

Peripheral Democracy

International Pressures, Internal Dynamics and Democratisation in European Former Soviet Countries

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Abstract

In the early 1990s, a widespread belief appeared regarding the diffusion of democracy all around the world and, in particular, in former communist countries. This belief proved sound for former communist countries in Central and Central-Eastern Europe that were now members of the European Union. However, in European post-Soviet republics that have not yet been admitted into the EU, faith in democratisation remains uncertain. Today, some of these countries (in particular Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia) are considered to be hybrid regimes at best. Others, such as Belarus, are clearly authoritarian countries. There is a multiplicity of reasons for the different results in political transformation in the two areas. However, the influence of European Union and the effects of conditionality (democratisation as a must for admission in EU) are very important. On the other hand, the lack of membership perspectives may only partly explain the failure of EU pressures for democratisation in certain former Soviet countries. Some of them suffer the influence of a Russian political trend towards authoritarianism. This is the reason why these countries are sometimes called 'double periphery'. In spite of the relevance of external influences, internal elements also matter. Transition from communism in these countries has meant the contemporary creation of market economies and democratic political regimes. The interaction of the two processes has led to the rise of hybrid regimes. As a consequence, the future of these regimes and the possibility of democratisation in European post-Soviet republics remain uncertain. Based on the results of research funded by the European Union in 2006–2008, this paper analyses in a comparative perspective the internal dynamics and the key elements that have led to the establishment of hybrid or authoritarian regimes in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. It also discusses the perspectives of democratisation or authoritarian regression in these countries and the elements that may help or hinder transition to democracy.

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1 Introduction

After the collapse of the communist world and the first steps made by former communist countries towards a market economy and Western political models, widespread expectations arose about democratisation in the area. Non-Soviet former communist countries rediscovered their European nature and saw the European Union as the main political and economic model to adopt. Former Soviet countries initiated a process of deep transformation and created independent national states. A first fracture emerged between former Soviet countries and former communist countries in Central Eastern Europe. The latter had inherited national states and economies through the communist period whereas former Soviet states had resulted from the fragmentation of a single political and economic entity, the USSR and had to face so-called quadruple transition.¹

Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries required a huge amount of funds to support economic transition and recovery. These funds arrived from international or regional organisations (IMF, EU), states (mainly USA and Germany) and private investors who used their capital to buy local firms or to open new ones in former communist states. The crucial role of international and regional organisations as fund suppliers gave them the power to lend their voice to the adoption of democratic rules and the respect of human rights in recipient countries. During the early 1990s, this form of economic conditionality was the main instrument used to induce democracy and the free market in former communist states.

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¹ Kuzio suggest four different kinds of transitions in post-Soviet countries: democratisation, marketisation (or market building), state building and nation building. T. Kuzio, Transition in post-communist states: triple or quadruple?, *Politics*, 21(3), 2001, pp. 168–77.

At the end of the 1990s it raised the possibility for Central Eastern European and Baltic countries to be admitted into the EU. This opportunity created a new fracture among former communist countries. Candidate countries became the main recipient of EU funds and had to adapt their legislation and political regimes to the *acquis communautaire* and the principles of democracy. The other post-Soviet countries didn't. Then, the paths of candidate countries and the remaining former Soviet countries diverged. Today, former communist countries that joined EU between 2004 and 2007 are considered democratic countries,² while the remaining European post-Soviet countries are regarded at best as hybrid regimes.³

In this paper I will analyse some national cases of former Soviet neighbours of the European Union. In particular I will focus on the so-called 'double periphery' (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine), although the cases of Russia and Georgia will also be discussed in various parts of this paper. In fact, Russia is a crucial actor in the region and has had a huge influence on the other countries. Moreover Russia is both a European state and a former Soviet neighbour of the EU, in spite of a lot of specificities that might suggest differentiating the Russian case from those of double-periphery countries. Although Georgia is neither an EU neighbour nor a European country,⁴ its geographical position and international situation make it similar to those of double-periphery countries. So, I will touch occasionally on the case of Georgia.

I will try to answer four questions. The first is in regards to the reasons for the different results of political transition in candidate countries and the remaining European post-Soviet countries. Why have the former become democratic countries while the latter have not? The second question deals with the role of external pressures in political and economic transformation in post-Soviet countries that are now neighbours of the European Union. How have international pressures shaped the evolution of these regimes? The third question focuses on the different regimes now in power in Russia, Belarus, Moldova Ukraine and Georgia. Why are there these differences? The final question I will try to answer regards the future evolution of the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. Will these countries become democratic in the short term?

² Various criteria are used for defining whether a country is a democracy or not. In this paper I will use the data and evaluation published by Freedom House. See Freedom House, *Nation in Transit*, Washington, various years.

³ Those countries that are neither democratic nor authoritarian are usually called hybrid regimes. Various definitions and denominations have been proposed for different kinds of hybrid regimes. See L. Diamond, Thinking about hybrid regimes, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2), 2002, pp. 21–35; L. Morlino, Régime hybrides ou régimes en transition?, in M.S. Darviche (ed.), *Penser la dynamique des régimes politiques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008, pp. 1–24; L. Morlino, *Are there Hybrid Regimes? Or is Only and Optical Illusion?*, forthcoming; M. Wigell, Mapping hybrid regimes: regime types and concepts in comparative politics, *Democratization*, 15(2), 2008, pp. 230–50.

⁴ Georgia, as well as other Caucasian republics, may be considered neighbours only by sea. Also, Caucasus is usually considered part of Eurasia but not a European region.

2 The debate on EU conditionality

During the last few years various scholars have explained democratisation in the new Eastern member states of the EU as a direct consequence of EU conditionality.⁵ In particular Vachudova suggested that EU leverage, conditionality and the perspective of membership were crucial in driving former communist candidate countries towards democracy. This explanation apparently suggests an answer to our first question. In fact, if EU leverage and conditionality have made the new members democratic, the lack of membership perspectives and, as a consequence, the weakness of leverage and conditionality, may explain why new neighbours never became democracies.

This extension of leverage theory to former Soviet neighbours does not work for several reasons. The first is that there is uncertainty about the democratic nature of new Eastern member states. Some of these countries are heavily corrupt, institutional mechanism works badly and the effectiveness of rule of law is in doubt. These countries have adopted a large part of *acquis communautaire* and have followed a prescription arrived at by Brussels during the pre-accession period. However, in various cases these rules were not applied efficiently or had not been applied at all. Also, after admission into the EU and because of the lack of coercive tools against member states, these countries escaped democratisation by applying the mechanism of conditionality. Thus, the limits of their democratic consolidation emerged. In other words, EU membership does not guarantee that democratisation in these countries is irreversible nor that the quality of democracy will improve.⁶ This suggests that leverage theory only explains part of a process not yet completed.

On the other hand, accepting leverage theory does not mean that membership is essential to induce democratisation in the EU neighbourhood. In fact, leverage theory distinguishes active and passive leverage and explains that passive leverage also exists without any form of active leverage and conditionality.⁷ So, the existence of passive leverage creates opportunities for active leverage without the need to offer membership in the EU. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is based on this logic. In fact, it is incontestable that EU economic attractiveness and its political model exert

⁵ M. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; F. Schimmelfenning and H. Scholtz, EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange, *European Union Politics*, 9(2), 2008, pp. 187–214.

⁶ About the concept of quality of democracy see L. Morlino, 'Good' and 'bad' democracies: how to conduct research into the quality of democracy, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 20(1), 2004, pp. 5–27. L. Diamond and L. Morlino (eds.), *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2005.

⁷ Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*, pp. 63–9.

influence and passive leverage on Eastern neighbours. Also, it is well known and implicit in leverage theory that for candidate countries membership was mainly synonymous with EU funds and enrichment. So, the linkage between economic growth and consolidation of ruling elites in candidate countries was a crucial element of conditionality and active leverage.⁸ Ironically, maybe the lack of political conditionality makes external pressures more effective. The converging economic interests of new neighbours, international organisation and foreign states, and the consequent empowerment of ruling elites induced by economic growth, make internal actors and governments more receptive to external pressures. Instead, political pressures and conditionality endangering the internal balance of power and the ruling position of economic and political elites create hostility. However, economic growth creates conditions for internal democratic development outweighing the resistance of non-democratic ruling elites against political leverage and conditionality.

Finally, if EU membership is not on the table for former Soviet neighbours, membership in other international organisations is. This means that other forms of active leverage apart from EU membership perspectives exist to induce democracy in those countries. In particular, economic attractiveness and whatever the EU's new Eastern neighbours may gain by stricter links with the EU and other international organisations are powerful tools for active leverage.

Probably, the real question to answer is not whether EU leverage works, but what are the real aims and priorities of international organisations and foreign states that exert pressures on European post-Soviet countries that are now neighbours of the European Union? In fact, democratisation is not the only declared aim of external pressures. Various other matters are important for external actors; for example, the consolidation of the market economy and rule of law in the field of economic regulation, energy and transport networks, financial stability, repayment of external debt, and military alliances.⁹ In the opinion of this author democratisation ranks last among these aims. This is the main explanation for the poor results of external pressures for democratisation in the area.

An analysis of EC assistance funds allocation in post-Soviet neighbours (see Table 2 in Appendix) reveals the existence of priority and marginal items. This is evident in the case of EU support to democratisation in the area, in a fully political sense. Table 2 shows the sums paid by the EU in the European post-Soviet area for various projects, support to democratisation and human rights included. The latter is a very small portion of the whole amount paid. Moreover, there is an evident disproportion in the distribution of

⁸ Schimmelfenning and Scholtz suggest focusing on population quality of life instead of general economic growth as a crucial element that supports democratisation. Schimmelfenning – Scholtz, *EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood*, p. 211.

⁹ K. Dawisha (ed.), *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, Armonk (N.Y.), M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

funds among countries. Georgia collected the largest portion of funds granted by the EIDHR and specifically devoted to support democracy.¹⁰ However, Georgia is the smallest among the countries funded, and it was no less non-democratic than Belarus or Ukraine in the same period. This disproportion suggests that there were other reasons for over-funding Georgia, probably connected with its strategic position and pro-Western attitudes. Anyway, funds paid by the European Community went mainly for Tacis projects in the fields of nuclear safety or cross-border cooperation. Money was also paid for humanitarian tasks such as food security, anti-landmines activities or the ECHO programme.¹¹ However, humanitarian assistance cannot be considered as a form of direct support to democratisation.

Considering funds distribution, democratisation ranks last in the EC's priorities. However, other funds come from single EC member states and national foundations that support democratisation in various ways. So, the poorness of money devoted to democracy assistance by the EC is counterbalanced in part by the funds of member states and foundations. These funds may be relevant, in particular in certain fields such as political parties' support, whose empowerment creates the basis for a working democracy.¹² However, assistance policies of EU member states usually focus on topics and countries particularly interesting in themselves. This means that post-Soviet neighbours are the main recipient of assistance by Eastern European members of EU, which means the poorest.¹³ Nevertheless, the payment of these funds does not depend on EU conditionality. So, they have not to be considered for evaluating Communitarian support to democratisation.

The quantitative analysis of EC financial assistance to democratisation in the post-Soviet neighbourhood demonstrates the paucity of the EC/EU's efforts to use economic assistance to promote political changes in the regimes of the area. Furthermore, the analysis of country reports on the Eastern neighbourhood policy suggests that democratisation and regime change are not the EU priority aims in the area.¹⁴ The real priorities are energy and transport networks and regulations in fields particularly important for EU interests like capital flows, investments or governance.¹⁵ The latter is crucial

¹⁰ EIDHR is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights established in 2005.

¹¹ ECHO provides emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflicts outside the EU area. See http://ec.europa.eu/about/what/history_en.htm.

¹² It seems that political foundations in EU member states have a relevant role in assisting parties in post-Soviet neighbours. See J. van Wersch and J. de Zeeuw, *Mapping European Democracy Assistance. Tracing the Activities and Financial Flows of Political Foundations*, The Hague, Netherland Institute of International Relations, working paper 36, 2005.

¹³ For example an important support for democratisation in Moldova comes from Romania. See L. Jonavičius, *The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, Madrid, Fride, working paper 55, 2008.

¹⁴ See country reports on EC website http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

¹⁵ Local governance is becoming an important target of EU support to post-Soviet countries.

to guard EU investors against arbitrary actions and to protect their investments and activity. Rule of law and efficient administrative and judiciary systems in post-Soviet countries help to fight against illegal emigration to EU and criminal traffics at borderline. This is what really matters to the EU. This means that the EU's inability to address the political regimes of post-Soviet neighbours towards democracy depends first of all on the lack of interest of the EU in this field and not on the lack of membership perspectives. Membership is only one of the possible instruments the EU may use to induce political changes in neighbour countries and its lack doesn't preclude the EU from the possibility of exerting political leverage. The point is that the EU aims to exert political leverage in other fields than democratisation and the offer of membership is an inadequate instrument to pursue this aim.

3 External pressures and internal dynamics

An analysis of mechanisms and transmissions channels of external pressures suggests that economic attraction may be a powerful instrument of active and passive leverage, independently by conditionality and membership perspectives. We will study these mechanisms referring to the case of EU pressures on post-Soviet neighbours. This case is particularly apt because of the wide interest and literature devoted to the EU's external activities. The EU is only one of the possible international actors able to influence internal politics in post-Soviet neighbours. However, the EU is the richest and more attractive economic area close to the double-periphery countries. It also aims to promote democracy in the area. So, to study EU influence on these countries is probably the better way of understanding how international pressures shape democratisation in double periphery.

The analysis of EU influence on the post-Soviet neighbourhood requires identifying the main actors involved, the processes activated and the transmission channels of external pressures that make EU influence effective. All the countries face external constraints. Because of these constraints these countries are not insulated from the rest of the world as well as from the international economy and politics. External constraints limit the economic and political independence of a country and its ability to implement politics. In fact, the existence of external constraints reduces the working space of governments and their freedom to define their politics limiting the number of choices they have. Usually, external constraints and the limits they impose are out of the control of the single governments that face the constraints. These governments have a rare influence on the

Probably this interest also depends on the opportunities for EU investors to take control of local public services (gas, power and water supplies, garbage treatments). Interview with Andriy Sukhoryabov, Ecolog Group (Poland), Kiev, February 2008.

dimension and essence of external constraints, and they can only adapt their choices to the limit imposed by external constraints. Constraints may result from the deliberate policies of foreign countries or international institutions as well as by mechanisms of international economy and politics which the single states cannot manage. Usually these constraints work independently of the political regime of the countries they affect. However, the impact may be different depending on the internal actors and dynamics touched by the constraints. So, the interaction between external constraints and internal processes is the crucial element to analyse to understand the impact of external pressures.

There are two types of external constraint: political and economic. That doesn't mean that political constraints address only political matters and economic constraints only deal with economic matters. In fact, both kinds of constraints may induce transformation in the opposite side. The use of economic conditionality for political aims is a relevant example of external constraint used by external actors to support their political pressures.

If external political pressures depend mainly on the coordinated and planned actions of external actors, economic pressures don't. In fact, the international economic structure is in a large part the result of colliding preferences and strategies, sometimes correctly perceived or planned, sometimes not. So, the outcomes of external economic constraints may be erratic and unmanageable. On the other hand, political constraints also influence the effects of economic constraints. In fact, changes in political structure, normative environment and the effectiveness of the rule of law in hybrid regimes determined by external pressures may have a relevant impact on the effects and the transmission channels of external economic constraints. So, political constraints able to influence these internal elements will also have relevant effects on the impact of external economic constraints. Also, we need to distinguish the planned and unplanned outcomes of external constraints. For example, both the deliberate policies of the EU and the indirect consequences of its existence may have an impact on its neighbours.

There are different categories of external constraints that may have a relevant impact on non-democratic regimes in the European post-Soviet area. External constraints share two macro categories: constraints planned and imposed directly by external institutions such as the IMF and EU and constraints imposed indirectly by certain aspects of the international context such as the international economy and political geography. The latter are usually unmanageable and unpredictable in terms of outcomes and timing. We will therefore refer to them as erratic constraints. Also, while governments may negotiate with international actors, who may impose strict external constraints, this is impossible for erratic constraints.¹⁶ However,

¹⁶ We need to distinguish among states, regional organisation and international institutions.

planned constraints may also produce erratic and unplanned outcomes. On the other hand, erratic constraint may induce states to negotiate international coordinated action to manage the effects of those constraints. In certain cases unplanned outcomes may be more relevant than the effects of planned policies. This is the case of the economic attraction of the EU area which, in this author's view, results more effectively than other EU policies in attracting post-Soviet neighbours towards liberal democracy.

Before concentrating on the specific case of EU influence, we need to define a general model for analysing the impact of external pressures and constraints on post-Soviet neighbours. Analysing such a complex phenomenon as EU external influence on post-Soviet neighbours needs defining a scheme to picture the roles and interdependence of the main actors involved in this process. Figure 1, which depicts the scheme I propose,¹⁷ shows some specific element of EU external influence and identifies the main internal actors and channels of transmission of external influence in a post-Soviet neighbour. Planned and unplanned elements generate external influence. The latter may be subdivided into political and economic as respectively the political model or market and finance. Otherwise, unplanned elements may be defined as institutional or structural. In this case political or economic models are institutional elements while market and finance are structural elements. All of these elements interact with internal actors or structures inside the neighbour country.

The main elements that determine EU influence in post-Soviet countries are the EU political and economic models, EU policies and EU economic attraction. Democracy and market economy are the main aspects of EU political and economic models. In other words, liberal democracy represents an example of a political regime that may inspire and address political programmes and the requests of various actors inside the post-Soviet neighbour states. This political regime is not exclusive to the EU but is characteristic of the whole Occident and it resulted in being very attractive, mainly in the early post-Soviet period. The political model of the European Union and its member states represents an example of political regimes for many parties and civil society of post-Soviet countries, whereas the economic model adopted in the EU mainly influences the preferences and strategies of post-Soviet economic elites.¹⁸

We define international organisation bodies like the European Union that are neither states, nor institutions. Instead, for international institutions we mean those bodies like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that have specific functions worldwide.

¹⁷ Different schemes to depict the impact of external pressures and the reaction of internal actors had been proposed. For different descriptions of the impact of external agencies actions on post-Soviet countries see K. Dawisha and M. Turner, *The interaction between internal and external agency in post-communist transitions*, in K. Dawisha (ed.), *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, pp. 398–424.

¹⁸ Ukrainian oligarchs used to say, 'Do business with the Russians and protect them with the Europeans.' This indicates how the EU liberal democracy represents a model to follow in

EU policies in post-Soviet countries are targeted to support specific political and economic processes. For example, the EU introduced the neighbourhood policy and in its framework inserted the EIDHR programme to support democratisation and human rights in the area. Also, the EU developed policies in the field of transnational railways networks and oil pipelines as well as policies of immigration and border control.¹⁹ All these policies shape EU relations with post-Soviet countries. Besides, EU policies mainly affect the governments and the economic structure of countries and in part civil society. Finally, elements of EU economic structure interact with the post-Soviet countries' internal economic structure and shape the strategies of businessmen. The main elements to consider are the trade flows between the EU area and the post-Soviet countries; the opening of the EU internal market to goods and workers coming from post-Soviet countries; and the accessibility of the EU financial market to post-Soviet borrowers. All these elements determine the interdependence of the post-Soviet and EU economic structures, which means the economic attractiveness of the EU.

The impact of EU pressures and politics on internal actors and structures generates internal processes that result in pressures on the government by parties, civil society and economic elites. These pressures address the government's policies in favour of or against the EU, depending on the attitudes of the internal actors that exert those pressures and the relationship existing between these internal actors and the government. For example, the Belarus and Russian governments reacted to the support EU granted to NGOs with restrictions against NGOs' activity and hindered the influence the EU exerted on NGOs.²⁰ In contrast, the Ukraine government issued laws to grant more transparency in firms' balance sheets to satisfy pressures by economic elites that aimed external financial support.²¹

One of the main hypotheses of this paper is that EU economic attraction is the crucial element in determining EU leverage on post-Soviet neighbour countries. Apparently, this may be sufficient to explain why we assume economic elites have the most relevant function in the transmission of

their minds, notwithstanding the convenience of doing business with Russians. In fact, the adoption of an EU-inspired system of rules could grant them the respects of their propriety rights and business freedom.

¹⁹ The most prominent among these programmes are TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) created in 1993, INOGATE, an international energy cooperation programme between the European Union, the coastal States of the Black and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries established in 1995, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (UBAM) launched in 2005, and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management) an old programme created in 1992 and extended to the ENPI countries in 2008. See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/index_en.htm (consulted in December 2008)

²⁰ T. Ambrosio, Insulating Russia from a colour revolution: how the Kremlin resists regional democratic trends, *Democratization*, 14(2), 2007, pp. 232–52.

²¹ Interview with Vladimir Dukhnenko and Vitaliy Shapran, manager in chief and financial chief analyst of Expert Rating Agency, Kiev February 2008.

external pressures on countries. Instead, it is the statement about EU economic attraction that is derived from the predominance of economic elites' role and of economic interests in internal dynamics.

This predominance depends mainly on two factors. First, in almost all the post-Soviet countries traditional internal actors (political parties, NGOs, interest groups, trade unions and civil society) are too weak to influence the government. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia are hybrid regimes where political parties are electoral machines for political elites and their ability to orient government policies is very poor. Also, certain interest associations (e.g. industrialists or traders' associations) have limited influence on the government. The latter interacts mainly with informal groups or single persons with direct corporative relations. These groups or persons are mainly industrialist or oligarchs, which means part of the economic elites. Larger groups with well-defined economic interests such as trade unions or industrialist associations play a secondary role in political life.




Figure 1 Transmission channels for EU pressures, leverage and conditionality.

Trade unions are mainly under state control or heirs of the former Soviet trade unions and of their philosophy in the field of state–workers relations.²² This is true also for Ukraine where there are independent trade unions. However, independent trade unions are strong only in certain sectors and act mainly for aims limited to those sectors.²³ In Belarus, the situation is worst. The country lives under an authoritarian regime and there are few opportunities for organised political action. However, the economic field is the most vulnerable to external pressures and may be the field in which individual and groups interests will result in pressures for change. This is because transition to a market economy will create huge opportunities for the enrichment of managers as happened in Russia and Ukraine during the 1990s.²⁴ So the personal interests of managers as potential oligarchs may undermine the Lukashenko regime.

Furthermore, civil society and its components (NGOs, media, the Church) are unable to exert strong pressures on the government. In low-income countries, it is difficult to mobilise citizens for political action, apart from a few occasions and for short periods such as is the case of coloured revolutions.²⁵ Workers and intellectuals need to spend time acquiring incomes and don't have the time and energy for constant collective action.²⁶ Also, many important media are owned by a small number of people who use them in their interaction with the government, or they are directly under government control.²⁷ Free media and journalists face pressures, menaces and sometimes violence to stop their enquiries.²⁸ Finally, intellectuals are vulnerable by their economic weakness, in particular when they are academics in countries like Moldova where heads of academic institutions are

²² P. Kubicek, *Unbroken Ties: the State, Interest Associations, and Corporatism in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. These characteristics of various post-Soviet trade unions also emerged in various interviews with local trade union leaders. Interviews with Leonid Manea, president of Confederația Națională a Sindicatelor din Moldova, and with Oleg Budza, vice president of Confederația Națională a Sindicatelor din Moldova, Chișinău, Moldova April 2008; interviews with Iarema V. Zhugaievych, president of Trade Union of Aircraft Builders of Ukraine, Kiev, February 2008. In particular Zhugaievych emphasised the crucial role of mediator his association had in defining national labour contract and rules.

²³ Interviews with Olexiy Klasztorny, Natalia Levytska and Oksana Shevchuk, Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Ukraine (KVPU), Kiev, February 2008.

²⁴ Interviews in Belarus demonstrate that among economists and other intellectuals there is diffused support for market reforms as a solution for economic problems of the country.

²⁵ Interview with Elena Syrinskaya and Alexander Bogomolov, Maidan Citizen Action Network in Ukraine, Kiev, February 2008.

²⁶ A journalist we interviewed in Chisinau (Mouldova) told us he had six different jobs to gain approximately 500 euro at month. Interview with Vitalie Călegăreanu, Chisinau, April 2008.

²⁷ See Freedom House country reports prepared to rate democracy in post-Soviet countries. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=46&year=2008>.

²⁸ The cases of Ukrainian journalist Gongadze and of Anna Politkovskaya are well known worldwide.

appointed by the government and may be dismissed overnight.²⁹ So, in most of the countries we analyse economic elites are the only groups able to exert strong pressure on the government, i.e. they are the most powerful channel for transmitting EU pressures to orient government policies.

The second factor that has made economic elites crucial for EU leverage in double-periphery countries depends upon the interests of economic elites. They are not only the most powerful actor but are also the one most interested in economic relations with EU. Oligarchs, industrialist and bankers need access to the EU financial and goods markets in order to enlarge their business and sell their products. Of course, the EU is not the only area they target but it is the richest and among the closest. Furthermore, Russian strategies of economic penetration in double-periphery countries is based on the direct takeover of industrial plants and banks, a strategy local businessmen don't like and try to face with access to the EU economic area.³⁰ Although economic elites are the main actors in transmitting EU pressures on industrial countries, general economic interests also play a relevant role in mobilising smaller groups and addressing government.³¹ This is the case in Moldova where there are no oligarchs nor a strong economic elite. Moldova's dependence on emigrant remittances from the EU³² make the government more sensible to requests from and pressures by the EU and other international organisations such as the Council of Europe.³³

Apart from the action of economic elites, the other crucial channel for the transmission of EU pressures is direct action on national governments. As anticipated, the governments of the countries we analyse have complex and diversified interests in their relations with EU. Part of these interests is political, involving EU support to face Russian influence. Others have an

²⁹ Interview with Ion Tabarta, lecturer at the University of Chisinau, April 2008.

³⁰ Interview with Vladimir Dukhnenko and Vitaliy Shapran, manager in chief and financial chief analyst of Expert Rating Agency, Kiev, February 2008; N. Shapovalova, The Russian Penetration Strategy towards Ukraine, paper presented at the International Graduated Symposium *New Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine: Politics, History and Culture*, Toronto, 17–19 March 2006. On relationship between Ukrainian and Russian businessmen see R. Puglisi, Clashing agendas? economic interests, elite coalitions and prospects for cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55(6), 2003, pp. 827–45. R. Puglisi, The rise of the Ukrainian oligarchs, *Democratization*, 10(3), 2003, pp. 99–123.

³¹ The mobilisation of shopkeepers and others small businessmen and their support to protesters was an important factor in Ukrainian Orange revolution. Interview with Alexander Moroz, former speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev, February 2008.

³² In 2006 emigrant remittances to Moldova were approximately 440 million euros and arrived mainly by Russia (41%), Italy (33%) and the remaining countries of Western Europe (14%). See data in European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Moldova. National Public Opinion Survey on Remittances*, London, EBRD, 2007, pp. 124–5.

³³ During the previous years, Moldova had been requested by the Council of Europe to refund Moldovan citizens abused or erroneously imprisoned. Moldovan government ever fulfilled its dues. Interview with Vitalie Nagacevschi, president of Organizația Obștească 'Juriștii Pentru Drepturile Omului', Chișinău (Moldova), April 2008.

economic nature with political outcomes. Economic support, workers flows, investments and trade with EU strengthen the economy of the countries and the consensus of citizens toward the governments. Therefore EU economic attractiveness has also a political dimension. However, what really made economic attraction effective is the nature of EU interests in double periphery. These interests are mainly economic. EU interests and the aims of its leverage on post-Soviet neighbours do not require dramatic changes in political regimes as in the case of membership perspective. So EU conditionality is more acceptable for a hybrid regime's government because it is a kind of soft pressure and limited to specific aspects. In other words, the lack of membership perspectives reduces constraints to EU leverage and have made it more efficient, at least in certain sectors. What limits EU political leverage in the post-Soviet neighbourhood is not the lack of membership perspectives but the poorness of EU aims, plus other elements connected with Russian influence in the area.

4 A comparative analysis of political regimes in the European post-Soviet area

The case studies drawn above suggest the impact of external pressures and the constraints they exert on post-Soviet regimes, with changes depending on different variables. In other words, certain external constraints affect the internal dynamics of post-Soviet neighbours more than others. Besides, the impact of the same external constraint may be more or less relevant depending on specific conditions.

One of the main variables able to explain the different impact of external pressures is time: specifically, the period in which an external constraint influences the internal dynamics of a country settles the severity of its impact. In fact, the internal conditions that make the external constraint severe in a certain period may disappear or change in the following period. Then, the impact of external constraint decreases. This is the case with IMF constraints on Russia. The country was in dramatic need of financial help during the 1990s. This enabled international institutions to exert strong pressures on it. Thus, the impact of institutional constraints became relevant. Afterwards, Russia's economic recovery and the dramatic increase in gas and oil prices freed Russia from further need for financial help, making external pressures and constraints ineffective.

Another variable to consider is the internal social structure. If there is a mixed social structure including big industrialists (or oligarchs) as well as small entrepreneurs, shopkeepers and other groups that may mobilise to defend their interests, the impact of external economic constraints will be deeper, as happened in Ukraine. This is because there are more actors

potentially touched by external pressures or attracted by external models. Also, if only a few of them have a positive attitude towards external pressures, they will mobilise and exert pressures on the government, whereas in regimes without wide social differentiation and pluralism, such as Belarus, the impact of external constraints will be gentler.

In addition, economic structure matters. Usually, external actors create external political or economic constraints to make their pressures effective. This was the case with IMF and EU conditionality. External economic constraints have a different impact on industrial or agrarian countries. Usually industrial countries are more influenced by the international economy and finance than agrarian ones. This is the case with Moldova where the economic attractiveness of EU and Russia is limited to remittances of emigrants and markets for Moldovan wine exportation. Of course, Moldova may welcome investment or economic aid, but the economic structure and the laws of the country do not make investment attractive.³⁴ Furthermore, the impact of the international economy has been weak. Post-Soviet agrarian countries react slowly to changes in international economy because of their scarce involvement in it. This is not the case with Ukraine and Belarus, both of which are heavily dependent on external finance and energy supply.

Finally, external pressures and external constraints may be exerted by actors with different attitudes towards political and economic matters and the different post-Soviet countries may have different attitudes towards these countries. The EU, USA, Russia and IMF have different views on democracy, free market and human rights and the best way to induce them in post-Soviet countries. In particular, Russia has an unenthusiastic approach to Western interference on former Soviet countries and their political regimes. Instead, Russia proposes a semi-authoritarian political model and uses its economic potential to contrast the pro-Western attitudes of its neighbours. Also, we must remember that external constraints interact. So, divergent external constraints may reinforce or reduce the outcomes of each other and orient internal political change towards or against democratisation in a different way depending on the country involved.

5 Democracy perspectives

The future developments of these regimes, if yet impossible to glimpse clearly, may still be outlined if drawing upon the processes of transformation analysed in the literature. In Russia, the consolidation of Putin's regime is the result of the reorganisation and prevalence of a post-Soviet political oligarchy

³⁴ In Moldova foreigners are not allowed to be owners of certain kind of properties (e.g. land and building). Furthermore, becoming Moldovan citizens is very difficult because a document signed by the president of the Moldovan Republic is required.

which originated in the KGB, like Putin himself. This political oligarchy prevailed over the oligarchs who had taken control over the resources of the country (in particular the energetic ones) by imprisoning some of them, forcing others to flee, and drawing many of them closer to the state, ensuring their political neutrality or support to the regime in exchange of security and guarantees for their ownership of the accumulated wealth.³⁵ In Russia things seem settled and the democratisation halted.³⁶

In Belarus, on the contrary, there are good reasons to foresee counter-authoritarian developments. The regime is centred on Lukashenko and should his rule end as a result of natural causes, forced dismissal or lack of consensus, it is probable that privatisations will restart creating oligarchs. The final result would probably be more similar to that in Ukraine, given the absence in Belarus of significant energy resources and the need for mediation between the political rulers and the emergent economic elite, which should foster the creation of corporative relations.³⁷

The future of the current Ukrainian regime depends on many factors which are difficult to measure. Among the factors which will surely make a difference, there is the attraction of the two geopolitical areas and institutional models: the so-called Russian sovereign democracy,³⁸ and EU democracy. If the economic attraction and the dependence on Russian energy could curb the political evolution of Ukraine towards a consolidation of a hybrid regime, that same dependence may also push towards Europeanisation and democratisation as a reaction against Russian influence. The existence of two fronts, each favouring one of the two poles of attraction, in the context of a political regime in transformation, could favour a more democratic path, but only if none of the two factions consolidates its power and succeeds in modifying the electoral mechanisms and institutional equilibria in its own favour. However, the rise of a regime where power is concentrated in the hands of a hegemonic president able to guarantee stable political equilibrium may change the course of transformation at the price of democracy.³⁹ The

³⁵ H.E. Hale, Democracy or autocracy on the march? the coloured revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(3), 2006, p. 323.

³⁶ M.S. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

³⁷ Fish suggest that countries with huge raw material (oil and gas included) like Russia have a predisposition to become authoritarian. Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia*, pp. 114–38.

³⁸ The concept of 'sovereign democracy' is a sort of ideology supporting Putin's model of government and assigns a central role to statism, strong leadership and popular support. M.A. Smith, *Sovereign Democracy: the Ideology of Yedinaja Rossiya*, Watchfield, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2006.

³⁹ The relationship between presidentialism and democracy was initially analysed by Juan Linz. Moving from those studies, Fish insists on the institutional system relevance in post-Soviet regimes evolution. J.J Linz, The perils of presidentialism, *Journal of Democracy*, Winter 1990, pp. 51–69; J.J Linz, The virtues of parliamentarism, *Journal of Democracy*, Fall 1990, pp. 84–91; M.S. Fish, Stronger legislatures, stronger democracies, *Journal of*

developments in Ukraine and Georgia, where the two presidents elected during the coloured revolutions changed the power equilibrium between parliament and presidency in favour of the latter, cast some shadows over the possibility of a democratic future for these countries.

In Moldova, the difficult economic and social conditions risk obstructing or reversing the fragile democratisation process which is dependent more on the inability of any particular group of power to prevail over others, rather than on the presence of real conditions for the consolidation of a liberal democracy.⁴⁰ The consolidation of Communist party power may hinder the transformation of the hybrid Moldovan regime to a democratic one. On the other hand, so-called Moldovan pluralism by default, the poverty of the country and the attractiveness of EU membership perspective may avoid a return to authoritarianism.⁴¹

The data reported in Table 1 outline a general framework of the democratisation process in the European post-Soviet countries and show that since 2000 none of them has ever been considered democratic according to the democracy score. Only Ukraine and, less so, Georgia and Moldova have ratings which correspond to a democracy in some specific areas like the electoral process and civil society or the independence of the media. A closer look to the general democracy score, which is an overall rating of the country, indicates that the democracy score in 2008 if compared with values in 2000 worsened for all countries studied here, but Ukraine. This suggests that the democratisation process is not only at a difficult point, but that it has even worsened.

A new element has just appeared that may influence the evolution of these regimes. It is the international financial and economic crisis. It has created many problems in post-Soviet societies and economies and these are having an effect on the nature and evolution of the different regimes. Usually economic crises are associated with authoritarian involutions and the reduction of political and market freedoms. Various historical experiences suggest the existence of a correlation between these phenomena. There is no doubt that economic crises influence the preferences of economic elites and the attractiveness of external economic areas. Today, the former Soviet European countries face a deep crisis. All of them, EU members included, have serious problems of budget deficit, lack of credit, falling industrial production and rising unemployment. To contrast these problems, some of

Democracy, 17(1), 2006, pp. 5–20.

⁴⁰ L.Way, Pluralism by default in Moldova, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4), 2002, pp. 127–41.

⁴¹ Vitalie Nagacevschi emphasises the importance of the simple membership perspective in shaping Moldova's government attitudes towards EU and European Council pressures. In his view what really matter is not offer EU membership but 'to keep the door open'. Interview with Vitalie Nagacevschi, president of Organizația Obștească 'Juriștii Pentru Drepturile Omului', Chișinău (Moldova), April 2008.

these countries asked for help from international institutions and regional organisations such as IMF and EU. So, apparently the crises may empower IMF and EU and increase their ability to exert political leverage on all European post-Soviet countries and in particular on the double-periphery countries. However, Russia as a potential lender and economic partner also has the possibility of exerting more pressures on these countries or to offer an alternative to IMF and EU leverage. So, the scenario seems favourable to the reception of external pressures, probably addressed towards democratisation.

Unfortunately, the impact of international crises on the EU, Russia and the wide number of countries asking the IMF for help have reduced the prospects for democratisation in the EU Eastern Neighbourhood. The problems of EU member states' economies will be imposed to concentrate efforts to contrast international crises inside the EU. This means that post-Soviet neighbours cannot expect for loans and support for their financial structure. Also, EU markets will become less accessible for non-EU products because of a reduction on demand and internal policies in favour of national producers. This is probably also true for Russia, because the country has to face the consequences of the price collapse of raw material, budget crises and economic recession. On the other hand, the IMF needs to distribute its resources to many countries at the same time and has to aim to avoid economic collapse in some of these countries. This makes the transformation of regimes the last of the targets to be pursued.

In the situation described above, the most rational policy for the EU and Russia is to concentrate their efforts on their own economies and problems. As a consequence only EU member states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) among former Soviet European countries may expect support. Little possibility of external support (loans or importations) exists for double-periphery countries. This means that if until now external economic attraction favoured democratisation or contrasted authoritarian involutions, the reduction of EU economic attractiveness and the renunciation of IMF political conditionality will slow down democratisation in double-periphery countries or, worse still, will favour authoritarian involution.

6 Conclusions

The reflections illustrated above help us to answer the questions proposed in the first part of the paper.

Former communist countries who are now members of the European Union became democratic quickly thanks to the funds and conditionality of the EU. That doesn't mean they had no other possibilities of become democracies. This possibility existed and exists today for the remaining European post-Soviet countries. The EU simply accelerated democratisation in new member states and reduced the risks of authoritarian involution. Also

pressures of other international actors who adopted conditionality and aimed at achieving the same results as the EU, increased the speed of former communist countries' transition to democracy. However, the international pressures exerted on countries with different political and economic structures resulted in different transition processes. Moreover, the strength of international pressures changed depending on the countries. The EU concentrated a lot of money and pressures on candidate countries and paid less attention to the remaining countries. Instead the IMF aimed to build a free market economy in these countries, suggesting that the free market would induce democracy. All of these differences explain the different outcomes.

The political future of the post-Soviet EU neighbours is uncertain. However, the impact of international economic crises, the weakness of internal democracy supporters, and lack of external support all suggest that democratisation in the double-periphery area is in danger and that there are few reasons to suppose a rapid transition to democracy in the area.

Table 1. Main democracy indicators for European post-soviet countries neighbours of the European Union

	1999-2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Democracy score (overall rating)									
Belarus	6.25	6.38	6.38	6.46	6.54	6.64	6.71	6.68	6.71
Georgia	4.17	4.33	4.58	4.83	4.83	4.96	4.86	4.68	4.79
Moldova	4.25	4.29	4.50	4.71	4.88	5.07	4.96	4.96	5.00
Russia	4.58	4.88	5.00	4.96	5.25	5.61	5.75	5.86	5.96
Ukraine	4.63	4.71	4.92	4.71	4.88	4.50	4.21	4.25	4.25
Electoral process									
Belarus	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00
Georgia	4.00	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.25	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.75
Moldova	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75
Russia	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.50	6.00	6.25	6.50	6.75
Ukraine	3.50	4.00	4.50	4.00	4.25	3.50	3.25	3.00	3.00
Governance									
Belarus	6.25	6.25	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.75	7.00	7.00	7.00
Georgia	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.50	5.75	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.75
Moldova	4.50	4.50	4.75	5.25	5.50	5.75	5.75	5.50	5.75
Russia	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.00	5.25	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.25
Ukraine	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.00	4.50	4.75	4.75
Judicial framework and independence									
Belarus	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Georgia	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.50	5.00	4.75	4.75	4.75
Moldova	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.50	4.50
Russia	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.75	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.25
Ukraine	4.50	4.50	4.75	4.50	4.75	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75
Independent media									
Belarus	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.75
Georgia	3.75	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.00	4.25
Moldova	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.50
Russia	4.75	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25
Ukraine	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	4.75	3.75	3.75	3.50
Corruption									
Belarus	5.25	5.25	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25
Georgia	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.75	6.00	5.75	5.50	5.00	5.00
Moldova	6.00	6.00	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.00	6.00	6.00
Russia	6.25	6.25	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	6.00	6.00	6.00
Ukraine	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75	5.75
Civil society									
Belarus	6.00	6.50	6.25	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.75	6.50	6.50
Georgia	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50
Moldova	3.75	3.75	4.00	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75
Russia	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.50	4.75	5.00	5.25	5.50
Ukraine	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.50	3.75	3.00	2.75	2.75	2.75

The ratings are to be interpreted as follows:

Consolidated democracies	1.00-2.99
Semi-consolidated democracies	3.00-3.99
Hybrid regimes or in transition	4.00-4.99
Semi-consolidated authoritarianisms	5.00-5.99
Consolidated authoritarianisms	6.00-7.00

Source: Freedom House, *Nation in Transit* 2007 and 2008 (http://www.freedomhouse.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=84)

Tab. 2 EC assistance to some post-soviet countries, 1999-2006 (in million euros)

a) By country and programme

Ukraine	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Tacis									
<i>National Programme</i>	38.60	48.00	43.00	47.00	50.00	70.00	88.00	100.00	484.60
<i>Nuclear Safety</i>	50.30	3.50	69.40	44.00	46.60	34.30	28.40	40.30	316.80
<i>Cross-border Cooperation</i>	5.20	1.00	5.50	0.50	3.00	3.00	18.00	4.00	40.20
<i>Regional Programme</i>	3.70	6.00	9.10	10.50	6.00	6.00	8.70	—	50.00
Fuel Gap	—	25.00	20.00	20.00	—	—	—	—	65.00
ECHO	6.30	1.30	0.90	—	—	—	—	—	8.50
Macro-Financial Assistance	—	—	—	110.00	—	—	—	—	110.00
EIDHR	0.20	—	1.30	0.60	0.60	0.50	1.80	0.95	5.95
AENEAS	—	—	—	—	1.30	—	1.50	—	2.80
Anti-landmines	—	—	—	—	—	7.00	—	—	7.00
STCU	3.00	4.50	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	5.50	5.00	34.00
Total	107.30	89.30	153.20	236.60	111.50	124.80	151.90	150.25	1,124.85
Belarus	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Tacis									
<i>National Programme</i>	—	5.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.00
<i>Cross-border Cooperation</i>	2.31	8.15	—	11.20	—	—	—	—	21.66
<i>Regional Programme</i>	1.70	2.00	3.90	2.20	7.40	—	—	—	17.20
CBC Small Projects Facility	0.40	—	0.90	0.20	—	—	—	—	1.50
ECHO	1.99	0.69	0.20	—	—	—	—	—	2.88
INTAS	0.40	0.80	0.50	—	—	—	—	—	1.70
Total	6.80	16.64	5.50	13.60	7.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.94

Moldova	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Tacis									
<i>National Programme</i>	14.70	—	14.80	—	25.00	—	42.00	—	96.50
<i>Cross-border Cooperation</i>	—	2.00	3.00	1.10	2.00	1.00	3.60	10.00	22.70
<i>Regional Programme</i>	—	0.90	—	1.25	—	6.60	5.10	12.30	26.15
Food Security	—	5.50	—	10.40	—	10.00	—	10.00	35.90
ECHO	3.90	0.80	0.80	—	—	—	—	—	5.50
EIDHR	—	0.20	0.47	—	—	—	—	—	0.67
PVD-NGO Co financing	—	—	—	—	0.50	—	—	—	0.50
SPP	—	—	4.70	—	—	—	—	—	4.70
Total	18.60	9.40	23.77	12.75	27.50	17.60	50.70	32.30	192.62

Georgia	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
TACIS	16.00	—	15.00	—	14.00	25.00	—	20.00	90.00
ECHO	13.00	—	4.00	—	4.20	4.00	2.00	2.00	29.20
Food Security	12.00	—	13.00	—	—	12.00	10.00	10.00	57.00
Rehabilitation in conflict zones	4.00	—	5.00	—	—	2.00	2.00	2.00	15.00
Macro-Financial Assistance	19.00	—	6.00	—	—	7.00	—	33.00	65.00
Aid to mitigate the effects of Russian financial crisis	4.00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.00
CFSP and RRM	—	—	2.00	—	2.00	5.00	—	—	9.00
EIDHR	—	—	—	—	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	8.00
Other (including PVD-NGO)	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.00	1.00	2.00
Total	68.00	0.00	45.00	0.00	22.20	59.00	17.00	71.00	282.20

b) By country (aggregate)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Ukraine	107.30	89.30	153.20	236.60	111.50	124.80	151.90	150.25	1,124.85
Moldova	18.60	9.40	23.77	12.75	27.50	17.60	50.70	32.30	192.62
Belarus	6.80	16.64	5.50	13.60	7.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.94
Georgia	68.00	0.00	45.00	0.00	22.20	59.00	17.00	71.00	282.20
Total	200.70	115.34	227.47	262.95	168.60	201.40	219.60	253.55	1,649.61

Fonts:

Belarus country strategy paper 2007-2013, p. 31; *Georgia country strategy paper 2007-2013*, p. 33; *Moldova country strategy paper 2007-2013*, p. 35; *Ukraine country strategy paper 2007-2013*, p. 30; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_ukraine_en.pdf

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