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Sicurezza e cooperazione nel sistema internazionale.
Il multilateralismo si rafforza ma anche il unilateralismo cresce.

La sicurezza multilaterale è un'esperienza nuova delle relazioni internazionali. La sua formazione appartiene a un processo di lunga durata delle istituzioni internazionali che, dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, ha assunto la forma delle operazioni di pace. Il paper, dopo aver analizzato il multilateralismo come pratica delle relazioni economico-commerciali e delle relazioni di sicurezza nel sistema mondiale contemporaneo, analizza i dati delle trasformazioni delle operazioni di pace degli ultimi venti anni e arriva alla conclusione che, come avviene nelle relazioni commerciali, anche nel campo della sicurezza il multilateralismo è sempre più affiancato dal unilateralismo.

DRAFT

Explaining the growth in number of peace operations, especially in the past twenty-five years, is the concern of many students of multilateral security in contemporary world politics. According to the analysts, the peace operation practice has been pushed up by factors like the upsurge of violence in international, and especially internal, conflicts since the late 1970s (Call and Cousins, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006); the devolution of violence control to United Nations that followed in time to the end of the Soviet-American rivalry (Daniel, Taft, and Wiharta, 2008); the policies of the world economic institutions that negatively affected debtor countries in the 1980s and 1990s (Jacobson, 2003); the Western states support to humanitarian actions and the *responsibility to protect* principle (Andersson, 2006; Bellamy, 2009); and the increasing participation of regional organisations in multilateral security (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Sidhu, 2006; Wilson, 2003). This paper aims at furthering this study, and forwards a new explanation of the phenomenon. Assuming that multilateralism is the recent output of the long-term world institution building process, in this study it is argued that, on the medium-long term, the change of the number, agency, and task of peace operations is associated with the change of the political conditions of the world system. In particular, these conditions are the features of the competition on the leadership of the world political system, and the related actions of the states that share either the same or compatible orientations towards that competition and the existing structure of government of the world system. States hold the cost of participating in

peace operations for various reasons. In the present analysis, these reasons are seen as tied to the features of the phase of the competition on the leadership of the global system. Hence, the general hypothesis tested in this analysis is the following one. The features of the phase of the global political competition determine both the nature and violence of conflict and the deployment of peace operations by the United Nations and other actors. Over the time of contemporary world politics, these features have affected the practice of peacekeeping by changing the original function and tasks of peace missions, and promoting new actors as peace and security operation organisers. In the first section of this paper, after a short review of the debate on the rise of regional actors in peacekeeping, it is argued that the study of the emergence of minilateralism is key to understand the rising importance of Non-UN-led peace operations. In the second section, the theory and research hypothesis of the analysis of minilateralism in security are presented. In the third, data are analysed, and the hypothesis is tested to positive results.

Minilateralism, security, and the global political competition

Analysts have been used to conceptualize the growth in number of Non-UN-led peace operations as the regionalisation and hybridization of peacekeeping. As a matter of fact, regional and sub regional international organizations have been active in the field of peace operations during the past fifty years, but the number of regional peace operations grew dramatically in the last ten years. Assessing this upsurge, analysts adhere to contrasting views of its relevance to the practice of multilateral security. Some of them argue that regionalization is not an important innovation because the United Nations prompted *burden-sharing and a functional division of labor* with regional organisations (Wallenstein and Heldt, 2008), and never ceased to be the principal institution of peacekeeping (Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Heldt, 2008). This is particularly true regarding the legitimacy of intervention for security and peace purposes. The data on the mandate/status of 205 peace operations, examined in this study, broadly support this view. In general, the growth of regionalisation is viewed as the mere adaptation of the peace operation practice to the rise of new circumstances. Gowan and Johnstone, for instance, remark that the regionalisation of peace operations is *a process of natural selection rather than intelligent design, shaped by a proliferation of institutional frameworks* (2007:3). Other analysts disagree, and underline the dramatic growth in number of only European organisation-led operations. Consequently, they express preoccupation for *a growing divergence between Western and non-Western operations* (Sidhu, 2006), and accuse regional organizations for acting as the *coalitions of willing* (Wilson, 2003). Undoubtedly, peacekeeping regionalization is uneven process. Quite robust in Europe, and increasingly so in Africa, it is unknown in Asia, though Asian countries contribute massively to UN peace operations inside and outside the continent, and in the Middle East, where operations are conducted by external country personnel. In Latin America and former Soviet Union areas, the peace and security missions organized by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) act on their own, normally with no mandate and recognition by the United Nations for reasons contingent to the local circumstances. As argued elsewhere (Attinà, 2006; 2007), the uneven participation of regional organisations in multilateral peace operations is the effect of the uneven stage of cooperation on security in the different regions of the world. In fact, the high number of

operations of the European and African organisations is consistent with the advanced stage of the European regional security partnership, and the rising, multi-layered form of the African security system (see Franke, 2008).

The argument put forward in this study is that the debate on the regionalisation of peacekeeping is inconclusive because it misses the essence of the change in the current practice of peace operations, i.e. the upsurge of minilateralism. Also the hybridization concept is an unsatisfactory analytical instrument to catch the nature of the current transformation of peace operations. It merely represents the existence of operations of different forms, mandated to accomplish a plurality of tasks like interruption of violence, protection of minorities, and reconstruction of civil and political life. In this paper, it is argued that the true change of the practice of peace operations is the growth of minilateralism, rather than that of regionalisation and hybridization.

Minilateralism is the form of collective action that shares with alliance cooperation the centre site of the abstract continuum that bridges multilateralism and unilateralism. As John Ruggie wrote many years ago (1993), multilateralism is the form of collective action based on shared principles and agreed rules and mechanisms. Unilateralism, instead, is the form of action based on the national interest and resources of the single state. Differently from alliance cooperation, i.e. the form of action of two or more states that coordinate their interests and resources, minilateralism is the form of collective action of small groups of states that share compliance with world-wide multilateral principles and norms, but decide to act disjointedly from world-wide formal organisations either on the single occasion or recurrently. Since the participating states deliberately restrict the membership of minilateral operations, the risk of discrimination is present in all minilateral endeavours. Today, minilateralism is the hot topic of international trade studies. They investigate on both the nature of trade agreements signed by regional and non regional blocs of countries, and the effects of these agreements on the multilateral practices of the World Trade Organization (see, for instance, Kono, 2007). Normally, the governments that sign minilateral trade agreements declare that these agreements are fully compatible with world-wide multilateral trade regimes, but economists of different schools have different views on this matter. According to the analyst's perspective, minilateralism is assessed as either neutral, harmful, or beneficial to multilateral trade agreements.

As the data of this study demonstrate, the practice of multilateral security has been coexisting with minilateralism during the time of contemporary world politics. But, in recent times, minilateral operations have been growing considerably in number. Therefore, scientists and practitioners should take into careful consideration this process, and dissect the positive and negative consequences that minilateralism might have on the practice of peace operations. Usually, the governments that participate in Non-UN peace operations declare that these operations are compatible to, and consistent with, the United Nations principles of multilateral security. This might be true but such a truth must be carefully checked. In a recent study, for example, Bellamy and Williams (2009) have analysed the peace operation practice of the Western states, namely the states member of NATO and the European Union plus Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Even though the concept of minilateralism is not employed in the study, the two scientists carried out the task of assessing the multilateral-minilateral breadth of the West's peace operations. On the whole, they recognize that *the relationship between the West and UN peace operations has thus remained ambivalent. The West's great powers*

have moved from seeing peace operations as a means of furthering their interests in specific crises to seeing them (and non-UN peace operations) as a vehicle for policing international order and alleviating human suffering (2009: 43). Regarding the multilateral-minilateral dimension, Bellamy and Williams distinguish the contribution of the Western states to UN, hybrid, and Non-UN operations. Overall, regarding the UN peace operations, the troops, police, civilian personnel, and financial funds contribution of the West has declined in the last ten years. Regarding hybrid missions, i.e. the missions in which UN troops work in tandem with forces and troops of other international organisations,¹ the West's contribution has been growing with some differences between the four types of hybrid missions that can be distinguished from one another according to the *purpose* of the Western component, namely 'spear-head/vanguard' operations, 'stabilization' operations, 'fire-fighting' operations, and 'over-the-horizon' operations.² Lastly, regarding (c) the wholly non-UN peace operations, the Western states have deployed forces only in a small number of cases, but quite frequently they have provided logistical support and financial assistance to these operations by helping to fund, equip and train the peacekeepers of regional organizations in Africa. Briefly, it is hard not to share Bellamy and Williams' concluding remark.

... the West has increased its contribution to hybrid peace operations and missions that take place outside of the UN system. Viewed in a positive light, the West's willingness to participate in hybrid operations represents a commitment to finding pragmatic solutions to some admittedly difficult problems at a time when the West's faith in UN capacity and command and control mechanisms is relatively low. Viewed in a negative light and over the longer term, however, the West's reluctance to invest significant resources in making the UN's peace operations the best they could be may have more detrimental effects (2009: 54-55).

The global leadership competition model and multilateral security

In the present analysis, the multilateral-minilateral dimension of security governance of the contemporary world system is associated with the change of the competition for global power/leadership. In particular, the change of global political competition is the change of the four-phase cycle of global power/leadership that George Modelski conceptualized in the evolutionary world politics model (2000; 2001). For the sake of brevity, this study focuses on the phases of the current cycle of world

¹ Bellamy and Williams distinguish peace operations organizationally as 'tightly-coupled' (i.e. operations in which the UN and non-UN components are jointly mandated and share some common command or political decision making structure), and 'loosely coupled' (i.e. operations in which the different components do not share formal legal or institutional structures, though the UN and non-UN components may cooperate very closely).

² In 'spear-head/vanguard' operations, Western troops prepare the security environment on the ground in order to hand over to a UN or other international peace operation; in 'stabilization' operations, Western troops work alongside UN and/or other international peace operations to provide military security; in 'fire-fighting' operations, western troops provide in-theatre support to beleaguered UN or other missions already in the field; in 'over-the-horizon' operations, Western troops are despatched to within striking distance of the theatre in question to perform a deterrent and perhaps later an enforcement role in support of a beleaguered operation.

politics, and does not discuss Modelski's long-term analysis of world politics and the regular pattern of the evolution of the global political system, i.e. the approximate one-century-long four-phase cycle of global political competition. In successive versions of the model, two different labels are given by Modelski to each phase. In the first version (see, for example, Modelski, 1978), the labels of the four phases remind to the reader the different role of the global power state. In the second version (see, for example, Modelski, 2008), labels evoke the essence of the competition on the global agenda and institutions. The main features of each phase are summarized as it follows In the *global power/execution* phase, the coalition of the states that prevailed on the others in the macro-decision phase of the past cycle, carries out its strategy for solving the problems of the system. In the *de-legitimation/agenda-setting* phase, states increasingly disagree among themselves on the solution of the common problems, and propose new contending agendas, i.e. new arrays of problems and problem-solving policies. In the *de-concentration/coalition-building* phase, the states form opposite coalitions that sustain contending agendas of world problems, and prepare for the selection of the new global agenda. In the *global war/macro-decision* phase, one coalition of states prevail on the others in a confrontation that is played with the existing rules of the game. This coalition imposes on all the states new strategies, institutions, and policies for solving the problems of the system.

In the period from the Second World War to the end of the past century, political competition in the world system experienced two phases of global political competition, the global power/execution and de-legitimation/agenda setting phase. In current years, global competition has the uncertain characteristics of in any transition period, namely from the de-legitimation/agenda setting to the de-centralization/coalition building phase [Table no.1]. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the starting year of each phase is not the exact date of an abrupt change, but the marker of the discontinuity existing between successive phases.

Table no. 1
Cycles of global power/leadership

<i>Hegemonic power</i> - <i>Global Leader</i>	Phase			
	<i>Global Power</i> - <i>Execution</i>	<i>De-legitimation</i> - <i>Agenda setting</i>	<i>De-centralization</i> - <i>Coalition building</i>	<i>Global War</i> - <i>Macro-decision</i>
United States	1945-1973	1973-2000	2000-2026	2026-

In the execution phase of the American-led strategy of solution of the global problems, i.e. from 1945 to the early 1970s, the world was organised by political and economic institutions and regimes, and governed by rules and policies, inspired by the principles of economic and political liberalism. Functional, economic cooperation was promoted by organisations like the OCDE and UNCTAD. The foundations of multilateralism were laid down in this phase, and the structure of government of the world system was founded on multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank, and the GATT regime. In the following phase, namely from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the past century, the strategy of government of the dominant coalition decreased in efficacy and legitimacy. Debates on new problems and priorities occupied the world public space. In political affairs, bloc politics gradually

declined in vigour; division and contrast occurred even among the governments of the dominant coalition; the Western European countries started to build the common foreign and defence policy of the European Union; the countries of Asia and Africa entered into a period of volatile foreign policy. In economic affairs, the United Nations conferences and government summits debated on the new international economic order; the world economic regimes, mainly the monetary, finance, and trade one, passed through continuous reforms; disorder broke in, and hurt, the world economy with the collapse of the Bretton-Woods monetary regime; the crisis of the financial order lasted until the 1990s, and neo-liberalism and de-regulation (the so-called *Washington consensus*) were adopted as the new foundation of the so-called *globalisation economy*. On the whole, the role of the United States and the dominant coalition, which had been built on the outcomes of the Second world war, decreased under the effect of various factors that eroded the power of the global leader and its coalition, and gave room to the growth of multilateral practices. It is worth saying here that this interpretation of the world system structure and change does not reject, but amends the bipolar interpretation of world politics. The Soviet Union challenged the American-led institutions of the world system by supporting political opposition in countries of different areas of the world. However, the Soviet Union was unable to oppose the liberal market strategy that the Western coalition imposed on the organization of the world economy. Consequently, it was unable to influence multilateral world policies like the trade, finance, and communication policies that were run by the institutions of the world system with the compliance of a large number of states. Briefly, the Soviet Union was able to influence multilateralism but not to the point of interrupting the existence of this practice.

In the global leadership cycle interpretation of world politics, the agenda setting phase gives up to the coalition building phase, namely the formation of groups of states that have different preferences on the priority and solution of the world problems. Understanding the present transition is complicated by various conditions like the hard task of selecting the factors that currently count the most in coalition building. Are these factors economic ones like energy and raw materials, information technologies, and financial resources? Is the defence of traditional culture important to create large and viable coalitions more than the promotion of democracy and open society? This problem notwithstanding, consistently with the theory of the global leadership cycle and the features of the past two phases of global competition here presented, the hypothesis on the change of multilateral security and peace operations (see Table no. 2) can be spelled out as it follows.

H: *In the phase of global power and strong leadership, international and domestic violent conflicts are few in number, and low in intensity. In these circumstances, resort to multilateral mechanisms of intervention in violent conflicts is low as well.*

In the following phase, power de-legitimation and the erosion of the leadership of the global power and dominant coalition cause the growth in number and intensity of both conflicts and multilateral operations, and new tasks are given to peace operations.

In the third phase, the level of conflict remains high but resort to multilateral security is influenced by the process of the re-configuration of coalitions. In these circumstances, it is increasingly difficult to the United Nations to organize peace operations. Hence, multilateralism grows, and reshapes multilateralism.

Table no.2
Phases of global political competition, conflict violence, and multilateral security

Phase	Violent conflicts	Resort to multilateral security
Execution of the strategy of the global power (1945-c. 1973)	Low in number and intensity	Low and centralized
De-legitimation of the global power and agenda setting (c 1973-c. 2000)	Growing in number and intensity	High and mainly centralized
Coalition building (c. 2000-c. 2025)	High in number and intensity	Rather low and de-centralized

The analysis of this hypothesis employs the ADISM dataset of peace/security operations.³ ADISM defines multilateral peace/security operation as the operation decided by international organisations and groups of states for the purpose of interrupting violence also at the earliest stage of explosion, and reconstructing peace, security, civilian and humanitarian conditions in countries and areas that are upset by international and internal conflict. A multilateral peace operation employs military/police and/or civil personnel of several countries (sometimes, a single country on the responsibility of an international organisation) with a mandate for either single or cumulative tasks which are commonly known as peace support, peacekeeping, peace building, and peace enforcement. The ADISM dataset, Codebook version 2.2008, contains the data of 205 multilateral peace operations organized by the United Nations, NATO, OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), European Union/ESDP, OAU (Organisation of African Unity), AU (African Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa), CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), OAS (Organisation of American States), the Commonwealth of Nations, the Arab League, and Ad-Hoc Coalitions. The dataset covers the time period October 1st, 1947 to September 1st, 2008. Eleven items are recorded for the single multilateral peace operation, namely the official operation acronym, the organisation/actor in charge of the operation, the geographical area in which the operation is located, the receiving country, the starting and end dates, the time duration of the operation in number of years and months, the size as the peak number of the military and civil personnel, the total number of deaths, the presence and form of the UN Security Council authorization/endorsement and absence of it, the local level of the agency (i.e. initiative, organization, and action) of the operation.

Global political competition, conflict violence, and peace operations


Resort to multilateral security mechanisms and the participation of states in peace operations both depend on the phase of global political competition, and are

³ See <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>. ADISM is the Italian acronym of “Data Archive on Italy and Multilateral Security”, a project of the Department of Political Studies of the University of Catania. This project seeks to collect, disseminate, and use quantitative data for the study of international security, multilateralism, and the foreign policy of Italy. Data search, collection, and recording of peace operations have been carried out by Rosa Rossi, University of Catania, and Simon Riesche, University of Siena.

associated with the level of violence in international conflicts and domestic conflicts of international importance. The data of the University of Uppsala UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset are used here in order to inspect the level of conflict violence in the world system over the past sixty years (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002). This archive stores data of four types of armed conflicts with at least 25 casualties. The extrasystemic, interstate, internationalized internal, and internal conflict types are defined as follows. Extrasystemic armed conflicts are between a state and a non-governmental group on a different territory from that of the state. Interstate conflicts are between two or more governments. Internationalized internal conflicts are within a country between a government and a non-governmental party; where the government, the opposition or both sides receive troop support from other governments, that actively participates in the conflict. Internal conflicts are between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries.⁴

The total number of armed conflicts has been growing from the early 1950s to the late 1990s. Especially since the late 1970s, in coincidence with the early de-legitimation phase of the cycle of global power, the growth in number of armed conflicts has been mostly due to internal conflicts [Graph no. 1].

Graph no.1



Source: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/charts_and_graphs.htm (Access April 11, 2009).

The increase in number of internal armed conflicts over the second phase of the global political competition, then, can be taken as the factor pushing up the number of peace operations and the multiplication of the tasks and functions of the operations, namely for mandating to multilateral missions the task of peace support and building.


⁴ See http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/definitions_all.htm#k (Access: April 11, 2009).

Extrasytemic conflicts disappeared at the end of the de-colonization era, and are of no concern to this analysis. Interstate conflicts have a low and rough course, which seems set to remain close to the zero level for the time being (see Harbom and Wallenstein, 2007). These conflicts, of great concern to multilateral security institutions, are sided by internationalized internal conflicts as the most important case of intervention. The number of internationalized internal conflicts decreased remarkably after the end of the Cold War, but is growing again since 2003. Intervention in these conflicts, like intervention in internal armed conflicts, is important also to the functional change of peace operations.

In conclusion, violence in the world system, as indicated by the number of armed conflict, is associated with the features of the global competition phases. Violence in the de-legitimation phase has been higher than in the phase of the global power when the dominant coalition was able to control the main problems of the world system. The high level of violence during the second phase is confirmed by the UCDP/PRIO data on the intensity of conflicts that distinguish wars from minor armed conflicts (Graph no. 2). In the early 1990s, both the number and intensity of conflict have been decreasing, but during the past six years they have been increasing again. This fact can be associated with the transition of global competition from the agenda setting to the coalition building phase. Power de-concentration in the global system is an important factor of violence as well as interference and intervention in the affairs of other countries, especially countries ravaged by turmoil and warfare. Both external governments, for national interest, and international organisations and coalitions of states, for promoting multilateral security, might decide to act in order to influence political change by resorting to peace operations.

Graph no.2


Conflicts by intensity 1946 - 2007



Source: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/charts_and_graphs.htm (Access April 11, 2009).

Invented by the United Nations to give effect to the norm of intervention against states responsible for aggression and peace breaking, peace operations have been used all over the period of the contemporary world system. Non-UN missions entered the stage of multilateral security in 1953, on the initiative of the coalition of governments that monitored the border between the two Korean countries. Until 1972, with the exception of the OUA mission to Algeria and Morocco in 1963, Non-UN missions were organized by ad hoc coalitions of Western countries, and dispatched to South East Asia (the Korean Peninsula, and Vietnam), Europe (Cyprus), the Middle East (Jordan), and Africa (Uganda and Tanzania). This occurrence is apparently consistent with the characteristics of the phase of execution of the strategy of the dominant coalition countries. The same can be affirmed regarding the growth in number of Non-UN multilateral operations organised also by Non-Western countries in the successive phase of de-legitimation of the strategy of the dominant coalition. In this phase, new missions of ad hoc coalitions were sided by two Arab League missions in 1972 and 1976, three OUA missions in 1979-1981, and a long list of regional organisation missions in the 1990s. All these operations demonstrate the ascending role of regional organisations as multilateral security actor in the phase of agenda setting, i.e. the time in which new courses of action and ways of organising international relations are discussed in the world public space. Last, it is worth noting that this growth trend continues to raise so much decisively that, in the years of transition to the phase of power de-concentration and coalition building, the number of new Non-UN led operations is repeatedly larger than the number of UN-led operations (see Graph no.3).

Graph no.3
New peace operations by year (1947-2008)




Source: ADISM Peace/Security Operations Dataset (Codebook version 2.2008)

<http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>

The Non-UN led operations are deployed by 11 regional organisations and various ad hoc coalitions of governments. For the sake of simplifying the comparison of different peace operation organising actors, the data of all peace operations are here divided in six groups: the UN, European (NATO, OSCE, and EU), African (OUA, AU, ECOWAS, and CEMAC), CALC (Commonwealth, Arab League, and CIS), American (OAS), and Ad-Hoc Coalition group (see Graph no.4).

The UN-led operations are the largest group of peace operations, and by far the longest in duration. The UN-led operations are 40,5 % of all recorded operations, but the European and Ad Hoc coalition ones jointly reach the same percentage level. The time length of an operation signals both the seriousness of the conflict in the area of intervention, and the propensity of the states to hold the role of multilateral security promoter. The longer a peace operation is, the higher the human, material, and financial costs imposed on the participating countries are. Bearing in mind that the ADISM data are all uncensored ones, the duration size of the operations of the Ad Hoc Coalition group and, especially, of the recently active European one, is impressive because most of the Non-UN-led operations have been created in recent years.

Graph no.4
Number and duration of peace operations (1947-2008)



Source: ADISM Peace/Security Operations Dataset (Codebook version 2.2008)
<http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>

To better assess both the change of multilateral security in world politics and the role of different organising actors, attention must be drawn to two aspects of the topic, namely the formal aspect of the mandate, and the process aspect of the growing concurrence of UN and Non-UN led peace operations. Peace operations, as the main multilateral mechanism of intervention for the sake of defending international peace and security, are the legitimate instrument of collective action in world politics thanks to the authorization of the UN Security Council (SC). This is the case of (a) the UN-led operations and SC-authorized POs, and (b) the operations organized and conducted by international organisations and ad hoc coalitions authorized by the Security Council. UN-led and SC-authorized peace operations are fully, i.e. legally and politically, legitimate operations. In addition, the UN Security Council has endorsed and recognized also a number of non-legal operations in an advanced stage if their deployment. Consequently, these operations are seen as legitimated by the United Nations. Lastly, a number of peace operations have been conducted with no UN recognition and endorsement. From a legal point of view, these operations are not legitimate. However, they can be perceived as legitimate by certain actors, the local parties included in case the peacekeepers fulfil their tasks appropriately (see Riesche, forthcoming). In conclusion, under the formal point of view, the largest number of

peace operations are legitimate operations, either as UN-led, SC-authorized, or SC-endorsed/recognized operations (see Table no. 3). However, the status of one on four operations is outside the UN mandate procedure, and with no United Nations recognition and endorsement. Under the process point of view, it is remarkable that 9 non-legitimate operations started in the execution phase of world politics; 25 in the delegitimation phase; and 16 since 2001. European organizations and ad hoc coalitions have the largest share of these operations, and of the active ones in particular.


Table no. 3
Peace operation mandate and status (1947-2008)

	European	Ad Hoc Coalition	African	CALC	American	Total	Percent
UN-led POs						83	40,5
Security-Council- authorised POs	10	10	5			25	12,2
Security-Council- endorsed or recognised POs	11	7	10	3	1	32	15,6
No recognition or explicit endorsement POs	15	12	9	8	6	50	24,4
POs with mandate/status missing information	10	5				15	7,3
	46	34	24	11	7	205	100,0

Source: ADISM Peace/Security Operations Dataset (Codebook version 2.2008)
<http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>

Lastly, it is worth noting that, in 2008, 65 active operations are counted. 26 of these are UN-led operations; and 39 are Non-UN led ones. In addition, since 1996, the number of Non-UN active peace operations has been larger than the number of UN-led ones (see Graph no. 5). This is the product of the growth in number of three groups of Non-UN peace operations, the European, the Ad Hoc Coalition, and the African ones. In particular, the European group operations have been growing in number steadily since 1991, and in 2006 they became more numerous than the UN-led ones.

Graph no. 5
Active peace operations (1947-2008)



Source: ADISM Peace/Security Operations Dataset (Codebook version 2.2008)

<http://www.fscpo.unict.it/adism/adism.htm>

In conclusion, the growth in number of non-legitimate and non-UN legitimated operations, and the high number of Non-UN-led peace operations in recent years confirm the hypothesis that unilateralism is increasingly changing the nature of the resort to peace operations in world politics. This study has demonstrated also that the change of peace operations is associated with the change of the competition on global leadership. On this ground, one can hinder that system conditions, i.e. the global competition phase, has an impact on the features of multilateral security.

Concluding remarks

In this study, the attention of the scientists and professionals has been called on the relation existing between the features of the phase of global political competition and both the level of conflict and the number and form of peace operations. In particular, the general hypothesis has been positively tested because it has been demonstrated that (a) the number of peace operations varies in consistency with the features of the global competition phase; and (b) unilateralism is increasingly present in the peace operation practice of the transition period towards the coalition building phase. In particular, the entry of the European international organizations in the practice of multilateral security must be assessed by taking into account other aspects of the European countries and European Union foreign policy. Attention is called, for instance, on their participation in the *ad hoc* coalition operations of the West, in the initiative of the G8 known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) aimed at training 75000 soldiers, above all of African countries, for peace operations within 2010, and in the creation of the Rome Center of Excellence for Police Stability Units. Briefly, the entry of the European international organizations in the practice of peace operations points out that, in the incoming phase of coalition re-configuration of the global political competition, the states of the dominant coalition don't abstain from unilateralism even at the risk of decentralizing the responsibility of the peace operation mechanisms from the United Nations to regional actors and *ad hoc* coalitions.

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