Democratic reform processes are often supplemented by expectations of tangible improvements in social welfare. While the connection between the emergence of democracy and the development of welfare states in the West has been the object of several studies, however, there is a scant empirical literature on the effects of recent democratisation processes on social welfare in developing countries. This is particularly true for Africa. Many sub-Saharan states undertook multiparty reforms during the early 1990s, some of them achieving truly democratic progress. In a dramatically poor environment, Africans often anticipated that democratic reforms would deliver a number of additional benefits. Social welfare was among them. This paper investigates whether and how the advent of democracy affects social welfare policies – and, in particular, health policy – by examining one of Africa’s most successful cases of recent democratization (Ghana) and comparing it with developments in a country of enduring authoritarian rule (Cameroon).

The development of the South Korean welfare state is roughly divided into two main periods: before and after democratization. Under the authoritarian regimes – formally inaugurated by the military coup led by General Park Chung-hee and until the fall of General Chun Doo-hwan’s rule in 1987 – the South Korean state was close to what Chalmers Johnson called an “authoritarian developmental state.” The South Korean government put its policy priority on economic concerns like growth and stabilization, and subordinated social policy to those economic considerations. Although some welfare programs were introduced during this period, they were intended to supplement, support, and promote economic growth. The authoritarian political elites prohibited participation of social groups in the policy-making process. In the social policy sphere, a small group of decision-makers were allowed to introduce measures to enhance military regime’s legitimacy and strengthen its relationship with pro-regime sectors of the population. In this setting, bureaucrats played a crucial role, enjoying the power to put the “economy first” principle into practice. The absolute lack of external pressures from the society or “political insulation” enabled elites and bureaucrats to act undisturbed in making welfare and other policies. The democratization process since the mid-1980s marked a watershed in the political order as well as in the social sphere of South Korea. The restoration of a parliamentary democracy in 1987 was welcomed by the population, tired of decades of authoritarian regimes. Above all, the process of democratization spelled the end of the paradigm in which the government was virtually the only actor in the social policy arena. This state-centered paradigm underwent a significant change thanks to the emergence and proliferation of new actors that had not been able to express themselves freely during the authoritarian period: social movements. As democratization advances, the autonomy and authority of the state have been increasingly constrained by social movement actors, such as citizens’ movement organizations, labor unions, and environmental groups. These new actors have been particularly important in introducing and institutionalizing new welfare measures and contributing to the paradigmatic policy shift from “growth” to “redistribution,” from “efficiency” to “collaboration.” In other words, social movements since 1987 have embodied the role of policy entrepreneurs, filling the vacuum left by the central government and elite bureaucrats in the field of social welfare policy-making. The role of social movements was extremely critical in the midst and in the wake of the economic crisis that hit the country in late 1990s. The economic crisis, in fact, coincided with the election of Kim Dae Jung at the presidency of the country. As it is well known, Kim Dae Jung was a fervent democrat, supported in particular by the middle and working classes. Ironically, the construction of a comprehensive welfare state in South Korea began precisely during the economic crisis, owing to the effort of President Kim as well as the upsurge of social movements that could finally make their voice heard by the government. In this respect, the establishment of the Tripartite Commission of Labor, Business, and Government constitutes an excellent example of the paradigmatic change away from the developmental state approach, since labor was involved to break the existing exclusive and collusive relationship between the state and business. This paper aims at showing, utilizing a historical-institutionalist approach, the role of social movements in the creation and evolution of a comprehensive welfare state in South Korea. In doing so, we will first provide an overall picture of social movements in South Korea; then we will identify the main junctures in the development of welfare policies in South Korea in the pre- and post- democratization phases, in reference to the growing role of social movements; finally, we will analyze the behavior of civil society organizations during and after the economic crisis, their growing importance in the South Korean public sphere and their involvement in structuring social policy measures and programs.

In the last decades democracy spread in many parts of the world, and this generates several questions about its performance. The object of this work is the relationship between democracy and the “quality of governance”. The main purpose is to analyse empirically the consequences of democratization on several indicators of governance. Starting from the procedural definitions of democracy the theoretical arguments that guides my work claims that the transition to a democratic system introduces more competition in the political arena through the concrete possibility of government alternation. This credible threat strenghtens the relation of accountability between voters and government members inducing the latters to maintain an accountable behaviour. This should produce a general increase in the quality of governance of political systems. This argument generates three main hypotheses. First, the presence of democratic structures increases the quality of governance; second, the level of democracy of a political system affects the quality of its governance in a non-linear way. This means that higher levels of democracy increases the performance of a country but only after a specific threshold. Third, older democratic regimes present a better quality of governance. To test these hypotheses I use a cross-national dataset containing data on democracy and performance for 191 countries. To operationalize my dependent variable I use the “Worldwide Governance Indicators” developed by the World Bank Institute, whereas as independent variables I use different measures of the level of democracy (Freedom House, PolityIV, Vanhanen) as well as indicators of the longevity of democracy. To obtain more generalizable results I test the validity of the hypothesised relations for the effects of several control variables. The results obtained seem to confirm my research hypotheses.

Le istituzioni della democrazia liberale portano “naturalmente” con sé la riduzione dell’ingiustizia economica? L’analisi storico-comparata delle democrazie della “Prima ondata” ha suggerito che lo sviluppo delle politiche di welfare possa essere spiegato dalla mobilitazione elettorale della classi lavoratrici. L’ipotesi di una relazione positiva è presente anche nella letteratura sulla transizione e sul consolidamento democratico e sulle “conseguenze della democratizzazione”. Tale ipotesi è tuttavia in contraddizione con l’evidenza del nesso tra la recente “ondata” di democratizzazione e il processo di globalizzazione economica, che in Occidente appare associato alla crisi del welfare state e alla conseguente crescita della ineguaglianza. Il paper ripercorre alla luce di queste tematiche il dibattito sull’evoluzione delle politiche di welfare nel Sudafrica democratico, sviluppatosi dopo il 1994 nel confronto con la letteratura comparata sul welfare capitalism e in continuità con il dibattito sui rapporti tra capitalismo e apartheid. Da un lato, la ‘derazzializzazione’ del mercato del lavoro e del sistema di welfare ha fatto sì che l’accesso ai livelli di reddito più elevati sia stato reso in larga misura indipendente da status ascrittivi, aprendo la strada alla formazione di una ampia borghesia nera. Dall’altro, il consolidamento della democrazia liberale si è dimostrato compatibile con livelli inalterati di ineguaglianza economica complessiva, legati alla crescita del gap tra insiders e outsiders marginalizzati dal mercato del lavoro all’interno della maggioranza nera. Nel caso sudafricano, la riduzione dell’ineguaglianza economica sembra dipendere da fattori aggiuntivi rispetto al (anche se non indipendenti dal) le istituzioni della democrazia procedurale, in particolare dalla formazione di political class-coalitions favorevoli all’introduzione di regimi distributivi volti alla riduzione dell’ineguaglianza e alla presenza/assenza di “vincoli esterni” relativi alla scelta di politiche macroeconomiche in grado di condizionare la formazione di tali coalizioni.