

How Far Does the European Union Influence Turkey's Energy Sector Reform?

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Italian Political Science
Association Twenty-fourth
Annual Conference
Panel Session 8.6
'Market, security or waste?
Energy and international
relations'
Venice, Italy
16-18 September 2010

Draft. Work in progress.
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Abstract

How far does the European Union (EU) influence domestic energy reform in Turkey? Does it all depend on EU programmes and membership conditionality? This article investigates the conditions under which EU rules-based energy reforms are taken on in the target country. It builds on a comparative study of the three subfields within EU energy cooperation (sustainability, competitiveness and security) with Turkey (1995-2010) to argue that the more strongly EC energy principles are coded in the *acquis*, the more these rules are institutionalised in transnational networks and are internationalised, the more rule adoption is facilitated at domestic level. Interestingly, however, key domestic factors (the necessity to cope with country-specific energy problems, the willingness and state capacity to formulate and adopt reform) ultimately constrain the occurrence and extent of sub-sector reform. Regulatory harmonisation takes the shape of a rather selective but progressive alignment with the *acquis*. EC energy sustainability principles and rules consistently hit in Turkey. Zooming out, this article substantiates the thesis of EU energy cooperation with Turkey as a three-fold, differentiated and domestically-driven process of expanding sectoral integration.

Keywords: external diffusion, external governance, Europeanization, European energy policy, Turkey's energy policy, Turkish accession process, Euro-Mediterranean relations

1. Introduction

Differently from traditional state actors and superpowers, the European Union (EU) has developed towards a unique political system and emerged as a distinctive transformative power in the international system. Exporting its own ideas, rules and institutions is what the Union has been doing since the Treaties of Rome and Paris were signed. From an internal perspective, the domestic impact of the EU has been largely researched by scholars of Europeanization (Börzel and Risse 2000, Cowles et al. 2001; Héritier et al. 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Dimitrova 2004; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Graziano and Vink 2006). From an external perspective, the question of how EU ideas, norms and rules travel beyond EU borders has engendered various academic debates and studies based on analytical concepts such as external governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Lavenex 2004/2008; Barbé et al. 2009; Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Freyburg et al. 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Youngs 2009) norm and idea diffusion (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Strang and Meyer 1993; Jeeperson et al. 1996; Strang and Soule 1998; Simmons et al. 2006; Börzel and Risse 2009), and even external Europeanization (Olsen 2002; Lavenex and Ucarer 2004; Escribano 2006; Schimmelfennig 2007; Börzel 2010).

In seeking to change ‘others’, the European Union has ultimately constructed a distinct foreign policy identity as well as its own instruments (Manners 2002; Manners and Whitman 2003; Diez 2005). By employing institutionalised patterns of dialogue and bilateral/multilateral cooperation schemes with third countries, the EU seeks to promote of its rules, ideas and institutions abroad. In that, the Union fosters the approximation to the *acquis communautaire* and widely promotes market-based reforms, regional integration and democracy – while seeking to avoid the costs of possible political and economic instability (i.e. in the neighbourhood) and to gain/maintain the access to foreign markets. As a result of this, the Union has developed a network of external relations which establish cooperation in various policy sectors falling under its legislative competence.

In this context, European energy policy emerges as a problematic case. The first developments at EU level dates back to early and mid-nineties, when energy emerged as global problem requiring supranational coordination. Given the silence of the Treaties as well as the opposition of EU member states to any major developments in this field, the Commission forged a *modus operandi* in order to lock energy issues ‘in’

overlapping policy areas falling under its legislative competence (Matlary 1995, Renner 2009; Jegen 2009). This made the inclusion of the energy sector into the Single Market agenda a reality. Similarly, the Commission reframed energy issues under environmental and external relations policies. For a decade and a half the Commission hence fostered the creation of a body of EU energy legislation by means of constantly exploiting its formal and informal powers. In the meanwhile, the Commission projected internal activities in the energy field to its external relations –particularly to its relations with producer and transit countries in the Middle East, North Africa, the Gulf and the Eastern neighbourhood (including Russia). In 2006 the Commission’s Green Paper set out a three-fold strategy to build up a common energy policy, which identified three main objectives for both the internal and external activities – energy sustainability, competitiveness and security (European Commission 2006). Only very recently the Lisbon Treaty established the entry of energy among the shared competences between the Union and its member states (see Zapater 2009). At the end of the day, the competences of the Commission are still limited, intra-EU energy integration is slowly progressing and the EU does not speak with one voice in its external energy relations. Nevertheless, an EC energy regulatory framework does exist thus providing the templates for the Commission’s external activities in the energy field.

While the Union devotes ever-growing effort and resources to promote EU rules-based energy governance reform in candidate countries as well as other third countries, little is known on how to bring about a good return on this investment. This article aims to fill this void by investigating how far the European Union (EU) influences energy sector reform in Turkey through the accession process as well as regional cooperation. To do so, this article will build on a comparative study of the three subfields within EU energy cooperation (sustainability, competitiveness and security) with Turkey in the time frame stretching from 1995 to 2010. In details, this article will scrutinize the *conditions* under which EU rules-based energy reforms are taken on in the target countries. It will substantiate the thesis of the domestically-driven nature of EU reformative power on the Turkey’s energy sector. On the one hand, it will be shown that the more strongly EC energy principles are coded in the *acquis*, the more these rules are institutionalised in transnational networks and are internationalised, the more their adoption is facilitated at domestic level. On the other hand, it will be argued that key domestic factors (the willingness and state capacity to formulate and adopt reform, the necessity to cope with country-specific energy

problems) constrain the extent of sector reform. Zooming out, this article will highlight the more recent hit of EC energy sustainability principles and rules in Turkey.

Section 2 will bridge over external governance and external diffusion, that is, the key analytical concepts on which this article is based. Section 3 will devise analytical framework for explaining the conditions under which EU rules-based energy reforms are taken on in Turkey. Section 4 will devote to empirical analysis. Section 5 will summarize the findings and conclusions.

2. Bridging over external governance and external diffusion

The notion of external governance indicates a new form of institutionalised interaction with third countries through which the European Union seeks to expand its *rules* beyond EU borders (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Scholars of external governance refuses to project the unitary state actor model on to the European Union and moves away from traditional foreign policy analysis by examining processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer (ibidem). The concept of external governance is deep-rooted in debates in international relations and comparative politics, being it based on the assumption that high interdependence between political units generates demand for governance. Institutionalised modes of interaction are the structures through which political units seeks to coordinate this interdependence (Lavenex et al. 2009: 814). Three are the ideal types theorised in the literature: hierarchy, network and market modes of external governance (Lavenex et al. 2007; Lavenex 2008; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). They are characterised by different levels of legalisation and institutionalisation, ranging from more legalised and asymmetrical interactions with little room for ‘the ruled’ to negotiate to more horizontal/informal and decentralised interactions between political units (see Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009).

Diffusion can be defined as a process through which policy ideas spread across time and space (cf. Strang and Meyer 1993). Diffusion studies concerning the European Union address both the internal and external diffusion processes. While internal diffusion has been extensively researched, this is less the case for external diffusion processes trough which the EU seeks to export its ideas into third countries. Linking to external diffusion adds a new dimension to our analysis: ideas, not just rules. One the one hand, ideas are conceived here

as *causal beliefs*, that is, shared claims regarding cause-effect relationships and states of the world (Börzel and Risse 2009: 6). On the other hand, ideas are seen as *principled beliefs* or *norms* encapsulating shared expectations on the appropriate behaviour to take in a given context (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Jeeperson et al. 1996). Diffusion is mediated by a broad range of influence channels between countries, varying from more coercive mechanisms (such as imposition of policies or international binding norms) to voluntary adoption of foreign policy models (see Knill 2005). To different extents, policies entail both causal ideas and norms. In other words, policies encapsulate at the same time ideas on what is the cause-effect of a policy problem and how to appropriately deal with the problem *per se*. This article is interested in the possible variation between diffusion of causal beliefs and norms.

Even if not equivalent concepts, external diffusion and external governance can be consistently mixed up (see table 1). (a) In both cases the analytical focus is on process. External governance research analyses the factors that account for empirically observed processes of EU norm diffusion and transfer to third countries. Similarly, external diffusion studies focuses on the spreading process of EU policy models across third countries and regions. (b) When it comes to the empirical focus, external governance is concerned with systems of rules (including norms as well as procedures of coordination). External diffusion is rather concerned with ideas (causal beliefs and norms). Studying rules and ideas together may enable to get a fuller picture on how far Europe can promote domestic policy change in line with its rules and principles in target countries.

(c) With respect to the dependent variable, both external governance and external diffusion pertain to the study of policy change. In details, the former scholarship seeks to explain the structural modes and effectiveness of EU external governance (Barbé et al. 2009; Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009; Freyburg et al. 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Lavenex et al. 2009; Youngs 2009). The bulk of this literature has mostly dealt with EU policies towards the neighbouring regions. With regards to the modes of governance, authors have largely described the modes in which the EU seeks to expand its rules beyond its borders. Lavenex *et al.* (2009) have found that external modes follows internal sectoral modes. This means that rule expansion varies depending on the issue-area and follows a policy-specific logic. With respect to the second dependent variable, authors have sought to explain the effectiveness of EU external governance at three different levels: rule selection (in international negotiations and agreements), rule adoption (in domestic

legislation) and rule application. Scholars have mostly elaborated on institutionalist, power-based and domestic structure hypotheses on the conditions under which external governance is effective. However, none of the hypotheses has been confuted so far – thus leaving the big question on conditions of effectiveness still unanswered (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 809).

External diffusion seeks to explain the adoption process through which EU policy ideas spread across political units other than Europe. As to the external influence upon domestic policy adoption, authors have largely investigated the different mechanisms through which ideas spread across countries (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Strang and Soule 1998; Simmons et al. 2006, Börzel and Risse 2009). When it comes to the influence of domestic structural factors upon policy diffusion, many insights can be drawn from this literature. Sociological diffusion studies have pointed out that foreign ideas need to be made socially meaningful as to make domestic adoption practicable. In this view, culture and institutions are conceived as significant facilitating factors of diffusion (Stang and Meyer 1993). In other words, policies diffuse insofar as they resonate with the cultural and institutional structures of their recipients. While the literature on diffusion has largely explored the EU as promoter of normative and causal ideas, the effects of EU attempts at external diffusion have been left mostly under-researched. Hence what are the conditions under which efforts at external diffusion work?

To bridge over the two scholarships, this article restrains its focus on conditions under which reforms are taken on in a target country (being the empirical focus on the EU's rules and ideas as well as Turkey's systems of rules and ideas). For the sake of clarity, this article observes policy outputs (the policies adopted by a government) rather than policy outcomes (the actual effects of a policy in terms of goal achievement) (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 776).

Table 1: Bridging over external governance and diffusion research

	<i>External Governance</i>	<i>Policy Diffusion</i>
Analytical focus:	<u>process</u>	<u>process</u>
Empirical focus:	<u>systems of rules</u> (norms, procedures)	<u>ideas</u> (causal beliefs, norms)
Dependent variable:	modes of external governance; <u>adoption process</u> effectiveness (rule selection, <u>rule adoption</u> , rule application)	

3. EU explanation vs. Domestic structures explanation

When the birds fly together, sometimes they converge towards a common point. But sometimes they don't. Similarly when state actors voluntarily engage in international cooperation schemes, sometimes their policies converge towards a common point. But sometimes they do not. With regards to the EU, this example can be generally applied to its relations with candidate countries and other third countries. By employing institutionalised patterns of dialogue and bilateral/multilateral cooperation schemes, the EU seeks to expand its ideas and systems of rules beyond its borders. Here a set of key questions arises: how far can the European Union influence endogenous reform processes in a target country? Do EU external policies and programs make a difference? Or does it all depend on the countries the EU is cooperating with?

To explain the conditions under which EU rules/ideas-based reforms are taken on in a target country, this article advocates for an interdisciplinary approach which links external governance and diffusion research with scholarship on new institutionalism. Drawing on rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches (Bulmer 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996; Scharpf 1997; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Kerremans 2001, March and Olsen 1996, 1998, 2004; Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Peters 2005), this article contrasts an EU explanation with a domestic structure explanation. For the sake of clarity, this article focuses on the individual contribution of the EU (rules, ideas and institutions) and domestic structures in Turkey to the explanation of reform adoption.

EU explanation

The EU explanation asserts that the Union is capable of influencing, to different extents, both the preferences and behaviour of target countries' political actors. Consequently, the EU constrains the pathways to energy reform adoption in the target countries.

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, energy cooperation between the EU and a target country follows the templates of EU formal institutions (i.e. norms, rules, procedures). Established patterns of dialogue and cooperation, hence, constitute equilibrium contracts among self-seeking actors. In that, the EU institutional actors behave in a strategic way and seeks to maximise their utilities. For instance, the EU seeks to avoid the costs of political instability in the neighbourhood – which may discourage infrastructure investments or affect disruptions of energy supplies. To influence endogenous energy sector reform processes in a target country, the Union makes use of a set of mechanisms and

instruments. First, the legal coercion mechanism consists of inducing a target country to joining multilateral regimes or bilateral contractual agreements. These instruments reduce uncertainty in cooperation, makes some options less costly for the EU and outline a set of binding obligations for all parties. The second mechanism is manipulations of utility calculations, which refers to the ability of inducing a target country into adopting EU rules via negative and positive incentives. While the key instrument is conditionality, other instruments are widely used by the EU: financial assistance, loans, support to business investment, technical cooperation and assistance, capacity-building programs. The key point here is that the EU influences domestic reform in a target country by altering state actors' behaviour. From a rational choice institutionalist point of view, the EU influence hence depends on one key condition: the quality of *incentives*, i.e. EU political conditionality. Do the perspective of membership offset adaptation costs? Do incentives envisage significant gains for a target country?

From a sociological institutionalist perspective, EU-target country energy cooperation is shaped by EU formal and informal institutions. In other words, cooperation includes not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but also the symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding action and reform in a target country. EU institutional actors promote EU ideas and rules because they believe these are appropriate models (logic of appropriateness). In so doing, the EU makes use of two key mechanisms: persuasion, which pertains to the practises through which target countries' state actors internalise EU causal beliefs (that is, ideas on what is the cause-effect of a policy problem); socialization, which refers to the practices through which target countries' state actors learn to internalise EU principled beliefs (that is, ideas on how to appropriately deal with a specific policy problem). The European Union deploys these two mechanisms through different instruments such as enhanced energy dialogue and information exchange (high level committees, experts meetings), joint problem-solving (technical cooperation, capacity-building) and transgovernmental/elites networking. Here, the key point is that the EU influences both the preferences and behaviour of state actors in the target country considered. From a sociological institutionalist point of view, EU influence hence depends on specific qualities of EU rules and ideas. The more strongly EU causal ideas, principles and normative models are coded in the energy related *acquis*, the more EU rules are institutionalised in transgovernmental networks and are internationalised, the more likely is their adoption in a target

country. *Codification* is strong if causal beliefs and principles are legalised in EU energy acquis and also incorporated in international rules; medium when causal and principles beliefs are legalised only in EU energy acquis; weak if these elements are not (or only loosely) legalised in the acquis. *Institutionalisation* is strong if both EU bilateral and regional programmes/networks promotes and deal with EU energy rules and policy models; medium when only EU bilateral programmes/networks exist; weak if no EU networking activities are taken. *Internationalisation* is strong if both the EU and other international actors actively promote relevant rules and policy models; medium when only the EU promotes these rules; weak if only other international actors makes efforts at promoting specific energy rules and policy models.

Domestic structures explanation

The domestic structures explanation contends that the conditions under which a target country adopt EU rules/ideas-based reforms are determined by domestic structures.

From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, EU-target country sectoral cooperation follows the domestic structures of the target country considered –more exactly its formal structures: i.e. norms, decision rules, procedures. Cooperation constitutes an equilibrium contract among self-seeking actors. This means two things. First, preferences of target country's state actors are endogenously formed. In other words, the EU has no influence on preference formation. Second, behaviour follows the logic of consequentiality. Target country agents voluntarily engage in cooperation schemes, behave strategically and determine the reforms to be adopted in the light of their own country's utility maximisation. In so doing, rule expansion follows two mechanisms as follows. The first is regulatory approximation/ harmonization, which refers to political/ legal agreements through which the target country engage to comply with selected rules (approximation) or to transfer a well-defined body of rules into its legislation (harmonization). The second mechanism is lesson-drawing, which pertains to the voluntary adoption by a target country of specific EU rules because they are seen as efficient solutions to domestic problems. The key point, here, is that domestic structures determine the preferences and behaviour of target country's political actors; and constrain the maximum output to be permitted. From a rational choice institutionalist point of view, two are the key conditions under which EU rules-based reforms are taken on in a target country. On the one hand, the *willingness* of political actors to adopt specific EU rules and

undergone reform. In details, willingness is the result of dissatisfaction with the status quo or comes from the necessity to cope with country-specific policy problems. On the other hand, the *state capacity* to formulate a policy and adopt reform. In details, the state capacity is the result of the administrative and technical capacity of a target country. Also it refers to the veto points and veto actors that might oppose to the adoption of a specific reform.

From a sociological institutionalist perspective, EU-target country sectoral cooperation is constrained by both formal and informal institutions of a target country: i.e. norms, values, rules, procedures, ideas, discourse symbol systems and cognitive scripts. Political actors' behaviour follows the logic of appropriateness. This logic of action opens up to new forms of interactions between the target country considered and the EU. Cooperation brings to the exchange of information and practises between the parties. The mechanism of diffusion and rule expansion is mimicry: it refers to the voluntary adoption by a target country of specific EU policy ideas, models and rules that are seen as appropriate solutions to a problem at hands. Here, the key point is that domestic structures are conceived as normative-cognitive vessels that guide target country's actors towards reform. From a sociological institutionalist point of view, the key condition under which EU rules/ideas-based reforms are taken on in a target country is the *compatibility* of the proposed reform with the target country's systems of rules and ideas. The more similar cultural, institutional and economic structures are, the more reform and the related approximation is facilitated.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the analytical framework having been designed for explaining the pathways and conditions under which EU rules/ideas-based reforms are taken on in a target country.

Table 2: EU explanation

	<i>Rational Choice Institutionalism</i>	<i>Sociological Institutionalism</i>
EU-target country energy cooperation	follows EU formal institutions: i.e. norms, rules, procedures equilibrium contracts among self-seeking actors	is shaped by EU formal and informal institutions: i.e. norms, values, rules, procedures, ideas, discourse symbol systems, cognitive scripts
Behaviour of EU institutional actors	Logic of consequentiality	Logic of appropriateness
Mechanisms of diffusion/rule expansion	(a) Legal coercion (instruments:) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • multilateral regimes, bilateral contractual agreements, binding obligations (b) Manipulations of utility calculations (key instrument:) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conditionality (additional instruments: financial assistance, loans, support to business investment, technical cooperation and assistance, capacity-building)	(a) Persuasion (cognitive ideas are internalised) (b) Socialization (normative ideas are internalised, so that actors do the right thing) (instruments:) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enhanced energy dialogue and information exchange (high level committees, experts meetings) • joint problem-solving (technical cooperation, capacity-building) • transgovernmental/elites networking
Policy outputs	EU behaves strategically and makes use of cooperation structures as influence channels in order to induce a target country into a certain behaviour	Institutions are normative-cognitive vessels that guide actors towards outputs. Cognitive-normative vessels tend to reproduce themselves over the time.
Conditions	Quality of incentives (do the perspective of membership/potential gains offset adaptation cost?)	Qualities of EU ideas and rules (codification, institutionalisation in transgovernmental networks, internationalisation)
EU institutional structures do make a difference...	When influencing state actors' behaviour (target country)	When influencing (1) actor's preferences and (2) behaviour.

Table 3: Domestic structures explanation

	<i>Rational Choice Institutionalism</i>	<i>Sociological Institutionalism</i>
EU-target country energy cooperation	follows the domestic structures of the target country, more exactly its formal structures: i.e. norms, decision rules, procedures equilibrium contracts among self-seeking actors	follows the domestic structures of the target country, more exactly its formal and informal structures: i.e. norms, values, rules, procedures, ideas, discourse symbol systems, cognitive scripts
Preferences of target country's state actors	Endogenous formation (no EU influence)	Endogenous formation
Behaviour	Logic of consequentiality	Logic of appropriateness
Mechanisms of diffusion/rule expansion	(a) approximation/harmonization (b) lesson-drawing (EU rules are seen as efficient solutions to domestic problems)	(a) mimicry (EU rules and policy models are seen as appropriate)
Policy outputs	Rational purposive agents bump into structures, behave strategically and determine outputs	Institutions are normative-cognitive vessels that guide actors towards outputs.
Conditions	Willingness to undergo reform (if domestic change do not challenge the state control) (necessity to cope with a specific problem, dissatisfaction with status quo, → positive past experiences) State capacity to formulate and adopt reform (veto players, veto points, technocratic potential capture, imbalance formulation-adoption-implementation)	Compatibility between the target country's systems of rules/ideas and the EU rules-based reform
Domestic institutions do make a difference...	When constraining the maximum output to be permitted.	When shaping state actor's preferences and behaviour.

4. EU-Turkey energy cooperation and regulatory convergence: three case studies

This section provides the results of the empirical analysis of energy cooperation in three subfields –energy sustainability, competitiveness and security– between the European Union on the one hand, and Turkey on the other hand. Located at the heart of Eurasia, Turkey is among the ten big emerging markets; the fastest growing energy markets and CO₂ emitters in the world. It is a secular constitutional republic which is presently ruled by moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey has a EU candidacy status since 1999 and is involved in the accession process since 2005. It also participates in the Union for the Mediterranean. The time frame considered stretches from the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995, going through the first Euro-Med Regional Energy Plan in 1998 until the currently on-going developments, with a special focus on the Turkey’s accession process. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010 in Brussels and Ankara as well as on official documents and reports.

The following sections establish the values for codification, institutionalisation, and internationalisation before turning to the analysis of domestic adaptation.

Energy sustainability

The energy sustainability principle is rooted in the shift towards a low carbon economy. The EU sees that a sustainable use of energy can be achieved by developing renewables and other low carbon energy sources such as alternative transport fuels; boosting energy efficiency; combating global climate change (European Commission 2006: 17). This principle is highly *coded* in both the EU *acquis* (2001 directive on the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources; 2003 directive on the promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport; 2006 directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services; 2003 and 2009 ETS directive; 2009 renewable energy directive; 2009 Directive on the geological storage of carbon dioxide; 2002 and 2010 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive) and relevant international rules (such as 1997 Kyoto protocol and its related instruments). It is also incorporated in a number of soft law instruments at EU level (1997 Action Plan for renewable energy; 2007 Renewable Energy Roadmap; National Energy Efficiency Nation Plans; National Renewable Energy Action Plans; Transparency Platform). Regulatory convergence in the

subfield of energy sustainability is a priority for EU cooperation with Turkey. Rules are highly *institutionalised* and *internationalised*. As regards Turkey, rules on energy sustainability are bilaterally promoted mainly through the pre-accession (until 2005) and accession schemes. While the energy chapter is still blocked due the Cyprus' veto, the environmental chapter has been opened since December 2009. Here, cooperation is hierarchically organised. At regional level, Turkey is part of three main Euro-Mediterranean frameworks of cooperation: namely Med-EneC (energy efficiency in the construction), Med-Emip –a regional platform for enhanced dialogue, information exchange and assistance to policy formulation and legislative advice with a prevalent focus on reduction of the environmental impact of energy-related activities in Mediterranean Partner Countries– and the newly Mediterranean Solar Plan. At sub-regional level, Turkey is part of the Baku Initiative, the Inogate programme and the Energy Efficiency Finance Facility. EU regulatory convergence efforts are reinforced and supported by other international actors and organisations –above all, the national cooperation agencies of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands; the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME)– which very often work in synergy on technical and financial assistance projects such as the Mediterranean Action Plan, the Blue Plan, etc. In times of crisis, a question arises on the real possibilities of financing the Mediterranean Solar Plan.

Although the above properties of EC rules on energy sustainability did facilitate adoption in domestic legislation, a close analysis of Turkey's reform trajectory suggests that domestic conditions ultimately constrained the extent of sub-sector reforms. The Law on the Use of Renewable Energy Sources in Electricity Generation of 2005 (Parliament of Turkey 2005) set out a general framework for the promotion of competitive prices for electricity generated from plants that have a renewable energy resource certificate and renewable energy investments. The law did not set a target for electricity generated from renewable sources until 2009, when the revised strategy paper for the electricity sector set a share of 25% of electricity to be produced from renewables by the end of 2020. In 2007 Turkey adopted a framework law on energy efficiency (Parliament of Turkey 2007), which did not include targets nor provisions on the promotion of high-efficiency cogeneration, as foreseen in the *acquis* (European Commission 2007: 50). Subsequently, new key implementing regulations were adopted on the energy performance and

insulation of buildings as well as energy efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises. The Kabul Law of 2009 (Parliament of Turkey 2009) enabled Turkey to join the Kyoto protocol. In formulating and adopting key reforms on renewables (RE) and energy efficiency (EE), *state capacity* and *willingness* were strong. In the formulation stage, Turkey significantly attained to the relevant *acquis*. Interestingly, Turkey also picked up some pieces of legislation from the Japanese and Dutch EE regulations, as follows: (a) the Energy Efficiency Coordination Board (EECB); (b) as regards EE measures for the industry sector, industries have to compulsorily set up an energy management system and nominate an energy manager trained at the Energy Efficiency Training Centre (EETC) based at EiE; (c) on the Dutch model, voluntary agreements with industrial factories have been set. Furthermore, the EE law were adopted at unanimity, revealing that no relevant veto points and actors opposed to domestic adoption. These conditions were coupled with a strong *necessity* to cope with country-specific energy problems. It important to highlight that in late 2008 Turkey was producing already 17% of its electricity from renewable energy sources. Interestingly, however, electricity consumption is expected to double by 2020: hence the Turkey's primary need to boost and capitalise on the untapped renewable and energy efficiency potential (European Commission 2009: 59).

Energy competitiveness

The EU asserts that a more competitive use of energy can be achieved through opening up internal markets for gas and electricity and ensuring efficient functioning of markets as well as competitive prices (European Commission 2006: 17). *Codification* of EC principle of energy competitiveness is medium. Although being highly coded in EU energy trade and internal energy market rules (directives on electricity and gas markets liberalisation, provisions on unbundling and European regulator), this principle is loosely incorporated in relevant international rules. GATT/WTO rules contains relevant rules of general application, but do not deal specifically with energy matters (see World Energy Council 2009). The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) –which creation in 1994 was strongly pushed by the EU– establishes a defined framework of rules on energy trade, investment and transit. However, only some of the signatory states have been provisionally applying the treaty (Goldthau and Witte 2009: 380). Conversely, EC rules on energy competitiveness are highly *institutionalised* at bilateral (pre-accession and accession schemes), regional (Med-reg dealing with cooperation between energy regulators, Med-ring dealing with the completion of the Euro-

Mediterranean electricity and gas ring) and sub-regional levels (Black Sea Synergy). The value for *internationalisation* of EC rules on energy competitiveness is medium. EU efforts are mainly reinforced by activities of the member states, the Council of European Energy Regulators, the IEA and the International Monetary Fund (IFM), but support from other international actors is limited.

As regards domestic adaptation, since 1998 Turkey has made important progress notably in aligning with the EU rules on the electricity and gas sector. The Laws on the Electricity Market (Parliament of Turkey 2001a, EML) and Natural Gas Market (Parliament of Turkey 2001b, NGML) of 2001 set the basis for the liberalisation, market restructuring and harmonisation with EU related acquis. This has been complemented by the creation of the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) and subsequent implementing legislation (European Commission 2002). However, a close analysis of sub-sector reform reveals a set of interesting findings. First, The strong *necessity* to cope with electricity specific problems suggests that market restructuring was indeed a priority for Turkey. In fact, until 2001 Turkey was not self sufficient in meeting its electricity demand with its domestic production. In that, shortage was met by imported electricity mainly from Bulgaria and Russia. Second, Both the framework laws were adopted in the winds of liberalisation and privatisation so that the *willingness* to adopt EU specific rules was medium/strong. With respect to electricity sub-sector reform, Turkey demonstrated to be even more prone than other member states to align with EU specific provisions on unbundling, i.e. separating the energy transmission networks from the production and supply side. In 2001 the national electricity champion TEDAS unbundled in three companies: EUAS (generation), TEIAS (transmission and market operator) and TETAS (wholesale). TEDAS and its seven regional distribution companies were rearranged and distribution network of Turkey was divided into 21 regions. The fact that Turkey fairly adopted the electricity unbundling is a telling message –considering that the Commission’s unbundling credo found strong opposition by member states’ governments and national champions, who strongly pushed for third package on electricity and gas liberalisation then approved in 2009. Differently, the NGML set the unbundling of the national gas champion BOTAS by 2009. In the NGML unbundling of distribution activities was not required, whereas the 2003 EU directive it did. With the 2009 new EU directive downgrading unbundling, further adaptation might take place in the near future. Third, the *state capacity* to formulate and adopt reforms was medium/strong, but not controversy-free. On the one hand,

the formulation and adoption of EML did not reveal any particular veto point nor veto actors. On the other hand, the case of NGML suggests a different story. Although largely reforming the gas sector, the law was enacted without any relevant distributional domestic conflict. Unfortunately, the policy formulation-adoption was ‘captured’ –escaping from wider constellation of actors– whereas policy implementation found later veto players notably limiting the implementation and effectiveness of the reforms adopted. Therefore, the discrepancy between the NGML and developments on the market call for substantial revision of the law. Interestingly, however, it has to be remarked that the adoption of the two key laws (EML and NGML) and the creation of the Energy Regulatory Board was a condition for the IMF’s support for Turkey (European Commission 2001: 70). To sum up, Turkey was strongly willing to reform its electricity and gas sectors, had a sufficient capacity to formulate and adopt reform (with the exception of NGML), and had little power to resist to the IMF’s pressure for adaptation.

Energy security

The EU contends that energy supply can be secured through an integrated approach that mainly consists on reducing demand, diversifying the energy mix as well as sources and routes of energy imports, stimulating infrastructure and technology investments and addressing energy emergencies at EU level (European Commission 2006: 17). The EC principle of energy security is weakly *coded* in the EU *acquis*. Significant elements of energy security can be found in EU rules on oil stocks, transit, Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E), in Lisbon Treaty provisions concerning short-term supply disruptions and, indirectly, in rules on energy efficiency. However, key decisions on the energy mix and sources of energy imported remain still a matter of national politics thus undermining the basis of the energy security principle. EC principles and rules on energy security are highly *institutionalised* in both bilateral and regional programmes and transgovernmental networks in the framework of TEN-E. Given the relatively modest size of EC rules on energy security of supply, EU cooperation has taken a rather physical approach. Yet, the Commission tends to prioritise the intra-EU enhancement of the gas storage and network capacity. Interestingly, however, intergovernmental cooperation on Nabucco has positively contributed to build a ‘sense of trust’ between high-level officials in the Commission and Turkey. As a result of this, the Commission opened negotiations with Turkey upon accession to the Energy Community Treaty in September 2009, which would be of particular importance in further advancing

regulatory alignment with EU rules on the electricity and gas internal market, and renewables and energy efficiency (European Commission 2009: 59). Conversely, *internationalisation* is weak. Although relevant EC activities and programmes do exist, EU efforts are seriously weakened by the fact that member states often adopt very diverging positions and policies on security of supply thus not allowing the EU to speak with one voice.

With respect to domestic adaptation, important steps have been taken to comply with IEA commitments on emergency preparedness (European Commission 2000: 52) – organisation of which Turkey is a member). The Petroleum Law of 2003 (Parliament of Turkey 2003) advanced legal alignment with the EU oil stocks *acquis*. Yet considering the limited extent of the *acquis* on security of supply, policy reform has been rather oriented towards ambitious infrastructure building projects (Turkey-Iran gas pipeline, Blue Stream, Caspian-Mediterranean, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) with the objective of diversifying energy routes, sources and suppliers as well as strengthening Turkey's role as a key energy hub for Europe. In that, Turkey demonstrated high *willingness* and *state capacity* to reform, coupled with a strong *necessity* to cope with its high reliance on energy imports. EU-Turkey energy security cooperation builds on a set of positive experiences: (a) the construction of the Turkey-Greece gas interconnector, which started in 2002 and was finalised in 2008; (b) the technical preparations for the realisation of the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector natural gas pipeline; (c) the construction of the Babaeski-Filippi line, which was completed in June 2008 (European Commission 2008). To fully integrate into the internal electricity market, Turkey need not only regulatory harmonization but also the synchronous physical connection of the Turkish power system with the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE). For that, Turkey is working on a number of projects which contribute to the completion of priority axes 4 (Greece-Balkan Countries UCTE system) and 9 (Mediterranean Electricity Ring) under the TEN-E umbrella (European Commission 2009: 68). Furthermore, the development of the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project from the Caspian and Central Asian region to the EU via Turkey has been strongly pursued by both the EU and Turkey, and is among the top TEN-E projects of European interest. This has led Turkey, the European Commission and the other members of the Nabucco consortium to sign an intergovernmental agreement in July 2009. However, the realisation of Nabucco is pledged with problems concerning the transit regime, financing and gas suppliers. But, this is

rather a matter of pipeline politics in which diverging or changing positions of individual member states often emerge.

5. Conclusions

In this section, the conclusions emerging from a comparative analysis of three case studies will be presented. Three outcome patterns can be easily detected. First, there is a continuity between EU internal and external activities in each of the sub-fields considered. The codification-institutionalisation-internationalisation hypothesis has been fairly tested and holds true: the more strongly EC energy principles are coded in the *acquis*, the more these rules are institutionalised in transnational networks and are internationalised, the more their adoption is facilitated in Turkey. EU rules-based reform adoption is strongly correlated with the strength of codification. This is clear for instance in the case of energy security. The strength of institutionalisation is patent in the three cases. High values for internationalisation strengthen the legitimacy of rules and reforms. Clearly, EU rules in sub-fields or particular issue-areas in which intra-EU integration is only slowly advancing are less likely to hit in Turkey. Second, this article highlighted the domestically-driven nature of EU transformative power on the energy sector reforming. Interestingly, it has been argued that key domestic factors (the necessity to cope with country-specific energy problems, the willingness and state capacity to formulate and adopt reform) ultimately constrained the extent of sub-sector reform. It has been shown that Turkey engaged in significant energy sub-sector reform, behaved strategically and chose the pieces of reforms to be adopted in the light of its utility maximisation. Third, this article has shown that energy regulatory harmonisation took the shape of a rather selective but progressive alignment with the related *acquis*. Overall, EU influence on the Turkey's energy sector reform goes green. Even though further harmonisation is needed, EC energy sustainability principles and rules consistently hit in Turkey.

To conclude, this article has substantiated the thesis of EU energy cooperation with Turkey (1995-2010) as a three-fold, differentiated and domestically-driven process of expanding sectoral integration.

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