 (2004).

Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996);

Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84–118;

Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World* (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).

George F. Kennan, "Japanese Security and American Policy" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1964.

Robert E. Kelly, "Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt'" *Asian Security* April 2010.

Jennifer Lind, "Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics" Unpublished PhD Thesis Department of Political Science MIT. Cambridge MA. 2004.

Jennifer Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy." *International Security* 29 2004 (1): 92–121.

Michael Mastunduno, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Mike Mochizuki, "Japan Shifting Strategy Toward the Rise of China" *The Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 30, No. 4–5, 739 – 776, August–October 2007.

Mike Mochizuki, "Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy," *Strategic Asia*, vol. 4 (September, 2004).

James Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: an alternative to the capability aggregation model." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(November):904-934. 1991.

James D. Morrow, "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security" *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

Hiroshi Nara. *Shigeru: Last Meiji Man*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 2007.

Joseph Nye, "The Nye report Six Years Later". *International Relations of The Asia Pacific*. Volume 1 2001.

Maaiké Okano-Heijmans, "Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single-Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea" *JapanFocus* October 21, 2008

Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.

T.J. Pempel, "Japan Rethinks Its Security. The US, Asian Regionalism or some kind of mix?" *Kyoto Journal of Law and Politics*. 3 (1).

Jeremy Pressmann, *Warring Friends. Alliances Restraint in International Politics*. Cornell University Press. 2009.

Mitchell B. Reiss, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in Asia," in *Strategic Asia 2005–06*.

Christopher I. Pehrson "String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power across the Asian Littoral". *Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy*. US Army College. June 2006

Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: the resurgence of Japanese power and purpose*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.

Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan's Historic Change of Course" *Current History*. September 2006.

Denny Roy, "Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions," *Survival* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 196–205.

Bruce M. Russett, "An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances" *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1971), pp. 262-289.

Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell University Press 2007.

Richard J. Samuels "New Fighting Power!" Japan's Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security" *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 84–112.

Richard J. Samuels, *Strong Nation, Strong Army. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. Cornell University Press Ithaca 1994.

Giovanni Sartori, "Comparing and Miscomparing", in David Collier and John Garring, *Concept and Methods in Social Science. The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*. Routledge. 2009.

Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976.

David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's military: progress, problems, and prospects*. University of California Press. Los Angeles. 2002

Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36 (4): 1984.

Glenn Snyder, "Process variables in neorealist theory." *Security Studies*, Volume 5, Issue 3 Spring 1996.

Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998)

Yuki Tatsumi, "National Defense Program Outline: A New Security Policy Guideline or a Mere Wish List?" *Japan Watch* 20 December 2004. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000) pp. 178–219;

Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, "The Rise of China Threat Arguments" PhD Dissertation. 2006 Department of Political Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*. London: Heinemann, 1961.

Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990.

Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39. Spring 1997.

Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security* 18. Fall 1993

Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.

Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Concept of a Commitment in International Relations" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), pp. 39-56.

Patricia Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2004.

Robert O. Work, *Sea Basing: All Ahead, Slow* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 2006).