12.1.1. Public Party Financing at EU Level and the Development of Europarties and of their System

Luciano Bardi e Eugenio Pizzimenti

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects on European political party organisations (PPELs) and on their party system of Reg. 2004/2003’s implementation.
In most European countries, political parties rely on public funding. Historically, party organisations depended on private contributions: Socialist and Social-democratic parties on fees paid by their members and transfers coming from ancillary organisations; Liberals and Conservatives survived thanks to donations from private business and wealthy individuals. These differences were perhaps responsible for the different organisational models that characterised parties with different ideological and sociological orientations. But a funding model based upon within-party family-similarities appears to be inadequate to understand the evolution of contemporary party financing and its consequences in organisational terms.
In the last fifteen years, academic debate on party organisation focused on the hypothesis of a progressive shift of internal power from the so-called party in central office to the party in public office, at the expense of the grass-roots level (the party on the ground). Although no general agreement exists, the tangled processes of centralisation, bureaucratisation and professionalisation of party structures may be partially explained in terms of parties’ massive need for public subsidies, which have become indispensable for political parties to survive environmental changes. In fact, politics has become more and more expensive due to the ponderous use of mass media and capital-intensive campaigning techniques and to the ensuing professionalisation of political activities. These tendencies coincided with the parallel decline of labour-intensive organisational models and the constant decrease of parties’ internal revenues (membership fees, fundraising activities, social events). In addition, the need to reduce inequalities in political competition – also by limiting the role of external private funding – and to enhance financial transparency – made Member State support an indispensable pillar of party revenues.
Regulation (EC) 2004/2003 defines the role of PPELs and the requirements needed for party eligibility to receive funding from the European Union. The provisions of the Regulation may well be able to consolidate more effectively the various party components operating at European level. However, while the literature on the funding of party organisations suggests that rules and regulations have a tendency to promote organisational convergence, the EU regulation set only a generic organisational pre-requisite for PPELs. In addition, the generally positive picture provided by the Statute is counter-balanced by two provisions, one contained directly in the Statute, and the other in its implementation rules, which keep the federations in a subordinate position with respect to their national components and the parliamentary groups.
Our investigation follows two main trajectories: 1) a more in-depth comparative analysis of PPEL statutes and internal regulations, by focusing on three different aspects of party organisations, i.e., party membership, party deliberative/executive organs, financial rules; 2) a critic review of Regulation 2003/2004 provisions and its impacts on the balance of powers between PPELs and national political parties. The goal of this contribution is to shed some light over the state of the art of the building process of a more effective and autonomous transnational party system.

12.1.2. Europartiti e Partiti Italiani: Quale Convergenza? Offerta politica nazionale e posizionamento degli Europartiti nelle elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo (2009)

Daniela Piccio e Edoardo Bressanelli

Abstract: Se valutato con i parametri della teoria normativa della rappresentanza politica, il sistema politico europeo non si contraddistingue certo per il raggiungimento dell’ideale democratico, né si avvicina ad una sua approssimazione. L’introduzione delle elezioni dirette al Parlamento Europeo (PE), il rafforzamento dei poteri di quest'ultimo, e la crescita di influenza politica degli Europartiti non hanno ovviato ad un problema strutturale di rappresentanza. Le elezioni per il PE vengono contese da partiti politici nazionali, che propongono candidati nazionali e strutturano la competizione attorno a temi e priorità nazionali.
Tuttavia, pur considerato questo importante limite, il 'deficit democratico' dell'UE potrebbe non essere così grave come spesso lamentato, se si riscontrasse l'esistenza di una coesione politico-programmatica tra i partiti politici nazionali e gli Europartiti a cui essi appartengono (Thomassen, 2009; McElroy, Benoit, 2010). In tal caso, infatti, il processo rappresentativo sarebbe, seppur indirettamente, garantito: le posizioni dei cittadini troverebbero espressione attraverso i partiti nazionali che, aggregandosi in gruppi parlamentari transnazionali, potrebbero trasformare, nei limiti delle competenze attribuite al PE, le preferenze dei cittadini in politiche pubbliche.
Questo lavoro, sulla base dei dati raccolti nell'ambito del progetto ‘EU-Profiler', la prima ‘Voting Advice Application’ sviluppata in occasione delle elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo del 2009 (Trechsel, Mair, 2011), si propone di misurare il grado di convergenza esistente tra i profili ideologici e programmatici dei partiti italiani e degli Europartiti a cui sono affiliati. Tale convergenza viene catturata confrontando le posizioni degli Europartiti e dei partiti italiani rispetto alle principali aree di competizione partitica – elaborando empiricamente il posizionamento dei partiti rispetto al questionario dello 'EU-Profiler'.
Le domande di ricerca a cui questo lavoro cercherà di offire una risposta sono: quanto si discostano le posizioni dei partiti italiani rispetto alle posizioni degli Europartiti? L'instabilità dei partiti e del sistema partitico italiano rende più difficile un processo rappresentativo strutturato sulla base delle grandi 'famiglie politiche' europee (socialisti, popolari, liberali etc.)? Fino a che punto possiamo considerare significativa l’offerta politica a disposizione dei cittadini italiani nell’ambito delle elezioni per il Parlamento Europeo?

12.2.1. Disciplina e comportamento di voto dei MEPs. Il caso della GUE/NGL

Fabio Sozzi

Abstract: Secondo alcuni autori (Hix et al. 2007; Lindberg 2008) la coesione di voto dei gruppi parlamentari al PE può essere spiegata attraverso la loro capacità di disciplinare il comportamento di voto dei propri MEPs per mezzo di incentivi positivi (distribuzione di cariche) e negativi (revoca delle cariche). Obiettivo di questo paper è capire se questa spiegazione possa essere applicata anche ad un gruppo parlamentare come quello della GUE/NGL caratterizzato da una struttura organizzativa di tipo confederale che, in quanto tale, non presuppone una «coalizione dominante» in grado di sanzionare i MEPs devianti ovvero premiare quelli virtuosi. A tal fine verranno testate empiricamente sul caso specifico della GUE/NGL diverse teorie sul comportamento di voto dei parlamentari cercando di individuare quella che possa spiegare meglio gli elevati livelli di coesione raggiunti dal gruppo oggetto di esame.

12.2.2. Europarties as Legitimizing Organisations

Enrico Calossi

Abstract: La letteratura da sempre imputa ai partiti politici varie funzioni all’interno dei sistemi politici (strutturazione del voto, articolazione degli interessi, comunicazione e socializzazione politica, selezione del personale politico, ecc…). Storicamente i diversi modelli di partiti che si sono succeduti (dal partito di notabili al partito pigliatutti, passando dal partito di massa e per finire con il cartel party) hanno adempiuto a questo funzioni in modo diverso.
Gli Europartiti, un modello di partito che, per certi versi, estremizza alcune caratteristiche del cartel party (Katz, Mair, 1995), come ad esempio la perdita di contatto con gli elettori, l’autonomia funzionale delle diverse facce del partito e la dipendenza dai fondi statali, difficilmente riesce ad adempiere a quelle che originariamente sono state considerate le funzioni dei partiti.
Riprendendo anche la figura del “Partito in Franchising” (Hopkin, Paolucci, 1999) utile per concettualizzare i rapporti all’interno dei partiti nei sistemi politici multilivello, le relazioni tra gli Europartiti (a loro volta suddivisi tra la faccia istituzionale rappresentata dai gruppi Politici del Parlamento Europeo e da quella extraparlamentare rappresentata dai Partiti Politici a Livello Europeo - PPLE) e i partiti nazionali sembrano spesso caratterizzate da una sorta di scambio in base al quale i partiti nazionali garantiscono risorse economiche, voti e deputati agli Europei, mentre quest’ultimi forniscono “legittimazione” a quelli di livello nazionale. Una evidente dimostrazione di come avvenga la legittimazione da parte del livello europeo nei confronti dei partiti nazionali si ha soprattutto contestualmente all’accesso all’Unione Europea di un nuovo paese, situazione che obbliga/facilita i partiti nazionali del neo-membro a scegliere un’affiliazione europea. Un altro momento particolare, che esemplifica il ruolo ricoperto dalle strutture politiche europee nel fornire “legittimazione” ai livelli nazionali, avviene quando un partito nazionale, volente o nolente, cambia la propria affiliazione europea (ad esempio l’espulsione della Lega Nord dal gruppo Liberale o il passaggio dell’Irlandese Fianna Fail dal gruppo Nazionalista a quello Liberale). Un ulteriore aspetto rilevante è rappresentato dalle resistenze che i piccoli partiti nazionali, già presenti all’interno di un gruppo parlamentare o di un PPLE, muovono per impedire l’accesso al gruppo stesso di un altro partito nazionale, magari più grande e competitore elettorale.
L’obiettivo di questo paper è quello di ricostruire fornire un framework interpretativo dei rapporti tra partiti nazionali e Europei partendo dalla ricostruzione delle vicende che hanno caratterizzato l’approdo dei vari partiti nazionali ai loro referenti europei, concentrandosi in particolare su quei casi di cambiamento di affiliazione politica che meglio potrebbero consentire di analizzare il ruolo giocato dalle strutture europee nel fornire legittimità ai livelli nazionali.

12.3.1. Form follows function—and content? EU Foreign Policy coordination in the Council of Ministers after the Treaty of Lisbon

Philipp Thaler

Abstract: The Lisbon Treaty and accompanying documents entail a plethora of provisions to increase the coherence of EU Foreign Policy. Energy Policy is named as a policy area of shared competence between the Member States and the Union and it subjected to a range of objectives laid down under an new Title. One of the underlying assumptions of those drafting the Treaty was that institutional reconfiguration, formalization of procedures and objectives as well as policy integration directly affect policy outcomes and thus ‘intelligent design’ can be an instrument to increase policy coherence. In particular the Council of the European Union (Council) has been subjected to changes in its institutional context. Within the Council responsibilities and working practices of Committees were altered affecting inter-committee relations. Specifically the formalization of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which since the Treaty of Lisbon has a legal mandate is likely to challenge the former dominant position of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). The PSC’s powers in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have been enhanced but (theoretically) it could even discuss security issues of other policy fields, such as energy security. This has important implications for EU Foreign Policy coherence in at least two respects. Firstly, certain policy issues can and will be dealt with in both committees which might increase institutional rivalry but at the same time emphasizes the importance of horizontal cross-coordination between them. Secondly, in an unprecedented way representatives in the two committees will have to deal with issues from different policy-areas. Resulting new channels for socialization and learning may lead to a constructive fusion of formerly often separated policy areas, such as human rights and energy policy or, in more general terms, norm- and interestbased policy fields. This opens an interesting research agenda on the implications of policy context and policy content for foreign policy coherence.

12.3.2. A shared European vision of energy governance in a changing EU neighbourhood? Analysing energy norm convergence in the Caspian Sea region

Ed Stoddard

Abstract: EU external energy policy in its periphery has often been described as a conflictual area of EU politics, with divergent member state, EU institution and energy company interests arguably leading to sub-optimal policy and an inability of the EU to speak with one voice in an increasingly complex external energy (oil and gas) environment. In contrast, this paper contends that EU external energy governance policies present an overlooked and much more convergent sphere of EU policy. However, this degree of convergence does not necessarily extend to energy producing states. European consensus seen in this area is due to the reliance of European political actors on commercial companies for the provision of affordable, adequate energy supplies. Under these circumstances, European energy security becomes, in part, an extension of energy company risk. This reliance creates an imperative for the EU to export liberal energy governance norms to third countries that increase competition and reduce the risk of commercial energy operations.
However, the logic of externalising a liberal energy environment, with associated increases in competition and reduced state involvement, does not necessarily reflect the policy preferences of energy producing countries, whose interests are often driven by a number of non-commercial factors deriving from the nature of their political and economic structures. By breaking down EU external energy governance in the Caspian into its constituent norms and examining the extent to which these norms are shared by stakeholders, an understanding can be gained of the degree of policy convergence in this area. As such, this paper proceeds as follows: firstly, the norms inherent to energy governance policy in the Caspian region are elucidated; secondly, the degree of preference convergence between European stakeholders is addressed; thirdly, the interests of two Caspian energy producers (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan) are analysed in light of these energy governance norms.
Understanding both the extent of policy convergence between European energy actors and the causes of producer resistance to European energy governance norms sheds light on the ongoing dynamics of energy governance in the EU periphery.

12.3.3. Turkey as an Emerging Regional Energy Power

Sohbet Karbuz e Veronica Lenzi

Abstract: In May 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu became Foreign Minister of Turkey, after having been chief foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister since 2002. One year before, when still working in academia, he had published a book, called ‘Stratejik Derinlik’ (Strategic Depth) in which he noted how Turkey, emerging from its secondary position during the Cold War and in the NATO alliance, was increasingly a key country. He claimed that Ankara should invest on its geopolitical and geostrategic position, to establish itself regionally and globally. In other words, Turkey has to be ready to face a new geography coming out of globalization, which has not much to do with the old East-West contrast of the Cold War. Coherently with this stance, since its entrance in the governmental staff, the executive has pursued a policy of appeasement with its neighbors, focusing on developing positive and mutually winning relations. In this new situation, Turkey is investing on its unique geography and history to advance its own foreign policy interests and considers itself at the center of the stage, as a pivotal country for the new regional equilibriums.
This paper aims at assessing the effectiveness of this policy evolution from an energy perspective, which integrates Turkey in the global energy changes. For this reason, we initially focused on the links between energy and foreign policy in the most important world powers, namely China, Russia and the United States. The review of their energy strategies allowed us to design the framework of the current global energy scenario in which Turkey moves.
Then, we shifted to our case study, that is Davutoglu’s ‘strategic depth’ approach and its influence on Turkey’s external projection in the politically sensitive and economically paramount energy sector. The country’s regional role has been thus evaluated through a comparative analysis of Turkey’s energy relations with big powers, its neighboring countries and international organizations. The goal was twofold. On one side, we wanted to determine the current situation of Turkish energy policy, and which domestic concerns and international actors are gaining ground in its development. On the other side, we aimed at assessing how Turkish foreign policy has not yet inserted energy among its strategic pillars. As our work shows, though successful under many aspects, Davutoglu’s foreign policy should be increasingly driven by Turkey’s energy needs, and not the contrary.

12.4.1. The Arab Spring and the Russian Summer?

Evan Thompson

Abstract: The future of European Union energy security is set to shift markedly in response to the numerous events and issues taking place currently, including ongoing economic and financial turmoil and the civil unrest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The Arab Spring has cast doubt on the long-term relations the EU has with many of its key suppliers in North Africa and the Middle East. It also underscores the ongoing concerns of instability and transit security that plague hydrocarbon exploration from these regions. Additionally, the unfolding crisis with the Fukushima nuclear power plant has had cast doubt on the long-term viability of the nuclear industry. This has been to the extent that the current German government has decided to phase out nuclear by 2022 in favour of renewable energy sources. In conjunction with the EU’s 20-20-20 targets, this emphasises the level of importance that Germany and the wider EU attribute to their ‘low-carbon’ future. Nevertheless, there is still set to be an important role for hydrocarbons, particularly gas (given its cleaner credentials than coal and oil) in the energy mix of the EU. Russia, having the largest gas reserves in the world has the potential to supply a great proportion of the EU’s growing demand for gas. This paper seeks to analyse the current situation in major European oil and gas suppliers in the Middle East, in particular Libya, and the effects that the ongoing uprising there will have on a future supplier-consumer relationship. From there, the paper wishes to examine the EU- Russia relationship and draw some preliminary conclusions as to whether the Arab Spring provides an opportunity for the growth of an EU-Russian ‘Summer’.

12.4.2. When environmental challenges spill over into energy policy problems: the case of the Polish (potential) veto on the EU climate–energy package during the council summit in December 2008

Dr. Rafał Riedel, Jean Monnet Professor, University of Opole

Abstract: This paper answers the question of why the Polish veto on the climate – energy package was a real threat during the EU energy summit in December 2008. The main gravity point of the article is its empirical dimension, which covers the political and economic background of Polish government
positions before and during the December 2008 EU summit when negotiating the future form of the climate-energy package. The author delivers the conclusions of a report1 that supports the bargaining tactics of the Polish government. In multi-variant forecasts, it analyzes the predicted impact of implementation of the EU package on the Polish economy, energy-production sector, and household budgets. This factor motivated the Polish executive to potentially veto the ambitious environmental goals of the community, as they were perceived to be counterproductive to the country’s economic development. This observation illustrates a classical misfit as understood in the Europeanisation literature. To understand this particular exemplification, the author employs selected European integration theoretical perspectives – the (neo)functionalism, two-level game and multilevel governance models – as descriptive, explanatory and interpretative vehicles. These theoretical proposals are only suggested as interpretative background in order to escape the trap of dichotomous thinking (Regions and Empires versus Markets and Institutionslogic) when searching for theoretical perspectives in European energy relations investigations.

12.4.3. Should the EU Climate Policy Framework be Reformed?

David Ellison

Abstract: Though to-date the EU has played a very significant leadership role in international negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the emission-reducing performance of individual EU Member states has for many been less than stellar. Rather than reducing emissions, a large number of EU15 Member states have continued to raise them. Based on an analysis of the most successful policy instruments, this paper argues that EU policy efforts could benefit from three important policy innovations. The following strategies—the adoption of an EU-wide FIT (feed-in tariff), the introduction of an EU-wide carbon tax and the introduction of more flexibility in the trading of carbon credits—could significantly improve the rapidity of emission reductions, their relative cost-efficiency and help spread burden-sharing more evenly across individual sectors and Member states. In focusing on these key strategies, important questions are raised both about the effectiveness of EU and Kyoto-style commitments, as well as the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). To-date, the commitment strategy and the ETS mechanism have had the smallest impact on emission reductions. Without significant policy innovation, the EU climate and emissions reduction strategy misses several important opportunities. By promoting this set of strategies, the EU could make a far greater contribution to future global efforts to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations.

12.5.1. L’Italia e l’Unione Europea. Una relazione al tramonto?

Federiga Bindi

Abstract: Come è nata e si è sviluppata negli anni la relazione tra Italia e Unione Europea? Quali sono e sono stati gli attori rilevanti, le istituzioni, i punti di forza e di debolezza? Questo paper analizza in modo comprensivo e approfondito la relazione tra l’Italia e l’Unione Europea, guardando in particolare a tre fattori: la relazione storica tra attori politici italiani e processo di integrazione europea; le istituzioni ed i meccanismi legislativi alla base della relazione tra Italia e UE, le strategie negoziali italiane sia nelle “high politics” che nelle “low politics”.

12.5.2. Il Programma Nazionale di Riforma e l’integrazione europea: l’impatto sulle modalità del coordinamento a livello domestico

Federica Cacciatore e Alessandro Natalini

Abstract: È stato recentemente osservato che la Strategia di Lisbona rappresenta un caso di architettura della governance di cui é significativo osservare l’impatto sulle amministrazioni nazionali. In questa prospettiva è stata analizzata la sua influenza sulla redistribuzione del potere nell’ambito degli Esecutivi evidenziando, in particolare, che la Strategia di Lisbona ha inciso sulla centralizzazione della governance delle politiche europee anche se con modalità diverse da paese a paese. E già in precedenza si era mostrato che l’europeizzazione può determinare un incremento del livello di centralizzazione negli esecutivi, ma non sempre, e comunque non con le stesse modalità. È stato, inoltre, evidenziato che in diversi paesi, in particolare quelli dell’allargamento, l’integrazione comunitaria è particolarmente contrastata e scarsamente effettiva. La nostra relazione si concentra sul livello domestico, in quanto ci proponiamo di osservare l’impatto della nuova strategia per le riforme strutturali (Europa 2020) sulle forme di coordinamento a livello nazionale. In particolare questa strategia è connessa all’adozione di sette “iniziative faro”, all’introduzione del Semestre europeo e alla successiva adozione del Patto per l’Euro. Con l’introduzione del Semestre europeo: a) si anticipa l’adozione del Programma nazionale di riforme (PNR) affiancandola a quella del Patto di Stabilità (PS); b) si adottano a livello comunitario criteri ordinanti cui deve essere informata la manovra
finanziaria; c) si innesta sulla procedura di bilancio nazionale una fase ulteriore in cui i paesi membri confrontano le scelte adottate tra loro e con le istituzioni comunitarie; d) si introducono forme di monitoraggio in comune dei risultati conseguiti dalle politiche di bilancio. In altri termini, il nostro quesito di ricerca è: l’adozione dei PNR ha effetti sulla governance domestica sul piano orizzontale (rapporto tra i ministeri) e verticale (rapporto tra i livelli di governo e verso i rappresentanti degli stakeholders)? Se sì, di che tipo? È possibile raggruppare i modelli di governance seguiti nei diversi paesi in alcuni clusters? Se sì, che ruolo svolgono la tradizione politico-culturale e il fattore tempo nel determinare un’integrazione differenziata? L’indagine si concentra su sedici paesi membri.

12.5.3. Da Maastricht a Nizza. Il ruolo dell’Italia nella formazione dell’Unione Europea

Marco Ragusa

Abstract: La letteratura sulla storia dell’integrazione europea tende spesso a presentare i progressi decisivi di questo processo come il risultato, diretto o indiretto di un accordo tra Francia e Germania. Se questo è innegabile, rimane il fatto che l’Italia ha fornito un suo importante contributo al processo d’integrazione, in particolare fungendo da anello di congiunzione tra la coppia franco-tedesca e i Paesi medio-piccoli. Nel corso degli anni novanta, e in particolare nella negoziazione del Trattato di Maastricht, i rappresentanti politici e diplomatici italiani profusero molti sforzi per promuovere l’integrazione europea, ottenendo alcuni risultati considerevoli. Tra questi vengono ricordati il Consiglio europeo di Roma dell’ottobre 1990, la sconfitta della Thatcher, il documento italo-britannico su sicurezza e difesa, l’avvio della moneta unica. Spesso per ragioni politiche contingenti non si è potuto riconoscere e valorizzare il ruolo giocato dall’Italia nel negoziato di Maastricht. L’approfondimento di quella fase storica è oggi determinante per ridefinire il contributo che il nostro Paese potrà dare nel nuovo scenario euro-mediterraneo dell’integrazione.

12.6.1. L’Europa secondo i partiti: vincolo, scelta o opportunità?

Nicolò Conti e Vincenzo Memoli

Abstract: Facendo riferimento alle relazioni tra i partiti e l’Europa, il paper ricostruisce gli scenari che si sono delineati a partire dall’esordio dei nuovi partiti sulla scena politica nel 1994, fino alle recenti elezioni europee nel 2009. Metteremo in luce i principali cambiamenti che hanno contraddistinto le scelte europee del sistema politico nazionale fornendo delle risposte alle seguenti domande di ricerca: l’Europa rappresenta un macro-tema rilevante all’interno dell’offerta programmatica? Si tratta di un macro-tema intorno al quale si articolano proposte e posizioni alternative? Come si dividono i partiti su questo macro-tema? La tematizzazione dell’Europa ha subito trasformazioni nell’ultimo ventennio? I risultati dell’analisi rivelano come la struttura dei contenuti sia, in effetti, cambiata nel tempo. Inoltre, a un atteggiamento europeista su determinate questioni (per esempio le politiche) non corrisponde necessariamente un medesimo atteggiamento in altre questioni (per esempio identitarie o della rappresentanza). Il “menù europeo” si presenta ricco di opzioni e le formazioni politiche ne scelgono varie combinazioni secondo il proprio sistema di credenze, ma anche in maniera strumentale rispetto alla propria agenda politica. Esiste una molteplicità di posizioni e di visioni dell’Europa in concorrenza tra loro, che si sovrappongono alle linee di conflitto che regolano la competizione politica nazionale, articolate entro i confini di un europeismo che può dirsi diffuso, dal momento che non sono ancora emerse forme irriducibili di euroscetticismo.

12.6.2. L’estrema destra, la destra radicale e l'Europa

Manuela Caiani e Nicolò Conti

Abstract: L'euroscetticismo in Italia è un fenomeno alquanto circoscritto. Gli studi più recenti dimostrano che nel versante partitico non trova molto spazio, anche le formazioni che formulano un discorso più critico verso l'UE hanno infatti serie difficoltà a tradurre questi orientamenti in concreti comportamenti istituzionali. Tuttavia, l'opinione pubblica italiana mostra una crescente disaffezione verso l'Europa. Esiste in Italia un'opposizione all'UE, all'interno ma anche all'esterno del Parlamento che, in futuro, potrebbe intercettare la disaffezione degli elettori, come già avvenuto in altri stati membri? Da questo punto di vista, le forze di estrema destra e della destra radicale rappresentano una voce di dissenso sempre più critica verso l'UE e la loro retorica un potenziale collante in grado di influenzare l'agenda, a livello societario e politico, su temi sensibili legati all'Europa (quali l’euro, il nazionalismo, l’immigrazione). Quali sono i principali contenuti di un'opposizione radicale all'Europa? Come si colloca l'euroscetticismo dei partiti nel parlamento rispetto all'opposizione extra-parlamentare? L'analisi si focalizzerà sullo studio della Lega Nord e dei movimenti di estrema destra, attraverso uno studio dei frames che ne caratterizzano il discorso politico sull'Europa.

12.6.3. Gli italiani tra identità, euroscetticismo e voto europeo

Fabio Serricchio

Abstract: Nel Giugno del 2009 i cittadini europei sono stati chiamati alle urne per il rinnovo del Parlamento europeo. Nonostante la rilevanza dell’appuntamento elettorale, il tasso di partecipazione medio rilevato nei paesi europei è stato - però - particolarmente basso.
Anche in Italia la partecipazione elettorale ha fatto registrare una flessione: sette punti percentuali in meno rispetto alle precedenti elezioni, svoltesi nel 2004, oltre il venti per cento in meno se il confronto è con le prime elezioni del 1979.
Diverse circostanze inducono a ipotizzare che il calo di partecipazione registrato in occasione delle elezioni europee non sia fisiologico: in primo luogo questo è superiore a quello rilevato in altre nazioni europee; inoltre la differenza tra l’astensione alle elezioni nazionali e europee è in netto incremento, infine, il calo sembra strettamente associato al decremento degli indici di europeismo degli italiani. Anche se la letteratura assegna alle elezioni europee lo status di elezioni di secondo ordine, ci sono fondati motivi per ipotizzare che il calo di partecipazione elettorale alle consultazioni europee risponda in realtà a logiche diverse e trovi nell’euroscetticismo crescente la sua prima ragione.
Questo paper si propone di approfondire la relazione tra identità europea e sostegno per il progetto di integrazione europea, da un lato, e voto europeo.

12.7.1. Identifying the European and North African interests behind the ENP

Christos Kourtelis

Abstract: According to the EU, the ENP was developed with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all. The aim of this paper is to analyze the existing literature about the ENP and to evaluate the political and economic interests that inform the policy. The paper argues that the related bibliography sees the policy in a holistic manner and under this notion it perceives the policy as a beneficial strategy that brings positive results for the entire Euro-Mediterranean region or as an exploitative EU tool against the partner countries. By exploring the Association Agreements and the Action Plans that inform the ENP, this paper defines more precisely the interests that are involved in the strategy. Based on a sectoral analysis of three North African economies (Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) and of the EU, this paper identifies the role of the participants in the agricultural, industrial and service sector and determines the interest groups that benefit and lose from the initiative. The paper shows that the policy does not yield only commercial gains for the participants. So far, it has reinforced the political power of the North African regimes, spurring in this way the recent social unrest.

12.7.2. Sinking European Integration in the Mediterranean Sea. Rome, Paris, and London and their quest for hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea between 1950s and 1980s

Diego Scarabelli

Abstract: The analysis studies the covert operations that France, Italy, and Great Britain initiated in order to obtain hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea. As case studies, it considers the Suez Crisis, Gaddafi’s Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Chad. These secret operations are contextualised in the framework of European integration. Since the end of the Second World War the European states ratified several defence agreements in order to be protected from a possible Soviet invasion and contain a German rearmament. Institutionalist and neofunctional scholars underline the importance that these agreements had on shaping the behaviour of national governments. In contrast to this view, the current research adopts a neo-realist approach to the study of European integration. The findings of the covert operations are a main part of the argument. As a matter of fact, the analysis, relying on these results, shows that the agreements chosen by the states were not a first step in a path that would lead to an integrated European army. The research, therefore, strongly disagree with theories based on path dependency. Although not in a direct way, the states confronted each other, thus their goal was not to submit power to supranational institutions. They wanted to maintain the hard power in their national borders and use it for their internal needs. The confrontations with the other European states also demonstrate that they did not consider the latter as real allies, but as existing and potential contenders. A study of the American policies for the region is also taken into account in order to understand if it the US, throughout its Mediterranean policy, had an impact on European integration.

12.7.3. EU’s Mediterranean policy after the Arab revolts: breaking the path?

Sarah Wolff

Abstract: The Arab revolts that unfolded since the beginning of 2011 could have acted as a European awakening, pushing the EU to impose its normative agenda to the region. The granting of advanced statuses to Morocco and Tunisia before the revolts, without any conditionality, or the attitude of both member states and the EU institutions vis-à-vis Libya testified of the difficulties to turn this normative discourse into a reality so far.
Instead, the past decade has revealed that the externalization of Justice and Home Affairs policies has been at the heart of EU and its member states attention towards the region. Migration, border control and visa requirements have been fundamental elements of the EU’s policy towards Mediterranean partners. Next to sustaining a normative discourse on how to democratize and promote the rule of law in the region, the EU Mediterranean policy has in fact been characterized by the prevalence of its own internal strategy concerns.
The Arab revolts could be interpreted as a ‘critical juncture’ whereby the EU could reform its policy towards the region. Following a rational-choice-historical institutionalist approach, this paper analyses the 2011 EU policy documents that have attempted to respond to the Arab revolts. The main findings of the article is that EU’s Mediterranean policy after the Arab revolts has been bound to the same path. Due to the prevalence of the preference of its member states to protect EU’s internal security, it has been difficult to break this path. This explains why any normative agenda in the region is affected similarly by time and the strategic preferences of the Member states.

12.8.1. The social agenda in the EU-Africa partnership: Discourse and Policy Practice

Valeria Fargion and Marco Mayer

Abstract: The approach to globalization that held the international scene until the end of the 1990s – usually summed up as the “Washington Consensus” – envisaged development in terms of an increasing GDP, assuming that dynamic growth would automatically reduce poverty and resolve distributive problems. In this framework social policy had a merely residual role. “More market and less state” meant dismantling public services in favour of private provision and user co-payments. But given the minimal development of public infrastructure, in the case of Africa this approach produced devastating social consequences, particularly the inability to stop the HIV/AIDS pandemics. Nowadays, at least according to the public discourse in international fora, the picture looks quite different. Over the last decade the major international institutions – including the World Bank and the IMF – have progressively distanced themselves from the tenets of the hitherto dominant neo-liberal paradigm. Within this context, the European Union has played a primary role, by emphasising the social dimension of globalization and calling for a new paradigm in international development co-operation. Notably, the 2005 “European Consensus on development” breaks new ground in the relationship between the European Union and developing countries, and quite interestingly, the act was originally entitled “the Brussels Consensus” to set it blatantly against the “Washington Consensus.” Since then, European institutions - and particularly the Commission - have produced a variety of policy documents emphasising the European commitment with the ILO decent work agenda, with the MDGs, and a general concern for a more assertive approach into the external dimension of European social policy. During the same years African governments have also taken important steps towards a consensus on the need and scope for social protection in Africa (as illustrated by the Social Policy Framework adopted in 2008 during the first AU Conference of Ministers in charge of Social Development). The paper intends to provide an accurate overview of these recent developments with the aim of shedding light on what is the balance between economic, political and social aims in the European Union’s relations with Africa. How important are social protection goals in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action plans and how does this reflect in the programs which are actually financed? The paper will address the latter question by focussing on sub-Saharan Africa, particularly on the country strategy papers for the current EDF program 2008-2013 and on the extensive use of general budget support. The main goal of the analysis is to shed light on the priorities on which the European Union is concentrating in each country in order to understand whether and to what extent these priorities reflect a coherent strategy, what is the role of health and social policies within this context and how is the EU is applying the ‘division of labour’ principle with respect to other international donors and especially with respect to EU member states. The issue is largely unexplored, as the recently published European Report on Development states, openly calling for research and especially for a mapping of EU support for social protection in Africa. Considering that the topic under consideration stands at the intersection between different strands of literature ( development studies, international relations, European foreign policy, global social policy) which do not speak to each other often, the paper aims to fill a gap within available studies and to contribute to the theoretical debate on the relationship between discourse and policy practice.

12.8.2. Democratic Realism or Democratic Mission? The EU's democracy promotion in its neighborhood

Daniela Huber

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has turned into a global script for Western foreign policy being portrayed as the 'panacea for all global ills', including security threats like terrorism. But what exactly encourages and constrains democracies to promote democracy abroad? Examining the case of EU democracy promotion in its Mediterranean neighborhood, this paper argues that democracy promotion mainly serves identity needs: it helps to lock in a democratic narrative in the EU in face of democracy - and identity – deficits. As a diversion from this policy would be costly in face of these identity needs, constraining factors like potential security threats through democratization are reinterpreted in a way as to bring them in coherence with democracy promotion. This policy is furthermore pushed by the growth of the international norm democracy and by waves of democratization worldwide. Thus, in face of the recent uprisings in the Arab world, we can expect that the EU as a democracy promoter will not find itself in crisis, but will rather receive a boost for its foreign policy agenda.

12.8.3. The EU as an International Actor in Trouble? Lessons from the Mediterranean Policy

Stefania Panebianco

Abstract: This paper assumes that the current crisis in the MENA region can be regarded as a testing case for the EU acting (or not) as a power Europe. The Lisbon Treaty seeks to provide new strength and more consistency to the EU foreign policy. Art. 21 (Chapter 1 on the General Provisions on the Union’s External Action) identifies goals, strategies and values to defend through the EU external action. Yet, the current events in the Mediterranean area, including the NATO intervention in Libya, are showing EU’s difficulties in facing regional crises, because EU member states have often different interests and strategies. Different national preferences render difficult the elaboration of a quick and coherent response of the EU.

A vision of the EU foreign policy dominated by some EU member states is not new (e.g. Hill, 2004), but the essential issue is what happens when the “big three” (France, United Kingdom and Germany) do not share the same interests or strategies for the Mediterranean. It is not the first time that France and Germany do not share the same strategies concerning the Mediterranean (let’s mention for instance the UfM case). The EU had already proved incapable of acting cohesively and vigorously during the war in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. The Libya crisis now is a serious case in point, proving once again that among the EU there are different national preferences, views and strategies.

Beyond the lack of coordination between member states, the institutional weakness of the EU foreign policy framework set up with the Lisbon Treaty has to be considered. The new institutional EU foreign policy framework is being tested: does synergy exist between the President of the Council of the European Union, Van Rompuy, and the High Representative Baroness Ashton? Synergy between these two figures is necessary to elaborate a more coherent EU foreign policy, and Mediterranean policy in particular.
The regime changes in some MENA countries are offering the EU a chance to test its internal coherence. But the current risk for the EU is to act as a divided power Europe in the Mediterranean.

12.9.1. From Hydra to Octopus? Post-Lisbon EU and the South Caucasus

Nelli Babayan e Natalia Shapovalova

Abstract: The basic assumption of the Lisbon reform of EU foreign policy is that the creation of the new empowered post of High Representative and the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will greatly enhance the external action of the EU. The South Caucasus is one of the regions where EU pursues a broad variety of policy objectives – security and conflict resolution, energy security (diversification of energy supply), democracy and human rights promotion, and economic reforms through bilateral and regional cooperation. Before the Lisbon, the EU diplomatic presence in the region was as much as varied as those objectives: the European Commission delegations in three South Caucasus capitals, ESDP mission (EU Monitoring Mission - EUMM) to Georgia and two EU Special representatives (the two latter supervised by the Council). After the Lisbon, the EC delegations turned into the EU delegations, the EUMM turned into the EU Common security and defence policy mission and all these actors came under the roof of the EEAS. Confusing competences and competing institutional loyalties have been finally reconciled under the single EU leadership dealing with foreign policy. By examining the case of the South Caucasus, this paper aims to analyse whether the institutional change in EU foreign policy and the establishment of the EEAS have resulted in what it intended to – the enhanced external action of the EU.

12.9.3. The European Parliament vis-à-vis the New International challenges

Donatella Viola

Abstract: The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced substantial changes aimed at strengthening the EU international dimension, yet the powers of the European Parliament (EP) have not been increased to a proportional extent. Since the late 1960s, even before the official institutionalisation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EP has struggled to give its contribution to foreign policy making and to gain more visibility on the world stage. In particular, it has been at the forefront of new initiatives of the European Union in relation to human rights and democracy. Already in 1962, the EP adopted the Birkelbach Report, which defined democracy as one of the essential criteria for European Community membership, as officially recognised three decades later at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council. In a turbulent world, the EP has became an important forum where global, regional, national and subnational issues are discussed and where joint transnational solutions are envisaged. The huge number of delegations and participation in parliamentary assemblies also reflects the EP international ambition and represents a good example of its activity worldwide. Despite this, systematic studies on the contribution of the European Parliament to foreign policy have been relatively scarce. This paper aims at investigating the EP as an effective and potential global actor especially vis-à-vis the recent crises in the Mediterranean area.