

***The European Parliament after Lisbon:
Policy Position and Ideological Coherence of the Political Groups¹***

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This paper focuses on the policy position and the ideological coherence of the political Groups in the VIIth European Parliament. It seeks, therefore, to provide an answer to the following questions: what is the boundedness of the political families represented in the EU elected chamber? How – and in what issues – are they differentiated? By measuring the policy preferences of the national parties aggregating in the parliamentary Groups, it also addresses the important issue of their cohesion. How sparse and heterogeneous are their constituent member parties? More than fifty years after the European Parliament started its institutional journey, these questions are all the more valid after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the further expansion of the European Parliament legislative powers. They trigger important implications both for the smooth functioning of EU parliamentary politics and the prospects of a EU democracy based upon transnational political parties. The empirical analysis presented in the paper will be based on two new recent data sources: the coding of the election manifestos issued by the national parties for the European Parliament elections (Euromanifesto Project, University of Mannheim) and the self-placement of political parties in a policy space (EUProfiler, EUI). By showing the validity of these novel data, this paper also pursues a methodological scope and seeks to contribute to the expanding literature on the measurement of the policy positions of parties at the European-level.

Presentation

This paper focuses on the policy position and the ideological coherence of the political Groups constituted in the VIIth European Parliament. It seeks, in particular, to provide an answer to the following questions: what is the boundedness of the different political families represented in the EU elected chamber? How – and in what issues – are they differentiated? By measuring the policy preferences of the national parties composing the parliamentary Groups, it also addresses the important issue of their policy cohesion. How sparse and heterogeneous are their constituent member parties? More than fifty years after the European Parliament started its institutional journey, and almost sixty years after the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community first

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convened, these questions are all the more valid in a much more diverse and variegated Union. Indeed, the general motto of the EU: “United in Diversity” could be extended to the EP political Groups, which could now be composed by member parties from each of the 27 States of the EU and, at times, even include more than one party per Member.

There are at least two main reasons why these questions are substantially important. The first pertains to the internal workings and organization of the European Parliament. Only homogeneous political Groups can pursue a coherent political agenda. If the Groups are too internally divided, they will fail to deliver what they promised to the European electorate (through national parties). It will be impossible for them to state an official policy position and pursue it in the European Parliament, to issue common declarations and, more importantly, to vote cohesively in the committees and in the plenary. Contingent majorities and random aggregations of deputies will form for each and every vote, making the legislative process hardly manageable.

Even more fundamentally, the ideological coherence of the political Groups is of crucial importance for the prospects of the EU democracy. Although political representation is, in the EU context, still “filtered” through national parties, it could certainly be argued that when (and if) the national parties coalescing in the same political Group at the EU level express similar concerns and values, then common 'European' party cultures and even identities are already in place. What they will only need to fully release their potential are stronger institutional and organizational 'infrastructures' at the EU level. In brief, the similarity in the policy preferences among the national parties contesting the EP elections and forming the transnational groupings is crucial in providing the European voters with a meaningful programmatic supply, which could be converted in concrete public policies through the EU legislative process (see, especially, McElroy, Benoit, 2010 and Thomassen, 2009).

In order to describe and evaluate the policy positions and coherence of the EP political groups, this paper relies on two data sources. First, it makes use of the manifestos issued by the national parties for the European Parliament elections (*EMP data, University of Mannheim*). These manifestos are the most obvious place to look at when the purpose is to study (variation in) the position of the EP groupings. They are issued regularly by the national parties contesting the European Parliament elections and seem to convey more precise and meaningful information on Europe than any other source. Furthermore, we can interestingly compare the official manifestos adopted by the Euro-parties with those issued by their member parties (i.e. the national parties). Second, we rely on the EU Profiler data on parties (*European University Institute, Florence*). The Profiler was an electronic tool by means of which electors could discover which political party was closer to their own preferences, by expressing their position with respect to several policy

statements, for the 2009 EP elections. Political parties, answering to an identical questionnaire, were also asked to self-place themselves in a policy space. Overall, the data generated by the EU Profiler is a very specific and updated source of information to study party positions in the EU context.

This paper is structured as follows. Part I provides the historical and legal background to the requirement of “political affinities” to constitute a political Group in the Parliament, discussing some potential problems for their ideological homogeneity. Part II presents the data, together with a test of their validity. Part III develops the empirical analysis. Finally, Part IV concludes. The data and the measures are described in full in the Appendix.

1. The policy cohesion of the political Groups

1.1 The formation of the political Groups and their “political affinities”

Ever since the European Parliament was established, its organization has been structured upon transnational political Groups. In 1958, the newly born European Parliament inherited from its forerunner, the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community, its rules of procedure and its three political Groups: the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists and the Liberals (and “supporters”). In turn, the Common Assembly was the first international assembly to ever be structured around political Groups. Not long after its creation (in September 1952), the Assembly witnessed the *de facto* formation of the political Groups, which began to structure its workings according to ideological rather than national divisions. The earliest version of the formal rules of the Common Assembly still made no mention of “political groupings”, while it was often referring to the principle of national representation – for instance, in the allocation of some internal positions, as it was customary in the other international assemblies. Very soon, however, the distribution of committee seats and chairmanships began to take into account both national *and* party representation, the deputies were no longer seated in the hemicycle in alphabetical order, but according to the political Group they belonged to. Finally, in June 1953, the new Rules of Procedure formally recognized that political Groups could be formed according to “*political persuasion*” (see Hix, Kreppel, Noury, 2003:311-315).

The early article 33bis, under the title “Political Groups”, listed the conditions to be met by the political Groups to be recognized as such. Two criteria were established. First, the minimum number of deputies to establish a political Group was set at nine. Second, the delegates could organize themselves into groups according to political sympathies. These fundamental requirements for the constitution of the political Groups are still found in the most recent version of the Rules of

Procedure. In the 2009 edition of the Rules, art. 30 states: “members may form themselves into groups according to their *political affinities*”. Moreover, the numerical criterion is rephrased as: “a political group shall comprise Members elected in at least one-quarter of the Member States. The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall be 25” (art. 30.2). The numerical criterion has been constantly modified in order to take into account the expansion in the membership of the Assembly – following, for instance, the introduction of direct elections, or each enlargement wave. However, we are here especially interested in the second parameter, namely the “political affinities” of members. What is the purpose of this article? And what are its concrete implications for the formation of the political Groups?

When it was first introduced, the requirement of “political affinities” was meant to prevent the formation of national groupings. In those early days of European integration, it was broadly felt that the organization of the Common Assembly in national groupings was fundamentally anti-European. Furthermore, the deputies themselves discovered very soon that they had more in common with their fellows from sister-parties in other ECSC/EC Member States than with their co-nationals. In any case, even if a Christian-Democratic, a Socialist and a Liberal grouping were soon established in accordance with the criterion of political persuasion – the Groups could still be the *de facto* expression of a quite broad, at times very broad, range of political cultures and traditions. An early observer of the Common Assembly describes them: “The highest degree of uniformity is undoubtedly in the Socialist group, which, with one exception, is made up of representatives of the Socialist parties in each of the member States. Far less homogeneity exists in the Christian-Democratic group, which combines a majority of Roman Catholics with a minority of Protestants. Each of these groups nevertheless has a certain basic unity of doctrine, i.e. the Socialist and Christian philosophies respectively. In the ‘Liberals and *apparentés*’ group, there could obviously be no degree of monolithic structure whatsoever [...] We have been unable to find any doctrinal grounds on which to account for the uniting of these divergent tendencies in a political group” (Van Oudenhove, 1965:27-28)

According to the above statement, the Liberal (and supporters) Group had little, if any, ideological affinity, and its *raison d’être* was merely “negative”: whoever was unable to identify with a Christian or a Socialist political culture converged into the “Liberal” grouping. Nevertheless, the history of the European Parliament provides us with other – and far more striking – examples of political Groups which failed to meet the criterion of political affinities. The Technical Group for the Defense of Independent Members, constituted in 1979 by the Italian radicals and small Communist parties, by Euro-skeptic Danes and the Belgian and Irish independent deputies, stated in its declaration of constitution: “each member of the Group keeps its own political program, its

freedom of speech and of voting both in committees and in the plenary”. The only concession to political affinities was represented by the fact that membership of the Group was 'only' open to “democrats and anti-fascists”.

An even more notorious case regards the later Technical Group for Non-Attached Members - Mixed Group, set up in 1999 by deputies of very diverse political background, from the Italian Radicals to Le Pen's Front National. This case represents a *unicum* in the history of the European Parliament because – for the first (and only) time – the Parliament voted for the dissolution of the Group. One might wonder: on what grounds was the TDI dissolved – when the EP never challenged the political affinities of any of its groupings before? The answer is that the 1999 case had no precedent because the Group *explicitly* denied in its constitutive declaration the requisite of political affinities. Because of this explicit denial, the Parliament was compelled to take action and to specify more clearly when a grouping of deputies is *not* a political Group. The new “political Groups” article kept its formal character (“Parliament need not normally evaluate the political affinity of members of a group”) except when the Members of a Group explicitly deny their political affinities. In short, it was given a *negative* definition of “political Group”, considered to be “a (sufficiently large) set of deputies who do not explicitly refute political affinities among themselves when deciding to form a Group” (Settembri, 2004:168).

Thus, despite the formal requisite of the political affinities, the parliamentary rules cannot guarantee that the transnational groupings will represent coherent political cultures. Each political Group defines by itself its own membership criteria, and its ideological homogeneity (or heterogeneity) will be the result of political choices, rather than legal norms. This is why this paper presents an empirical catalogue of the priorities and the policy positions of the national member parties constituting the political Groups in the VIIth European Parliament. Before moving to the presentation of the data, the next paragraph identifies some potential sources of turmoil for the programmatic coherence of the political Groups.

1.2 Party families in a changing context

The political Groups and the party system in the European Parliament are based respectively upon the parties and the party systems of the member States of the EU. It has been traditionally emphasized that a EU party system is only feasible if the major lines of political conflict in Europe do not coincide with the national borders but, rather, cross-cut national distinctions (i.e. Thomassen, 2002). As shown in the previous section, with reference to the early days of the Common Assembly, the traditional party families represented a more binding 'glue' for its Members than their national

origins. In other words, they had more in common as Socialists or Christian-Democrats than (say) as French or Germans. This is consistent with a reading of European politics based upon a few fundamental social cleavages, which had been 'activated' and interpreted by political actors in a roughly similar fashion throughout (Western) Europe. The social cleavages – between agriculture and labour, the church and the state, the centre and the periphery, the industrial workers and the owners of the capital – 'produced' competing political parties, which could be grouped in distinct party families according to the social groups they represented and the basic ideological principles to which they subscribed. Out of the main four cleavages originally identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the class cleavage has proven to be particularly important for party competition. Indeed, the class cleavage – together with the religious cleavage – has been subsumed in a more general left-right dimension, which normally represents the foremost reference for both parties and voters.

A 'party family' reading of politics in the European Parliament has been successfully offered by several analysts. For instance, on the eve of direct elections, it was observed: “the three genuinely transnational groups – the Socialists, the Christian-Democrats and the Liberals – all contain wide divergences of attitude and outlook [...] but although this is true, it is not the whole truth. There are big differences between the German, British and French socialist parties [...] but no-one is likely to confuse Helmut Schmidt or Willy Brandt with Margaret Thatcher or Giscard d'Estaing” (Marquand, 1978:444). A decade later, transnational party cooperation at the EC level was said to bring national parties closer and closer together: “at the level of party elites, programs are becoming increasingly similar, and it cannot be denied that the parties are moving closer together. Even without exaggerated optimism it can be said that the process is strong enough to make the classification of the *famille spirituelles* less problematic now than it was before the Second World War” (Von Beyme, 1985:137).

Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to believe that the exercise of identifying the boundaries of the traditional party families has recently become more complex. Western European party systems have witnessed the emergence of new divisions which could not be foreseen decades ago, such as the politicization of Green issues, or that of the European Union. Besides that, the classic party families have also witnessed important changes and adaptations through time. The core values and principles upon which they have traditionally centered are often said to be waning. Regarding especially the most successful party families, it may prove to be more difficult now than just a couple of decades ago to identify their core sets of values: the specialized literature often depicts “catch-all” people's parties, “cartel” parties and “electoral professional” parties, seeking to satisfy the short term demands of pragmatic voters in a context of growing policy consensus (e.g. Katz, Mair, 1995). According to some observers, this trend has become fully evident in the post-

1989 world, when the “end of ideologies” has left political parties with only a feasible course of action: supporting liberal-market democracy. Therefore, it is a widely-heard argument that the concepts of 'left' and 'right' would be less-meaningful now and new categories are in need for the future.

Besides that, a reading of European politics in terms of the traditional party families is also challenged by the continuous enlargements of the EU. While it might have been a relatively easy task to bring together the Socialist or the Christian-Democratic parties in the EC-6, the political Groups faced a much more challenging situation on the eve of the far-ranging expansion to the ten young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, entering the EU between May 2004 and January 2007. Indeed, party family categories appear to be more inadequate the more they are asked to travel beyond Western European boundaries (Benoit, Laver, 2006:133-145). At the time of the “Big Bang” enlargement, party systems in Central and Eastern Europe were still in a state of flux – with parties suddenly emerging or disappearing in a context of very high electoral volatility. Moreover, political parties used to exploit the label “liberal”, even when they had very little, if anything, to share with the liberal family, some conservative or populist parties ventured to present themselves as Christian-Democrats and the Greens, with a couple of minor exceptions, were practically absent. On one hand, this clearly suggests the need to apply with the due care traditional party family categories to post-communists systems. On the other hand, it might also highlight a tension for the integration of CEE parties in the political Groups, with some risks for the latter policy coherence.

2. Presentation of the Data

The data used to study the ideological position and cohesion of the political Groups originates from two main sources. Since the objective of this paper is to map the policy positions of the national parties in as many Member States as possible, we decided to compute – according to well-established techniques – some policy scales where national parties could be usefully located. Even if a qualitative analysis of a few selected parties might have cast more light on the subtleties of political rhetoric, an extensive analysis of the complex reality of the European Parliament (where 751 MEPs, for about 170 national parties, sit in seven political Groups or as independent) required the use of quantitative data and some simple statistical techniques. The data we employed (described in more detail both below and in the appendix) originates from the coding of the election manifestos issued by national parties for the 2004 EP elections (*EMP data-set*) and the self-positioning of political parties (cross-checked and, eventually, modified by experts) for the 2009

European Parliament elections (*EU Profiler*).

2.1 Euromanifesto Project

The Euromanifestos Project (EMP), based at the University of Mannheim in Germany, applies quantitative content analysis to the election manifestos issued by the national and the European-level parties for the European Parliament elections. The theoretical and methodological foundation of the EMP lie in the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), a long-lasting international endeavour, which systematically collected and coded the election manifestos issued by the national political parties for the national elections in the post-World War II period (for an extensive presentation, see Budge *et al.*, 2001).

National (and European-level) parties also issue election programs for the European Parliament elections: the EMP moved from the idea that these manifestos, conveying meaningful information on the political priorities and positions of the parties, could be coded following the CMP instructions. In order to capture their European content, the original coding-scheme has been marginally modified: without getting into the technical details here (but see Braun, 2006), it shall suffice to note that several categories and a new level have been added to the original coding to better catch the party discourse concerning European integration.

The aim of quantitative content analysis is to transform words into numbers. In the case of election manifestos, each quasi-sentence – which is the unit of analysis and can be understood as the verbal expression of one political idea or issue – is placed in one of the categories defined by the original dictionary. This dictionary is made up of 69 coding categories (peace, free enterprise etc.) grouped into 7 policy domains (external relations, economy etc.). Let us imagine that an election manifesto states: “our party supports the introduction of a tax for the goods imported from China”. This (quasi-)sentence is coded under the category “protectionism: positive” in the “economy” domain. The coding is repeated for each of the (quasi-)sentences in the manifesto and – at the end of the work – the whole text is transformed into numbers: what we are left with is a table with the number of quasi-sentences falling under each coding category.

From the items obtained from the manifesto coding, a left-right and an anti-pro European integration scale can be computed. The computation of the left-right scale is based on a slightly modified version of the CMP scale (see again Budge *et al.*, 2001 and Braun *et al.*, 2006), while the EU integration scale is made up from the aggregation of specific EMC category between two poles: positive and negative references to the EU polity and policies (Braun, 2006 *et al.*). Finally, it is worth observing that very few parties and, in general, small parties, do not issue any

manifesto for the European Parliament elections. In this case, a substitute for the Euromanifesto has been searched for (ex. the European ‘chapter’ of a corresponding national platform, or a speech of the leader). In other cases, it might also happen that parties adopt the manifesto of the Euro-party where they have membership. However, the vast majority of national parties still adopt their own manifesto for the European Parliament elections.

2.2 EU Profiler

The EU Profiler, based at the European University Institute (Florence) conveys information both on voters and political parties. The Profiler is an electronic tool by means of which voters have the possibility to place themselves in a policy space determined by several dimensions and find out which political party – both in their own country and throughout the EU – is closer to their own preferences.

This paper uses only the EU Profiler data for political parties. Two methodological issues are particularly relevant and need to be briefly discussed - first, the coding of the parties. Political parties were asked to answer a questionnaire made up of thirty policy questions. The *self*-placement of the parties – asked to provide empirical evidence, such as manifesto extracts, leader declarations, interviews etc. to substantiate their answers – was then checked by a group of country experts, who compared the party self-placement with their own information. The experts, like the parties, were asked to support their own coding with documents and, among the sources for the coding, the primary role was assigned to the party manifesto for the EP elections. In case of discrepancy between the two, the experts had the final word. The second issue concerns the selection of the questions to be included in the survey. After careful analysis of party discourse (based especially on party manifestos), twenty-eight general and two country-specific questions were grouped in nine policy fields representing the main issues for party competition. Out of these groupings: a general left-right scale, an anti-pro EU scale and seven specific policy dimensions were generated (see Trechsel, Mair, 2009 and www.euprofiler.eu)

The EU Profiler data presents two important strengths. First, the tool was specifically designed for the 2009 EP elections, thus providing the most updated evidence for party positioning and issue priorities. Second, the data covers all Member countries in the EU-27 and almost all parties represented in the VIIth European Parliament (see the appendix).

The correlation between the two scales is 0.69 ($p < .01$) and about half of the variance ($r^2 = .47$) in the Euromanifesto scale is accounted by the expert scale. From graph 2, three elements are worth emphasizing. First, with the clear exception of the Latvian People's Party (TP), there are almost no parties which get classified as opposed to the EU by the manifestos and supportive by the experts (or the other way round). Second, the Euromanifesto measure is less dispersed. While parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or the Mouvement pour la France (MPF) make full use of their manifesto to criticize the EU, there are no corresponding parties in the positive side of the spectrum. In other words, there are no Euromanifestos dealing exclusively with the EU polity and policies in positive terms. Third, the large majority of the observations is clustered in the top-right quadrant – where all the mainstream parties are. Hard Euroskepticism is to be found only among traditional left (ie. the Greek KKE or the French PC) and, especially, conservative parties. Here again, the empirical test does not dismiss the validity of the Euromanifesto anti-pro EU scale.

3. Empirical Analysis

We begin – drawing on previous work (Klingemann *et al.* 2007:28-50) – by presenting the Euro-manifesto data, which allow us to get an overview of the issue priorities of the political Groups. Table 1 shows which themes are most emphasized by national parties in their European election manifesto. Numbers in the table indicate the content code share belonging to each issue category: for instance, 'military strength' indicates the percentage of the manifesto devoted to military issues (such as the need to maintain or increase military expenditure, rearmament, need to create an EU army etc.). Each number in the cells could thus vary from 0 (when the party manifesto does not mention the issue at all) to 100 (if the whole manifesto deals exclusively with the issue). The grouping of the policy domains (external policies, constitutional affairs etc.) follows the competences of the EP Committees, while the grouping of the coding categories draws from Klingemann *et al.* 2007, but it is adapted to the EMP data. It is important to stress that the table simply indicates the emphasis that parties assign to each policy category (or, if you wish, the amount of text for each policy area): low entries do not necessarily indicate negative positions.

Looking at the entries in table 1, three main observations can be made. First, the manifestos of the national parties grouping in the EPP and the S&D mostly emphasize the same categories. For both political Groups, the most 'popular' issue is international cooperation (including stronger cooperation in the EU). It is then followed by positive references to the EU institutions (support for a European constitution and positive references to the Parliament and the Commission), ranking

second for the EPP and third for the S&D and, finally, by expansion of the welfare state (although the space devoted to expanding the welfare state is almost double in the S&D manifestos: 13,8 % vs. 7%). For the rest, the EPP parties devote more space to issues of traditional morality (support for a traditional family, religion etc.) and to the market economy. In turn, the S&D parties give a more prominent role to the protection of the environment and to state intervention in the economy.

The second observation concerns the ALDE and the two leftist political Groups (the Greens-EFA and the GUE-NGL). Even though international cooperation still ranks high in their issue priorities, each of them assigns a special prominence to a particular policy category. Thus, the ALDE Group is very supportive of the market economy (11,9%), the Greens-EFA parties devote one-fourth of their manifestos to environmental protection (24%), while the GUE-NGL demands a stronger welfare state and supports an assertive role for the State in the economy.

Table 1: political Groups priorities as revealed by their Euro-manifestos

	EPP	S&D	ALDE	Greens-EFA	GUE-NGL	ECR	EFD
International Cooperation	12,7 (1)	14,3 (1)	9,2 (2)	8,3 (3)	7,8 (3)	5,3	1,8
Military Strength	3,8	1,4	1,6	0,1	0,2	1,2	0,3
Peace	1,4	3,4	2,1	5,8	6,6	2,7	0,6
Nationalism	1,9	1,1	1,9	1,3	3,2	5,3	30,5 (1)
Special Relations	1,7	0,7	1	0,5	1,4	3,2	0,1
Enlargements	3,9	1,1	2,1	0,8	0,5	0,1	2
Constitutional Affairs							
EU Positive	10,2 (2)	8,1 (3)	5,7	8,2	5,8	6,5	2,8
EU Negative	3,1	1,7	3,6	2,6	5,1	20,8 (1)	12,7 (2)
Democracy	2,8	4,3	4,9	5,4	5,9	3,3	7,6
Government	3,3	4,9	2,7	1,6	2,7	11 (2)	8,2 (3)
Decentralization	4	2,4	4,1	3,4	3	1,4	5
Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs							
Freedom and HR	2,4	2,1	3,5	5,6	4	1,5	3
Traditional Morality & Order	6,6	4,3	5,4	1	1,8	9,8 (3)	5,9
Economic and Monetary Affairs							

	EPP	S&D	ALDE	Greens-EFA	GUE-NGL	ECR	EFD
Market Economy	6,4	5,4	11,9 (1)	2,6	3,6	7,4	4,4
Planned/Mixed Economy	1	1,5	1	1,1	7,9 (2)	1,6	1,3
Economic Infrastructure	6	5,5	5,7	1,3	2	1,1	2
Social Affairs							
Welfare State Limitation	0,1	0	0,1	0	0	0,4	0,1
Welfare State Expansion	7 (3)	13,8 (2)	7,6	10,4 (2)	14,5 (1)	1,6	1,2
Social Group Politics	0,3	0,5	0,2	0,6	0,3	0	0
Environment							
Environmental Protection	4,1	6,6	8,2 (3)	24 (1)	7,5	3,9	4,3
Agriculture							
Agriculture	3,1	2,5	3,6	3,7	2,1	5,9	0,5

Note: Entries are means of national parties emphases (% sentences belonging to each category) - weighted per number of MEPs per national party. In bold the highest entry per row. The numbers in parentheses indicate the three most emphasized issues per political Group.

Finally, the ECR and the EFD distinguish themselves with a markedly Euro-skeptical rhetoric: negative references to the EU institutions occupy one-fifth of the ECR manifestos and are ranked second in the hierarchy of priorities of the EFD, where they are accompanied by a very pronounced nationalistic appeal (30,5%). Both Groups devote much space to institutional affairs and support administrative efficiency and strong executives in the member States. Furthermore, the EFD puts a particular emphasis on the issue of democracy, which becomes a critique to the anti-democratic nature of the EU, and it supports decentralization (opposing centralization at the EU level).

This data seems to indicate that the political Groups are quite clearly distinguished according to the issues they prioritize. In economic and social affairs, references in favour of a market economy and – although it is hardly mentioned by parties – for welfare state limitation clearly separate the ALDE, the ECR and the EPP (to the right) from the other groupings (to the left). Regarding the support for European integration, a divide emerges between the ECR and the EFD (strongly opposed) *vis-a-vis* the other political groupings, where positive and negative references to the EU lean towards the positive side, moderately so for the GUE-NGL and convincingly so for the other political Groups.

Has the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe brought any change to the above

picture? Do parties from the post-communist systems make up a politically distinct sub-group? In order to address these questions (see also Klingemann, 2007:29-32), table 2 displays the means of the share of the manifesto sentences referring to the usual policy domains, grouping the national parties by region (whether they are from the 'Old' EU or from Central and Eastern Europe). The last column lists the total means together with the results of a statistical (difference-of-means) test. It can certainly be observed that in the majority of categories there are no important differences between the parties from the two regions. If we limit our focus to those categories highlighted in bold – the most emphasized per policy domain – Central and Eastern European parties are significantly different only in “traditional morality, law and order” and for environmental issues. The latter is easily explained: there are almost no Green parties in our sample (and very few, in general, in Central and Eastern Europe). The difference in the former category is, instead, specifically due to the fact that most CEE parties joining the EPP or the ECR Group – for instance, the Polish Law and Justice, the Latvian People's Party, the Lithuanian New Era or the Slovakian Christian Democratic Movement – put a very strong emphasis on this category, as no Western European party does.

Looking more broadly at the other categories, significant differences are to be found in the emphases on “special relationships” (in CEE manifestos, a quite prominent place is obviously occupied by the relationships with Russia); on “economic infrastructure” (where CEE parties predictably raise their voice more loudly) and on “planned economy”, which post-communist countries – quite understandably – tend to downplay. Overall, the impact of the 'Big Bang' enlargement, albeit not negligible, appears to be limited to a few well-delineated issue areas.

Table 2: political priorities in Western and Eastern Europe


	Old Europe (93)	New Europe (31)	Total (124)
Domains:			
1. External Affairs			
International Cooperation	10	9,5	9,9
Military Power	1,1	1,2	1,2
Peace	3,5	2,7	3,3
Nationalism	3,2	4	3,4
Special Relations	0,9	2,4	1,5**
Enlargements	1,8	0,6	1,5**

2. Constitutional Affairs			
EU positive	7,8	6,3	7,5
EU negative	4,7	4,3	4,6
Democracy	4,9	3,8	4,6**
Decentralization	4,4	3,1	4
Government	4,3	3,4	4,1
3. Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs			
Freedom and HR	3,2	2,6	3,1
Traditional Morality, Law & Order	4,4	9,4	5,7**
4. Economic and Monetary Affairs			
Market Economy	5,8	5,7	5,8
Planned/Mixed Economy	2,3	1,1	2**
Economic Infrastructure	3,7	5,8	4,2**
5. Social Affairs			
Welfare State Expansion	9,5	12,8	10,3
Social Group Politics	0,2	0,6	0,3
6. Environment			
Environmental Protection	8,6	4,3	7,5**
7. Agriculture			
Agriculture	3	3,8	3,2

Note: Entries are weighted means of national parties emphases (% sentences belonging to each category). ** sig. .01 (analysis of variance, robust estimates). In bold the main issue per policy domain.

In order to more accurately present the political cohesion (or heterogeneity) of the political Groups, the policy positions of the national parties who received at least one parliamentary seat in the 2009 European Parliament elections have been displayed in a bi-dimensional space, where the horizontal axis represents the left-right position and the vertical axis the anti-pro European integration position of the parties. The two axes have been selected for their relevance in European politics: several empirical studies, based on a wide-range of data and methods, have convincingly demonstrated that the left-right and the integration dimension constitute a parsimonious, but fairly accurate, representation of the EU (and EP) policy space (i.e. Hix *et al.*, 2007; McElroy, Benoit, 2007).

Graph 2: the EPP, the S&D and the ALDE Groups in a bi-dimensional space



Note: $n(\text{EPP})=32$; $n(\text{S\&D})=26$; $n(\text{ALDE})=24$. The long-dashed lines are for the Euro-party manifesto, the short dashed lines are for the mean weighted position of the national parties represented in the Group. Each circle represents a national party: the bigger the circle, the larger its number of MEPs.


In the scatter-plots (graph2 and graph3), the short dashed line graphically represents the weighted mean position of the national parties, the long-dashed line depicts the position of the corresponding Euro-party (when present), while the continuous line is simply the mid-point of the scale. Each member party is represented by a circle. The bigger the circle, the more MEPs a party received in the 2009 EP elections. In order to get a measure of the policy position and of the 'spread' of the Groups, we have computed weighted means and standard deviations (reported in table 3). Starting with the Group of the European People's Party, it can be seen that the vast majority of its constituent national parties are in the top-right quadrant (right-of-the-center position and pro-European). The mean position of the national parties on the left-right dimension is 12.9 while the position on European integration is 11.5. The EPP appears to be more cohesive on the EU dimension (standard deviation (sd) = 1.1) than on the left-right axis (sd = 1.7). In the graph, this is visually displayed by the more pronounced overlapping of the circles around the vertical mean than around the horizontal mean. Furthermore, there are a few parties on the left-hand side quadrant and others moderately critical of the EU. Leaning more towards the left-hand side, we have the Italian SVP (indeed, contesting the elections with the centre-left coalition in Italy), the Finnish National Coalition and the Belgian Humanistic Democratic Centre, while the Bavarian CSU and the Italian UDC lean more towards the right-hand side. The Latvian People's Party and a few other parties grouped around the mid-point of the scale seem, instead, more critical towards the EU. It should also be noted that the big five (the German CDU, the Italian PDL, the French UMP, the Polish PO and the Spanish PP) are all quite close in the policy space.

Moving forward, the S&D Group occupies a centre-left position and is in favour of European integration. Its component parties are more cohesive on the anti-pro EU integration dimension (sd = 0.6) than on the left-right axis (sd = 1.4). The UK Labour Party is furthest to the right, while the Belgian, French-speaking, Socialists occupy the furthest left position. It is interesting to note that the Euro-party (PES) position on the left-right axis (9.9) is fairly more centrist than the national parties' mean (9).

Finally, the ALDE Group is placed at the centre of the political spectrum and its constituent parties are pro-European. Here again, there is almost double the variation on socio-economic policies than on the integration dimension. According to the manifesto estimates, only two parties deviate markedly from this centrist position: the Flemish OpenVLD and the Estonian Reform Party, occupying a right-wing position. The position of the ELDR party (one of the two Euro-parties represented in the ALDE Group) almost coincides with the mean position of the national parties. Overall, these data indicate that the three bigger political Groups can hardly be distinguished and are all internally cohesive on European integration. A wider range of positions is represented on the

left-right spectrum, where the political Groups are internally more heterogeneous, but their respective positions are also quite distinct: the EPP occupies a centre-right position, the ALDE is firmly at the centre and the S&D lies at the centre-left of the policy space.

Graph 3: the smaller Groups in a bi-dimensional space



Note: $n(\text{G-EFA})=15$; $n(\text{GUE-NGL})=14$; $n(\text{ECR})=7$, $n(\text{EFD})=6$. The long-dashed lines are for the Euro-party manifesto, the short dashed lines are for the mean weighted position of the national parties represented in the Group.

The positions concerning the other Groups are displayed in graph 3. In line with conventional descriptions of the EP policy space, the Greens-EFA and the GUE-NGL are located on the left-hand side, while the Conservatives (ECR) on the right-hand side of the spectrum. The Europe Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD) occupies a right-wing position – even if one of its main constituent parties, the Italian Northern League, is placed on the left by its manifesto data regarding economic policy, where the State plays an active role. Both the Greens and the Communist parties are quite

dispersed on socio-economic policy, but the biggest constituent parties are firmly on the left-hand side. The ECR Group is remarkably cohesive on the two dimensions ($sd = 0.8$) and its member parties are all in the bottom-right quadrant (right-wing and Euro-skeptic). However, it is the EFD Group that has the most critical views towards European integration (no party in our sample is as opposed to European integration as the UK Independence Party).

Table 3: the political Groups on the left-right and anti-pro EU integration scales

	<i>Left-Right</i>		<i>Anti-Pro EU</i>	
	national parties (sd)	<i>Euro-party</i>	national parties (sd)	<i>Euro-party</i>
EPP	12,9 (1,7)	13,7	11,5 (1,1)	11,8
S&D	9 (1,4)	9,9	12 (0,6)	11,3
ALDE	10,2 (1,7)	10,4	11,6 (0,9)	11,6
Greens-EFA	5,6 (1,2)	4,7	10,5 (0,7)	10,8
GUE-NGL	4,5 (2)	-	9,5 (1,1)	-
ECR	12,9 (0,8)	-	7,8 (0,8)	-
EFD	11,1 (2,6)	-	4 (4)	-

Note: entries in the column “national parties” are weighted means (standard deviations)

If a two-dimensional display allows for a synthetic and fairly accurate representation of the EU policy space, it is also true that the real policy spaces where parties compete are highly multidimensional. Nonetheless, empirical analyses need to cope with a trade-off: a mono or bi-dimensional space is parsimonious and simple, but at times insufficient to grasp the complexity of the political world; in turn, a multidimensional space could better represent reality, but further problems could arise in interpretation (e.g. Laver, Hunt, 1992:11-15). In this paper, rather than taking side in this debate, we decided to explore both paths. Having already presented the EMP data in a bi-dimensional context, we now turn to a multidimensional space, by making use of the EU Profiler data.

The EU Profiler team has computed seven policy scales out of the thirty items of the questionnaire submitted to political parties, with reference to: liberal society, expanded welfare state, economic liberalization, restrictive financial policy, law and order, restrictive immigration policy and environmental protection. As we have already underlined, they were carefully selected by the EU Profiler researchers after an examination of party discourse and priorities. Table 4 reports the political Groups means together with their standard deviations to measure the Group cohesion

on the specified dimension. Also, in order to offer a quicker appreciation of the policy spaces occupied by the EP political Groups, spider graphs are also displayed (graph 5). In a spider graph, each spike represents a policy dimension, while the area obtained by connecting the positions of the Groups on each dimension depicts the policy space each political Group occupies.

Before looking at the spider graphs, let us focus on the dispersion of the national parties. Table 4 highlights, in bold, the standard deviations with particularly high values. Obviously, with high standard deviations, the national party members of a Group occupy a broad range of positions on the selected dimension. Among the political Groups, the S&D and the Greens appear to be the most coherent. On the other side, both the ECR and, especially, the EFD appear to be, instead, the expression of a wide range of positions. For instance, the parties in the ECR have very diverse opinions on 'law and order' (indicating harsher punishments for criminals and restriction of civil liberties to fight terrorism) and 'restrictive immigration policy'. However, the EFD is by far the most heterogeneous political Group, with its component parties broadly differing in almost all the dimensions – and agreeing only on the need for a restrictive immigration policy. As it has already been pointed out by looking at the EMP data, the cohesion of the S&D stands out among the biggest political Groups, while the EPP looks quite divided on environmental protection (to be more precise: on the need to prioritize the protection of the environment over other economic goals) and on immigration policies. The ALDE parties display a very pronounced variation on environmental protection (sd = 6.6) and on welfare expansion (for example, on the need to increase social programs, healthcare services and creches), as it was, in any case, easily predictable given the traditional distinction between social (left-wing) and market (right-wing) liberalism.

Table 4: policy position and cohesion of the political Groups on seven policy scales

	EPP (39)	S&D (28)	ALDE (26)	Greens-EFA (21)	GUE-NGL (16)	ECR (8)	EFD (6)
<i>Liberal Society</i>	5.4 (2.5)	12.8 (2.6)	11.5 (3.6)	17.7 (2.1)	16.3 (2.2)	9.7 (5.1)	7.7 (4.7)
<i>Economic</i>	10.3 (2.3)	4.8 (2.1)	10.1 (4.4)	3.1 (1.8)	4.5 (3.2)	10.7 (2.7)	13.4 (5)
<i>Liberalization</i>	10 (2.6)	4.8 (2.2)	10.6 (4)	3.9 (2.2)	5.3 (3.3)	10.5 (4.4)	13.2 (5.5)
<i>Restrictive financial policy</i>	16 (3)	8.6 (3.1)	9.7 (3.6)	2 (2.9)	5.3 (4.1)	12.3 (4.6)	14.8 (4.6)

<i>Restrictive</i>	12.3	7.9	9.1	5.7	6.8	7.4	16.9
<i>immigration policy</i>	(4.4)	(3.7)	(4.2)	(2.8)	(4.5)	(4.9)	(2)
<i>Environmental</i>	9.1	15.2	10.7	17.4	16.2	9.6	5.3
<i>protection</i>	(4.5)	(3.7)	(6.6)	(3)	(3)	(3.4)	(4.1)
<i>Expanded Welfare</i>	10	16.9	10.7	17.6	19	11.3	8
<i>State</i>	(3.9)	(2.7)	(5.3)	(2.7)	(3.5)	(2.5)	(5.6)

Note: entries are weighted means, standard deviations in parentheses. Under the name of the Group, in parentheses, the number of cases. In bold $sd > 4.5$


The spiders are a very effective way to look at the policy positions and at the policy differences between the political Groups. As it can easily be seen in the graph below, the polygon, delineated by the national party positions on the seven dimensions, occupies an area stretching towards the upper-left corner for the S&D, the Greens-EFA and the GUE-NGL, an area stretching towards the bottom-right corner for the EPP, the EFD and (less so) the ECR and, finally, an area delineated by the mid-point of the scales in the case of the ALDE.

In more detail, the Greens-EFA and the GUE-NGL occupy a very similar (almost identical) policy space, while the S&D Group also ranks high on both environmental protection and the need for further welfare protection. However, it is less in favour (albeit still over the mid-point of the scale) of policies for the recognition of same sex marriages, legalization of euthanasia and the decriminalization of soft drugs (grouped under “social liberalism”).


The ALDE, similarly to what we observed for the Euromanifesto data, neatly separates the left from the right, occupying the mid-point in almost all scales. On economic policies, the ALDE is hardly distinguishable from the EPP or the ECR. They are, instead, distinct in the 'law and order' dimension (both the EPP and the ECR are for tougher measures against criminals and tolerate some restrictions of civil liberties in the fight against terrorism) and on immigration (where the ECR is, overall, less restrictive). The EFD resembles the EPP with 'law and order', but it supports more restrictive immigration policies and is more in favour of a neo-liberal economic agenda albeit, as we emphasized in the previous paragraph, with a very wide variation of positions among its constitutive parties.

Graph 5: Spiders (EU Profiler)

a) the EPP, the ALDE and the S&D Groups



b) the smaller political Groups



Note: the seven dimensions are: “Lib Soc” - liberal society; “Eco Lib” - economic liberalization; “Financial” - *restrictive* financial policy; “Law” - law and order; “Immigration”- *restrictive* immigration policy; “Envi” - environmental protection; “Wel” - *expanded* welfare state. The higher the value on a dimension, the stronger the agreement of the Group on the policies expressed by the specified dimension

4. Concluding Remarks

This paper has studied the policy positions and the ideological coherence of the political Groups as they were constituted after the 2009 European Parliament elections. The analysis began

with an assessment of the provision – contained in the Chamber Rules of Procedures since 1958 – that political Groups have to be formed according to their “political affinities”. It has been shown that this disposition is formal and it is only applicable when a political Group explicitly refuses to acknowledge that it rests on some (even loose) ideological bases. A Group “political affinity” is the result of political choices, rather than legal requirements: Groups remain free to set their own conditions for membership. Thus, an appreciation of the cohesion of the political Groups cannot but be made empirically. This paper has sought to do so by relying on two different data sources: the Euromanifestos issued by national parties for the European Parliament elections and the self-placement of parties on some well-known policy dimensions. The aim of the empirical analysis was based in mapping the issue priorities and the positions of the political Groups, together with the variation among their constituent national parties.

Following a traditional reading of European party politics, as based on a small number of well defined party families with core values and identities, the findings have shown that the political Groups (or, to be more precise, the national parties that make them up) emphasize 'their own' issues. The liberal ALDE placed its strongest emphasis on the market economy, the Greens on environment, the Communist GUE-NGL on welfare state expansion, the conservative ECR on law and order and the EFD on Euro-skepticism and restrictive immigration policies. From the Euromanifestos, it was more difficult to appreciate the differences in priorities between the Christian-Democratic (conservative) EPP and the Social-Democrats. Nevertheless, the EU Profiler data clearly emphasized that the S&D supports liberal society and a stronger welfare state and the EPP more market-driven economic policy combined with a more traditional orientation towards social-liberal issues. Furthermore, despite all the warnings which accompanied the 'Big Bang' enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, we showed that its impact on the cohesion and the policy agenda of the political Groups has been moderate. CEE parties have some distinct priorities (especially in foreign and economic policies) but, overall, they are far from constituting a separate sub-group. To reiterate the EU motto for the political Groups, it could be argued that even in the EU-27 they are still “United in Diversity”, with very diverse member parties in terms of their national origin, but rather united in terms of their policy preferences.

The analysis conducted for each political Group has revealed some interesting aspects. The EPP occupies a right of the centre policy space – with a position on socio-economic policies similar to that of the ECR. This analysis confirms the shifting towards the conservative pole of the former Christian-Democratic Group – even if some of its constitutive parties still stick to a centre, if not slightly leftist, position. However, the position of the EPP towards European integration is firmly supportive, while the ECR is firmly Euro-skeptical (or, as they prefer, “Euro-realist”). The

implication of this finding is that the separation between the EPP and its former ED component (including the UK Conservatives) has enhanced the cohesion of the EPP on this important dimension. The Socialists (S&D Group) are the most cohesive of the three 'historical' political Groups: this finding is confirmed both by the Manifesto and the Profiler data. The classic literature on the EP Groups has traditionally emphasized the relative ideological homogeneity of the Socialists on socio-economic policies. However, the S&D is currently a very unified Group also in terms of its support for the European integration project. The times when it was found to be more divided over the EU than on left-right policies (Hix, Lord, 1997:18) seem to be definitely gone. Finally, the ALDE Group is certainly united on its support for European integration, while it is more varied in socio-economic policies. Indeed, this is a classic problem for liberal parties, which are traditionally divided into a left and a right-wing group. Furthermore, all data unambiguously show that the ALDE is occupying the centre of the policy spectrum and its main competitors for this important position appear to be now the Social-Democrats, rather than the EPP.

For the other political Groups, the picture is clear: on the left, the Greens-EFA has adopted a pro-European position (with little variation among its parties), while the GUE-NGL is more critical but not outright opposed to the EU. On the right, the ECR and the EFD are the strongest opponents of the European project. Furthermore, all data showed that the latter political Group is the least coherent in policy terms, with very diverse preferences among its national parties on specific policy issues as well as on the left-right scale.

On a more general level, these findings are beneficial findings for the prospects of EU democracy. The main political Groups have cohesive and well-identifiable positions on left-right policies. Among the smallest political Groups, only the EFD shows a clear lack of ideological cohesion on the socio-economic dimension but, with all evidence, is united by its strong anti-EU perspective. Political Groups can then translate this relative homogeneity in a concrete legislative agenda which, in the post-Lisbon context and with the extension of co-decision, has become more important. The main problem that remains will be to bridge the distance between European citizens and the EU. Political Groups, with the help of their associated Euro-parties, should become capable to effectively propose their manifestos and working programs to the European voters, to confront them with a choice among alternatives.

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Appendix

A. National parties included in the analysis (EMP data-set)

Group of the European People's Party

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
1	Germany	CDU	34	2004	14,3	11,2
2	Germany	CSU	8	2004	15,9	9,7
3	France	UMP	29	1999	10,9	12,6
4	Italy	PDL (FI)	28	2004	13,3	11,4
5	Italy	UDC	5	2004	15,6	9,3
6	Italy	SVP	1	2004	8,1	11,1
7	Poland	PO	25	2004	13,6	12,8
8	Spain	PP	23	2004	14,2	11,6
9	Hungary	FIDESZ	14	2004	12,8	10,1
10	Portugal	PSD/CDS-PP	10	2004	10,5	11,1
11	Greece	ND	8	2004	10,9	11,4
12	Austria	OVP	6	2004	13,1	14,3
13	Netherlands	CDA	5	2004	12,3	12,6
14	Sweden	MSP	5	2004	14,1	11
15	Sweden	KD	1	2004	10,8	11,4
16	Slovakia	SMK	4	2004	9,8	11,6
17	Slovakia	KDH	2	2004	13,3	10,1
18	Finland	KK	4	2004	7,9	11
19	Ireland	Fine Gael	4	2004	10,2	12,2
20	Lithuania	TS-LK	4	2004	13	9,5
21	Belgium	CD&V	3	2004	12	12,7
22	Belgium	CDH	1	2004	8,8	12,4
23	Luxembourg	CSV	3	2004	15,3	12,1
24	Czech Rep	KDU-CSL	2	2004	13	11,8
25	Cyprus	DISY	2	2004	11,7	11,8
26	Latvia	JL	2	2004	10,1	11,6
27	Latvia	TP	1	2004	12,8	7,5
28	Malta	PN	2	2004	12,3	11,7
29	Slovenia	SDS	2	2004	12,5	11,3
30	Slovenia	NSI	2	2004	13,5	10
31	Denmark	KF	1	2001	11,9	12,1
32	Estonia	IL	1	2004	12,3	9,7

n (parties) = 32

Total seats = 243

Coverage MEPs = $243/265 = 91,7\%$

Coverage States = $24/26 = 92,3\%$

Socialists and Democrats

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
33	Germany	SPD	23	2004	8,3	11,9
34	Italy	PD	21	2004	8,3	11,5
35	Spain	PSOE-PSC	21	2004	8,6	12,5
36	France	PS	14	2004	10,9	12,2
37	UK	Labour	13	2004	12,1	12,7
38	Greece	PASOK	8	2004	8,7	11,9
39	Czech Rep	CSSD	7	2004	10,2	12,8
40	Polonia	SLD-UP	7	2004	7,6	12,3
41	Portugal	PSP	7	1999	10	12,8
42	Slovakia	Smer	5	2004	8,5	11,3
43	Sweden	Sdap	5	2004	7,1	10,9
44	Austria	Spo	4	2004	9,1	11
45	Denmark	SD	4	2004	7,4	11,6
46	Hungary	MSZP	4	2004	11,6	12,5
47	Belgium	PS	3	2004	6,3	11,6
48	Belgium	SPA	2	2004	7,1	11,2
49	Ireland	LP	3	2004	8,1	11,3
50	Lithuania	LSDP	3	2004	8,6	9,6
51	Malta	LP	3	2004	9,9	11,3
52	Netherlands	PvDA	3	2004	8,6	11,7
53	Finland	SDP	2	2004	7,1	10,9
54	Slovenia	ZLSD	2	2004	9,5	12,2
55	Estonia	SDE	1	2004	6,3	11,4
56	Luxembourg	LSAP	1	2004	9,2	12,8

n (parties) = 24

Total seats = 166

Coverage MEPs = $166/184 = 90\%$

Coverage States = $23/27 = 85\%$

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
57	Germany	FDP	12	1999	12	11,8
58	UK	Lib	11	2004	10,5	11,2
59	Italy	DiPietro	7	2001	7,9	12,4
60	France	MoDem	6	2004	10,5	12,7
61	Belgium	VLD	3	2004	14,9	9,9
62	Belgium	MR	2	2004	10,4	10,5
63	Denmark	Venstre	3	2004	10,8	12,7
64	Finland	Kesk	3	2004	8,2	11,6
65	Finland	SFP	1	2004	7,8	12,2
66	Ireland	Fianna Fail	3	2004	8,7	11,2
67	Netherlands	D-66	3	2004	8,6	11,6
68	Netherlands	VVD	3	2004	10,4	11,6
69	Sweden	FP	3	2004	9,7	11,5
70	Sweden	Center	1	2004	8,9	11
71	Estonia	K	2	2004	9,8	11,5
72	Estonia	ER	1	2004	14,7	11,5
73	Latvia	LC	1	2004	9,5	10
74	Lithuania	DP	1	2004	10,1	10,8
75	Lithuania	LCS	1	2004	9,5	11,1
76	Luxembourg	PD DP	1	2004	10,5	11,2
77	Slovenia	LDS	1	2004	9,3	12
78	Spain	CiU	1	2004	7,8	10,7
79	Spain	PNV	1	2004	8,7	10,4
80	Cyprus	DYKO	1	2004	11,1	12,3

Total Parties = 24

Total seats = 72

Coverage MEPs = $72/84 = 86\%$

Coverage States = $17/ 18 = 94\%$

Greens-EFA

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
81	Germany	Die Grunen	14	2004	4,7	10,8
82	France	Europe Ecologie	14	1999	5	10,9
83	Netherlands	GL	3	2004	6,9	11
84	Austria	Die Grunen	2	1999	4,8	10,4
85	Belgium	Ecolo	2	2004	7,8	10,2
86	Belgium	Groen!	1	2004	7,8	10,2
87	Denmark	SF	2	2004	5	9,7
88	Finland	Vihreat	2	2004	6,9	10,5
89	Sweden	MPG	2	2004	7	8,2
90	UK	Greens	2	2004	5,4	9,4
91	UK	PC	1	2004	6,4	11
92	UK	SNP	1	2004	9,4	10,2
93	Latvia	LC	1	2004	8,5	9,2
94	Luxembourg	DG	1	2004	4,7	10,8
95	Spain	Verdes	1	2004	4,7	10,8

Total Parties = 15

Total Seats = 49

Coverage MEPs = $49/55 = 89,1\%$

Coverage Countries = $12/14 = 85,7\%$

GUE-NGL

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
96	Germany	Linke	7	2004	4,9	10,4
97	France	Gauche	5	2004	2,3	9,2
98	Czech Rep	KSCM	4	2004	3,8	10,2
99	Cyprus	AKEL	2	2004	7,1	9,9
100	Greece	KKE	2	2004	5,2	8,1
101	Greece	SYR	1	2004	8,5	9,9
102	Netherlands	SP	2	2004	2	9,8
103	Portugal	CDU	2	1999	5,4	8,7
104	Spain	IU	2	2004	3	10
105	Denmark	FB	1	2004	7,6	6,3
106	Ireland	Sinn Fein	1	2004	3,7	9,2

107	Finland	VAS	1	2004	2,3	10,8
109	Nor Ireland	Sinn Fein	1	2004	3,7	9,2
110	Sweden	VP	1	2004	8,7	7

Total Parties = 13

Total Seats = 33

Coverage MEPs = 33/35 = 94,3%

Coverage States = 13/14 = 92,9%

ECR

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
111	UK	Cons	24	2004	13	7,2
112	Poland	Law Justice	15	2004	12,1	7,4
113	Czech Republic	ODS	9	2004	14	8,7
114	Latvia	LNNK	1	2004	11	9,7
116	Hungary	Democratic Forum	1	2004	14,6	9,8
117	Netherlands	CU	1	2004	13,5	9,5
115	Nor Ireland	UUP	1	2004	10,6	9,6

Total Parties = 7

Total seats = 543

Coverage MEPs = 52/54 = 96,3%

Coverage States = 6/8 = 75%

EFD

ID	Country	Party	No. Seats	Data	Left-Right	Anti-Pro EU
116	UK	UKIP	12	2004	11,4	0
117	Italy	LN	9	2004	8	8,6
118	Denmark	DF	2	1999	16,2	5,1
119	Greece	Laos	2	2004	14,7	4,8
120	France	MPF	1	2004	14,1	2,2
121	Netherlands	SGP	1	2004	13,5	9,5

Seats: 27

Coverage MEPs = 27/ 31 = 87,1%

Coverage States = 6 / 9 = 66,7%

B. Policy Categories for the analysis of the Euromanifestos

<i>Klingemann, 2006:41-44</i>		<i>This paper</i>	
Foreign Policy	<i>Categories</i>	External Policies and Security	<i>Categories</i>
Military Strenght	104	Military Strenght	104
Peace and Detente	106, 105, 1031	Peace	106, 105, 103
Nationalism	606, 109, 1032, 6013, 110, 601, 1025, 1026	Nationalism	109, 110s, 601
Int Cooperation	107, 108, 1015, 602	Int Cooperation	107, 108, 606, 602
Special Relationships	101, 102, 1011, 1012, 1012, 1022, 1013, 1023, 1014, 1024, 1016, 6011, 6014	Special Relationships	101s, 102s
		Enlargements	316s, 317s
State Policy		Constitutional Affairs	
Freedom and HR	201, 1033	Democracy	202
Democracy	202, 2021	Constitution	1_203, 3_203, 1_204, 3_204
Constitution	203, 204, 2032, 2041, 2031, 2022, 2023, 2033	Centralization	302
Centralization	302	Decentralization	301, 607
Decentralization	301, 3011, 103, 607, 6071	Government	1_303, 3_303, 1_305, 3_305, 304
Modes of Government	305, 303, 304	Deepening and EU institutions	2_203, 2_3021, 306, 308, 311, 3111, 312, 2_305
Communism positive	Special Items MRG	EU Opposition	2_204, 2_3011, 310, 2_3101, 307, 309, 313,
Communism, negative	Special Items MRG		

		2_2021, 2_303, 318
		<p>Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs</p> <p>Freedom and HR 201s</p> <p>Traditional Morality 601, 603, 608, 605, and Order 2_6021</p> <p>Social Liberalism 604</p>
Economic Policy		Economic and Monetary Affairs
Market Economy 401, 4011, 4014, 4012, 407, 414, 402, 403		Market Economy 401, 407, 414, 402, 403
Planned or Mixed Economy 413, 4121, 4122, 4123, 4124, 415, 409, 406, 405, 404, 4132		Planned/Mixed Economy 413, 415, 409, 406, 404, 405, 412s
Economic Infrastructure 411, 410		Economic Infrastructure 411, 410
General Economic Orientation 408		General Economic Orientation 408
Environmental Protection 501, 416		Environment 501, 416
Agriculture 703		Agriculture 703
Social Policy		
Traditional Morality, Law and Order 603, 608, 605, 6061 6081		
Cultural Libertarianism 604, 6072		
Welfare State Limitation 505, 5031, 5041, 507, 5061, 5021, 702		Welfare State Limitation 505, 507, 702
Welfare State Expansion 504, 506, 502, 701, 503		Welfare State Expansion 504, 506, 502, 503, 701
Social Groups Politics 704, 705, 7051, 7052, 706, 7061, 7062, 706		Social Groups Politics 704, 705, 706

Note: for a description of each item, see Klingemann et al. 2006:41-44 and Braun, 2006,18:38.

C. EU Profiler Data: summary of the data employed in the analysis

Group	No. parties	No. seats	Coverage seats	Coverage States
EPP	39	254	254/265 (95,8%)	26/26 (100%)
S&D	28	182	182/184 (99%)	27/27 (100%)
ALDE	26	80	80/84 (95,2%)	18/18 (100%)
Greens-EFA	21	55	55 /55 (100%)	14/14 (100%)
GUE-NGL	16	34	34/35 (97,1%)	13/14 (92,9%)
ECR	8	54	53/54 (98,1%)	7/8 (87,5%)
EFD	6	26	26/31 (83,9%)	6/9 (66,7%)

Note: 'No. parties' is the number of parties included in the sample per political Group; 'No. seats' the number of seats expressed by the n parties in the first column; 'coverage seats' is the share of MEPs (per political Group) included in the sample; 'coverage States' is the share of Member states (per political Group) represented in the sample.