

Governance dynamics in the unemployed issue field: a comparison of Lyon and Turin*

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Abstract

This paper focuses on governance dynamics and processes of democratisation in the field of unemployment. In particular, we take the two cases of Lyon and Turin, which are comparable in terms of economic structure, process of de-industrialisation and long-standing traditions of trade-unionism, so as to deal with a number of linkages across the public and the policy domains. Our main question is: Does the civil society – in its broadest meaning as a set of formal organisations, trade unions and social movements – have full access (formal or informal) to elites and institutions in the policy domain? Drawing upon most recent developments in the governance literature, the specific focus of this paper is on inclusive vertical linkages of political participation that may close the gap between public authorities and civil society organisations. More broadly, our analysis of various dynamics taking place in the field of unemployment allows for the comprehensive understanding of a highly segmented civil society, as it encompasses contentious actors (such as social movements as well as spontaneous committees), pivotal actor for the paix social (trade unions) as well as strategic partners for the delivering of public policies (for example, cooperatives and training schools).

Keywords

Local governance, two-mode networks, democratisation, unemployment

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1. Introduction

It is nowadays common sense that we are living in an interconnected world, where governance has substituted government as the main mode of managing the relationship between public institutions and civil society (OECD 2001) and deal with inter-institutional collective action (Feiok and Scholz 2010). As stated by OECD “in a world where the participation of business and organised civil society is increasingly the norm, the term ‘governance’ better defines the process by which citizens collectively solve their problems and meet society’s needs, using ‘government’ as the instrument” (OECD 2001:11). This is increasingly true for any level of government and for every policy domain (Denters and Rose 2005; Geddes 2005; Glendinning et al., 2002; Jessop 1995). In particular, the importance of the sub-national level has been stressed many times in the governance literature, owing to the partnership approach that has been fostered by European Commission (EC, 2005), the decentralisation processes that have taken place across Europe and the United States (John 2001, Denters, 2005), the prevalent role of new governance tools in urban development and renewal (Vesan and Sparano, 2009), as well as the long-standing agreement on the importance of the sub-national level to achieve citizen empowerment (Mill, 1861: 285). Moving from this broader agreement on the importance of governance arrangements, this article takes the local level and the unemployment issue field as its crucial fundamentals so as to approach a number of definition problems, boundaries and conceptual weaknesses of the governance approach. This latter have dealt with a plurality of aspects, including hierarchical regimes (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009:138), calling for a number of clarifications in the literature (Mayntz 2003, Treib et. al. 2007) as related local modes (or arrangements). By selecting a political field that is not characterised by a full development of local governance arrangements, here we aim to work on the base of a compromise between a general idea of governance as “what is going on in town” and a more specific conceptualisation of it as local governance arrangements (Bassoli, 2010).

The extensive analysis of the two cities of Lyon in France and Turin in Italy is conducted with two main aims. At a first descriptive level, we want to assess the main ingredients of local governance so as to show potential variations across the two cities. Is governance stronger in Lyon or Turin? And beyond the ‘more/less’ question, can we identify specific varieties of governance dynamics across the two cities? What about the relationship between governance and democratisation? Does the former always foster the latter, or alternatively, what are their different relationships across the two cities? At a second explanatory level, we inquire into factors accounting for variations in terms of vertical political participation since this latter is identified as the main dimension of cross-city variation. Hence, can inclusive vertical political participation be explained through the study of actors’ organisational attributes? Perhaps full governance an successful democratisation in the field of unemployment can better develop in contexts with richer, stronger, and more resourceful actors. Or rather, are variations of inclusion and participation more dependent upon the ‘functional’ nature of same actors, for example according to the ‘policy’ or the ‘services’ orientation that is prevalent within the unemployment field? And what about the role of relational structures of civil society within which single organisations are embedded? In a last step, description and explanation are also combined into a more prescriptive effort, with the aim to provide further knowledge on best conditions for an effective unemployment governance at the local level. What

can each city learn from the other so as to reinforce democratisation processes throughout the field?

Empirically, the study of linkages and interactions amongst a wide number of actors at different levels is at the core of this paper. Drawing upon recent works that have given a relational twist to the study of governance (Cinalli 2007a, Dente et al., 1998), here we focus on network dynamics in the unemployment field in the two cities. Following a thorough mapping, we have interviewed 56 organisations. In-depth semi-structured interviews have been conducted with these organisations relying on a strictly comparative schedule. These interviews have included not only qualitative in-depth questions, but also sets of standardised questions regarding political activities and attitudes, networks within and across the public and policy domains, as well as information on actors' structure and resources. We have thus gathered detailed data on attributes and relations that are suitable for use of network analysis, with the aim to give full strength to the relational operationalisations of governance and democratisation at the core of this paper. At the same time, a wide range of secondary sources, such as existing literature, organisations' publications, press articles and official documents from political and institutional authorities, has been used to deepen the analysis of further contextual dimensions.

Section 2 engages with the specific conceptualisations on which this paper is based. We emphasise the distinct contribution of inclusive vertical linkages of participation at the core of virtuous relationship between governance and democratisation. In particular, we argue that the vertical links across the policy domain (of political elites and institutions) and the public domain (of different types of non-governmental organisations and associations) allow for variable resources, attitudes, and participation to spread throughout the field, thus shaping the specific form that local governance may take. Section 3 introduces a large volume of contextual information so as to set up the comparison between the two cities. It also uses scholarly insights from literature of welfare state to understand the shape of unemployment policy field in the two cities. Section 4 presents the main findings, analysing in detail dynamics of networked governance in each city. Here we start with an evaluation of availability of information and their diffusion amongst 'city publics', before assessing the variable extent to which these latter share positive attitudes vis-à-vis the initiatives of policy-makers, and are willing to participate side by side with political elites. Afterwards, section 5 focuses on factors impacting upon the shape of inclusive vertical linkages of political participation. A number of explanatory factors are treated at length, including resources, functional dynamics, as well as relational structures within which actors are embedded, both at the individual and the aggregate level. Finally, section 6 sums up the overall argument and the main empirical results of our research, indicating directions for fostering local governance in our cities.

2. Governance, Networks, and Processes of Democratisation

In recent years, the local level has gained increasing scholarly attention, following the development of governance as a possible non-market solution for tackling social problems that government is unable to address (Mayntz 2003: 2).¹ Scholarship of local governance has often focused on the role of the local level within the EU (Harlow and Rawlings, 2006; Jordan, 2001), while dealing especially with formalised

¹ For a review of the term governance see Treib, Bähr and Falkner (2007).

arrangements such as partnerships² (Elander, 2002, Geddes, 1997), private-public partnership (Osbourne 2000), multi-sectoral partnership (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002), local governance arrangements (Bassoli 2010a; Grote 2008), and networked communities (@@). The role of institutionalisation has been brought at the centre of overall debate, detecting some minimum degree of formalisation behind the coordination of different public authorities through horizontal and/or vertical governance (@@), and the opening of the decision making to other actors, either organised interests in network governance arrangements (@@) or to lay citizens in participatory ones (Bassoli 2010). In its output, governance is considered to be apt to change the role of public actors from authoritative decision-makers to partners of private actors (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote, 2009:138). In its input, governance has to be based on a negotiation system in which public and private actors share mutual resources, trust each other, and engage in agreements that are collectively binding and complied with by all (Börzel and Heard-Lauréote 2009, Mayntz 1998). So conceived, the relationship between governance and democratisation could hardly be stronger, since through governance the private actors of the public domain 1) rely on available resources on an equal footing with the public actors of the policy domain, 2) feel to play a key role side by side with policy-makers, thus enhancing their legitimacy, and 3) can participate in the political process of decision taking.

Hence, we base our analysis on a thicker understanding of governance, assessing the extent to which our 'city publics' in Lyon and Turin (made of non-governmental organisations and other civil society groups that are active in the public domain) 1) share extensive resources in terms of information with policy-makers, 2) trust the policy process and feel their own role to be worth it, and 3) have a crucial weight on final decision. In simpler words, three main elements of governance are placed at the core of our understanding of democratisation, namely, *visibility*, *appreciation*, and *inclusion*. First, as different levels of authority (Europe, the national state, the region, as well as the local level of Lyon and Turin with their own departments) need to be visible to city publics, essential here is the performance in terms of diffusion and flow of information across different levels. Our first dimension of analysis thus refers to variable presence of information across the public and the policy domains, both at the local level and at other levels beyond that. Second, the degree to which city publics appreciate the role they themselves play for the functioning of governance is also important. Our second dimension thus analyse whether city publics feel that their own contribution matters, both at the local level of policy-making and at other levels beyond that. Lastly, fully democratised governance has to be inclusive of its publics, increasing accessibility of policy decision-making via direct participation through governance channels. Our third dimension thus focuses especially on the local level, so as to assess democratic performance of the local governance system, that is, the degree to which city publics have full access to local decision-making processes.

² Partnership is a key concept for governance, although it has been used in quite different ways. So for example for the European Commission partnership "implies close cooperation between the Commission, the authorities at national, regional and local level in the Member States and other governmental and nongovernmental organisations and bodies during the different stages of the implementation cycle of the Structural Funds" (European Commission, 2005:3). Meanwhile Ingemar Elander (2002) considers the term closed to those dealing with policy networks, with a few specificities (in Great Britain). Firstly it is ideologically loaded by the normative stress of considering it as a goal, rather than a tool, secondly it is "tied up with the Thatcherite strategy of stripping the local authorities of their power" (Elander, 2002: 192).

Following a number of scholarly contributions (@@), we take networks as a crucial feature of local governance. In particular, we consider the local level to be the best locus for networked governance (Marcussen and Torfing, 2003), since it is characterised by the presence of a large volume of heterogeneous actors in the public domain, territorial embeddedness, and ‘powerful subjects of political guidance’ (Grote, 2008: 10). Our quest for specific network dynamics taking in place in Lyon and Turin could hardly be more challenging, as the local level is always characterized by the presence of a political authority which may or may not enter in formal local governance arrangement (LGA), which may or may not endure an informal policy network, which may or may not share its prerogatives in terms of policy making process. We thus draw upon the concept of local governance arrangements in different fields (Bassoli and Polizzi, 2010), focusing on linkages across the public and the policy domain so as to understand the differential strength and the actual relational structures within which civil society, and its potential policy contribution, are placed. In so doing, we also readdress some ambiguities of the network conceptualisation of governance (Rhodes 1996 and 1997; Marsh and Smith 2001), as it has simply been used as a heuristic device rather than as an efficient instrument to analyse modes of governance (Christopoluos, 2008).

Methodologically, we rely on network analysis (for a broader debate see Christopoulos, 2008; Dowding, 2001; Marsh and Smith, 2000; 2001; Parker, 2007; Raab, 2001) so as to treat systematically our data about actors’ interactions within the field of unemployment in Lyon and Turin. In fact, we also show that network analysis is essential to measure a number of aspects of governance, shedding light on the variety of actors and their stakes in any political field as well as on their differential access to policy making (Cinalli 2007a, Berardo and Scholz, xxx; Feiock and Scholz, xxx; Rodriguez, 2010). Inclusion is indeed about the degree of this access, which network analysis can measure owing to its focus on actors’ relations rather than on actors’ attributes. Following previous work that systematically treat the unemployment field in relational terms (Cinalli and Fuglister 2008), here we see ties of information, attitudes, and participation as connecting pairs of actors into the broader relational system that constitutes the two unemployment fields under study. Since borders of these fields could reasonably be seized, we conceive each unemployment field in Lyon and Turin in terms of networks of ties amongst units: that is, as a set of nodes maintained by actors who, through their mutual interactions, shape the overall space within which they are rooted. Throughout our analyses, each actor is thus seen as a centre point from which lines radiate to other actors (that is, other actors with whom interactions are established). Causal impact travels in both directions: the overall relational structures emerge from the combination of actors’ choices, but it then impacts upon the actors themselves. In simpler words, one of our major hypothesis is that flow of information, type of attitudes, and degree of vertical participation of each actor in the public domain is somewhat constrained within the specific position that the same actor occupies within the broader relational structure, checking for potential impact of networks amongst civil society organisations upon their vertical exchanges with policy-makers.

Of course, we also have alternative hypotheses when moving on to explain network patterns in Lyon and Turin, since networks themselves may emerge out of available ‘resources’ and ‘opportunities’ at a given time and in a given space (Diani 1995,

Diani @@, Cinalli 2003). Accordingly, we evaluate shape of networks by drawing on theories of ‘resource mobilization’ (Obershall 1973, McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Zald and McCarthy 1987) and ‘political opportunity structure’ (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1994, Kriesi et al. 1995) as developed within the scholarly literature on collective behaviour. As regards ‘resources’, the consideration of material and instrumental criteria may offer valuable insights into the formation of networks across the two cities. More specifically, we want to analyse whether linkages have mainly been forged on the base of internal structuring of organisations, length of their presence in the field, their degree of formalisation in terms of internal governance (@@), their ownership of expensive assets such as office spaces (@@), and/or again functional dynamics based on their specific interest in policies or services (Lelieveldt et al. 2007, Torpe and Ferrer-Fons 2007). As regards ‘opportunities’, the cross-national dimension of our study significantly increases the potential explanatory role of different national ‘welfare regimes’ (Giugni et al. 2009, Cinalli and Giugni 2010) within which the unemployed field is situated, showing the impact of unemployment regulations upon participation of city publics. Indeed, it is now the time to move on to tackle the main political reforms and arrangements of the unemployment field in Lyon and Turin in order to start their systematic comparison throughout this paper.

3. The Unemployment Field in Lyon and Turin

Lyon and Turin stand out as key industrialized cities that have been experiencing similar unemployment problems over the past twenty years, in particular with respect to the young population. Lyon and Turin can also benefit from developments of French and Italian political frameworks that provide similar opportunities for policy-making to take place at the local level. That is, both countries have gone through a genuine policy of decentralisation over the last two decades. In France this process has culminated with the Constitutional Law of March 28, 2003. The text recognizes irreversibly the role of local authorities by including in its Article I the principle that “the organization of the Republic is decentralized”. A number of most recent law have confirmed the tendency to enlarge scope of city intervention. For example, the Law of February 27, 2002 on local democracy establishes that local authorities and departments may participate in the financing of subsidies to enterprises, while the Law of August 13, 2004 establishes that municipalities may exercise responsibilities for the policy reversal of the unhealthiness in the habitat. In a similar fashion, the territorial allocation of powers in Italy has gone through a significant degree of decentralisation. Before 1993, very limited budgetary autonomy was guaranteed to the municipalities, whereas the introduction of the *Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili* (ICI), a municipal tax on real estate, has offered more opportunities for the formulation and implementation of more independent local policies. In fact, a recent Constitutional Law (Law 3/2001) and an even more recent law (Law 42/2009) – have granted further responsibilities to local authorities in terms of policy formulation and implementation.

Beyond these initial similarities, however, the two cities have been selected owing to the fact that their common tradition of strong social fabric made of civil society associations, trade unions and political parties has been faced with a different development of policies and legal reforms over unemployment. Even a quick overview of welfare literature is sufficient to show that scholars have identified growing divergence between France and Italy, in spite of their common roots into ‘corporatism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). In general, the Italian model of welfare state

has handed over to the family the most delicate position as a crucial agent of social protection (Ferrera, 1996), while the French state has preferred to intervene extensively over welfare in an attempt to reach a virtuous balance between ‘corporatism’ and ‘universalisms’. Looking more specifically at unemployment, both countries have engaged in a number of reforms that have targeted the labour market to ‘loosen’ up the employment protection legislation (OECD online labour market programmes database), but specific policies dealing with unemployment and social inclusion have been developed more extensively in France than in Italy. In this latter country, little intervention has been produced even for the young unemployed, who have joined the labour force either as ‘atypical’ workers or as ‘standard’ workers (especially for non qualified jobs). By contrast, French unemployment protection has changed considerably over the last years. Not only were unemployment benefits quite radically restructured, but there was also a more significant shift with respect to the instruments of unemployment protection, seen in an increasing emphasis on ‘active’ measures for labour market integration and reintegration relative to the ‘passive’ provision of income maintenance.

In particular, the French unemployment protection system can rely not only on the ‘corporatist’ *régime d’assurance* (financed and managed by the social partners), but also on the ‘universalist’ *régime de solidarité* (financed and managed by the state). High unemployment rates amongst the youth have brought about large scale interventions by the state in the labor market and by 2005, more than one million young people were participating in a state-funded labor insertion program. With nearly 40 percent of all enrollees in state employment programs under 26, it is not an exaggeration to say that the problem of unemployment in France is largely a youth problem, at least from the standpoint of public policy. Insertion schemes initiated by successive governments in recent years can be placed into one of three categories. The first and largest category consists of policies designed to improve access to the private sector jobs, for example the *Contrats Jeune en entreprise*, which at times alternate between work experience and training. The Social Cohesion Act of January 2005 established the *contrat de professionnalisation*, which combines training for qualification with work experience in a company that receives, in turn, an exemption from state social security contributions up to the equivalent of the minimum wage. The second type of insertion policies emphasises the insertion of young people into jobs that are perceived to have a socially beneficial function. For example, the *Nouveaux services emplois jeunes programme*, which lasted from 1997 until 2002, sought to place young workers under 26 in long-term (five years) employment in such areas as social mediation, the environment, and personal services. Lastly, the third group of measures is aimed at providing assistance for young people facing particularly challenging employment situations, such as those who come from disadvantaged family conditions or have no qualifications at all, for example, the *Trajectoire d’Accès à l’Emploi* and the *Contrat d’insertion dans la vie sociale*. Overall, it can therefore be noticed the complex position of French unemployment approach vis-à-vis most recent ‘supply’ trends in EU unemployment policy-making. While some schemes do have activation elements, others rely on more traditional measures designed to increasing demand, often in sectors that are considered to be underdeveloped.

Differences between Lyon and Turin in the field of unemployment do not stop with the consideration of opposite national approaches. Looking more specifically at the

local level, evidence show that Italian municipalities have very low competencies in the formulation and the implementation of unemployment policy measures, their only focus being social assistance. By contrast, a process of “territorialisation” has been taken place in France in recent years, up to the point that discussion today refers to the local management of unemployment. Local authorities foster and support more and more projects of job carried by local actors. Since 2003, there is also a right to experiment defined by the decentralisation law, that allows local authorities to derogate to national arrangements if they wish, especially in social and economic domains. In this context, the competencies of the city concern primarily actions of proximity. However, they have recently been extended to the economic and social fields, where they were traditionally limited to financial aid to companies creating jobs and to various helps to families in need.

Differences between the two cities are also noticeable in terms of public information and support services for the unemployed. Turin stands out, once again, for its limited scope of intervention. A dedicated office for issues of employment and unemployment does exist (*Centro Lavoro Torino*), but public information and services are overall limited, with the only exception of support that is provided at the local level in terms of vocational training services. By contrast, Lyon has set up several priorities to promote employment and training, facilitating the efforts of job seekers, employees and entrepreneurs, implementing a ‘Local Plan for Integration and Employment’ in support of institutions which accommodate and assist the unemployed, guaranteeing that all actions in the field of unemployment comply the principle of equal treatment (*égalité des chances*), as well as expanding the implementation of inserting clauses (*clauses d’insertion*) to make effective the actual link between urban development and employment. Alongside with institutional partners and associations, the city of Lyon also set up in 2008 the *Maison de l’Emploi et de la Formation*. This latter aims at making an active stand in terms of employment and development in order to coordinate interventions related to employment, social integration, and training. It informs people looking for a job, it helps employers in their recruitments, it develops entrepreneurship, and it has established a job observatory (*Observatoire de l’Emploi*), gathering economic and social data from various actors in the field.

Most crucially, it is important to consider cross-city differences in terms of inclusion of civil society for the implementation of unemployment policies. Turin confirms its restrictive stance in terms of political opportunities, since the role played by local civil society actors is very limited with respect to the implementation of (very limited) policies. Lyon confirms its openness in terms of inclusive arrangements that guarantee access points across the public and the policy domain. The city established the *Plateforme pour l’Emploi* at the end of 2003 with the objective to encourage employment through mediation between active job seekers and companies. This is aimed to to reinforce cooperation between institutions, agencies, and other actors, thus improving the employability of people in social difficulties. A charter of engagement has been elaborated by the local administration, which has then been signed by business companies involved in the *Plateforme*. A map of actors active in employment policies and integration in Lyon has also been produced, accounting for over 200 private and public structures whose purpose is employment and employability in Lyon. Similarly, the action of the *Maison de l’Emploi et de la Formation* has been shaped on the objectives of the 2005 *loi de programmation pour la cohésion sociale*, so as to ensure

a stronger partnership of actors in the public sector side by side with representatives of civil society through regular interaction with with hundreds of associations in the broader Lyon urban area.³

In the case of Lyon, access of civil society to the policy domain is also based on top-down initiatives that foster grassroots democratisation. Thus, the *Conseils de Quartier* stands out as a new tool of consultation for local democracy, following the 2002 national law on ‘local democracy’ (*démocratie de proximité*) There are currently 34 *conseils de quartier* in Lyon: they are conceived as a forum of information and a public consultation at the local level. Any person residing or working in the city can participate to these councils. The *conseils de quartier* are also open to participation of associations, institutional representatives, and economic groups. At the same time, other bodies work to open up access points across the public and the policy domain. Thus, the *Conseil Municipal des Jeunes de la Ville* aims is to provide young people with a voice and to raise awareness for a collective approach and involvement in terms of citizenship in the city. The *Conseil des Résidents Etrangers Lyonnais* is a place of reflection and proposals enabling foreign populations living in Lyon to contribute to the daily life of the city. The *Commissions Extra-Municipales* bring together local politicians and representatives of the population, designated according to their fame, qualifications or professional capability. They deal with a large volume of issues, including early childhood, accessibility for the disabled, as well as social behaviour, family, and education. The *Commission Extra-Municipale d’Accessibilité* brings together groups of disabled, institutional partners, elected officials and experts, with a total number of over a hundred. Lastly, the *Comité d’Initiative et de Consultation d’Arrondissement* aims at promoting the participation of associations. In its quality of consultation tool, it is also a place of involvement and sharing of work experience for local associations. Meetings are public, though only associations registered may participate to the debate.

4. Network governance in Lyon and Turin

As said, our findings refer to variable presence of information, positive attitudes, and vertical political participation in the field of unemployment across the two cities of Lyon and Turin. Our data include systematic information on 21 organisations in Lyon and 35 organisations in Turin. A simple look at these actors is already sufficient to notice the different shape of the unemployment field in the two cities. While in Turin, we do find a more segmented civil society, made of antagonistic actors (such as social movements as well as spontaneous committees), pivotal actor for the *paix social* (trade unions) and strategic partners to deliver public policies (cooperatives and training schools), in Lyon the unemployment field stands out for its higher homogeneity and the prevalent presence of associations.

Network analysis is valuable to move beyond beyond a simple overview of organisations in the field. In particular, direct sociometric data about actors’ interactions have been collected in a direct case-by-case form, with information being organised in adjacent matrixes. In what follows, not only do we handle relational data in matrix form, but we also make recourse to visual graphs to provide useful snapshots of nodes and intersecting lines. Starting with some more general information about co-operation and disagreement in the field, we can notice that

³ <http://www.mdef-lyon.fr/spip.php?page=domaine>.

network patterns, albeit forged different constellations of actors, are quite similar, at least in terms of degree of projects’ sharing, exchanges of information, overlapping members, and extent of disagreement (Tab. 4.1).

(Table 4.1 about here)

However, major differences emerge immediately when inquiring the field through our relational conceptualisation of governance rooted into the three dimensions of information, appreciation, and participation. Taken together, these dimensions allow for evaluating governance as an inclusive procedure (who participate and why?) but also as a form of exclusion (who are left out?) (Polizzi, 2010). Here we use network analysis, and in particular the ‘two-mode approach’, to analyse flow of information, direction of attitudes, and degree of participation at the cross-road between the public and the policy domain in an attempt to address the analysis from a bottom-up perspective.

As regards, the first network, it is composed of different attitudes towards the public authorities, or by the different perception of having an open access to it (Bassoli e Baglioni, 2009). The organisations could express their position for specific level of government using five possible answers⁴: 0) our organisation doesn’t seek any contact with the public authorities; 1) the public authorities hardly listen to our organisation although our organisation does try to influence them; 2) the public authorities sometimes receives our organisation with hostility and other times is welcoming it; 3) the public authorities is friendly to our organisation, but our organisation initiates most of the contact; 4) the public authorities frequently seeks the advice of our organisation. For sake of clarity we considered answers ‘1’ as totally negative (expressing the concept of political exclusion), answers ‘1’ and ‘2’ as negative attitude and answers ‘3’ and ‘4’ as expressions of a positive attitude towards the specific level of government. In order to fully grasp the political attitude of interviewed organisations, we considered these answers as hints of permanent collaboration between public institutions and civil society. We considered the possible answers as part of a rank ranging from indifference (value equals to zero) to positive attitude and self-perception of political efficacy (value equals to four). Thanks to this strategy we have been able to create theoretical valued ties (from 0 to 4) between each organisation and every single level of government. Thus it was possible to draw the two-mode network of the relationship between organisation and public institutions. Most important when all the answers are take into consideration (aggregation by level) an index of the willingness of being politically involved is built. This question has been address to all civil society organisations, with the only exclusion of political parties, for five different level of government (International, European, National, Regional and Local) thus creating two matrices of 19 times 5 (for Lyon) and 26 by 5 (for Turin).

As regards the flow of information, we gathered data on whether the association has been receiving information by any specific level of government (European, national, regional, or local)⁵. This question is valuable to produce two matrices analogous to

⁴ “Which SINGLE statement best characterises the relationship your organisation has developed with different levels of government over the last three years?”.

⁵ “Regardless of whether you ever get invitations to participate in decision-making processes, does your organisation receive official information concerning the decision-making processes on questions

those already described. The second assessed if the organisation had been called to participate and/or actually participation in policy making body at the local level⁶. Indeed, the first finding was that all organisations that have been called to participate in such processes did lately participate. There were four possible loci of participation: “as a permanent member of the district or neighbourhood council”, “as a permanent member of a municipal council on specific issues (social services, women, education, etc.)”, “as an occasional member in a municipal committee to solve a specific problem” and “as member of “a municipal consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue”.

As regards the result, a comparative density graph is used to synthesise findings for these different networks (Fig. 4.1). The data clearly suggest a difference between Turin and Lyon:

- given the same average interest of having a relationship with political institutions (willingness to be involved by different level of governments) (density 0,5), Lyon has a rather small feeling of exclusion (answers 1) while Turin as a much larger. When considering both negative answers the situation worse-off for Turin, whose network density increase over 0,2;
- complimentary, Lyon network of positive attitude is much denser than the Turin one;
- similarly, when considering the reception of information, Lyon has a density similar to the one of governance interest, while Turin is much lower, even lower than the positive link network;
- finally, a totally different picture is given by actual participation at the local level decision making, Turin organisations are much more involved than the *Lyonese* ones.

Hence, there seems to be a paradox in the two cities presented. Lyon seems to have a positive attitude towards any kind of level, with a correspondent flow of incoming information, but it is then characterised by a low degree of inclusive vertical linkages of political participation. By contrast, Turin seems to have much more problems with political relationships, as well as with flow of information, but organisations of the public domain are more much more included in terms of political participation (the density is double those of Lyon).

(Fig. 4.1 about here)

Richness of network data is best understood in the graphical outfit. For this reason, we move on to present a series of different figures made of nodes and ties. In the first six pictures, the first question is presented in its different parts: overall interest in the political sphere (Fig. 4.2), negative attitude (Fig. 4.3) and positive attitude (Fig. 4.4). As far as concerns the political interest (Fig. 4.2) the data tells that organisations in Lyon and Turin do not seek contacts with higher levels of government (international, European and national) but tend to focus more on the local level⁷. This is explained, at

relevant for your organisation from any of these authorities?”.

⁶ “In the last 2 years, has your organisation been called to participate in decision-making processes in any of the following ways? [Interviewer: Only when interviewee mentions one, ask] Did your organisation finally participate?”

⁷ In Italy and France there are two local levels of government: *Provincia / Département* and *Municipality*.

least in part, by the fact that we are focusing primarily on local organisations, that is either local branches of peak organisations (such as trade unions) or locally founded and locally active associations (informal groups and local organisations). That is, the closer the level of government, the easier is to have a direct access to it. This is particularly true in Italy, where access to local political arenas, and consequent possibility to intervene in the local policy making on unemployment, depend on informal, interpersonal relations based on trust (Ranci 1999, Ranci and Montagnini 2009). Such trust relationships are more efficaciously established at local level where basically everyone knows everyone.

The first diagram (Fig. 4.2) contains different information: the link between actors (the actors are arranged by the number of positive answers they gave), the type of organisation (in the acronym A for associations, S for informal groups/social movements, T for trade unions, C for cooperatives and F for foundations), its aim (using different shape⁸) and their negativity towards political level (the bigger the symbol, the more answers of type 1 and 2 they gave). The first two pieces of information are crucial, since they are kept through-out the first set of figures. The arrangement is quite peculiar: on the left hand-side (top of the graph) there are those organisation without link (isolates) of any kind (thus the International level for Lyon and a S01 social movement for Turin); on the right hand-side the are those without positive linked followed clock-wise by those with one positive link (bottom on the right), then there are those with two (bottom part), continuing clock-wise there are those with three links on the left to conclude with those able to establish four positive link (out of a theoretical maximum of five).

(Fig. 4.2 about here)

Clearly the two cities are different. The city of Turin is characterized by a number of organisations policy oriented (with a circle shape) while only few of them can be observed in Lyon. As regard the structural features, it is clear that on average Turin node size are bigger (more negative attitude) and these nodes are as concentrated as in Lyon in the top right-hand part of the figure. This group with negative attitudes is much bigger in Turin as compared to Lyon (as shown more clearly by figure 3.4), thus association in Lyon have more links when it comes to positive attitudes. Even discounting this effect, organisations in Lyon have more positive link per-capita as it is clear in figure 4.3 where not only it is possible to spot the ‘new isolated’ actors on the top right-hand side of the graph, but the grouping of four and three links in Lyon are much more numerous than those in Turin.

(Fig. 4.3 about here)

There seems to be a correlation between being policy-oriented (circle) and having a negative feeling: in the two graphs, out of 17 policy-oriented organisations, only 8 do not have a negative link. Moreover there is a distinction between organisation with only negative links (the one in the right-hand top corner) and the others: indeed the former are characterised in Turin by their legal status of trade-unions and SMOs.

⁸ Square nodes indicate those associations which are service-oriented round nodes those who are policy-oriented, while up-triangles those which are a mixture of the two or whose orientation could not be assessed.

(Fig. 4.4 about here)

This first attitude, however, does not influence the other networks straight-away in both cities. So for example the three France associations with only negative perceptions (a01, a04, a08) do receive informations (all three of them) and actually participate in the local decision making process (a01 and a04). On the contrary the associations which have only negative attitude in Italy do not receive information (five out of eight) and do not participate (the same five). When considering the second network by itself the information we possessed about the density appears clearly in the number of isolated in the left-hand side of the pictures (Fig. 4.5) and the number of incoming ties received by the political level in the French case as compared to the Italian one. The network has been graphed so to have the actors grouped for homogeneous behaviour (number of ties and their directions): so for example all organisations on the left of the political level in Lyon are those with four information flows by political level (all but the district). In this case the shape provides information about the office used by the association (circle for owned, triangle for rented, square for hosted and diamond for illegally occupied), while bigger nodes are those organisations which are formally enrolled in a public register. Clearly the two cities are rather different also when considering these variables: relatively speaking, more associations own the office in Lyon and rent it in Turin, as more organisations are not registered in Italy (34,6%) than in France (26,3%). More importantly while the absence of this variable is not relevant in France to receive information, in Turin graph the vast majority of small nodes are isolates. Finally, as regards political levels, while the National level play a major role in Lyon (and the district is absent), the opposite holds for Turin.

(Fig. 4.5 about here)

The final dataset concerns the actual participation in formal decision-making mechanism set up at the local level: neighbourhood councils, municipal committees, municipal consultations and municipal council on specific issues (Fig. 4.6). Since being registered seemed important in the previous section, we kept this information in the shape of the nodes (square for being registered), while we opted to size the nodes according to the level of internal articulation⁹. As already mentioned before the *Lyonese* level of participation is much lower than the one in Turin, however while in Lyon only a few actors are active on more loci, in Turin this seems to be the norm. Therefore the high number of isolates in the case of Lyon, as expected by the low density, is almost matched by those in Turin. It seems quite clear that the participation is a game played only by a rather small number of actors in both cities, with some differences. While in Lyon the size and the shape of the nodes do not seem important, in Turin participation seems correlated both with 'being registered' (square) and the level of internal articulation (size).

(Fig. 4.6 about here)

There seems to be no correlation between the previous two dataset and this latter one. Indeed the city of Lyon, which is characterised by an high level of 'trust' in the

⁹ The minimum articulation is given by organisation with only an assembly (score 1), while the higher level is given by those organisation with: a board, a leader / president, a chair person, a secretary, a spokesperson, a treasurer, a general assembly, committees (score 8).

political system (measured by the perception of political inclusion) strengthened by a wide flow of information by all levels of government (with the exception of the district), has a rather small political activity in the local decision-making (Fig. 4.6). On the contrary the case of Turin is characterised by a low level of positive attitude, a high level of negative feeling (exclusion?), a rather weak information network and a dichotomised network (active and non active) organisations in the local decision-making processes. It is now time to move on to explain the reasons for such a counter-intuitive dynamic.

5. Explaining networked governance in Lyon and Turin

Different reasons may explain the difference degree of participation at the local decision-making. This section will provide a brief discussion and analysis of the main ones. However, since political participation at individual level a topic still to be settled (Balch, 1974; Raniolo, 2007), here we just aim to highlight a few possible explanations that work at the local level, at least in our two cities.

The lack of correlation between the previous 'attitude' dataset and the 'participation' dataset, as well as those between the 'information' dataset and 'the participation', have to be considered under the light of the statistical procedure adopted. First of all for a network to 'predict' a second network a major condition is given: the number of actors (as well as their identity) has to be kept constant (xxx). However this statistical requirement goes against the common sense and the research strategy: the importance of information flows from high level of government is of crucial importance in France (while it is not in Italy) (as it is clearly show in Fig. 3.5), as the overall attitude of the civil society actors have to be consider since the field is deeply structured by the European directive, the national legislation and the regional intervention. At the same time, we must admit that the attitude (as well as the information) on the local level has a different salience for local activation, since it is possible to hypothesise associations well embedded in sovra-local network, without local involvement or awareness. How to balance the two side?

It is also important to highlight the striking differences already pointed out in the previous section about the different importance played by the local level in the two cities. While in both cities local level is considered an important level (line two Tab. 5.1), in Turin every single actor (but not one) took it into consideration the city as possible partner and tried, at least, to influence it (answer 1). While in both cities the positive ties towards local level is the vast majority, the negative ties in Turin double those in Lyon. Lastly, information flows, that seem impressively higher in Lyon as compared to Turin, decrease the ratio when they are taken at the local level, where flow is denser in Turin than in Lyon.

(Table 5.1 about here)

Is thus reasonable to consider the network at the local level, as possible predictor of local participation? Not so straight forward, some caveats have still to be singled out, since the same statistical problems faced before are present when comparing a vector (as the local information network, with a matrix as the actual participation one). Instead of using regressions to force a result out of the data (collapsing the matrix into a vector), we opted for a more soft analyse based on the resource based theory of participation, at the node level (or individual level).

We have taken into consideration single variable that could be positive correlated to the political participation at the local level, checking them one after the other 'in isolation', later we tried to build a model with available variables. In this way we tried to explain the behaviour of the single organisation (participate or not participate), using both individual and relational variable, as crucial factor of prediction. Those variable were measure for:

- different level of resources (budget, recruited staff, office ownership);
- different kind of formalization (level of internal articulation, being registered);
- different aim (policy oriented organisations, service oriented ones, public programme running);
- different societal importance (level of centrality in the local field of unemployment, as perceived by the interviewed organisation¹⁰ or by others¹¹);
- different level of activity (only local, local and national, only national);
- different level of inflow information (as a proxy of political importance or visibility by the public authorities);
- more positive attitude towards the system (centrality in the attitude network of question three and four);
- different opportunities structure present in Turin as compared to Lyon.

When considered one stime, the single variables are not able to explain the variance in the actual participation (thus the participation itself). There are only five exceptions (Tab. 5.2)

- those who have a positive attitude in Turin and receive more information, also participate more at the local level (statistically significant), while the same does not hold in Lyon,
- the same holds for the information flow received specifically by the local level and by the Regional and local level only for Turin,
- those who are active also at the national level avoid participation at the local level in Lyon;
- those who are not associations are more involved in Lyon.

(Table 5.2 about here)

While the first four pieces of information gives us important insight on the role of positive attitude in and the importance of information in the two cities, the latter two variables on Lyon can be read either as trivial or important indicators. As regards the legal form, since the only two organisations out of 19 that are not associations are politically active at the local level this could be nothing but sheer luck, at the same time it could be read as an important indicator of 'occupation' of the field. Indeed while the Turin field is contested and segmented by the legal form of the organisation, the Lyon one looks deeply occupied by associations. Thus other kind of organisations (such as trade-union and foundation), once they enter the domain, are also able to exploit all the possible governance tools. The second 'trivial' variable is the one on the

¹⁰ The measure was the out-degree centrality, thus the number of perceived partner an organisation have.

¹¹ The measure was the in-degree centrality, that is a measure of popularity, since it counts the number of time an organisation is mentioned as partner by other actors.

level of activity, again only 3 organisations are active at both level, thus the fact that two of them are politically excluded could be easily discharged.

As regards the indications provided by the first variables, they are much more reliable since they insist on division that are more even in the population analysed, although they are less able to explain all the variance (R-Square) of the participation. Clearly the organisations that are more central in the first two networks are also those more active in the local participatory tools. However the relation is not subject to degree but rather to dichotomy. Rather than "the more your attitudes are positive (or the more information you get) the more likely you are to participate", the story goes like "if you have positive attitude – thus you are not one of the excluded (and you receive information), you will have a chance to participate". Even though the statistic presented in Table 5.2 is not able to clearly point out this result. It can be easily spotted in the following figure (Fig. 5.1), where nodes are shaped according to the different values of degree centrality. Clearly while the differences between squares, up-triangles and down-triangles (i.e. different level of inflow information), circles (those which are not informed) are clearly isolated.

(Fig. 5.1 about here)

Some more interesting insights can be grasped when controlling simultaneously for different variables. This can be easily understood, since the fact the different associations (that participate in the decision making) may have opted for different strategies. Some may have invested more in the structure (as expected), some may be more skilled (years of the presence in the city), some may be more interested in the policy framing while other in the actual provision service, and so on and so forth. Therefore the best way, in network analysis, to assess the importance of a variable while controlling for the other is the OLS model via permutation¹². Indeed the permutation algorithm (Borgatti et al., 2002) we used is able to prove the significant difference in the model of the participation of the two cities.

While in Lyon the most recent associations, involved only at the local level, owning an office are those who participate more, in Turin the oldest, which provide services or alternatively are trade-unions, participate more. In both models two variable are important to give significance to the overall model (as it is typical in permutation test) although sometimes they are not significant on their own.

(Table 5.3 about here)

Here introducing discussion about different workings of resources and relational variables because of the different contexts of POS.

6. Conclusions

To be tackled on the base of feedback from the floor.

¹² However to run OLS regression in networks have different requirements. Since the output is more sensitive (than a standard OLS model) to different scales, as different order within the vectors. The results presented in the following pages have to be taken cautiously also because the number of permutation was kept low in order to test different possibilities.

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